Hard Sayings: The Rhetoric of Christian Orthodoxy in Late Modern Fiction by Haddox, Thomas F. (Thomas Fredrick)
Literature, Religion, and Postsecular Studies
Lori Branch, Series Editor

T h e  O h i O  S T a T e  U n i v e r S i T y  P r e S S   •   C O l U m b U S
Hard Sayings
The Rhetoric of Christian Orthodoxy in 
Late Modern Fiction
Thomas F. Haddox
Copyright © 2013 by The Ohio State University.
all rights reserved.
library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
haddox, Thomas F. (Thomas Fredrick)
hard sayings : the rhetoric of Christian orthodoxy in late modern fiction / Thomas F. 
haddox.
p. cm. — (literature, religion, and postsecular studies)
includes bibliographical references and index.
iSbn 978-0-8142-1208-0 (cloth : alk. paper) — iSbn 978-0-8142-9310-2 (cd)
1. Christianity in literature. 2. O’Connor, Flannery—Criticism and interpretation. 3. 
Spark, muriel—Criticism and interpretation. 4. Updike, John—Criticism and inter-
pretation. 5. Percy, Walker, 1916–1990—Criticism and interpretation. 6. Gordon, mary, 
1949-—Criticism and interpretation. 7. robinson, marilynne—Criticism and interpre-
tation. i. Title. ii. Series: literature, religion, and postsecular studies.
Pn49.h23 2013
813'.54093823—dc23
2012047044
Cover design by Jerry Dorris, authorSupport.com
Text design by Juliet Williams
Type set in Palatino and iTC leawood
Printed by Thomson-Shore, inc.
 The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the ameri-
can national Standard for information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed 
library materials. anSi Z39.48-1992.
9   8   7   6   5   4   3   2   1
Acknowledgments vii
Introduction Christian Orthodoxy and the rhetoric of Fiction 1
Chapter 1  Flannery O’Connor, the irreducibility of belief, and the  
Problem of audience 23
Chapter 2  Catholicism for “really intelligent People”:  
The rhetoric of muriel Spark 50
Chapter 3 John Updike’s rhetoric of Christian american narcissism 85
Chapter 4  Walker Percy’s rhetoric of Time, apocalypse, and the  
modern Predicament  125
Chapter 5  The Uses of Orthodoxy:  
mary Gordon and marilynne robinson 161
Epilogue On belief and academic humility 204
Works Cited  209
Index  218
ContentS

no book is produced alone, and whatever merits this one may possess 
derive in large part from the contributions of friends, colleagues, and fam-
ily members who discussed it with me, offered constructive criticism, and 
encouraged me to persevere. among my colleagues at the University of 
Tennessee, i particularly want to thank misty anderson, Dawn Coleman, 
allen Dunn, amy elias, heather hirschfeld, russel hirst, mark hulsether, 
Keith lyons, Chuck maland, Jeff moody, and Steve Pearson for reading 
sections of the manuscript and taking the project seriously; and Stan Gar-
ner, who as head of the english Department did much to create a congenial 
environment for its completion. 
 looking farther afield, i am grateful to robert Donahoo and avis 
hewitt, who invited me to present some of the material in this book at con-
ferences; to anthony Direnzo and David malone, whose conversations 
with me at conferences proved to be especially helpful; and to marshall 
bruce Gentry, who was very hospitable when i came to milledgeville back 
in the summer of 2004 to examine Flannery O’Connor’s manuscripts. ralph 
Wood, whose work i have followed for several years, has provided, from 
afar, the scholarly standard to which i aspire.
 Two portions of this book have been previously published. a section of 
chapter 1 first appeared, in a different form, under the title “On belief, Con-
flict, and Universality: Flannery O’Connor, Walter benn michaels, Slavoj 
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Žižek,” in Flannery O’Connor in the Age of Terrorism, ed. avis hewitt and 
robert Donahoo (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2010): 231–39. 
Sections of chapter 2 first appeared, in a different form, under the title 
“religion for ‘really intelligent People’: The rhetoric of muriel Spark’s 
Reality and Dreams,” in Religion and Literature 41 (autumn 2009): 43–66. i am 
grateful to both publishers for permission to reprint this material here.
 i am grateful to Sandy Crooms at The Ohio State University Press for 
her enthusiasm and professionalism, to the two anonymous readers who 
evaluated my manuscript and whose suggestions improved it considerably, 
and to maggie Diehl and maggie Smith-beehler for their meticulous copy-
editing. and above all, i am grateful to my wife, honor mcKitrick Wallace, 
and to my children, James, elizabeth, and anthony, for their incomparable 
love and support. i present this work to them with love, zeal, and apologies 
for the time it has consumed. 
The cover of this book is a photograph of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gedächt nis-
kirche in berlin, an image reflective of the multiple ironies surrounding the 
situation of Christianity in the late modern world. The old church, perma-
nently damaged in an air raid in 1943, dates only from 1891 and was named 
not for Jesus Christ or for a Christian saint, but for Kaiser Wilhelm i of Ger-
many. as such, it is a symbol of the often dubious relationship between the 
church and the modern state that used to characterize much of Christen-
dom. The modern concrete, steel, and glass tower to the right is not a secu-
lar office building but the “new” Gedächtniskirche, consecrated in 1961. The 
small cross on its summit is not visible from the angle of this photograph 
and seems, even when visible, like an architectural afterthought—perhaps 
appropriately enough for a building that berliners like to call “der lippen-
stift” (the lipstick). yet even granting these mordant ironies, the building 
remains a Christian house of worship and, through its very imperfections, a 
testament to the difficulties of speaking the hard sayings of Christianity in 
a late modern context.
This is a book about the work of six writers of fiction—Flannery O’Connor, 
muriel Spark, John Updike, Walker Percy, mary Gordon, and marilynne 
robinson—and its relationship to what i call “Christian orthodoxy.” i 
define Christian orthodoxy as the conviction that the central dogmas and 
moral imperatives of historic Christianity are true and binding and that we 
ignore their truth and their claims upon us at our peril. Orthodox Christian 
believers affirm, at a minimum, that there is one God, who has revealed 
himself in the Old and new Testaments; that there are three persons, 
Father, Son, and holy Spirit, in the one God; that Jesus Christ is both God 
and man; that his salvific death and resurrection were real historical events, 
not mythic narratives or metaphors; that those who believe in him and 
repent will have eternal life; and finally, that such believers, commanded to 
live in accord with Jesus’ moral teachings, constitute the Church, the body 
of Christ, wherein salvation is found.1 moreover, orthodox Christians do 
not regard these as merely intellectual propositions but strive continuously 
to make of their belief and their actions an integrated whole. Christian 
orthodoxy, in short, is both a narrative that claims to tell the truth about the 
human predicament and a mode of life lived in obedience to God.
 1. beyond these minimum propositions, of course, orthodox Christians—whether Cath-
olic, Protestant, or eastern Orthodox—disagree considerably about particulars of doctrine 
and practice.
1
Christian Orthodoxy and the 
Rhetoric of Fiction
IntRoduCtIon
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 i consider the novels and short stories discussed in this book as case 
studies in what Wayne booth long ago called “the rhetoric of fiction,” 
investigating how their authors position themselves in relation to Chris-
tian orthodoxy and attempt to persuade their intended audiences of the 
truth and the desirability of its doctrinal claims. The first four writers—
O’Connor, Spark, Updike, and Percy—began their careers in the 1940s 
and 1950s and have to varying degrees identified themselves as advocates 
for Christian orthodoxy. Gordon and robinson, who began writing in 
the 1970s, have a more complicated stance toward Christian orthodoxy—
indeed, Gordon often writes in explicit opposition to it—but they too see 
it as essential to their projects, whether as a force to be challenged in some 
of its particulars or as something to be appropriated for other purposes. 
all six writers, i maintain, have much to teach us about the relationship 
between Christian belief and literary rhetoric in what i call the late modern 
period—a time that begins roughly with the Second World War.
 it would be easy enough—and partially accurate—to explain the 
broad differences between O’Connor, Percy, Spark, and Updike on the one 
hand and Gordon and robinson on the other by referring to the cultural 
upheaval in the West known as “the Sixties,” which temporally divides the 
first group of writers from the second. Such an explanation would, how-
ever, align too neatly with a classification of the first four writers as “mod-
ern” in orientation and the last two as “postmodern.” i maintain that as 
Westerners of the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries, all six writers 
inhabit a late modern world still with us—a condition defined by liberal 
and democratic forms of government, religious toleration, and an expan-
sive cultural pluralism underwritten by an increasingly global capitalism.2 
This world has much in common with the one predicted by sociology’s 
“secularization thesis,” which held that as modernization proceeds, a “dis-
enchantment of the world” (max Weber’s phrase) comes to sever religion 
from the public sphere and to weaken its cultural influence. marx, Weber, 
Freud, and Durkheim all advanced versions of the secularization thesis, 
 2. Part of what makes this period “late modern” is the perception that some political-
economic regimes—mercantilism, fascism, or Soviet Communism, for instance—have been 
decisively discredited, leaving no viable alternatives to finance capitalism. “late modern” 
thus suggests a certain shrinking of horizons, and in this sense it echoes the term “late mod-
ernism,” which Fredric Jameson regards as a disappointing interval between the utopian high 
modernisms of the early twentieth century and the postmodernism that soon supplanted 
them (Singular Modernity 165–66). i too perceive shrunken horizons and disappointment, but 
i define “postmodernism” very differently from Jameson, as one strong current within the 
late modern rather than a phenomenon in its own right. i also mean to evoke the urgency 
intrinsic to Christianity—the sense that ever since Christ’s resurrection, the hour has been 
“late.”
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which, despite their considerable differences, all foresaw religion’s ongoing 
attenuation. it is now a commonplace that in the mid- to late twentieth cen-
tury, the secularization thesis was widely accepted by intellectuals in the 
West, including many who were avowedly Christian.3
 From a contemporary perspective, the secularization thesis has become 
less persuasive. it seems most persuasive when applied to contemporary 
europe and Japan, far less so when one considers the United States and 
latin america, and least convincing when one views the middle east, 
africa, and asia, where an intensification of religious belief and feeling in 
all of the world’s major religions proceeds in apparent defiance of mod-
ernization. important correctives have recently come from Peter berger, 
who insists that “modernity is not necessarily secularizing; it is necessarily 
pluralizing” (23), and especially from Charles Taylor, who in A Secular Age 
rejects “subtraction stories” in which modern human beings have “lost, or 
sloughed off, or liberated themselves from certain earlier, confining hori-
zons, or illusions, or limitations of knowledge” (22) and predicts that “the 
dominant secularization narrative, which tends to blame our religious past 
for many of the woes of our world, will become less plausible over time” 
(770). yet if the portrait i have sketched of the West since the mid-twen-
tieth century sounds like a wholly secular world, this is because i wish to 
emphasize the difference between Christian orthodoxy and the prolifera-
tion of any religious belief or intimation. i would argue that in the contem-
porary United States, for instance, profession of and emotional investment 
in Christianity remain strong, but that many avowed Christians have in fact 
adopted a kind of narcissistic spirituality that does not challenge a funda-
mentally secular order. The contemporary world may not be thoroughly 
secular in Weber’s sense, but it is primarily therapeutic—and therein lies its 
attraction for many.4
 3. See, for instance, harvey Cox’s The Secular City for an exemplary Christian endorse-
ment of secularization—indeed, an argument that secularization continues the demystifi-
cation set in motion when Jewish monotheism divided God from nature and the cosmos 
(15–32).
 4. i use the term “therapeutic” in the sense developed by Philip rieff. The term implies 
narcissism and a disconnection from social endeavors, but i do not mean to equate it with 
“pietism” or “contemplation,” nor do i mean to suggest that all strategies of coping with 
the pains of life are ignoble. rieff locates the origins of “the triumph of the therapeutic” in 
Freud’s work and distinguishes sharply between “our present inwardness” (that is, therapeu-
tic culture) and “ancient faith.” For rieff, “the therapy of all therapies is not to attach oneself 
exclusively to any particular therapy, so that no illusion may survive of some end beyond 
an intensely private sense of well-being to be generated in the living of life itself” (Triumph 
261). in therapeutic culture, religion contributes toward this “private sense of well-being” and 
may even be perceived as necessary to social order. but the question for rieff, as Christopher 
lasch puts it, is “not whether religion was necessary but whether it was true” (228).
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 Such conditions tend to produce neither militant atheism nor even a 
general indifference to religion, but rather what amy hungerford calls 
“postmodern belief.” hungerford describes postmodern belief as a “belief 
in meaninglessness,” a valorization of the form over the content of religion. 
She argues that american literary culture since 1960 is strongly marked by 
this “belief without meaning [which] becomes both a way to maintain reli-
gious belief rather than critique its institutions and a way to buttress the 
authority of the literature that seeks to imagine such belief” (xiii). Whether 
embraced consciously or not, postmodern belief works to reconcile indi-
vidual religious feelings with the pluralism of american life. it does so 
largely by stressing the nonsemantic, aesthetic aspects of religious practice 
and even of religious language—striving, like the new Critical poem that 
hungerford considers its analogue, to “be” more than to “mean” (xviii).
 as a description of a broad swath of recent american literature and its 
relationship to belief, hungerford’s account is convincing, and her read-
ings of texts by writers such as J. D. Salinger, allen Ginsberg, Don Delillo, 
and Toni morrison are often illuminating. my quarrel is not with her liter-
ary history but with her evaluation of “postmodern belief” and its textual 
exempla. While hungerford perceives in her chosen literary texts and in 
the culture that nourishes them “the very richness and success” of post-
modern belief (xv)—even arguing that it is “in good measure responsible 
for the continuing relevance of american literary culture since the 1960s” 
(xxi)—i perceive instead the proliferation of an eclectic but vapid “spiritu-
ality” that may pay lip service to some features of Christian orthodoxy but 
empties out the radical specificity of its truth claims. against hungerford, 
i maintain that to take Christian orthodoxy seriously means to entertain (if 
not necessarily to accept) the primacy of truth over desire, utility, and cus-
tom, and to remain open to the content as well as the forms of Christian 
belief.
 in a pluralistic society, writers with orthodox Christian commitments 
will try to anticipate the commitments and desires of their intended audi-
ences, to speak to their own historical and cultural situatedness. They 
will neither neglect nor minimize the narrative dimension of Christian-
ity, its unfolding in time as a story of redemption. yet they will not proffer 
their arguments only as a set of aesthetic or therapeutic satisfactions—in 
attempting to persuade, they will insist, in ralph Wood’s words, on “the 
premise that the Christian Story is absolutely and definitively true, not only 
for me and my kind, but potentially for every human being” (Literature vii). 
because the six writers i examine take Christian orthodoxy seriously, even 
when they do not endorse all of its propositions, their arguments are, even 
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to many sympathetic readers, “hard sayings.”5 my task will be to evaluate 
their claims to persuasive authority in a climate in which the value of per-
suasion itself has been called into question.
 i write as a roman Catholic Christian, and the disproportionate weight 
given to Catholic writers reflects my own commitments and scholarly 
interests, though it also reflects the fact that, for whatever reason, more 
avowedly Catholic than avowedly Protestant fiction writers of literary 
merit have addressed such questions since 1945.6 because i maintain that 
Christian orthodoxy and reason are compatible, i am opposed to the wide-
spread notion that theology is an idiosyncratic and personal endeavor that 
should be excluded in principle from public deliberation and from other 
forms of inquiry.7 accordingly, i reject both the positivism of much contem-
porary scientific thought, which sees religious and metaphysical discourse 
as irrelevant at best and pernicious at worst (as in the “new atheism” of 
richard Dawkins or Daniel Dennett); and the romantic irrationalism of 
much that goes by the name “postmodernism” (for instance, the work of 
Jean-François lyotard or Gilles Deleuze).8 These two currents of thought, 
however ostensibly opposed, in fact complement each other well—as 
seen in those strands of libertarian thought that yoke together a positivist 
understanding of economic behavior with a commitment to the primacy 
 5. my title, of course, alludes to the Gospel passage in which some of Jesus’ disciples, 
hearing him teach that those who eat his flesh and drink his blood will have eternal life, 
respond, “This saying is hard; who can accept it?” and then abandon him (John 6:60). This 
remains a “hard saying” even within Christianity, as the history of theological dispute about 
transubstantiation reveals.
 6. This fact is, in some respects, surprising. Walker Percy has, in an amusing section of 
Lost in the Cosmos called “Why Writers Drink,” proposed that painters and sculptors are the 
“Catholics” among artists, while writers are the “Protestants.” language, less material than 
painting or sculpture, focuses solely on the word (or Word) but lends itself more readily to 
gnostic temptations and distortions (147–48). The images produced by painters and sculp-
tors, moreover, can be viewed as possessing an implicit sacramental force (a Catholic view) 
or as temptations to idolatry (a Protestant one). When i consider my own relationship to the 
works that i examine here, i have to conclude that my theology is Catholic, but my aesthetic 
sensibility is Protestant.
 7. See, for instance, John rawls’s Political Liberalism. even when not explicitly acknowl-
edged as a principle, this exclusion informs a good deal of contemporary opinion in Western 
societies about the relationship (or lack thereof) between religion and public life.
 8. i will have more to say about postmodernism, but for now i would insist that the 
most common slogan associated with it—lyotard’s “incredulity toward metanarratives” 
(xxiv)—makes no sense. To be conscious of the contingency of one’s beliefs, of the possibil-
ity that they could be different or could change, does not imply that one holds the beliefs 
less firmly, that one is less convinced of their truth. One can only become incredulous toward 
one metanarrative by replacing it with another; a general incredulity toward metanarratives 
is impossible.
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and unanswerability of desire, often rendered polemically as “freedom” or 
“choice.” moreover, both of these currents work to discredit acts of per-
suasion. The first suspects that facts speak for themselves and that persua-
sion always amounts to coercion, demagoguery, or seduction; the second 
resents what it considers persuasion’s pretense of objectivity, as if human 
beings could ever have sufficient distance from their desires to consider 
them in the cold light of someone else’s argument, or would consent to do 
so if they could. both, in short, are suspicious of ordinary human beings’ 
capacity to listen and to make competent judgments, and both—whether 
cynically, joyously, or unwittingly—endorse a way of life centered upon 
bread and circuses: experts should run the world, and one should trust 
them implicitly in order to pursue one’s desires without worry and with 
maximum liberty.9 in a world so ordered, religion can be only a private 
matter of therapy and self-fashioning.
 if, however, Christianity proclaims the truth—as O’Connor, Percy, 
Spark, and Updike affirm, and as Gordon and robinson are prepared to 
consider—then these writers’ fiction confronts a central problem of rhet-
oric, which richard Weaver sums up in a question: “[i]f truth alone is 
not enough to persuade men, what else remains that can be legitimately 
added?” (15). One might reply that Weaver’s question is misguided, that 
to pursue the truth as one does in philosophy and theology should suf-
fice. Perhaps even to pose such a question with respect to fiction shows, 
as Simone Weil once suggested, that humans have returned “to the age of 
Protagoras and the Sophists, the age when the art of persuasion—whose 
modern equivalent is advertising slogans, publicity, propaganda meetings, 
the press, the cinema, and radio—took the place of thought and controlled 
the fate of cities and accomplished coups d’état” (64). Plato’s desire to ban-
ish the poets in The Republic is only the earliest extant attempt to draw a 
line between imaginative writing and philosophy, and even he has Socrates 
call the opposition between the two “ancient” (396). moreover, it cannot 
be denied that many Christians have shared his desire, while others have 
 9. my understanding of the terms “persuasion” and “judgment” is influenced by bryan 
Garsten, and i will cite here his definitions: “Persuasion in the strict sense identifies a way of 
influencing that is neither manipulation nor pandering. . . . by judgment i mean the mental 
activity of responding to particular situations in a way that draws upon our sensations, be-
liefs, and emotions without being dictated by them in any way reducible to a simple rule” 
(7). Garsten is interested primarily in the role of persuasion in democratic politics; he wishes 
to preserve a space for it, against those theorists of deliberative democracy who, following 
rawls, believe that political arguments in a democracy must be rooted in a shared conception 
of public reason. it should be clear that from the standpoint of political philosophy, i agree 
with those who hold that religious discourse and argument have a legitimate place in the 
public sphere—but the primary thrust of my argument is about religious persuasion in and 
of itself, rather than its possible political applications.
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endorsed imaginative writing only when it functions as transparent alle-
gory or dogmatic exposition—in short, when it is aesthetically bad accord-
ing to contemporary literary standards. On the other hand, readers who 
value aesthetic complexity often consider it incompatible with didacticism: 
as marian e. Crowe puts it, “even people who don’t mind being preached 
to in church, object to it strongly when they sit down to read a novel” (2). 
Given these pitfalls, why turn to fiction at all—particularly when philoso-
phers and theologians who argue for an authentically Christian and his-
torically grounded understanding of both reason and faith have done 
important work? alasdair macintyre, for instance, has argued (above all, 
in Whose Justice? Which Rationality?) that the tradition initiated by aristotle 
and subsequently enlarged and revised by augustine and aquinas has con-
tinued to maintain its explanatory power and capacity for self-correction in 
the face of less coherent, less persuasive challenges from the younger tradi-
tion of liberalism. Doesn’t the consideration of fiction in this context merely 
muddy the waters?
 although i find macintyre’s argument compelling, i am aware that rela-
tively few people will ever engage it, that in our contemporary moment 
most who struggle with questions of belief and rationality do not turn to 
philosophy or academic theology for aid. moreover, i fear that too many 
are not particularly interested in truth—that even if they have never read 
William James or richard rorty, they, like rorty, would endorse the James-
ian view that truth is “a compliment paid to sentences that seem to be pay-
ing their way” (rorty, Consequences xxv), rather than something that exists 
irrespective of our emotional investment in it.10 To this extent, philosophy 
and theology are already at a disadvantage because of their traditional 
insistence that truth—which necessarily excludes and divides—is an object 
of primary importance. Postmodern belief would regard such claims as 
unwarranted arrogance, affirming instead only those philosophers or theo-
logians who abjure or relativize any notion of truth.
 Fiction, on the other hand, reaches a wide audience and can have great 
persuasive power. indeed, fiction in the broadest sense seems inescapable 
in argument, for philosophers, theologians, and Jesus himself have had fre-
quent recourse to it, whether in the form of allegory, counterfactuals, or 
 10. rorty of course recognizes the ironic nature of such a claim—is it “true,” after all, 
that truth is only a compliment?—but refuses to argue with those who challenge it. instead, 
he wants to seduce his critics to this point of view. Perhaps, then, it is more accurate to say 
not that many are uninterested in truth but that, like rorty, they inoculate themselves from 
challenges to their own “truths” by labeling them preferences—and then maintaining that 
preferences cannot be questioned, because tolerance demands it. here again persuasion as 
such is precluded, and the effort to influence people is redescribed as either coercion or se-
duction.
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other protofictional narratives. Jesus’ parables are the obvious example, but 
even Plato, often understandably viewed as the enemy of rhetoric, finds 
the fictive and rhetorical mode of allegory useful for his arguments in the 
Phaedrus and The Republic. The popularity of such novels as The Da Vinci 
Code and the Left Behind series is only the most recent evidence of fiction’s 
ability to provoke religious argument and even to serve as surrogate the-
ology—sometimes despite factual errors, commitment to false premises, 
flawed reasoning, or bad faith on the part of the author. and even if a 
reader begins from something like a rortyan standpoint, distinguished fic-
tion might nevertheless lead readers to love truth for its own sake. (That 
the work of the six writers examined in this book is more aesthetically dis-
tinguished than the productions of Jenkins and lahaye or Dan brown i 
take to be an uncontroversial claim.)
 Some of the most interesting recent arguments in narrative theory, to be 
sure, have bracketed any connection between fiction and truth, even when 
they have not invoked aesthetic worth as the alternative to truth. richard 
Walsh, for instance, describes “fictionality” as a distinct use of rhetoric 
(rather than a set of generic or formal features), and the “age-old problem 
of fiction’s claim upon our attention” as “the problem of reconciling fiction-
ality with relevance” (16). readers find fiction compelling neither because 
they mistake it for a set of propositional truths—after all, most sentences 
in novels, referring to nonexistent people and events, are “false”—nor 
because they view it as an unproblematic imitation of the real world, but 
rather because they perceive its relevance to their interests. i find Walsh’s 
argument suggestive but potentially misleading in its implication that rel-
evance and truth are so neatly separable. (i am tempted to reply: Truth is 
always relevant.)11 he is correct to maintain that “[f]iction does not achieve 
relevance globally, at one remove, through some form of analogical think-
ing, but incrementally, through the implication of various cognitive inter-
ests or values that are not contingent upon accepting the propositional 
 11. For the same reason, i am hesitant to endorse fully nicholas boyle’s very different 
argument that a “Catholic approach to literature” would affirm that “[l]iterature is language 
free of instrumental purpose, and it seeks to tell the truth” (125). much turns, no doubt, on 
the precise resonance of the phrase “instrumental purpose.” For boyle, “[b]oth sacred and 
secular literature . . . do not talk about the things of this world as, directly or indirectly, ca-
pable of fulfilling the desires of the speaker of the writer but talk about them in a way that 
Kant, who had something like this insight . . . called ‘disinterested’” (125). Seeking to tell the 
truth may not be “instrumental” in that it will often not fulfill one’s own all-too distorted 
and self-destructive appetites. but if boyle means merely that in reading literary texts, read-
ers may come to love the truth, without respect to how well it approves their cravings for 
power, then i am happy to concur. i would only add that having the right relation to the 
truth must be a matter of urgency, and that one should not simply reject exhortations to the 
truth on the grounds that they might be described as “instrumental.”
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truth of the utterance itself and upon the deployment, investment, and 
working through of those interests in narrative form” (30). The writers i 
examine certainly affirm particular truths that do not depend upon accept-
ing the reality of the characters and the events they depict—which is what 
i understand Walsh to mean by “the propositional truth of the utterance 
itself.” moreover, these writes’ efforts will succeed only to the degree that 
they establish these truths, through context-specific appeals, as relevant to 
readers. While the time that elapses in reading does preclude an “analogical 
thinking” that establishes relevance immediately, readers can and do make 
general statements about the truth claims of fiction as they read, statements 
which can later be corrected or refined. Taking Walsh at his word, then, 
when he holds that “a pragmatic approach to fictionality . . . does not, and 
should not, conflict with what we currently do as readers and critics” (37), 
i see no reason not to investigate both the persuasive strategies that these 
writers employ and their fidelity to the truths that they communicate.
 as benedict anderson has suggested, the novel is an ideal vehicle for 
the presentation of argument in a secularized milieu, more congenial to the 
sensibilities of educated contemporary readers than allegory or parable. as 
“a device for the presentation of simultaneity in ‘homogenous, empty time,’ 
or a complex gloss on the word ‘meanwhile’” (25), the novel invokes an 
“imagined community” that embeds and helps to explain its characters even 
as it generates conflicts among them.12 Just as what binds millions of amer-
icans into a single nation is less their shared intimacy or their commitment 
to a single set of beliefs than their simultaneous existence in a historically 
defined place, characters in novels interact and argue with each other with-
out the harmonizing force of a single worldview—even when the author’s 
own beliefs are evident. For this reason a theorist of genre such as mikhail 
bakhtin can view the novel as essentially dialogic and “unfinalizable” 
(68). i am happy to agree if “unfinalizable” means that beliefs expressed in 
novels are essentially contestable rather than “equally valid”—a distinction 
that bakhtin’s admirers do not always seem to recognize.
 even more than from Walsh, anderson, or bakhtin, however, i take my 
critical bearings from booth, who never lost sight of the banal but radical 
fact that works of fiction, like all language, are communications between 
human beings. Communication in good faith requires an effort to under-
stand that cannot be evaded by appeals to the “text itself” (as in many 
twentieth-century formalisms), to the ostensibly self-undermining prop-
erties of language (as in received accounts of deconstruction), or to some 
form of biological, historical, or ideological determinism. The bracketing of 
 12. The phrase “homogenous, empty time” is Walter benjamin’s.
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authorial intention may perhaps be warranted when a reader focuses nar-
rowly upon aesthetic judgment, though even then i have my doubts. but 
the mere fact that we exclude our own writing from such proscriptions, 
believing our persuasive efforts to be freely undertaken and worthwhile, 
suggests that we ought to extend the same courtesy to fiction writers. 
Unless one is willing to commit to a programmatic and contradictory anti-
humanism when confronting writing with persuasive intention (and it is 
striking how inconsistent even those who claim to do so become when 
push comes to shove—witness the later career of michel Foucault), one 
must begin by taking writers at their word, respecting their efforts to com-
municate on their own terms, and acknowledging whatever clarifications 
they offer in commentary on their own work. as booth makes clear in The 
Company We Keep, one’s “coductions,” in which one judges the intentions 
and merits of individual authors and works, will be “implicitly a compari-
son between the always complex experience we have had in its presence 
and what we have known before” (71). Such a stance does not rule out the 
possibility that a given piece of writing may be inept, its purposes inco-
herent or dishonest, or its author a victim of false consciousness. but the 
burden of proof for such claims is on readers; it cannot be waved away by 
recourse to general theories about language, subjectivity, or ideology whose 
premises are in principle unfalsifiable.
 The writers examined here take for granted that in a world of secular, 
homogenous, and empty time, many in their intended audiences will not 
subscribe to their beliefs. and indeed, as writers of self-consciously liter-
ary fiction, they appeal to an educated audience more likely than the gen-
eral population to live secular lives and to believe in the desirability (if not 
the inevitability) of secularization. They do not conclude, however, that the 
effort to persuade through fiction is futile. instead, they present their beliefs 
forthrightly, in all their urgent contestability. Perhaps none is as explicit and 
thorough in the presentation of her beliefs as O’Connor, whose letters and 
essays, collected in The Habit of Being and Mystery and Manners, provide for 
many of her critics the definitive statement of how her fiction is to be inter-
preted. but even for those who are less explicit and whose concerns range 
afield from the strictly theological (such as Updike, Spark, and Gordon), the 
positive content of their Christian beliefs, rooted in the specific history, lit-
urgies, and dogmas of Christianity, can be determined.
 The specificity of these practices and beliefs ultimately derive from 
the centrality of revelation to Christianity—the claim that what is to be 
believed has been revealed by God through prophets; the inspiration of 
sacred scripture; and divine interventions in history such as the selection of 
abraham and his descendants as a Chosen People, the exodus of the isra-
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elites from egypt, or the incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection of Jesus. 
Protestants and Catholics have traditionally agreed that whether reason 
contradicts or complements Christian orthodoxy, it cannot provide entirely 
sufficient grounds for Christian belief; only the authority of revelation 
can.13 The importance of revelation to these six writers’ fictive projects—
often only implicitly expressed, but essential nonetheless—is rhetorically a 
double-edged sword. On the one hand, the ability to state one’s beliefs in 
positive, succinct form constitutes a rhetorical strength. against the thin-
ness of many secular systems of belief and ethics—which, in my view, min-
imize the necessity of conflict by taking too much for granted that human 
beings want to be well disposed toward each other—a belief in revelation 
produces forthright, irreducibly contestable propositions.14 (either Jesus is 
the son of God who takes away the sins of the world, or he wasn’t, and no 
amount of tolerance for Christian or non-Christian beliefs changes the fact 
that the question of who Jesus is/was is a truth claim, not an aesthetic pref-
erence.) On the other hand, if belief is founded upon revelation, then per-
suasion becomes much harder when the intended audience is not already 
open to the possibility that belief does not necessarily contradict reason. 
even if many would agree in theory with Paul Giles’s reminder that “[p]ure 
skepticism can never be attained, any more than pure reason or pure inno-
cence can,” such a reminder might do little more than suggest to secularist 
 13. When martin luther famously proclaimed that “reason is the Devil’s greatest 
whore,” he seems to have meant that reason, while useful for the purposes of human knowl-
edge, is a positive obstacle to knowledge of God, for it encourages the belief that one may 
achieve salvation entirely through one’s own efforts. Catholicism has traditionally had a less 
hostile opinion of the relationship between reason and faith, but its official teaching maintains 
that while reason may suffice to justify theism, it cannot suffice to justify belief in the dogmas 
of Christianity. as the most recent Catechism of the Catholic Church puts it: “What moves us to 
believe is not the fact that revealed truths appear as true and intelligible in the light of our 
natural reason: we believe ‘because of the authority of God himself who reveals them, who 
can neither deceive nor be deceived.’” and again: “Though faith is above reason, there can 
never be any real discrepancy between faith and reason. Since the same God who reveals 
mysteries and infuses faith has bestowed the light of reason on the human mind, God cannot 
deny himself, nor can truth ever contradict truth” (48, 49).
 14. many contemporary versions of pragmatism and cosmopolitanism, i would argue, 
fall under this category. Their emphasis on practice doesn’t, of course, deny that beliefs mo-
tivate people, but it greatly underestimates the degree to which beliefs matter. Kwame an-
thony appiah, for instance, points out that “we can live in harmony without agreeing on 
underlying values” and that “we can find ourselves in conflict when we do agree on values” 
(78). he is of course correct, but to make this argument presupposes that the primary good 
should be harmony. There is much to be said for such a live-and-let-live attitude; it is even 
compatible with much of the ethical thrust of Christianity. it cannot be, however, the sine qua 
non for Christians, because it does not admit the primacy of revelation. The misfit’s claim (in 
O’Connor’s “a Good man is hard to Find”) that Jesus “thown [sic] everything off balance” 
(27) is worth remembering here. balance and harmony are not necessarily Christian virtues, 
as Slavoj Žižek has reminded us (Fragile 122–23).
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readers what Giles calls “the discrepancy” between the “lucidity” of the 
“rational mind” and “every form of religious conditioning or assertion of 
religious truth” (19). Christian orthodox writers addressing a wider public 
therefore seldom rely on exhortations to the revealed word of God alone; 
they must employ other arguments, and various traditions within Chris-
tianity on the relationship between revelation and reason make possible a 
range of rhetorical approaches.15 The difficulty, it would seem, is how to 
employ strategies that do not initially depend on an appeal to revelation, yet 
do not ultimately contradict its primacy.
 a related difficulty has to do with historical context—or, put differ-
ently, the tension between the particularity of an act of persuasion and 
the universality of the claims asserted. a writer who proclaims the truth 
of Christianity might tailor rhetorical strategies to particular audiences—
one thinks of Paul, a Jew among Jews and a Greek among Greeks, or of 
augustine, accepting that Christians have something to learn from classical 
rhetoric as long as they don’t cross the line into sophistry—but insofar as 
he considers his beliefs to be true and therefore universal, there can be no 
exclusions of anyone on principle. yet because an intended audience is his-
torically, geographically, or rhetorically delimited, there is always the risk 
that the appeal to that audience will undermine the belief’s integrity. This 
risk is compounded when the vehicle for persuasion is a work of fiction 
and therefore bound up with culturally variable narratives and histories. 
The “transcendental signified” of any belief system is ahistorical, while 
the individual narratives that are the raw materials of fiction are tempo-
ral. Christianity, which affirms both an eternal, transcendent God and the 
teleology of God’s involvement with human beings (most strikingly in the 
incarnation), must negotiate both the temporal and the atemporal, account-
ing for its own enmeshment in the stream of human history. yet the more 
writers invoke the particularities of their time and place, or resort to auto-
 15. in presenting his own position on these matters, Giles mostly avoids definite state-
ments about the validity of religious claims but reveals his own secular commitment to 
“demystification” clearly enough. American Catholic Arts and Fictions seeks “to reveal how a 
secularized form of religious consciousness has become implanted within twentieth-century 
american art” (21), in ways that often elude detection. The “lucidity” of the “rational mind” 
thus proves itself through the deconstruction of claims to authority. at best, Giles suggests, 
Catholicism performs its own demystifying function when it confronts other (primarily po-
litical) claims of authority: “The culture of Catholicism deconstructs the more celebrated 
american ideologies . . . to reveal them as provisional systems; Catholic arts and fictions in 
turn deconstruct the theological and philosophical bases of Catholicism . . . but the critical im-
pulse of deconstruction in turn illuminates the fictional status of all these aesthetic creations, 
reconstituting them as inventions of the human imagination at particular times and places 
within history” (183). That it might provide access to a truth that is more than “provisional” 
and “aesthetic” is not seriously considered.
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biographical explanations for their own beliefs, the more idiosyncratic their 
beliefs might seem.
 Perhaps the first Christian writer to ponder the rhetorical problems 
involved in writing about belief within a secular context was blaise Pas-
cal. earlier proselytizers, such as Paul and augustine, could assume that 
their intended audience already shared a sense of the sacred (hence the 
enormous energy augustine expends in The City of God arguing against the 
gods of pagan rome, and in other works against Christian heresies). Pascal, 
however, reflects on the difficulties of arguments about belief when one’s 
audience includes agnostics. he proposes a strategy for how to craft argu-
ments that do not begin with revelation but do not preclude it: “[W]e must 
begin by showing that religion is not contrary to reason; that it is venerable, 
to inspire respect for it; then we must make it lovable, to make good men 
hope it is true; finally, we must prove it is true” (205).
 if the truth of Christianity is guaranteed by its divine revelation, then 
it follows that making this revelation explicit would be the final step of an 
argument on its behalf—that a potential convert could make this leap only 
after having been persuaded of its reasonableness and desirability. This 
task would be far more difficult than the first, as Pascal perceived it to be 
even long before marx, Darwin, or Freud. For Pascal understands the ear-
lier tasks of persuasion, however necessary, as steps that must finally be 
aufgehoben (to use the anachronistic hegelian term) in the “foolish” assent 
to Christian revelation:
Our religion is wise and foolish. Wise, because it is the most learned and 
the most founded on miracles, prophecies, etc. Foolish, because it is not all 
this which makes us belong to it. This makes us, indeed, condemn those 
who do not belong to it; but it does not cause belief in those who belong to 
it. . . . and so Saint Paul, who came with wisdom and signs, says that he 
has come neither with wisdom nor with signs; for he came to convert. but 
those who come only to convince can say that they come with wisdom and 
signs. (277)
The distinction between “convincing” and “converting” that Pascal iden-
tifies here marks the acid test of religious persuasion, and it is difficult 
to reconcile the first passage i quoted (with its methodical progression of 
argumentative steps) with the exasperation toward argument implicit in 
the second passage. how, then, does one move from convincing to convert-
ing, and what rhetorical strategies does one employ in this effort?
 For all six of the writers discussed below, irony is crucial to bridging 
the gap. “irony” here should not be understood primarily as a steely-eyed 
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fatalism that flirts with tragedy, corrodes any positive values, or leads 
only to a perpetually renewed (and frequently bogus) humility in the face 
of ethical and epistemological confusion. rather, it is above all an invita-
tion—to use booth’s helpful metaphor, an invitation to leap toward a 
new view “that is intended as wiser, wittier, more compassionate, subtler, 
truer, more moral, or at least less obviously vulnerable to further irony” 
than one’s former view (Rhetoric of Irony 10). Some, such as O’Connor, 
assume the hostility of their audience and take for granted that the invi-
tation will wound—that one must become a victim before (or at the same 
time as) one is admitted to the newer perspective. Others, such as Spark 
and Updike, make of the invitation a form of complicity between author 
and reader, wagering that much will depend on whether they have guessed 
their intended audience’s predispositions and desires correctly. yet for all of 
these writers, irony proves stable—it does not initiate an infinite regress in 
which no truths or bedrock values can be plausibly asserted or defended. 
What booth states of irony in general is true of all six writers’ approach to 
it, though their methods and degrees of intended “victimization” are very 
different: “[W]e need no very extensive survey of ironic examples to dis-
cover . . . that the building of amiable communities is often far more impor-
tant than the exclusion of naïve victims. . . . The author i infer behind the 
false words is my kind of man, because . . . he grants me a kind of wisdom; 
he assumes that he does not have to spell out the shared and secret truths 
on which my reconstruction is to be built” (28). This double movement—on 
the one hand, an exclusion that may involve an appeal to elitism (an appeal 
particularly evident in Spark); on the other, the building up of an affirma-
tive and potentially unlimited community of the like-minded—is, of course, 
intrinsic to Christianity itself, for the God who divides the sheep from the 
goats and emphasizes the narrowness of the straight path nevertheless 
wills the salvation of all human beings (1 Timothy 2:3–4). When such irony 
succeeds as an appeal, it probably does so in part because it accommodates 
both the exclusions of any actual community and the universality (that is, 
the truth) of that community’s beliefs.
 There is also, however, a more existential dimension to the irony that 
these six writers use—a sense that only an ironic approach can account for 
the messiness of the world and thus reach a contemporary audience effec-
tively. even a cursory glance at Western history during the twentieth cen-
tury suggests not only the enormous importance that irony assumed as 
an aesthetic concept but also the tendency to invoke it as a coping mecha-
nism for the traumas of modernity. arguments against Christianity, after 
all, found much apparent support in the horrors of the early to mid-twen-
tieth century—two world wars, the nazi attempt to annihilate the Jews, 
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the atrocities that took place in Stalin’s Soviet Union, and the dropping of 
atomic bombs on cities in Japan—which raised the question of theodicy 
in unprecedented ways. indeed, it has always been plausible to construct 
an account of modernism in the arts that places doubt about God and the 
social orders that he had allegedly blessed at center stage. Seminal mod-
ernist moments, texts, and themes would thus include Stephen Daedalus’s 
revolt against Catholicism in Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, 
Freud’s deep and intractable pessimism about religion in Civilization and 
Its Discontents, the inaccessibility of divine law in Kafka’s The Trial, and 
brett ashley’s affirmation in hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises that “not to 
be a bitch” is “what we have instead of God” (245).
 On the other hand—and partially in response to these developments—it 
is equally plausible to see modernism as a return to the primacy of belief 
after a long trek through the wilderness of positivist science and its mon-
strous offspring, global capitalism. nietzsche, however scornful toward 
Christianity his work may have been, was in this camp, looking forward 
to a revival of self-conscious paganism that would reject the bourgeois 
capitalism and slavish, atavistic religions of the last men. D. h. lawrence 
elaborated similar ideas in his novel The Plumed Serpent, suggesting that the 
modern world might rediscover more primordial and vital beliefs in the 
religion of the aztecs. The key figure here, however, was T. S. eliot, who 
also marks a decisive rupture within the “believing” wing of modernism. 
after beginning his career along vaguely nietzschean lines, enthusiastically 
applauding Stravinsky’s Le sacre du printemps and appealing to compara-
tive mythology in The Waste Land, eliot threw his allegiance to Christian-
ity, shocking many of his admirers in 1927 with his declaration that he was 
now “classicist in literature, royalist in politics, and anglo-Catholic in reli-
gion” (ix). by virtue of his visibility alone, eliot probably did more than 
anyone else to make Christian orthodoxy compelling to anxious moderns—
yet he appealed to irony no less than did those moderns who rejected 
Christianity. his literary career both paralleled and helped to influence 
a revival of religious writing, especially among Catholic writers. indeed, 
were i to conduct a comprehensive survey of major Western writers dur-
ing the age of high modernism (say, from 1910 to 1955) who either advocate 
orthodox Christian beliefs or engage seriously with them, i would have 
to deal not only with eliot but also with G. K. Chesterton, Charles Péguy, 
Georges bernanos, Graham Greene, François mauriac, Czeslaw milosz, 
Caroline Gordon, allen Tate, evelyn Waugh, W. h. auden, C. S. lewis, J. F. 
Powers, robert lowell, nikos Kazantzakis, and albert Camus.
 yet while O’Connor, Percy, Spark, and Updike first emerge in a period 
defined by aesthetic modernism, the bulk of their work was published 
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during and after the 1960s, when the banners of postmodernism (whether 
defined primarily in aesthetic or epistemological terms) begin to fly. in the 
most common understanding of the term, postmodernism is even more 
committed to irony than modernism was: irony drives the “incredulity 
toward metanarratives” that lyotard spoke of, undermining all metaphys-
ics, but generating, instead of the angst, despair, or religious faith that were 
its most frequent effects under modernism, a breezy joy, a vague sense of 
liberation. Given such a definition of postmodernism, Christian orthodoxy 
becomes less plausible, even as the specific aspects of modernity that once 
seemed to challenge it recede or lose their initially traumatizing charac-
ter. Perhaps it should not be surprising that writers who remain commit-
ted to Christian orthodoxy in such times increasingly present themselves as 
embattled and self-consciously contrarian.
 yet i do not view the ascendancy of postmodernism as a catastrophe, 
and i do not measure the rhetorical efficacy of Christian writers in post-
modern conditions primarily by their degree of crankiness. instead, i main-
tain that this usual understanding of postmodernism is wrong—or, at the 
very least, unwilling to embrace its implications fully. as Peter augustine 
lawler has suggested, postmodernism is best understood as “human reflec-
tion on the failure of the modern project to eradicate human mystery and 
misery and to bring history to an end” (1). The antifoundationalism that 
many conflate with postmodernism is, on the other hand, “really hyper-
modernism, or the exaggeration to the point of caricature of the modern 
impulse to self-creation” (2). i align myself not just with lawler but with 
a group of thinkers from romano Guardini to ralph Wood who hold that 
“postmodernism” affords a propitious opportunity to speak and hear 
Christian orthodoxy, and to do so in relative freedom both from the cul-
tural accretions that often distorted its message in the past (leading to, for 
instance, such phenomena as German Kulturprotestantismus) and from the 
increasingly discredited “modern” imperative to master and remake the 
world and human beings. Guardini’s evocation of the conditions obtain-
ing at “the end of the modern world”—a passage which was excerpted by 
Percy in the epigraph to his 1966 novel The Last Gentleman—remains power-
ful and, i believe, persuasive:
everywhere within the modern world [the Christian] found ideas and val-
ues whose Christian origin was clear, but which were declared the com-
mon property of all. how could he trust a situation like that? but the new 
age will do away with these ambivalences; the new age will declare that 
the secularized facets of Christianity are sentimentalities. This declaration 
will clear the air. The world to come will be filled with animosity and dan-
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ger, but it will be a world open and clean. This danger within the new 
world will also have its cleansing effect upon the new Christian attitude, 
which in a special way must possess both trust and courage.
 The character and the conduct of coming Christian life will reveal 
itself especially through its old dogmatic roots. Christianity will once 
again need to prove itself deliberately as a faith which is not self-evident; 
it will be forced to distinguish itself more sharply from a dominantly non-
Christian ethos. . . . The absolute experiencing of dogma will, i believe, 
make men feel more sharply the direction of life and the meaning of exis-
tence itself. (105–6)
 What Guardini calls “the new Christian attitude” centers upon the 
claim, accessible only through revelation, that God’s salvific work is gra-
tuitous and—as ralph Wood often reminds us—scandalous, in the original 
sense of the word.16 it can be reduced neither to a secularized ethics nor to 
a do-it-yourself spirituality. against the backdrop of a discredited moder-
nity, the electrifying character of Christian tidings is all the more evident. 
and those who wrestle with it honestly—including those who, like Gordon 
and robinson, cannot fully embrace orthodox doctrine and practice—tes-
tify to its power. The irony proper to such tidings is not only affirmative in 
booth’s sense of creating a community—it is also so in the joyful conviction 
that the world, however imbued with evil it may be, is already redeemed.
 in constructing this book, i have faced two recurring difficulties. On the 
one hand, there are the unavoidable problems of space and focus: because 
several of the writers discussed here have had extremely prolific careers 
(the published works of Spark and Updike, for instance, span roughly half 
a century), i have not been able to engage with all of their work in detail. 
On the other hand, because previous critics have read these writers through 
varied theological lenses, i am also wary of repeating familiar interpreta-
tions. i have tried to evade these difficulties not only by hewing closely 
to my focus on the rhetorical strategies of each writer, drawing compari-
sons and contrasts when appropriate, but also by focusing on works that 
are both representative of an author’s career as a whole and, in my view, 
unjustly neglected. The chapter on Updike, for instance, examines Couples 
and the rabbit angstrom tetralogy only in passing but proffers extended 
close readings of The Poorhouse Fair and In the Beauty of the Lilies. in the case 
 16. “Scandalous” derives from the Greek word skandalon, a snare or stumbling block. 
Guardini suggests that the cooptation of Christian “ideas and values” by secular Western 
culture has obscured the scandalous character of Christianity, its claim to be a truth that is 
nonetheless not “self-evident,” a truth that will have to be proven “deliberately,” despite its 
implausibility, but which can be confirmed only in the “absolute experiencing of dogma.”
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of writers whose corpus is smaller, such as O’Connor, i have simply chosen 
the works that seem to me best suited to highlight the authors’ distinct rhe-
torical appeals.
 Chapter 1 begins by considering the fundamental impasse that has 
always governed interpretation of Flannery O’Connor’s work. because 
O’Connor was so explicit both about her intended audience of secular-
ists and about her fictional aims, critics of her work have been divided 
into those who see her as a prophet and those who, rejecting her religious 
vision, seek either to redeem her work for twentieth-century liberalism or 
to castigate its alleged cruelty and antihumanism. after considering my 
own exasperation before this impasse, i argue that the impasse will per-
sist, for it reveals that belief itself—whether in Christianity or in some other 
set of commitments—is inescapable, and that O’Connor’s facility in fore-
grounding this fact is perhaps her most compelling strength as a writer. i 
then suggest that O’Connor intends her obsessive violence in large part as 
an index of human freedom, which her own Catholic version of Christian 
orthodoxy affirms. Precisely because intimations of freedom in a literary 
work must seem counterintuitive and self-contradictory—a fictional char-
acter, after all, is by definition not free—violence connotes freedom because 
it suggests a breaking of the chains of realist necessity and plausibility. 
The “freest” act of all thus becomes the acceptance of God’s grace, in spite 
of the considerable obstacles to its accomplishment. Taking up three of 
O’Connor’s most celebrated stories, “a Good man is hard to Find,” “The 
artificial nigger,” and “Judgement [sic] Day,” i contend that O’Connor 
more successfully dramatizes this nexus of violence, human freedom, and 
Christian belief in the first and the third of these stories than in the second.
 Chapter 2 examines muriel Spark, a convert to Catholicism and in some 
respects the most sophisticated of these writers. i argue that in contrast to 
O’Connor, who assumed the hostility of her audience, Spark declares her-
self to be writing for “really intelligent people” and tailors her rhetorical 
strategies as appeals to her readers’ aesthetic sensitivity—an approach 
informed by her own reading in John henry newman and by her tendency 
to portray artist figures whose own work is figured as analogous to divine 
creation. Though Spark’s particular approach runs the risks of theological 
distortion and unabashed elitism, i argue that often its cold, self-assured 
whimsicality often proves compelling, particularly in works such as The 
Comforters, The Girls of Slender Means, The Abbess of Crewe, Loitering with 
Intent, and Reality and Dreams.
 Chapter 3 examines the contradiction that many have seen in the work 
of John Updike—an unfashionable and stern commitment to Protestant the-
ology on the one hand and an obsessive attention to sexual delight on the 
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other, both filtered through a sense of american exceptionalism. Through 
sustained readings of The Poorhouse Fair and In the Beauty of the Liles and 
briefer considerations of Couples, Roger’s Version, and Terrorist, i argue that 
what resolves this apparent contradiction is a commitment to narcissism. 
Updike perilously casts the doctrines of Christianity as appeals to the 
essential narcissism of the twentieth-century white american male, gam-
bling that readers will find their own narcissism reflected and confirmed. 
in his first novel, The Poorhouse Fair, Updike accommodates this narcissism 
even as he (in light of his later work) uncharacteristically suggests that 
orthodox belief and moral conduct ought to go together. as his career pro-
gresses, however, Updike comes to divide the two and even to suggest that 
orthodoxy affords a greater frisson to one’s sins. by the time he publishes In 
the Beauty of the Lilies, he has come not to take disbelief seriously but rather 
to regard it as a species of thwarted belief that springs from the same nar-
cissistic desires that motivate faith. 
 Chapter 4 focuses on the later career of Walker Percy. like Spark a 
convert to Catholicism, Percy argues for the truth of Catholic Christianity 
but takes as his point of departure what he regards as the near-universal 
condition of boredom in modernity. in my earlier book, Fears and Fascina-
tions: Representing Catholicism in the American South, i argued that in his 
first three novels, Percy proposes that Catholicism can restore meaning to 
people made desperate by their boredom, but shows, against his intentions, 
how easily this Catholicism can become an essentially aesthetic marker of 
“lifestyle.” here i continue and refine this argument, considering the fic-
tive works of Percy’s later career—his novels Lancelot, The Second Coming, 
and The Thanatos Syndrome, and the narrative “a Space Odyssey” embed-
ded in Lost in the Cosmos. These novels display a new stridency, and i argue 
that they represent an attempt to leave behind the ambiguities of the ear-
lier books, even, perhaps, through a sacrifice of aesthetic complexity. at the 
same time, when these texts are at their most compelling, they continue to 
emphasize that only death brings closure to human lives, that any change 
in belief is possible until that point, and that the chief difficulty that Chris-
tians face is that of keeping faith in a world in which boredom is never per-
manently eradicated.
 Finally, in chapter 5, i examine the work of mary Gordon, a Catholic, 
and marilynne robinson, a Congregationalist. both writers emerge in a 
context defined by recent turmoil in their respective traditions—the events 
and effects of the Second vatican Council for Gordon; the decline of main-
line american Protestantism and of the habits of civic responsibility that it 
nourished for robinson. i do not challenge these writers’ self-description 
as Christian, but i do argue that their treatment of Christian orthodoxy is 
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more accurately described as a use of Christian orthodoxy than an argu-
ment in favor of it. Gordon’s novels—particularly Final Payments, The Com-
pany of Women, Spending, and Pearl—evoke the vanishing milieu of ethnic 
working-class Catholicism in the northeast, yet tend to argue that the 
value both of Catholicism itself and of the culture it produced is largely 
aesthetic. Theologically, Gordon invokes the “spirit of vatican ii,” but her 
deepest commitments, to art and to sexual pleasure, both intersect with and 
oppose this spirit in ways that seem even more self-serving than Updike’s 
avowedly narcissistic appeal. Turning attention to robinson’s intelligent 
and feisty appeal to a liberal Calvinist tradition in her essays, i argue that 
she places the doctrines of Christian orthodoxy in the service of a demo-
cratic humanism that she considers threatened by the triumphs of a mate-
rialist worldview and global capitalism. in her novels Gilead and Home, on 
the other hand, robinson portrays Calvinism, as practiced in a small iowa 
town in 1956, as the norm against which modern anomie is measured and 
found wanting—an approach that depends in part on an insular nostalgia 
that is in some tension with her avowed universalism. in both the novels 
and the essays, robinson succeeds in making Christian orthodoxy attrac-
tive to her readers but does so in a way that emphasizes cultural critique 
instead of truth—and in doing so empties it of much of its specificity.
 Throughout this book, as i develop my judgments of these writers’ 
rhetorical appeals, my primary intention is less to convert people than 
to convey something of the remarkable power and integrity of Christian 
orthodoxy, to insist that such unabashed claims to tell the truth deserve a 
respectful hearing. ralph Wood’s salutary reminder that “Christians are not 
converted and sustained in their faith chiefly through art and culture, but 
through the community of worship and witness called the church” (Com-
edy 282) marks the limits of my inquiry, for i am maintaining neither that 
“correct” readings of these writers’ fiction should result in conversion, nor 
that the work of these writers might provide—as per hungerford’s argu-
ment—an aesthetically rewarding surrogate for Christian belief. never-
theless, i feel comfortable here following augustine’s cues in On Christian 
Doctrine—subsuming (as Wayne booth does) fiction to rhetoric and likening 
these writers’ specific fictive narratives to a kind of oratory. The celebrated 
claim attributed to Karl barth—“belief cannot argue with unbelief; it can 
only preach to it”—need not necessarily contradict my purpose, for surely 
one can distinguish between more and less effective preaching.
 my overarching claim is that despite the difficulties negotiated by these 
six writers, Christian orthodoxy still has the potential to persuade or to 
trouble, even among educated audiences most committed to secular princi-
ples. indeed, i suspect—as Kierkegaard argued and Guardini reaffirmed—
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that this is truer, in a world deeply marked by hungerford’s postmodern 
belief, than it might have been in a more uniformly constituted Christen-
dom. This is my own boothian coduction, derived not only from my own 
experience of reading these works and finding my own faith both chal-
lenged and strengthened but also from the way my readings of these texts 
intersect with recent trends in the sphere of what used to be called “criti-
cal theory.” i am particularly encouraged by the fact that even a number 
of contemporary marxist philosophers, such as alain badiou and Slavoj 
Žižek, have claimed the banner of “belief” in an effort to resuscitate their 
moribund political projects.17 The potential power of Christian orthodoxy, 
in other words, is evident even to those who would appropriate it for anti-
Christian ends and distort its insistence on truth. if i am able to convey 
something of this power even to those who are nominally Christian but 
who are, to a far greater degree, citizens of the contemporary secular West, 
then this book will have fulfilled its purpose.
 17. See especially badiou’s Saint Paul: The Foundations of Universalism and Žižek’s On 
Belief.

I. on Homeric Battlefields: 
 A Confession and a Credo
any consideration of the rhetoric of Christian orthodoxy in late modern fic-
tion cannot avoid Flannery O’Connor, for no other Christian writer of the 
period has been as explicit about her avowed purpose and her intended 
audience. her commentary on her fiction has been quoted perhaps more 
often than the fiction itself, and her statements have, through repetition, 
acquired a magisterial ring. “let me make no bones about it: i write from 
the standpoint of Christian orthodoxy. . . . i write with a solid belief in all 
the Christian dogmas” (Habit 147; emphasis in text). “my audience are the 
people who think that God is dead” (Habit 92). “The novelist with Christian 
concerns will find in modern life distortions which are repugnant to him, 
and his problem will be to make these appear as distortions to an audi-
ence which is used to seeing them as natural; and he may well be forced to 
take ever more violent means to get his vision across to this hostile audi-
ence” (“Fiction Writer” 33–34). Precisely because O’Connor’s intentions are 
indubitable, much of the debate surrounding her work has been shaped by 
the degree to which her critics are already in sympathy with her project. 
The distinguished company of readers who share O’Connor’s theological 
premises, viewing her as a prophet who lashes the fallen world with the 
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painful truth that Jesus died to save humankind, is matched by the distin-
guished company of readers, going at least as far back as John hawkes, 
who hold that O’Connor is unknowingly of the Devil’s party. and these 
two contending sides are joined today by historicist critics from Jon lance 
bacon to Patricia yaeger, who see neither salvation nor nihilism in her work 
but only the distorted reflections of the racist, sexist, class-obsessed, and 
Cold War–damaged culture that was the South of her lifetime. The situa-
tion has not changed much since 1992, when Frederick Crews complained 
that “there is never a shortage of volunteers to replace the original antago-
nists” (156) in the fundamental debates over O’Connor’s work. Some read-
ers ask, “Should we take O’Connor’s Catholicism seriously or stow it away 
in a box marked ‘false consciousness’ or ‘irrelevant window dressing’”? 
Others ask, “Should we condemn O’Connor for remaining silent before the 
racial injustices of her time, or praise her for registering some slight or par-
tial resistance to them?”
 These questions cannot be answered solely on the basis of O’Connor’s 
literary corpus. although academic readers pride themselves on having 
escaped the limitations of the new Criticism, and although they repeat 
the notion that there is no disinterested point of view so often that it has 
become a bromide, the protocols of scholarly discourse still require read-
ers to act as if their arguments were latent in texts themselves and only 
incidentally positions in which they happen to believe. When readers 
approach O’Connor, however, such protocols get them nowhere, for at this 
late date, it should be clear that all of these contending positions are amply 
supported by textual evidence. There is no good reason to doubt the sin-
cerity or the orthodoxy of O’Connor’s beliefs, and readers who know how 
these beliefs informed her fictional practice must acknowledge her consis-
tency in applying them. There is no necessary contradiction, for instance, 
in the claim that the grandmother’s murder in “a Good man is hard to 
Find,” or mrs. may’s goring on the horn of the scrub bull in “Greenleaf,” 
might simultaneously function as the salvation of these women. Those who 
blanch at the ferocity of O’Connor’s vision and dispute that so violent and 
uncompromising a stance can be authentically Christian need to read more 
both about the dogmas and the history of Christianity.
 On the other hand, if O’Connor wrote “for those who believe that God 
is dead,” seeking to shock them into a life-changing awareness of the incar-
nation, then the response of individual readers suggests that she failed at 
least as often as she succeeded. early critics of her work such as Josephine 
hendin and martha Stephens, who found O’Connor’s fundamental prem-
ises (though not necessarily her fiction) repugnant, were neither stupid nor 
ignorant of her intentions, and while such readers might conceivably be 
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guilty of the intellectual hubris that O’Connor loved to skewer, one cannot 
charge them with a willful misreading of the text. Their own beliefs may 
be wrong, but their arguments are based on an examination of O’Connor’s 
fiction in good faith through the light of these beliefs.
 moreover, anyone who has taught O’Connor repeatedly knows that 
uninitiated students typically adore her work and are deft at generat-
ing interpretations, but they almost never arrive at those that O’Connor 
intended. my avowedly secular students, upon hearing of O’Connor’s reli-
gious orthodoxy, are puzzled and sometimes intrigued by what they per-
ceive as the exoticism of her position, but they then shrug and pursue their 
own interpretations, not converted, not feeling the slightest need to argue 
with her. my Christian students, on the other hand—unless they have been 
taught O’Connor by a previous teacher—are usually shocked. i almost 
always receive papers arguing either that O’Connor’s vision cannot possi-
bly be Christian or that her efforts to persuade are at best counterintuitive, 
at worst perverse, because in a contemporary United States shaped largely 
by what Christian Smith and melinda lundquist Denton call “moral Ther-
apeutic Deism” (118—my students do not use this term, but their descrip-
tions make clear that they have something like it in mind), she makes 
Christianity look depraved and unattractive. The first of these arguments 
is untenable; the second, however, is difficult to dispute. There is a corpse 
with three bullet holes at the end of “a Good man is hard to Find,” a body 
killed by a man obsessed with Jesus. O’Connor tells us, famously, not to 
pay attention to it but to “the action of grace” and the “lines of spiritual 
motion” (“On her Own Work” 113). Unfortunately, only the body is in the 
text; whatever grace and lines of spiritual motion there may be exist only 
in O’Connor’s intentions, in the responses of readers to them, and in the 
coductions that readers might formulate in ongoing conversations about 
them. To interpret the murder either as a highly entertaining horror, as sec-
ular readers might, or as a sign that the grandmother has been saved by 
one of God’s more inscrutable dispensations of grace, is to go outside the 
text, to refer to structures of belief rather than to simple, unproblematic evi-
dence. The debate centers not on the interpretation of the text, but on the 
proper context to choose for the interpretation of the text—and as such, it is 
irresolvable.
 The same is true of the debate surrounding O’Connor’s relationship to 
racial justice. On the one hand, some readers have found much to praise 
in O’Connor’s representation of black characters—alice Walker notes her 
“distance . . . from the inner workings of her black characters” and praises 
her for the humility that made such distance possible (52), while Crews 
echoes many readers’ sense that “the black characters in her fiction gen-
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erally do come off better than the whites—more humane, more intuitively 
sensible, and of course markedly less susceptible to the status anxiety and 
self-aggrandizement that she loved to pillory” (157–58). There is also, of 
course, O’Connor’s orthodox conviction, expressed most ringingly in “The 
artificial nigger” and in “revelation,” that everyone, black and white, can 
be saved. On the other hand, there is little in O’Connor’s fiction to indicate 
clear, unambiguous support for the civil rights movement, much distaste 
for those who participated directly in it, and much to suggest that such 
merely political matters are insignificant when viewed sub specie aeter-
nitatis. again, the debate is not about the interpretation of the text, since 
readers on both sides point to the same passages and interpret them plau-
sibly; it is about the priority of contexts of interpretation. What matters 
most—representational depth, declarations in support of racial justice, or 
the state of individual souls? Without a textually grounded way to adjudi-
cate these competing claims, the debate remains irresolvable.
 Faced with these impasses, my own impulse has always been to change 
the subject. Though as a Catholic i share O’Connor’s theology, i have 
always felt a certain resistance to her work, even when i have found it most 
compelling. in my own writing on O’Connor, i have read “Parker’s back” 
as a critique of visuality that can be illuminated by the work of lacan and 
luce irigaray; i have invoked Jane Jacobs’s theories of urbanism to account 
for the function of community in “a Stroke of Good Fortune” and “The 
artificial nigger”; and i have suggested that literary naturalism, especially 
in its theories of sexual determinism, might be a profitable lens through 
which to read Wise Blood. in pursuing these readings, my motivation 
has been to say something fresh, to draw attention to hitherto unnoticed 
aspects of O’Connor’s texts and, above all, to avoid the boredom of end-
less repetition. and yet i cannot escape the conviction that these readings, 
although not necessarily invalid—after all, they point to textual evidence 
and offer logical argument to make their cases, as any reading must—are 
ultimately beside the point. none of these readings challenges the funda-
mental debates about O’Connor’s work; each can easily be pressed into the 
service of one side or the other. One can, for instance, endorse a Catholic 
reading of O’Connor and think that O’Connor’s stance toward vision has 
more in common with lacan’s than with Descartes’s; there is no necessary 
contradiction here. One can reject O’Connor’s Christian commitments and 
believe that Wise Blood is best understood as a naturalist novel. my atten-
tion to differences has not made a difference.
 in The Shape of the Signifier: 1967 to the End of History, Walter benn 
michaels suggests that what i have been trying to do—to multiply possible 
readings of O’Connor’s work, to let a thousand flowers bloom—reflects a 
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larger trend within academic writing, a move away from “disagreement” 
and toward “difference.” The most obvious expressions of this trend are the 
rise of multiculturalism and the absolute commitment among many theo-
rists and critics to the primacy of the subject position. as michaels puts it, 
when readers commit to subject position—that is, to identity—as the key 
element that determines how they read a text, they commit to a protocol in 
which “there can be no conflicts of interpretation, not because there can be 
no conflict but because there can be no interpretation. all conflict has been 
turned into conflict between those who speak one language and those who 
speak another or between those who wish to eliminate difference and those 
who wish to preserve it, and the act of interpreting what someone says has 
been reconfigured either as the act of saying the same thing or as the act 
of saying something else” (64). While i have not proposed my readings of 
O’Connor as an expression of my own identity (in the manner of the “as a 
[fill in the blank with an identitarian category], i maintain” readings that 
one sometimes encounters), i have valued them precisely because i saw 
them as introducing an element of difference into an arena marked by end-
less disagreement. To speak of disagreement is to speak about belief, about 
questions of what is true and what is false; to speak of difference is to speak 
about identity or taste, neither of which is truly subject to debate.
 and yet, michaels suggests, to speak of difference instead of disagree-
ment cannot, in the end, be anything other than a dodge, for the distinc-
tion between difference and disagreement is also a clash of beliefs, not a 
choice—as my writing on O’Connor has sometimes implied—between 
beliefs and something else. The claim that difference qua difference mat-
ters is, after all, a truth claim, and it is just as contestable as the claims 
that either O’Connor’s religious vision or her vexing position on southern 
race relations should be the starting point for whatever critics say about 
her. and as a truth claim, it is necessarily exclusionary, despite its rhetoric 
of openness to multiplicity. it is, however, a claim that refuses to defend 
itself against direct challenges, and that smugly takes its refusal as a sign of 
unwarranted moral superiority.
 i read michaels’s indictment of the way academics argue—or, more pre-
cisely, refuse to argue—and i find myself justly condemned. The enjoyment 
i have derived from my readings of O’Connor has taken the form of one-
upmanship, of a sense that while others go on vulgarly shouting at each 
other about Christianity or about racial justice, i have perceived, as Wallace 
Stevens might put it, “ghostlier demarcations, keener sounds” (106). i have 
been like the representative intellectual that Slavoj Žižek posits in the fol-
lowing passage from The Puppet and the Dwarf, one of his recent books on 
the Judeo-Christian tradition:
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[W]hen, today, one directly asks an intellectual: “OK, let’s cut the crap and 
get down to basics: do you believe in some form of the divine or not?,” 
the first answer is an embarrassed withdrawal, as if the question is too 
intimate, too probing; this withdrawal is then usually explained in more 
“theoretical” terms: “That is the wrong question to ask! it is not simply a 
matter of believing or not, but, rather, a matter of certain radical experi-
ence, of the ability to open oneself to a certain unheard-of dimension, of 
the way our openness to radical Otherness allows us to adopt a specific 
ethical stance, to experience a shattering form of enjoyment. . . .” What we 
are getting today is a kind of “suspended” belief, a belief that can thrive 
only as not fully (publicly) admitted, as a private obscene secret. against 
this attitude, one should insist even more emphatically that the ‘vulgar’ 
question ‘Do you really believe or not?’ matters—more than ever, perhaps. 
(5–6)
 Žižek is correct here. although his recent work has been rightly criti-
cized by those who perceive its opportunism—his stated thesis, after all, 
is that Christianity and his own brand of atheistic dialectical materialism 
belong, so to speak, on the same side of the barricades—this opportun-
ism does not invalidate his more fundamental claim: that everyone is a 
believer of one kind or another, and that what divides believers in disagree-
ment from believers in difference is merely that the first group takes both 
its beliefs and its antagonists seriously while the second group tries to dis-
avow its beliefs or to prevent their emergence as points of contention. after 
all, one can argue with a belief; one cannot argue with a subject position. 
and one can respond to claims of radical openness to experience only by 
suggesting that the speaker is less radically open than he or she believes—
which leaves unexamined the premise that radical openness is supremely 
desirable or even possible. To invoke such terms in the course of an argu-
ment is, in effect, to declare them off limits, to decline engagement with 
those who see interpretation as a function of something other than a mere 
reflection of identity, and to call one’s seriousness into question.
 in a time when the general public knows little about the work of literary 
scholars, and derives much of what it does know from the inevitable stories 
in the media after each mla Convention that portray it as a circus, Žižek’s 
lesson demands attention. The commitment to difference among literary 
scholars is also, above all, a commitment to novelty, and as such, it rein-
forces the consumerist imperatives both of capitalist society and the pro-
fession. it is becoming difficult to avoid the conclusion that scholars value 
difference qua difference primarily because they need to go on publishing 
new things, and that their disdain for repetition differs little from the dis-
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dain of the consumer who, having purchased last year’s model, now needs 
this year’s lest he or she feel outclassed by hipper, more beautiful people.
 For this reason, scholars in the field of O’Connor studies may have 
much to offer their colleagues in the profession as a whole. The record of 
O’Connor criticism shows that for all the different topics that one might 
focus on in her work, it is impossible to avoid coming back to or being 
coopted by a few fundamental debates about significant matters. The 
profession would probably be healthier and its value more evident if all 
academic debate were like debate about O’Connor, if scholars were less 
consumed with the pursuit of novelty and publication and more concerned 
with the proposal and defense of core beliefs in their interpretations. as 
Fredric Jameson observed long ago in The Political Unconscious:
[O]ur object of study is less the text itself than the interpretations through 
which we attempt to confront and to appropriate it. interpretation is here 
construed as an essentially allegorical act, which consists in rewriting a 
given text in terms of a particular interpretive master code. [ . . . ] i hap-
pen to feel that no interpretation can be effectively disqualified on its own 
terms by a simple enumeration of inaccuracies or omissions, or by a list 
of unanswered questions. interpretation is not an isolated act, but takes 
place within a homeric battlefield, on which a host of interpretive options 
are either openly or implicitly in conflict. (9–10, 13)
O’Connor criticism certainly has been a “homeric battlefield,” in which a 
few interpretive master codes have slugged it out. Secular, religious, and 
historicizing critics have jumped into the fray, and whatever their argu-
ments, they have expressed their basic commitment to their beliefs in 
ways that remind me of the altogether admirable sentiment of rufus John-
son in “The lame Shall enter First”: “even if i didn’t believe it, it would 
still be true” (477). in other words, they have not shrunk from emphasiz-
ing the universality of their claims, the logical conclusion that claims that 
are true or false must be true or false for everyone, and that every genuine 
debate—as opposed to proliferations of difference—is a clash of competing 
universalisms.
 henry T. edmonson iii has recently argued that O’Connor’s work urges 
a “return to good and evil” and a rejection of modern attempts (beginning 
with nietzsche) to transcend these categories. his argument is correct, and 
it ought to be acknowledged as such even by those readers who reject the 
Thomist framework that he draws upon to define good and evil. it is cor-
rect not only because O’Connor did indeed seek to make readers freshly 
aware of the distinction between good and evil (this is simply a fact about 
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her intentions) but also because everyone who argues in good faith for the 
truth of his or her beliefs necessarily universalizes, necessarily combats 
those who reject them. everyone, in other words, committed to the search 
for truth necessarily invokes definitions of good and evil. even nietzsche’s 
claim to have transcended good and evil entails its own good and its own 
evil.
 many readers will find such a conclusion unsettling, because they have 
become accustomed to thinking of epistemic uncertainty and limitless tol-
erance as the highest virtues, as the indispensable preconditions for peace 
and justice. many might point out that the world’s most conspicuously 
militant universalism in recent years—a strand of islamic fundamentalism 
with a very concrete notion of jihad—has turned to terrorism, religious war-
fare, and other forms of violent provocation in order to advance its cause. 
Does not my argument here suggest that firmly held convictions make vio-
lence inevitable, because in a pluralistic world, there is no other way to 
make one triumph over others?
 i certainly hope that violence is not inevitable, and the banal fact that 
people sometimes do change their most firmly held convictions without 
having suffered coercion supports that conclusion. yet even if violence is 
not inevitable, conflict most certainly is, because even the attempt to reject 
certitude in the name of tolerance grounds itself in a universalist notion 
of the good, however it strives to deny that fact. What is needed is a bet-
ter account of how persuasion works, how conflicts about beliefs may end 
without recourse to violence. how does one interpretation of a work of 
fiction prove more convincing than another, especially when it is not, as 
Jameson suggests, a question of asking which interpretation has the few-
est inaccuracies, omissions, or unanswered questions, but of asking one to 
subscribe to a completely different worldview? how does one universal-
ism triumph over another, particularly when the debate is couched not in 
the conventions of philosophy but in the essentially rhetorical mode of fic-
tion—a mode given as much to the cultivation of “mystery” (to use one of 
O’Connor’s favorite words) as to rational argument?
 in what follows, i will attempt a provisional answer to these questions 
in O’Connor’s work, though it certainly falls short of a general theory of 
persuasion. Perhaps if i could answer these questions more generally, i 
would feel less exasperated. Until then i am, like too many others in this 
historical moment, too easily bored, too ready to pursue novelty for its own 
sake, too peevishly frustrated by the fact that debates about the true and 
the good are, however important, however inescapable, also (for the fore-
seeable future, at least) irresolvable. The debates go on, world without end, 
and all scholars in O’Connor studies—myself included—had better learn 
not merely to accept that fact but to embrace it.
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II. Freedom, grace, and Persuasion in 
 “A good man Is Hard to Find”
Given O’Connor’s stated intentions, what rhetorical strategies does she 
employ, and how do scholars formulate criteria to measure whether these 
succeed? i would like to begin with the observation that O’Connor typi-
cally cultivates identifications between her readers and particular char-
acters. When these characters condemn other characters, readers are 
therefore invited to endorse the condemnation. at the climax of her sto-
ries, however, readers experience a violent reversal: they discover either 
that they are not so different from those whom they condemned, or (what 
is more often the case) that those with whom they identify are horribly 
flawed. For O’Connor, it follows that these characters need divine grace, 
and so do we. When Thomas merton, eulogizing O’Connor, compared her 
to Sophocles (42), i believe that he had this structure of reversal and rec-
ognition (peripeteia and anagnorisis) in mind, which aristotle has associ-
ated with tragedy. Some readers, upon perceiving this shock, accept the 
tidings she brings, while others (perhaps most) reject them. although in 
practice it may be difficult to separate this decision from the question of 
whether readers have understood her intentions correctly, the two judg-
ments are in principle distinct. One can believe that one fully understands 
O’Connor’s intentions, even admire her skill in revealing them without 
resorting to overt didacticism, yet not be persuaded either of their truth 
or of their relevance to one’s own life. One can also, to be sure, agree with 
O’Connor’s moral judgments about her characters without agreeing that 
such judgments entail the necessity of Christian belief.1 in short, one can 
reject the identification with her characters upon which such persuasion 
seems to depend.
 1. in A Rhetoric of Irony, Wayne booth made this argument about O’Connor’s story “ev-
erything That rises must Converge,” though i believe that what he says is applicable to much 
of her fiction: “[T]his story can be experienced by anyone who catches the essential contrast 
among the three systems of norms, Julian’s, his mother’s, and the cluster of traditional, con-
ventional values we share with the author. Though it may seem thinner to those for whom 
Julian’s self-absorption and cruelty are judged in secular terms than for a Catholic who sees 
him as in mortal sin, the structure of experience will be the same for both: everyone will be 
forced to reject all or most of what the words seem to say. at every point we must decide 
on one out of many possible reconstructions, on the basis of a set of unshakable but silent 
beliefs that we are expected to share (however fleetingly) with the author. no one who fails 
to discern and feel some sympathy for these beliefs—only a few of them specifically roman 
Catholic—is likely to make very much of the story” (168–69). no doubt this response would 
exasperate O’Connor, but she might admit that in “everything That rises must Converge,” 
where belief in Christianity is not explicitly addressed and where the civil rights movement’s 
challenge to white southern racism forms a more immediate context for moral judgment than 
O’Connor’s Catholicism, readers are more likely to agree with her moral judgments without 
perceiving the need to pursue a “thicker” reading grounded in Catholic doctrine.
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 if freedom is possible for her readers, and O’Connor’s arguments 
invest much in the reader’s identification with her characters, then it fol-
lows that such identification is most successful when readers attribute free-
dom to these characters. The author’s note to the second edition of Wise 
Blood confirms this suspicion, though it also acknowledges the difficulties 
that readers may have in perceiving hazel motes’s freedom: “Does one’s 
integrity ever lie in what he is not able to do? i think that usually it does, 
for free will does not mean one will, but many wills conflicting in one man. 
Freedom cannot be conceived simply. it is a mystery . . . .” (no pg. num-
ber). yet freedom, mysterious enough in living human beings, becomes 
altogether illusory when attributed to fictional characters. as rené Girard 
once put it, mocking the putatively gratuitous freedom of protagonists in 
existentialist novels, “if the novelist is free it is hard to see how his char-
acters would be” (256). but this answer falsifies the experience of reading, 
for while characters in a work of fiction may not be free—one will never, 
after all, open up “a Good man is hard to Find” and discover that this 
time, The misfit has shot himself or taken up beachcombing on a Carib-
bean island—readers’ judgments of characters will prove incoherent if they 
do not attribute freedom to them. To identify with a character is thus to 
project my own consciousness of freedom into that character, so that deci-
sions undertaken or fates suffered resonate with my sense that against that 
other choices are possible, that i might have chosen differently.2
 When readers identify with characters in this way, they hypothesize not 
only about whether such identifications were intended by the author but 
also about how narrative conventions shape them. any understanding of 
freedom in a text emerges against a prior understanding of what models of 
freedom have been made comprehensible within that text’s tradition. The 
Catholic standpoint from which O’Connor begins presents special chal-
lenges, for its relationship to the mainstream of fiction in english and to the 
dominant understanding of freedom in that tradition is singularly vexed.
 according to the received account of literary historians from ian Watt 
to F. r. and Q. D. leavis, the novel in english is an essentially Protestant 
genre, in that its commitments to literary realism, individualism, and above 
all character (in the dual sense of particularized personality and mature 
moral agency) reflect a Protestant understanding of human freedom and 
flourishing.3 Over time, as marina macKay has suggested, this account 
 2. it is in this sense that i understand bakthin’s claims about the “unfinalizability” of 
the novel. Unfinalizability refers not to the freedom of the characters—for there is no such 
freedom—but to the inexhaustibility of readers’ potential judgments of fiction. 
 3. many theories about the nature of fiction in english take the novel, not the short 
story, as their starting point, and it might be objected that because the two are distinct genres, 
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of the english novel has tended to equate the exemplary virtues of Prot-
estantism with those of political liberalism, so that even an agnostic such 
as George eliot is plausibly described as a Protestant novelist. On the one 
hand, such novels celebrate what macKay calls the “evangelical spirit of 
the nineteenth century” that “people are capable of changing” (228) for 
the better; on the other hand, the freedom they depict is admirable only 
insofar as it is reasonable and conducive to social harmony—that is, when 
characters privilege “‘knowledge’ . . . over mystery and ‘accommodation’ 
over principle” (217). The explicit anti-Catholicism of many british nov-
els—for instance, the association of Catholicism with the gothic terrors and 
alleged oppressions of continental europe—suggests that in this tradition, 
the Church can only be an enemy of freedom, out to corrupt the will and 
intellect of unwary Protestants.
 although this account, as macKay puts it, “den[ies] . . . the primacy 
of the Spanish, Catholic Don Quixote in the inception of the novel, and 
den[ies], furthermore, that Catholic europe contributed to the subsequent 
development of the form” (216), it has rarely been challenged. how might a 
history of the novel appear if readers were to acknowledge these Catholic 
influences? They might well reverse macKay’s terms and conclude that a 
Catholic vision of the novel might privilege mystery over knowledge and 
principle over accommodation. it might present models of the self not eas-
ily reconcilable with liberalism, models in which change is unpredictable, 
performative, paradoxical—and in which the “realized individual character 
is, in fact, the least free of all” (231). and it might suggest that the richest 
fictions are not necessarily novels such as Middlemarch, in which charac-
ters develop over a long span of time in a highly particularized world, but 
shorter forms that register the shock of freedom more strongly. here, per-
haps, is a possible explanation for why O’Connor’s short stories are usually 
considered more accomplished than her novels.
 it follows then, that precisely because O’Connor identifies herself as 
Catholic yet works within a tradition historically marked as Protestant, her 
efforts will take counterintuitive forms and challenge notions of freedom 
that are dominant in Protestant and post-Protestant milieux. in a sense, 
then, i am reaffirming O’Connor’s oft-repeated statement that “to the hard 
of hearing you shout, and for the almost-blind you draw large and startling 
this leavisite account of the novel as essentially Protestant need not apply to O’Connor. it 
seems pertinent, though, that O’Connor does not seem to distinguish between the novel and 
the short story insofar as her own rhetorical strategies are concerned. her two novels, Wise 
Blood and The Violent Bear It Away, display the same patterns of identification, reversal, and 
recognition that i described above, though most critics agree (as do i) that many of her short 
stories are superior as works of art.
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figures” (“Fiction Writer” 34), with the qualification that it may be just as 
much the literary context of fiction in english as the unbelief of the twenti-
eth century that contributes to such sensory disabilities. but shouting and 
drawing large and startling figures pose their own risks, for a Catholic 
understanding of such things must neither deny freedom nor minimize its 
essential mystery.
 “a Good man is hard to Find” perhaps provides the best illustration of 
this problem in O’Connor’s fiction. O’Connor has of course been criticized 
for imposing her own interpretation of her work on readers, and her com-
ments on this story, in which she simultaneously justifies and deempha-
sizes her use of violence, are often cited as evidence. but what has often 
gone unremarked is the distinction that O’Connor draws between the effect 
of violence upon her characters and its effect on readers. “i have found,” 
she writes, “that violence is strangely capable of returning my characters to 
reality and preparing them to accept their moment of grace. Their heads are 
so hard that almost nothing else will do the work” (“On her Own Work” 
112). This is, i would argue, one of the cagiest moments in O’Connor’s 
writing. even as she underscores the function of violence in her work, she 
obscures her agency in inflicting it. She has not set out to dispense violence 
to her characters; she has only “found” that violence achieves the desired 
effect—and thus casts her characters as autonomous agents whose own 
stubbornness has driven her to this expedient. yet while violence seems 
necessary for her characters, it has the potential to mislead readers. hence 
her admonition that readers should “be on the lookout for such things as 
the action of grace in the Grandmother’s soul, and not for the dead bod-
ies” (“On her Own Work” 113). So even though both characters and read-
ers are potentially recalcitrant, characters are more certain to benefit from 
violence, not only because they cannot escape it but because there seems 
to be no danger of their misunderstanding what it portends. readers, how-
ever, are freer but for this very reason more prone to error, and they too 
must be assaulted, but with commentary instead of direct violence. here 
there seems to be a familiar standoff, one suggested long ago by partisans 
of reader-friendly criticism such as roland barthes: the freer a reader is, 
the more that freedom seems to be measured by resistance to authorial 
intention.
 in what sense, then, can the grandmother—the third party in this trans-
action—be considered “free”? readers’ understanding of her proceeds ini-
tially through the familiar processing of realist fiction. They observe what 
she says and does, discern her thoughts, and absorb significant information 
about her—the name of her cat, her fear of highway patrolmen, her pride 
in her manner of dress. if readers believe that they understand her, it is 
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because they recognize her as plausible within her time and place—a ridic-
ulous old woman whose identity has been largely shaped by the discourse 
of southern ladyhood. The more plausible she seems, the more likely it 
would seem that she will develop according to a model of liberal selfhood 
if she is to win readers’ approval—overcoming her vanities, her racism, and 
her selfishness through a painstakingly drawn sequence of experience and 
enlightenment.
 yet this does not happen. at the crux of the story, having failed to per-
suade The misfit to spare her life, readers are told that her head “cleared 
for an instant,” that she “saw the man’s face twisted close to her own as if 
he were going to cry and murmured, ‘Why you’re one of my babies. you’re 
one of my own children’” (29). She then touches him and is killed immedi-
ately afterward. in this passage, any sense of her thoughts and motivation 
falls away. The clearness of her head suggests that readers should trust her 
action here, but the content of this clearness is not specified. The fact that 
The misfit seems close to tears might also be significant, but this percep-
tion is itself ambiguous—does it belong to the grandmother or the author? 
it is not certain that the grandmother experiences a rush of love or pity for 
The misfit, plausible though such a reading may be. nor is it certain that 
she feigns love or pity in a final attempt to save her life, though this read-
ing is also plausible. neither reading is compelled by the text as, for exam-
ple, the earlier judgment of the grandmother’s vanity is. if the grandmother 
acts freely here—and O’Connor invites this judgment when she refers to 
the grandmother’s “special kind of triumph” (“On her Own Work” 111)—
her freedom is suggested most clearly by readers’ ignorance of her motives. 
O’Connor does tell readers, in her commentary, that such freedom is asso-
ciated with a moment of grace—but it would seem that she cannot, with-
out turning it into an illustration of determinism, account for it. hence the 
caginess i mentioned earlier, her reluctance to identify herself as the source 
of violence against her characters. This too, after all, would diminish the 
intended sense of the characters’ freedom—it would make violence the ulti-
mate cause, rather than the felicitous revelation, of this freedom.
 in “Some aspects of the Grotesque in Southern Fiction,” O’Connor 
speaks of the writer for whom “the meaning of a story does not begin 
except at a depth where adequate motivation and adequate psychology 
and the various determinations have been exhausted. Such a writer will 
be interested in what we don’t understand rather than in what we do. he 
will be interested in possibility rather than probability” (41–42). as David 
Sandner has argued, here O’Connor “anticipates that her grandmother can 
only be ‘adequately’ read as . . . [a] deluded figure . . . imagining at her last 
moment what was not there, what cannot be; she anticipates that her criti-
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cism can be discounted as well, that it asks for something that need not be 
deduced from the text as a necessary reading of its determining elements” 
(177). indeed, everything that readers have learned about the grandmother, 
through their processing of realist conventions, might lead them astray, for 
readers seek clues to her “adequate” motivation in what came before. any 
account of such motivation would lock the grandmother into a chain of 
cause and effect that the story neither confirms nor denies.
 i tentatively conclude that O’Connor highlights an inherent tension 
between mimesis and freedom, and that in affirming freedom at crucial 
moments, she complicates aristotle’s judgment in the Poetics that “the use 
of impossible probabilities is preferable to that of unpersuasive possibili-
ties” (61).4 it is always “possible” to act freely, especially if one understands 
that one’s truest freedom lies in accepting God’s gift of grace. but is it 
probable that one will do so—especially if one has been shaped by a for-
merly Protestant and now liberal culture that tends to view will as untram-
meled? O’Connor thinks, with much justification, that such probabilities 
are “unpersuasive,” though not “impossible.” When she warns her read-
ers not to misread the violence in the story, she might well be exhorting, 
“don’t worry about being persuaded. be free instead, for only in openness 
to grace does proper freedom exist.” The grace that allows for a conversion 
experience need not be tied to any human event, not even to the reading of 
a story about it. but O’Connor cannot simply give up the effort to persuade, 
even to preach—the Great Commission (matthew 28:18–20) demands it, 
after all. if readers can be convinced of the grandmother’s freedom even 
before death, perhaps they can be shocked into awareness of their own. but 
it is precisely readers’ commitment to a false model of freedom that blinds 
them, and leads O’Connor to the more overt—and, for many readers, less 
persuasive—effort of her commentary, which has provoked far more critical 
resistance than her fiction itself has.
 4. The distinctions here, admittedly, are subtle. Wendy Piper rightly notes that in the 
Poetics, “[t]he two elements of ‘probability’ and ‘surprise’ are interdependent; it is upon 
their synthesis that the emotional import of peripeteia and anagnorisis . . . depends and the 
moral and metaphysical weight of the tragedy, the sense of ‘wonder,’ is based” (164). The 
central issue seems to be whether the kind of tragic recognition and reversal of which aris-
totle speaks affirms a conception of human freedom or of determinism. O’Connor contrasts 
her emphasis on freedom with a “great tragic naturalism” that she respects but believes is 
achieved despite “the limitations of [a] narrow vision” (“Some aspects” 41). i read her as 
rejecting the “probabilities” asserted by determinist theorists of all kinds—which in some 
versions become invariable laws—in favor of the improbable possibilities of freedom and 
grace.
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III. o’Connor Relaxes: 
 “The Artificial nigger”
While “a Good man is hard to Find” has probably not converted many 
readers, its presentation of what is at stake in questions of belief is admira-
bly stark, neither minimizing the essential scandal of the Christian narra-
tive nor shrinking from the fact that readers must make a free commitment 
to it or reject it. There is no third option. The grandmother’s own attempt 
to construct an alternative based on moral consensus (and save her own 
skin) rather than on the irreducibility of doctrinal belief collapses, like 
most of her dialogue, into platitude: “i just know you’re a good man” (25). 
O’Connor’s stories, however, are not always so precisely delineated, and 
i turn now to “The artificial nigger” as a counterexample. my argument 
here is more openly personal, because i have long been struck by the diver-
gence between my own religious beliefs and my assessment of the story, 
which dissents from the widespread judgment that it is one of her stron-
gest. because critics who find O’Connor’s rhetorical strategies persuasive 
often already share her beliefs, i suspect that this divergence between my 
beliefs and a judgment to which these beliefs might predispose me sheds 
light on the more general question of when religious persuasion in fiction 
proves successful.
 as a roman Catholic, i believe in the same dogmas in which O’Connor 
believed. moreover, i believe that mr. head, like all human beings, is vain, 
sinful, and in need of redemption. he is not a monster—or, to be more pre-
cise, he is a monster in the most ordinary way, for his nature, like ours, 
is proud and fallen. his recognition of his sinfulness, followed by the 
reconciliation with nelson that occurs under the aegis of the story’s gro-
tesque statue, is therefore a crucial awakening. indeed, O’Connor is unam-
biguous about what mr. head learns or rediscovers: “he realized that he 
was forgiven for sins from the beginning of time, when he had conceived 
in his own heart the sin of adam, until the present, when he had denied 
poor nelson. he saw that no sin was too monstrous for him to claim as 
his own, and since God loved in proportion as he forgave, he felt ready at 
that instant to enter Paradise” (270). This passage evinces not only a greater 
theological explicitness than is typically found in O’Connor’s fiction but 
also an unusually lofty and affirmative tone. indeed, it is uncomfortably 
close to what O’Connor scornfully called “instant Uplift” (“novelist” 165), 
and yet one cannot complain that it is more obscure for being so. it is not 
in and of itself vapid, because the theology that underpins it isn’t. To an 
unusual degree in O’Connor’s fiction (as opposed to her essays), the final 
paragraphs make her intentions unmistakable.
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 yet despite this clarity of purpose, i remain unconvinced of the story’s 
effectiveness, for i do not believe that mr. head experiences a genuine con-
version. i have been surprised to discover that O’Connor considered this 
her favorite story (Habit 101, 209), irked by its popularity, and somewhat 
relieved to find Frederick Crews call the end of the story “one of the few 
trite, dramatically unearned, propagandistic passages in all of O’Connor’s 
mature fiction” (160). To be sure, the word “unearned” here suggests that 
Crews has in mind the distinction between “showing” and “telling” in fic-
tion, as well as the evaluative assumption that accompanies it and remains 
beloved of instructors in creative writing: showing is good, and telling, 
especially homiletic telling, is bad. but as Wayne booth observed in The 
Rhetoric of Fiction, this maxim breaks down as soon as one scrutinizes it: 
one can cite endless examples of effective “telling” and ineffective “show-
ing” in fictional narratives, so that the distinction between the two often 
betrays a “radical inadequacy” (16). What determines success is not the 
proportion of showing to telling, but the skill with which both showing and 
telling are adapted to the work’s rhetorical ends. my sense of why Crews’s 
judgment of the story is nevertheless correct begins with a key statement 
in the passage i quoted above—mr. head’s realization that “no sin was too 
monstrous to claim as his own”—which concretizes the story’s rhetorical 
weakness.
 What prompts mr. head to this realization is his denial of his son nel-
son. Faced with a crowd of angry women who threaten to call the police 
because nelson has accidentally broken one woman’s ankle, afraid because 
“[h]e had never in his life been accosted by a policeman,” mr. head pro-
claims, “This is not my boy . . . i never seen him before” (265). nelson 
responds with horror, accusing his father silently but effectively. even the 
women fall silent and allow mr. head to leave, “as if they were so repulsed 
by a man who would deny his own image and likeness that they could not 
bear to lay hands on him” (265). Clearly O’Connor intends for everyone 
to recognize what the narrator calls mr. head’s “true depravity” (270). his 
denial, in other words, must be singularly horrifying, but nevertheless in a 
way that signifies universal—and universally recognized—rather than indi-
vidual depravity.
 The problem, however, occurs in the leap between acknowledging that 
mr. head is guilty of a sin here and concluding that “no sin was too mon-
strous to claim as his own.” Does his action really reveal his capacity for 
murder, or rape, or torture? Or does it merely show that he is proud, easily 
frightened, and ignobly willing to betray to save his own skin? moreover, 
even his betrayal could have been far worse: he never actually abandons 
nelson; he feels instant remorse, and he tries, in his fumbling way, to rec-
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oncile with nelson even before he encounters the statue—by offering to get 
him a Coca-Cola and, later, to share water with him. his denial of nelson is 
certainly sinful, certainly despicable. but to invest it with an aura of speech-
depriving horror that stops the women’s half-righteous indignation in its 
tracks, is simply not convincing.
 mr. head’s epiphany makes sense only if he is already within a Chris-
tian framework of belief, for the “true depravity” of all human beings, the 
taint of original sin, is an a priori belief, not something that can be syllogis-
tically deduced from the existence of individual crimes. i believe it to be 
true because Christianity teaches it, not because human beings have always 
unleashed horrors upon each other—although the fact of such horrors cer-
tainly makes it easier to believe. even though nearly everyone grants that 
a capacity for wrongdoing is universal, most people admit degrees of cul-
pability (even the Church distinguishes between mortal and venial sin) 
and do not necessarily conclude, for instance, that one who tells a lie could 
just as easily have committed pedophilia or genocide. The “monstrosity” 
of mr. head’s action lies in the overweening pride that it reveals, and to 
interpret this pride as a monstrous sin requires familiarity with a tradi-
tion in which pride can be just as vile as murder—which places pride, for 
instance, as the first of the Seven Deadly Sins. if i find the women’s reac-
tion unconvincing, it is in part because i do not live in a culture in which 
pride compels universal fear and loathing. in fact, my hunch is that most 
contemporary readers of the story despise mr. head long before he betrays 
nelson, for his racism, his unwarranted arrogance, and his naïveté about 
urban life, and that his betrayal instead provokes their first real compas-
sion for him, precisely because its motivation—pride and fear—is so under-
standable, so easy to identify with. Such a response is not admirable—i 
would even say that it displays its own pride in its smug, implicit assump-
tion that racism is something of which only other people are guilty, and in 
its automatic contempt toward white, rural Southerners. but i do believe 
that such a response works against what O’Connor intends here.
 Once one realizes that mr. head’s epiphany makes little sense unless 
he is already some kind of Christian, it becomes easier to account for what 
richard Giannone has called the “dissonance” between “the elevated lan-
guage [of the narrator]” and “the rhetorical capacity of the plainspoken 
hick” (Hermit Novelist 125). mr. head would not express himself in this 
way, but he has, no doubt, been taught, for instance, that he has “conceived 
in his heart of the sin of adam,” and that “God loved in proportion as he 
forgave.” he may well perceive, in the isolation and misery that he feels 
just before he encounters the grotesque statue, “what man would be like 
without salvation” (268). all of these claims resonate within Christian 
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teaching, and they suggest that mr. head’s belief has always been more 
genuine than that of the merely nominal Christians who appear more often 
in O’Connor’s work, such as mrs. macintyre from “The Displaced Person” 
or mrs. may from “Greenleaf.” Other critics have made this point as well. 
martha Stephens, for instance, compares him to the twelve-year-old pro-
tagonist of “a Temple of the holy Ghost.” both she and mr. head must 
learn a lesson in humility, but as Stephens puts it, because they are already 
believers, “any sins of [theirs] . . . are going to be quite indulgently dealt 
with, [their] lesson in humility quite tenderly viewed” (165). While i do not 
share Stephens’s sarcasm, i think that she is on to something. many read-
ers know O’Connor’s claim that “to the hard of hearing you shout, and for 
the almost-blind you draw large and startling figures.” yet they tend to 
forget what immediately precedes this statement: “When you can assume 
that your audience holds the same beliefs that you do, you can relax a lit-
tle and use more normal means of talking to it” (“Fiction Writer” 34). mr. 
head, perhaps because he shares these beliefs, will not require so violent a 
lesson. accordingly, one should describe what happens to him not as a con-
version, but what one might call in Protestant terminology a rededication. 
Or, to use a Catholic formulation that O’Connor probably knew, mr. head 
experiences a movement from what John henry newman calls “notional 
assent” of Christianity to “real assent.”5 For this reason, however crucial 
such a change may be, it is not dramatically satisfying, because the distance 
to be traversed is not so great—certainly not the distance, as O’Connor 
once opined to ben Griffith, “from the Garden of eden to the Gates of Para-
dise” (Habit 78).6
 What about the grotesque statue itself? The narrator underscores that 
it is not a mere symbol of reconciliation, but its active agent: “They could 
both feel it dissolving their differences like an action of mercy” (269). That 
O’Connor subscribes to a sacramental view of existence in which ordi-
nary objects can become visible vehicles of God’s invisible grace, is a criti-
cal commonplace, but the statue functions more literally as something like 
 5. “in its notional assents as well as in its inferences, the mind contemplates its own 
creations instead of things; in real, it is directed towards things, represented by the impres-
sions which they have left on the imagination” (Grammar of Assent 57). moreover, “[real 
assents] are of a personal character, each individual having his own, and being known by 
them. it is otherwise with notions; notional apprehension is in itself an ordinary act of our 
common nature. all of us have the power of abstraction, and can be taught either to make 
or to enter into the same abstractions” (Grammar of Assent 63).
 6. To be sure, mr. head does feel, in his agony, “what man would be like without salva-
tion” (268). The use of the conditional here, of course, suggests that the statement is contrary 
to fact: human beings are already (potentially) saved, through the accomplished death and 
resurrection of Jesus. even in the depths of his agony, in other words, mr. head does not 
reject the basic claims of Christian orthodoxy.
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the sacrament of reconciliation, for it appears only after both mr. head 
and nelson have indicated a desire to be reconciled, however imperfect 
their contrition might be. mr. head’s desire takes the form of his overtures 
toward nelson (the Coca-Cola and the water); nelson’s takes the form of 
allowing himself to catch up slowly with his grandfather—within three 
pages, nelson moves from “[t]wenty feet behind him” (266) to “within fif-
teen feet” (267) to “about ten feet away” (268). The statue effects the recon-
ciliation in response to an implicitly expressed desire for it. how?
 One might reply that the arbitrariness, even the “artificiality” of the 
statue, is part of the point, that God bestows his grace where he will, and 
that to ask “how?” is an arrogant presumption. inasmuch as the statue has 
inevitable political implications, however—implications that O’Connor 
acknowledged when she called the statue “a terrible symbol of what the 
South has done to itself” (Habit 140)—the story cries out for a reading that 
will connect the statue’s function as agent of grace to commentary about 
the suffering of african americans and the moral responsibility for it. mr. 
head sees in the statue an image of universal agony—he learns from this 
experience that mercy “grew out of agony, which is not denied to any man 
and which is given in strange ways to children” (269). but it is understand-
able that readers might flinch at the quick leap to the universality of suffer-
ing here, as if what mr. head and nelson have endured is comparable to 
the systematic oppression of african americans that the statue makes vis-
ible. (To his credit, mr. head, having reflected on his suffering, immediately 
recognizes its paltriness, for he understands that agony “was all a man cold 
carry into death to give his maker and he suddenly burned with shame that 
he had so little of it to take with him” [269].)
 moreover, the reconciliation does not lead to anything like racial 
enlightenment on mr. head’s part, as other critics have acknowledged—
indeed, the retreat to their rural home, punctuated with nelson’s “i’ll never 
go back again” (270)—suggests a refusal to continue the challenge that the 
story has proposed, a challenge to test one’s faith through continued inter-
action with the suffering of others. Whereas the language that refers to mr. 
head’s individual salvation is clear and unambiguous, that which might 
suggest a recognition of his racism is vague—compare, for instance, “he 
saw now that no sin was too monstrous to claim as his own” with the sto-
ry’s most obscure sentence, “They stood gazing at the artificial negro as 
if they were faced with some great mystery, some monument to another’s 
victory that brought them together in their common defeat” (269). The best 
reading of this sentence i have seen is Christina bieber lake’s: “like Ozy-
mandias in the sand, this ‘monument to another’s victory,’ now completely 
effaced, shows how thin a victory it had really been. When mr. head sees 
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it, it changes him—or, more accurately, helps him name the changes he has 
already experienced. instead of seeing his identity as defined against the 
other, frozen in a cold rationality, he stands now with the suffering commu-
nity in identification and sympathy” (106).
 i do, however, have a quibble with lake’s interpretation. Whose vic-
tory is referred to here? it is “another’s” victory, contrasted with mr. head 
and nelson’s defeat, presumably the victory of a racist society over those 
whom it oppresses. yet to the extent that mr. head is complicit in the 
oppression of african americans that the statue reveals, this victory has, 
until now, also been his own. Do readers therefore read a renunciation of 
racism here, since logically, identification with the suffering community 
must entail identification with african americans as well? Does the con-
trast between “another’s” victory and “their” defeat imply that mr. head, 
too, has, unknowingly, been a victim of racism—but a victim who can take 
comfort in the fragility of the victory? i see no evidence that mr. head’s 
epiphany about the universality of suffering and pride entails specific iden-
tification with others, as opposed to recognition of a common humanity. 
indeed, because the fact of suffering is existential and its specific causes 
not addressed, one might even suspect that mr. head now considers the 
amelioration of suffering undesirable. if is true that having so little agony 
to take to one’s maker at death is a source of shame, why not allow things 
to remain as they are? The more suffering that african americans endure, 
the better off they will be when they face God; perhaps even the better off 
others will be, if we are to take seriously O’Connor’s claim that the story 
suggests “the redemptive quality of the negro’s suffering for us all” (Habit 
78).
 i conclude that even though O’Connor envisaged her audience as the 
people who think that God is dead, “The artificial nigger” is best under-
stood as a fable for Christians. mr. head serves as a kind of double for the 
Christian reader whose assent to Christian doctrine is mostly notional and 
who requires a shock to recognize anew his pride and his dependence on 
Jesus’ sacrifice. i wonder, however, whether O’Connor’s use of the racist 
statue is meant to extend mr. head’s epiphany further into the minds of 
her readers. it is easy to perceive how ridiculous mr. head’s pride makes 
him, long before he denies nelson; but perhaps it is harder for a Chris-
tian, southern, white reader of the 1950s to extend the lesson that mr. head 
learns into a recognition that racism has distorted southern society and 
imperiled souls. i do not believe that mr. head learns this specific lesson, 
but the vagueness of O’Connor’s language at this crucial point allows read-
ers to draw it, if they will.
 it is interesting that none of O’Connor’s manuscript drafts of “The arti-
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ficial nigger” contain the kind of extended commentary on reconciliation 
and salvation that the published story includes. There is also more doubt 
about just what has been learned. in all the versions of the story, mr. head 
and nelson realize that they have been reconciled, but in one version nei-
ther one realizes that the statue had anything to do with it; in one version 
nelson understands this but mr. head doesn’t, and in yet another version 
mr. head does but nelson doesn’t.7 Clearly O’Connor believed that the 
more explicit she was about the means and implications of the reconcilia-
tion, the more her readers would grasp the essential point. but in order for 
her to do this, it was necessary to make mr. head’s Christianity more evi-
dent and thus to lessen the distance that he had to travel to his final revela-
tion. Judged according to her own stated criteria, then—as an attempt to 
shock an unbelieving audience into the truth that Jesus died to save us—
“The artificial nigger” seems less convincing.
IV. the City in “Judgement day”
a similar situation prevails in “Judgement Day,” which O’Connor com-
pleted in the last month of her life. yet the results, i would argue, are very 
different. like “The artificial nigger,” “Judgement Day” depicts a protago-
nist who must leave his contented rural isolation, confront the crowds and 
the even more profound isolation of urban life, and discover through the 
usual process of recognition and reversal his own flaws. like mr. head, 
who hates and fears atlanta, Tanner regards new york as a place of filth 
and horrifically indiscriminate human mingling, with air “fit for cats and 
garbage,” where “all stripes of foreigner, all of them twisted in the tongue” 
live together in “pigeon-hutch[es]”—in short, “no place for a sane man” 
(531, 541). he also shares with mr. head a measure of O’Connor’s sym-
pathy and some evidence of already being a Christian when he under-
goes his experience, which might lead readers of “The artificial nigger” to 
expect him to receive a similarly gentle treatment from his author. Stuck in 
new york City at the home of his daughter, Tanner is determined to return 
home, either dead or alive. The conflation of his beloved home with heaven 
is obvious, and the fact that his daughter finally buries him in his native 
earth—after originally burying him in the city and then suffering from a 
guilty conscience—suggests the triumph of his rural vision over the urban 
wasteland.
 7. O’Connor’s drafts of “The artificial nigger” are located in the Flannery O’Connor 
Collection at the library and instructional Technology Center, Georgia College, milledgeville, 
Georgia, files 157b, 157c, and 158.
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 Such a reading of the story dovetails with a widespread perception that 
in O’Connor’s fictional world, cities are little more than foci of evil—places, 
on the one hand, where “interleckchuls” promote a superficial cosmopoli-
tanism that is no substitute for genuine community, and on the other hand, 
where industrial capitalism’s relentless activity, instrumentalization of 
human relationships, and destruction of the natural environment conspire 
to create a hell on earth. yet even though O’Connor’s own professed dis-
taste for cities tends to confirm this reading, in practice, urban life in her 
work appears more complicated and more potentially beneficial—above all, 
because the sheer number of encounters with other people that are pos-
sible can force epiphanies (as they do for mr. head) that splendid rural 
isolation cannot.8 indeed, “Judgement Day” builds upon “The artificial 
nigger”—and is, in my judgment, a better story—precisely because it does 
not let its protagonist off so easily, but rather reveals that in his movement 
toward something approaching racial enlightenment, unpleasant encoun-
ters with others may exact a necessary cost.
 if “Judgement Day” were merely about a longing for the country that 
is eventually satisfied, it would not be significantly better than “The Gera-
nium,” the much earlier version of the story that O’Connor had included in 
her m.F.a. thesis.9 as marshall bruce Gentry points out, “The Geranium” 
“comes close to [a] sentimental longing for the South” more reminiscent of 
Carson mcCullers (88). The story ends with Tanner’s earlier incarnation, 
Dudley, reduced to tears and bewilderment by the condescension of a black 
man who calls him “old-timer” (13) and by the destruction of a geranium 
that he used to observe in an apartment window opposite his. nothing 
complicates the story’s sentimental pathos. in “Judgement Day,” however, 
Tanner is eventually murdered—and, perhaps, simultaneously delivered to 
salvation—by an african american actor who lives in the apartment next 
door. if one is to read the ending of the story as a triumph for Tanner, as 
most critics have done, one must acknowledge that his exile in the city has 
been necessary. Just as in “The artificial nigger” the heads were forced 
to confront both urban atlanta and the presence of african-americans in 
order to find redemption, in “Judgement Day” Tanner seems to require a 
confrontation with the city, with a black man, and with violence.
 8. See my “The City reconsidered: Problems and Possibilities of Urban Community in 
‘a Stroke of Good Fortune’ and ‘The artificial nigger’” for a fuller account of the benefits of 
cities in her work.
 9. “The Geranium” is also O’Connor’s first published story, which first appeared in 
print in 1946 but was not collected in a book until The Complete Stories appeared in 1971. For a 
representative discussion of the revisions that O’Connor made to the story through the years, 
including the intermediate versions entitled “an exile in the east” and “Getting home,” see 
Giannone, Mystery of Love (233–39).
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 but why is this particular violence necessary? after all, what distin-
guishes Tanner even from mr. head is his lack of stubbornness. Unlike 
most hard-headed O’Connor characters, to whom change comes only as the 
result of divine violence, Tanner shows every sign of having learned several 
important lessons in the absence of violence. Though he is hardly perfect, 
he has made undeniable progress in overcoming his two most obvious (and 
interrelated) failings—his pride and his racism—well before he comes to 
new york.
 in the extended flashback that comprises most of the story, readers 
learn that once, Tanner had owned land in Georgia and had been foreman 
to a crew of black workers, whom he had kept in check by brandishing a 
knife and threatening to kill them periodically. Though Tanner has never 
actually killed a black man, because he fears going to hell, his dominance 
depends upon the threat of violence and is fueled by a poisonous racism. 
Tanner constantly carves small wooden figures with his knife, in an effort 
to conceal the involuntary shaking of his hands caused by kidney illness. 
even what might seem a sign of weakness, however, becomes transformed 
into a reflection of Tanner’s power: “The negroes picked [the figures] up 
and took them home; there was not much time between them and darkest 
africa” (537). This passage’s free indirect discourse, which blurs the dis-
tinction between Tanner’s point of view and the narrator’s, suggests that 
his carvings, even though the product of a physical weakness, function like 
fetishes, cast off by a powerful, disdainful god to superstitious worshipers, 
though it is unclear whether this is an accurate description of the african 
americans’ mindset or a fantasy of Tanner’s.
 Tanner experiences his first moral advance through his encounter with 
Coleman, a black man who had appeared on the scene one day, keeping his 
distance from the workers, watching them, and, provocatively, doing noth-
ing. When Tanner confronts Coleman, the possibility of violence is in the 
air, and both men, the narrator hints, acknowledge to themselves the satis-
faction they would feel were they to kill each other. but when Tanner finds 
himself carving a pair of false glasses without realizing it, he passes them 
along to Coleman, clearly intending to mock him: “‘Put these on,’ he said. 
‘i hate to see anybody can’t see good’” (538). To both men’s surprise, the 
event defuses the situation: “[Tanner] saw the exact instant in the muddy 
liquor-swollen eyes when the pleasure of having a knife in this white man’s 
gut was balanced against something else, he could not tell what” (538). 
The result is that Tanner and Coleman become friends, even to the extent 
of sharing the same home thirty years later. although Tanner rationalizes 
that since Coleman had “ma[d]e a monkey out of [him],” the only alterna-
tive would have been to kill him—“[a]nd he was not going to hell for killing 
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a nigger” (539)—his bluster belies the fact that he has just acknowledged 
Coleman’s humanity. The fact that their subsequent relationship conforms 
to racist protocols—as Tanner says, Coleman “cooks . . . cuts my firewood 
and empties my slops” (535)—does not lessen the horror that Tanner’s 
daughter feels when she discovers that they share the same space.
 Tanner’s second, more enduring moral advance occurs after he moves 
to new york—a move necessitated because he has lost his land, become 
destitute, and taken shelter with Coleman in a shack on land owned by a 
prosperous local black man, Dr. Foley. a clear embodiment of the increased 
social and economic opportunities that african americans were beginning 
to achieve in the 1960s, Dr. Foley taunts Tanner by observing that “[t]he 
day coming . . . when the white folks iS going to be working for the col-
ored” (540). in lieu of rent, Foley demands that Tanner share with him the 
profits from the whiskey still that now gives Tanner his livelihood. Unable 
to face such humiliation, Tanner contacts his daughter, who, appalled by 
his situation, takes him north. here, too, however, Tanner has learned his 
lesson, as a result of suffering, and conquered his pride: “if he had known 
it was a question of this—sitting here looking out of this window all day 
in this no-place, or just running a still for a nigger, he would have run the 
still for the nigger. he would have been a nigger’s white nigger any day” 
(540).
 in light of Tanner’s progress against his pride and racism, it is not sur-
prising that critics have generally liked him. Frederick asals calls him “the 
most sympathetically handled adult protagonist in all her stories,” the only 
one “in whom control and surrender, will and imagination, are reconciled 
and made one” (141). For Giannone, he is a “spiritual combatant” (Hermit 
Novelist 260), whose unhappy existence in new york parallels a hermit’s 
expiatory time in the desert, and who goes to his deserved reward after 
undergoing purification. and for Gentry, Tanner is morally admirable but 
aesthetically flawed because O’Connor herself likes him too much and 
identifies too closely with him (88). but these assessments lead back to the 
previous question: if Tanner is capable of moral growth, if he grows with-
out occasions of violence, then what function does the violence serve?
 The most compelling attempt to answer this question to date is ralph 
Wood’s. Wood connects Tanner’s fate to O’Connor’s celebrated concern 
with manners, particularly insofar as they affect the changing racial pol-
itics of the South. aligning O’Connor with such theorists of social mores 
as alexis de Tocqueville and Jean bethke elshtain, Wood argues that 
“Judgement Day” presents O’Connor’s conviction that “a democracy, per-
haps more than any other polity, requires manners” because “[e]xactly to 
the extent that ancient inequalities have been overcome, there is an even 
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greater demand for social restraint, for privacy, for the individual space 
one grants to others because one knows one’s own need for it” (Flan-
nery O’Connor 127). Since the civil rights movement has abolished many 
“ancient inequalities,” those that remain will become even greater foci for 
resentment unless, as O’Connor maintained, whites and blacks can con-
struct a new framework for living together based on mutual charity. Such 
charity will necessarily involve the wearing of masks. rather than seeing 
masks as mere hypocrisy that prevent people from expressing their inner-
most convictions honestly, Wood argues that for O’Connor, masks are nec-
essary for civilization itself. in their absence, society devolves either into 
a state of hobbesian warfare or into an enforced egalitarianism that abol-
ishes the distinction between the public and private and in doing so turns 
totalitarian.
 From Wood’s perspective, Tanner’s moral progress is incomplete, 
because despite his friendship with Coleman, he has never quite relin-
quished the old mask of racial superiority for a newer “mask” that com-
bines charity with unabashed affirmation of the truth. When Tanner meets 
the african american next door, he assumes that the man is from south 
alabama and must be homesick. he tries to strike up an acquaintance with 
him, calling him “Preacher” (the only honorific he knows for black people) 
and suggesting that the two might go fishing together. The man reacts with 
rage, calling Tanner a “wool-hat red-neck son-of-a-bitch peckerwood old 
bastard” and for good measure asserting that “[t]here ain’t no Jesus and 
there ain’t no God”—though of course his double negative affirms the 
opposite of what he intends. Tanner immediately retorts, “and you ain’t 
black! . . . and i ain’t white” (545). The actor then assaults him, causing 
a stroke. later, when Tanner is trying to escape the apartment and head 
southward, he meets the man a second time and repeats his mistake. This 
time, the man kills him and desecrates his body, forcing his head and arms 
through a banister so that he resembles a man in stocks. The upshot seems 
to be that while for most O’Connor characters, salvation and the presence 
of violence go together, Tanner has achieved his salvation before he is actu-
ally killed, in the moment when he simultaneously rejects the actor’s blas-
phemy and (unwittingly) affirms the irrelevance of racial distinctions. his 
triumph is so perfect that O’Connor can dispense with further preaching 
or pointed commentary (Wood, Flannery O’Connor 141).
 Wood’s reading, compelling as it is, does not observe that Tanner 
repeats the mistake of calling the actor “Preacher.” even if this mistake can 
be attributed to the mental confusion that has plagued Tanner since his 
stroke (indeed, he initially mistakes the man for Coleman), this hardly sug-
gests that he has completely overcome the racial condescension that Wood 
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had criticized in the earlier encounter. moreover, while Tanner has come to 
associate his rural home with heaven—his dream of returning in a coffin, 
only to burst through it and surprise Coleman and hooten with the joyful 
cry, “Judgement Day! you idiots didn’t know it was Judgement day, did 
you?” (549), reveals as much—it is difficult to see how he could have put 
into practice his new awareness of the meaninglessness of racial distinc-
tions in the South. The story does not give him the opportunity to succeed 
or to fail: even if the actor who kills him reveals that in “this yankee baby-
lon . . . people run over each other in their unrestrained and hell-bent rush” 
(Wood, Flannery O’Connor 140), even this violence fulfills Tanner’s desires 
more quickly, and more efficiently, than a return home would. That Tan-
ner’s daughter sends his body home to be buried in Georgia is icing on the 
cake.
 if it is misleading to see Tanner’s violent death simply as a martyrdom 
or a just reward for his moral and spiritual progress, it is equally mislead-
ing to interpret it as a blow for racial justice, as alice Walker, for instance, 
suggests when she states that the final version of “Judgement Day” reveals 
O’Connor’s belief in “justice for the individual” (53). indeed, Tanner’s fate 
is constructed so that readers of fundamentally differing commitments can 
derive satisfaction from it: those appalled by his racism and contemptu-
ous of the rural southern milieu that formed him can see poetic justice in 
his death at the hands of a black man in new york; those impressed by 
the moral progress that he makes can view his death (and the relocation 
of his body to Georgia), as a triumph, citing O’Connor’s injunction to pay 
attention to lines of spiritual motion, not to dead bodies. Tanner’s Christian 
belief, like mr. head’s in “The artificial nigger,” never seems in question—
even his fear of going to hell were he to kill bespeaks it—yet his trials in the 
city and even his death are necessary to the narrative, providing a closure 
that retrospectively endows Tanner’s life with meaning and with a graver 
sense of what might be at stake than in “The artificial nigger.”
 many critics have argued that as O’Connor’s career progressed, she 
left behind a tendency toward dualism that marred some of her earliest 
work, a tendency that belied her insistence elsewhere on the sacramental 
nature of God’s creation.10 it is easy to see why “Judgement Day” might 
be enlisted in support of this claim: the signature violence remains—and, 
 10. ralph Wood, for instance, has argued that “O’Connor’s public statements are often 
quasi-dualistic, and that her fiction at times suspends characters between the virtually equal 
powers of God and Satan” (Comedy 100). he prefers the more comic late stories, “The endur-
ing Chill,” “revelation,” and “Judgement Day” itself, as instances of a more theologically 
accurate and more “splendid comic vision” (Comedy 106)—though he also criticizes “The 
enduring Chill” for its “horrific ending” (Comedy 125).
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indeed, remains dramatically necessary—but the sense that Tanner is sus-
pended between God and Satan, the sense that gives “a Good man is 
hard to Find” its unforgettable starkness, is attenuated in favor of a more 
nuanced portrayal of good and evil mixed up with each other, evil serv-
ing as the unwitting means of good, good triumphing despite its relative 
feebleness. moreover, O’Connor’s avowed belief in human freedom finds a 
more powerful confirmation here than in the heavy-handed affirmations of 
“The artificial nigger,” or even in the undercurrent expressed in “a Good 
man is hard to Find” that freedom may be possible but typically reveals 
itself in its very improbability. Tanner seems freer than the previous stories’ 
protagonists—perhaps because he has already committed himself to the 
Christianity that the grandmother must discover and to which mr. head 
must rededicate himself, while readers of the story, perceiving both its 
greater nuance and its insistence nonetheless on meaningful closure, may 
also detect less browbeating from the author. The fundamental debate con-
cerning the truth of O’Connor’s theological claims and her effectiveness in 
making them will not cease, nor should it, and my own judgments of the 
relative merits of these three stories will not swing the balance in any direc-
tion. even at her worst, however—in the pious insularity of “The artificial 
nigger”—O’Connor demands respect, and at her best, she proves to be the 
most gifted and incisive of postwar fiction writers committed to orthodox 
Christian doctrine and practice.
I. on the Superior Pleasures of Catholicism
When muriel Spark died in 2006, after a career that spanned five decades, 
obituaries duly identified her as a Catholic writer, and the most percep-
tive of them followed earlier critics in noting her affinities with Flannery 
O’Connor.1 both writers avow a religious dimension in their work; both 
have a marked hatred for sentimentality; and both are known for violence 
and shock—not only in the fates that often befall their characters but also 
in their frequent use of narrators who violate conventional readerly expec-
 1. roger Kimball, for instance, observes that in Spark’s work, “There is a moral but no 
catechism. in this respect, if in few others, her work recalls the Gothic realism of the american 
novelist and master of the short story Flannery O’Connor. For both writers, the operation of 
grace is generally a funny but decidedly astringent affair” (2). Though he approaches Spark 
from a different angle, arguing rather too breezily that “in principle there is no disagreement 
between Spark and Derrida” (171), Willy maley’s essay from four years before reaches a simi-
lar judgment: “[i]n her Catholicism, Gothicism, formalism, and dispassionate rendering of 
the struggle between good and evil, Spark resembles in many ways Flannery O’Connor. . . .” 
(178).
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Catholicism for 
“Really Intelligent People”
My own kind would be really intelligent people, more or less 
intellectuals. I’m weary for them if I’m cut off too long.
—Muriel Spark, interview with Martin McQuillan (219)
2
The Rhetoric of Muriel Spark
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tations by passing intrusive judgment on the characters. Perhaps for these 
very reasons, both have achieved their greatest success in shorter fictional 
forms—for O’Connor, the short story; for Spark, the novel considered, as 
rodney Stenning edgecombe argues, as an expanded epigram, “with all 
the specious finality or, conversely, the elegant incompleteness that charac-
terizes the form” (2). not surprisingly, both have also been loved and hated 
for similar reasons. Until recently, admirers tended to view their fiction as 
caustically witty arguments for theological truths and their use of violence 
as a means of presenting such truths without pious cliché. Detractors, often 
positioning themselves against the writers’ religious beliefs, have found 
their purposes antihumanist and repellent, and their lack of sympathetic 
identification with their characters—often presented through authoritar-
ian narrators—aesthetically crippling. richard mayne’s characterization of 
Spark’s method is characteristic: “always, behind the tale, there lurks an 
alert didactic narrator . . . [with] a mother-knows-best dead-certainty that 
holds mrs. Spark’s novels in what her actress’ ghost-writer would call a 
vise-like grip.” (49).
 any comparison between the two writers, however, reveals not only 
the obvious differences of setting and tone (O’Connor’s backwoods Geor-
gia contrasted with Spark’s urban edinburgh or cosmopolitan italy, or 
O’Connor’s realism-cum-grotesquerie with Spark’s austere echoes of the 
nouveau roman) but also an asymmetry in critical interest—which even 
so blunt an instrument as the mla international bibliography reveals.2 
Despite a much larger body of work, Spark has provoked far less com-
mentary than O’Connor. Though this asymmetry may simply reflect 
O’Connor’s greater stature as a writer, a more immediately plausible reason 
for it is the greater certainty among readers of what is at stake in reading 
O’Connor. it is impossible, as i argued in chapter 1, to avoid confronting 
O’Connor’s own justification for her work. and the gravity of what is at 
stake—salvation or damnation—demands attention, even from readers 
who wish that critics would find something else to talk about.
 Spark’s own statements about her religion and art, however, are fewer 
and far more guarded. Though she has consistently maintained that her 
Catholicism is essential to her writing voice, she has provided neither theo-
logical context nor approved readings of her work, asserting (not entirely 
credibly), “i don’t set out to be a Catholic apologist in any form” (mcQuil-
lan interview 217). in interviews, she has expressed exasperation with the 
stupidity of other Catholics, the priesthood, and the liturgy, and while she 
 2. a keyword search for “Flannery O’Connor” on 13 June 2011 yielded 1,206 sources; 
one on the same date for “muriel Spark” yielded only 245.
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has not taken on the public role of a dissenting Catholic, she has acknowl-
edged her own departures from Catholic teaching with blithe indiffer-
ence. even her famous reference to Catholic belief as “a norm from which 
one can depart” (“my Conversion” 26) for satirical purposes hardly sug-
gests the same commitment to core Christian propositions that one sees in 
O’Connor. and while references to Catholicism abound in Spark’s novels 
(in this, her work is far more overtly “Catholic” than O’Connor’s), their 
significance is more obscure, lacking the portentous intrusions of the 
divine into everyday life that characterize O’Connor’s fiction.
 Only in the first nine years of Spark’s career as a novelist, in the works 
stretching from The Comforters (1957) to The Mandelbaum Gate (1965), is it 
possible to identify continuous, though often qualified, support for Catho-
lic beliefs—and indeed, both Spark’s religious admirers and her detractors 
tend to emphasize these novels. as with O’Connor, the degree of interest 
in these early novels seems to correspond to a sense of what is theologi-
cally at stake. yet even among them, only Memento Mori (1959), The Bach-
elors (1960), and possibly The Girls of Slender Means (1963) move beyond a 
glancingly favorable presentation of Catholicism to present anything like 
O’Connor’s repeated argument that Christianity is true and that nothing is 
more important than recognizing its truth. What Frank baldanza observed 
about Spark’s work in 1965 remains apt many novels later: “[S]he has not 
treated themes that make any direct confrontation with roman Catholic 
dogma [. . . . ] the practice of a religious discipline [in her novels] is not 
very widespread, and where it does exist, it seems to make relatively little 
difference one way or the other in terms of the moral or immoral acts of her 
characters” (191, 194).
 moreover, beginning with The Public Image (1968), the references to 
Catholicism no longer suggest general approval. many of these references 
seem to be arbitrary, not fully integrated into the text, and repeated for no 
apparent reason from novel to novel, as if Spark were merely brandishing 
a trademark. The religious framework that had seemed crucial to under-
standing the earlier novels now often reads as another aspect of what ber-
nard harrison calls the “studied inconsequentiality” (131) of Spark’s style:
nothing is ever fully explained or given depth. When, at crucial points, 
the puzzled reader demands explicit enlightenment, he is invariably 
fobbed off with an authorial giggle or a significant silence. Or novels sud-
denly peter out into scraps and fragments of action and conversation, as 
at the end of Jean Brodie or The Comforters, and the reader is left to work 
out for himself why these particular fragments have been shored against 
the ruin of what had appeared until then, at least in long stretches, to be 
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almost a conventional plot [ . . . ] On this view, surface and fashionable 
enigma have finally won out: there is nothing to be seen but what is to be 
seen, and that is precious little, though terribly stylish. (133)
Such a perception of Spark’s work, certainly plausible enough, probably 
explains why she has fewer orthodox defenders than O’Connor.
 it also certainly explains why many of Spark’s more recent fans, com-
mitted to a mystique of transgression and often drawing upon poststruc-
turalist theory, are impatient with talk of her Catholicism. bryan Cheyette, 
for instance, argues that “her playful and anarchic fiction . . . disrupts the 
certainties of her supposedly stable identity as a ‘Catholic writer’” (ix). he 
does not deny that religious conversion is important in Spark’s work, but 
he decries attempts to impose a “conversionist orthodoxy” (11) on readings 
of it, because such an orthodoxy “unproblematically splits the self into old 
and new, before and after, inner and outer. Conversion, in these terms, is 
turned into a form of determinism and becomes a rather too facile act of 
redemption” (7). martin mcQuillan, on the other hand, grants that Spark 
is a Catholic writer but then defines Catholicism so broadly as to be mean-
ingless. “[e]ven the documents of the Catholic church are not Catholic,” he 
maintains, because, as writing, they necessarily undermine “essential and 
stable meanings, which presuppose and seek an authoritative center.” On 
the other hand, given the sheer historical influence of Christianity (and 
monotheism more generally), “[i]t is impossible to be european today and 
not be ‘Catholic,’ it is impossible to live in the world today and not to be, 
in some way, ‘abrahamic’” (4, 5).3 against both critics, i maintain that after 
several decades of such moves, few things are more “facile” than ritual 
proclamations against binary oppositions and appeals to the endless prolif-
eration of meaning, whether attributed to a particular writer or to language 
itself. indeed, there is an implicit (and false) binary in such arguments—one 
that pits putatively authoritarian dogma against putatively free interpretive 
play.
 in this chapter i will argue that Spark’s presentation of religious belief 
is best seen neither as a seamless argument for orthodoxy nor as a testa-
ment to the anarchy of writing but as a rhetorical strategy adapted to the 
population with whom she has most often identified—namely, “really intel-
ligent people, more or less intellectuals.” Spark does not, of course, pro-
vide a rigorous, Gramscian definition of “intellectual,” but the positive 
connotations that she evokes are familiar enough: intellectuals belong to 
 3. Still more amusingly, mcQuillan maintains that “heaven, death, hell, and judgement” 
are “ideas not currently en vogue in the Catholic church” (5)—as if references to them had 
been quietly expunged from documents and liturgies.
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an intelligent, creative, and ethically sensitive minority, capable of greater 
logical reasoning and finer aesthetic discrimination than the general public, 
but also more attuned to the connections between language and power.4 
The relationship between “intellectuals” in this broad sense and religion 
in the late twentieth century is uneasy, for although, as Terry eagleton has 
observed, religion “is capable of operating at every social level: if there is 
a doctrinal inflection of it for the intellectual elite, there is also a pietistic 
brand of it for the masses” (Literary Theory 20), it is nevertheless evident 
that many twentieth-century intellectuals, committed to a narrative that 
links secularization with modernity, have tended to regard religion either 
as a lifestyle accessory (and so an essentially private and aesthetic concern) 
or as a crutch for those too afraid or unintelligent to trust their own powers 
of reasoning. as a Catholic writer, Spark, like O’Connor, is concerned with 
making religious belief credible to an intellectual audience presumed not 
to share it. yet whereas O’Connor assumes the hostility of this audience, 
deriding intellectuals and obsessively staging the spectacle of bien-pensant 
hubris laid low, Spark dramatizes her complicity with it. The reader who 
can appreciate Spark’s cold, whimsical art, seeing in it what she once called 
“the liberation of our minds from the comfortable cells of lofty sentiment” 
(“Desegregation” 36), is invited to regard Catholicism in the same light, 
as a system that affords superior aesthetic delights—if, that is, one can see 
beyond the tribal vulgarities of one’s fellow Catholics. That it also happens 
to be true is presented offhandedly, as a kind of fringe benefit.
 This rhetorical appeal also suggests a reason for the discrepancy in criti-
cal commentary on Spark and O’Connor. To insist too strongly on what is 
at stake in belief or unbelief, as O’Connor does, would negate Spark’s par-
ticular appeal, for such a move would cast the intended reader as someone 
weak enough to require either the threat of hell or a sentimentally lov-
 4. Geoffrey Galt harpham suggests that “[f]or the past century, the dominant ground-
ing idea for intellectual culture as a whole has been the thought of language. . . . This kind 
of emphasis on language itself is characteristically modern. a ‘premodern’ orientation, we 
might say, is signaled by a faith in the primacy of concepts on the one hand and the pos-
sibility of an unmediated observation of material fact on the other. . . . The modernist mo-
ment is achieved when immediacy in either direction is renounced as an illusion, when the 
limits of language are seen as the limits of the world, and linguistic mediation itself becomes 
the object of observation” (4). Though harpham is speaking primarily of twentieth-century 
philosophers of language, his observation is equally applicable to twentieth-century “intel-
lectuals” in the broader sense i have defined above, for it speaks to the association of the 
“intellectual” with aesthetic discrimination and pleasure (a novel, after all, is not an “unme-
diated” material fact) and to the self-consciousness and anxiety about agency and meaning 
that such aesthetic facility often promotes. i am tempted to extrapolate from harpham and 
to define an intellectual as one who regards language “in itself” as an ultimate reality but 
cannot decide whether it is the source and expression of freedom (aesthetic play) or the key 
mechanism that perpetuates determinism (ideology).
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ing God. hence the apparent inconsequentiality of many of Spark’s refer-
ences to religion: the worthy reader, it would seem, finds aesthetic richness 
precisely in this lack of consequence. moreover, this particular aesthetic 
is bound up with an interest in the peculiar pleasures of determinism, as 
novel after novel dispenses arbitrary fates to its characters, inviting read-
ers to rejoice in their lack of freedom and to shift their own identification 
between free narrator and unfree characters continually. The pleasures of 
such a dialectic of bondage and freedom are real, but they are also charac-
teristic of intellectuals who have acceded to different versions of linguis-
tic determinism—and who, unable to assert a grounded faith in freedom, 
turn to the delights of subversion as the next best thing.5 indeed, readers of 
Spark who ground themselves in poststructuralist theory, such as Fotini e. 
apostolou, tend to reduce her work to “an endless spiral of seduction and 
death, where one enters a structure that envelops him/her in order to cre-
ate a construct that will imprison others, who will, in their turn, desire to be 
enticed by this construct in order to enter and change it” (xvi).
 Though Spark does indeed appeal to such pleasures, she provides a 
more orthodox frame within which to understand them—one that reflects 
her own conversion to Catholicism under the influence of John henry new-
man. Known for his intellectual rigor, his highly aesthetic use of rhetoric in 
the Apologia Pro Vita Sua, his devotion to the beauties as well as the theol-
ogy of the eucharist and the liturgy, and his theory of the “illative sense” 
that emphasizes the personal nature of the apprehension of truth, newman 
combines the sense of intellectual and aesthetic richness that Spark relishes 
with an appeal to the determinism implicit in any appeal to the irreduc-
ibly personal. viewed through newman’s theory, Spark’s playful investiga-
tions of the relationship between writing and determinism suggest that the 
apprehension of religious truth comes more easily and is more rewarding 
 5. michel Foucault and Judith butler are representative figures here—indeed, it might 
be said that they make unusually explicit the anxiety about the relationship between lan-
guage and power that is characteristic of twentieth-century intellectuals more generally and 
try to defuse it by suggesting that subversion is the only possible recourse in a linguistically 
determined world. The later work of Foucault (especially the volumes of The History of Sexual-
ity) repeats the double gesture of invoking the omnipresence of power and discourse on the 
one hand and cataloguing the possibilities of self-cultivation within such a determinist frame-
work on the other. butler’s entire oeuvre is a continual turning of the screws of this problem, 
an attempt to account for the emergence of a subject’s severely limited agency from within 
a totality that subordinates subjects even as it calls them into being. a major consequence of 
Foucault and butler’s work, as martha nussbaum has suggested, has been the eroticization 
of power and subversion. Though i cannot mount here a full-scale critique of such a posi-
tion, suffice it to say that even if there were not good reasons to doubt the characterization 
of language as a “prison-house” (to allude to Fredric Jameson), the repeated description of 
such moves has become stupefyingly boring.
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for those gifted enough to see its complexity—which is to say, those with 
an aesthetic and intellectual disposition. indeed, it may be that one way to 
understand Spark is to see her as a kind of “bridge” figure between new-
man and such contemporary theological developments as radical Ortho-
doxy, which reaffirm the urgency of Christianity within postmodernity and 
have much to say about the intersection between Christianity and aesthet-
ics—though such a comparison might too blithely suggest the interchange-
ability of art and theology.
 in making this argument about Spark’s rhetorical strategies against 
certain emphases in poststructuralist theory, i am in basic agreement with 
Wayne booth’s claim that in a work of fiction, “the author’s judgment is 
always present, always evident to anyone who knows how to look for it” 
(Rhetoric of Fiction 20)—though i would add that booth’s matter-of-fact 
tone here understates the difficulty of such a task in a writer as cerebral 
as Spark. booth’s insight that “unreliable” fictions frequently “depend for 
their effects on ironic collusion between the author and his readers” (391) 
is true of nearly all of Spark’s work, and it becomes especially so after 1965, 
but such collusion is achieved only through considerable labor on the part 
of the reader, which in turn tends to confirm readers who believe them-
selves to be “in” on her project in their own intellectual prowess. in what 
follows, i will demonstrate the successes and sketch some of the limita-
tions of Spark’s rhetorical strategies, tracing her portrayal of Catholicism 
as a system that provides superior intellectual and aesthetic delights even 
as it continues to foreground the problem of how to reconcile freedom with 
divine providence, the author’s design with the expectation that characters 
in a novel be recognizably free. in most of the novels that i examine—The 
Comforters, The Girls of Slender Means (1964), The Abbess of Crewe (1974), Loi-
tering with Intent (1981), and Reality and Dreams (1996)—Spark foregrounds 
characters who are aspiring or accomplished artists, as if to suggest that 
both the problems and the potential achievements of Catholic belief should 
be understood primarily in aesthetic terms and only secondarily in terms of 
truth.
II. Freeing oneself from a novel: 
 The Strange Case of The Comforters
at the center of Spark’s aesthetic, as many have noted, is an analogy 
between an author’s control over her work and God’s omnipotence. The 
characters in a novel are, of course, not “free,” but Spark is perhaps unusual 
in highlighting the moral problematic that this basic fact of the reading 
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experience provokes—what ruth Whittaker calls the tension between “the 
formal demands of her art and the mute claims of her characters for narra-
torial recognition of their humanity” (150). David lodge has read The Prime 
of Miss Jean Brodie as a contest between “the Catholic God who allows for 
free will and the Calvinistic one who doesn’t” (“Time-Shift” 76), but the 
novelist is necessarily like the Calvinist God, and any attempt to view a 
novel as relevant to real life therefore invites the problem of how to square 
the tendency to judge characters as if they were free agents with their 
actual lack of freedom. in chapter 1, i referred to marina macKay’s argu-
ment that a Catholic genealogy of the novel, as opposed to the leavisite 
assumption of the genre’s Protestant underpinnings, might yield a different 
understanding of character and of one’s judgment of it. Whereas “[c]harac-
ter in life and the novel were conflated because leavisite criticism tapped 
into the evangelical spirit of the nineteenth century” that “people are capa-
ble of changing” (228), a Catholic lens might well suggest that change is 
unpredictable, performative, and paradoxical—with the corollary that “the 
realized individual character is, in fact, the least free of all” (231). in this 
framing of the problem, the dichotomy is not between Calvinist and Catho-
lic author-Gods but between an illusory Protestant freedom and an illusory 
Catholic determinism. Perhaps the “determined” quality of a character in 
a novel in fact functions as the clearest sign of the character’s freedom—
if only because such characters frustrate readers’ attempts to understand 
them.
 This is, in fact, how macKay reads Spark’s novel The Driver’s Seat (1970). 
lise, the novel’s protagonist, intends to be murdered and chooses her mur-
derer. her victimization is proleptically announced by the narrator early 
in the novel, but only near the end do readers discover that she has been 
pulling the strings all along, despite the fact that they know nothing of 
her motivations: “Spark gives autonomy to a character who consequently 
becomes depthless and unmotivated. The driver’s seat is the death of char-
acter” (macKay 232). as the narrator maintains of lise, “Who knows her 
thoughts? Who can tell?” (53). a similar situation structures Not to Disturb 
(1971), whose plot martin Stannard engagingly summarizes: “The servants 
of the Château Klopstock await the inevitable bloody deaths of their mas-
ters and prepare to profit from this by appropriating the contents of the 
house and by selling the story . . . neither are we told how lister and his 
crew know that murder is imminent, and know with such certainty that 
they have alerted journalists, written a scenario, and arranged for two por-
nographic film-makers to be on hand” (381–82). When the plot in which 
the servants wish to entrap their masters threatens to come apart, a quick 
and inventive rewriting occurs. in both novels, an author-figure—whether 
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Spark herself in The Driver’s Seat or the servants in Not to Disturb—main-
tains and even flaunts control of plot, while the dominated characters 
remain stubbornly opaque.
 yet i would argue that Spark’s most accomplished variation on this 
theme occurs in her first novel, The Comforters, which lacks the icy imper-
sonality of these later works. The Comforters reads less like a tour de force but 
proves more penetrating as a moral inquiry, in part because of its thinly 
disguised autobiographical element, which works against the systematic 
foreclosing of moral judgment that The Driver’s Seat and Not to Disturb 
attempt.6 The central figure of the novel, Caroline rose, is a recent convert 
to Catholicism and a writer (working on a study called Form in the Mod-
ern Novel) who has, after her conversion, given up sex with her boyfriend, 
laurence mathers. Convinced of the truth of Catholic dogma, she endures 
much irritation for it—less from the incomprehension of her friends and 
laurence (who is himself a lapsed Catholic) than from the pettiness and 
tribalism of most of the Catholics she encounters, whom she regards as stu-
pid, ugly, and “infatuated with a tragic image of themselves” (37). Shortly 
after Caroline is introduced, she flees from a retreat at the Pilgrim Cen-
tre of St. Philumena after unpleasant conversations with mrs. Georgina 
hogg, who disapprovingly says, “you’re the sort that doesn’t mix” (29), 
wears no brassiere under her cotton blouse, and describes her position 
at St. Philumena’s as a miracle effected by the intervention of the virgin 
mary (32–33). Though disgusted by such pious believers, Caroline finds 
in the discrepancy between them and the truth of Catholic dogma confir-
mation of the Church’s authenticity.7 When laurence tells her that she is 
 6. Willy maley, in my judgment the best of Spark’s critics who draw upon poststructur-
alist theory, has also made the best possible case for the merits of Not to Disturb, though he 
does not emphasize the freedom that lack of characterological depth might intimate. he finds, 
instead, an exposure of the “mutually assured destruction between aristocracy and peas-
antry, between the arrogant and the ignorant (however knowing in the ways of the world)” 
(183–84), and connects this exposure to Spark’s often quoted claim that “[r]idicule is the 
only honourable weapon [artists] have left” (“Desegregation” 35). Thematically, maley is on 
to something here, but i do not share his judgment that such deconstructive moves are “dis-
turbing,” nor do i detect any ridicule in them. Spark’s recommendation of ridicule is voiced 
from a position of moral and aesthetic commitment that may call political commitments into 
question, but does not prove as self-undermining as a Derridean focus would imply. because 
Not to Disturb provides no basis for judgment, it works against Spark’s program of an art of 
ridicule.
 7. it is possible to characterize Caroline’s attitude here as “sacramental,” as long as 
the sacramental is not conflated with the emotionally uplifting. Caroline is a kindred spirit 
of Sandy Stranger, the convert and nun in The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie, who achieves fame 
for writing a book called The Transfiguration of the Commonplace but whose expectations for 
ordinary happiness in the Church seem to be dashed nevertheless. having betrayed miss 
brodie for her fascist sympathies, Sandy discovers in the Catholic Church “quite a number 
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“always bad-tempered after mass,” she responds that this is “one of the 
proofs of the Faith so far as i’m concerned,” because “[t]he flesh despairs” 
(112) at such contact with her coreligionists. her favorite fellow Catholic is 
her Uncle ernest, a gay man who, like her, has renounced sexual relation-
ships and taken a “critical but conforming” attitude toward Catholicism: 
“the True Church was awful but, unfortunately, one couldn’t deny, true” 
(88–89). The novel makes clear that Caroline’s fastidiousness is not itself a 
product of her conversion itself; it continues an established pattern of “ner-
vous responses to food and sleep at the best of times” and frequent physi-
cal illnesses (70). For all her distaste with attitudes of martyrdom, she is 
accurately judged by laurence as one who cultivates a “[m]artyrdom by 
misunderstanding” (232) and by the narrator as possessing a “rapacity for 
suffering” (37).
 appearing at first to be a straightforward realist narrative, The Comfort-
ers shifts decisively toward metafiction when Caroline begins hearing the 
sound of a typewriter, accompanied by voices that comment on her actions 
and even her thoughts. She concludes that “a writer on another plane of 
existence” is using her as a character in a novel (66). (The biblical allu-
sion to the book of Job in the novel’s title now comes into play: Caroline’s 
“comforters” are those who would provide a coherent explanation for the 
voices—namely, that she is going mad—rather than permit her to confront 
the evident fact that there is no reason for her suffering.) as initial fear for 
her sanity gives way to a determination to resist this unknown author, the 
third-person narrator of The Comforters begins to express irritation with 
Caroline’s meddling. When the narrator abruptly relates, “at this point in 
the narrative, it might be as well to state that the characters in this novel 
are all fictitious, and do not refer to any living persons whatsoever” (74), 
Caroline screams in reply (though her words are delayed for eight pages), 
“That’s a damned lie. you’re getting scared, i think. Why are you suddenly 
taking cover under that protestation?” (82). later, when Caroline is in the 
hospital after suffering injuries in an automobile accident, the narrator 
complains that at this point in the narrative, “no experience of hers ought 
to be allowed to intrude,” but because she sleeps badly, she remains awake 
of Fascists much less agreeable than miss brodie” (123). When Sandy, now Sister helena of 
the Transfiguration, receives visitors, her mannerisms suggest imprisonment—she “clutche[s] 
the bars of her grille as if she wanted to escape from the dim parlour beyond, for she was not 
composed like the other nuns” (33). here Spark seems to mock Sandy’s impatience, but she 
also mocks those who would read too much into this gesture and perhaps discredit Sandy’s 
insights in doing so: “[e]veryone likes to visit a nun, it provides a spiritual sensation, a ca-
tharsis to go home with, especially if the nun clutches the bars of the grille” (118–19). See 
also benilde montgomery’s reading of the novel, which perceptively links Sandy’s sense of 
doctrinal development to newman’s.
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and “turn[s] her mind to the art of the novel, wondering and cogitating, 
those long hours, and exerting an undue, unreckoned, influence on the nar-
rative from which she is supposed to be absent from the time” (154, 155). 
Caroline resists the narrator in other ways as well, complaining that Geor-
gina hogg is “[n]ot a real-life character . . . only a gargoyle” (157), and that 
other key events of the plot, such as laurence’s grandmother’s position as 
leader of a gang of diamond smugglers, are too implausible to be convinc-
ing as fiction. When the narrator reports that Georgina hogg stops wearing 
brassieres because it is “like damming up the sea” to restrain her breasts, 
Caroline responds, “bad taste . . . revolting taste,” which prompts a further, 
defensive remark: ‘bad taste’—typical comment of Caroline rose. Wasn’t it 
she in the first place who had noticed with revulsion the transparent blouse 
of mrs. hogg . . .? it was Caroline herself who introduced into the story the 
question of mrs. hogg’s bosom” (157).
 Caroline explains her resistance to the unknown author in explicitly 
theological terms: “i intend to stand aside and see if the novel has any real 
form apart from this artificial plot. i happen to be a Christian” (117). Since 
her faith teaches that human beings are in fact free, she must determine 
whether her actions and the actions of the other characters correspond to 
freely undertaken decisions rather than an implausible novelistic logic if 
she is to maintain her faith. Such an attitude is consistent with her dismis-
sive response to mrs. hogg’s talk of miracles and demands for social “mix-
ing”: against such popular piety and appeals to a determinist Providence, 
she will use her reason to test her faith, apparently secure in the knowl-
edge that faith will prevail. The narrator responds, “all very well for her 
to resolve upon holding up the action. easy for her to criticize,” and imme-
diately arranges an automobile crash (118), as if to prove her wrong. it is 
precisely in the hospital, however, when Caroline is “supposed” to be out 
of the narrative, that she begins to escape the narrator’s complete control 
precisely by meditating on the art of the novel. Though her “sense of being 
written into the novel” remains “painful,” she also begins to glimpse her 
eventual deliverance from it: “[n]ow she was impatient for the story to 
come to an end, knowing that the narrative could never become coherent 
to her until she was at last outside it, and at the same time consummately 
inside it” (206). evidently, fiction is both a means of domination over help-
less characters and a medium that can teach readers something about their 
own freedom. how to reconcile this apparent paradox?
 The final resolution of the plot, which confirms Caroline’s continued 
entrapment yet gestures toward a sense in which she might also be free, 
is anticipated when laurence asks, “how is your book going?” and she 
responds, “i think it is nearing the end.” laurence, who means her book 
Form in the Modern Novel, is surprised, “for only a few days since she had 
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announced that the work was slow in progress” (190). When laurence 
presses her to clarify, she says, “i look forward to the end of the book . . . in 
a manner of speaking to get some peace”—here clearly referring to the 
book “about” her. immediately afterward, she asks, “Do you remember 
the passage in Proust where he discusses the ambiguous use of the word 
book . . .?” (194). Though she does not specify which passage from Proust 
she has in mind, this allusion is enough to alter a reader’s sense of how The 
Comforters configures the freedom of its characters.
 as Dorrit Cohn has painstakingly argued in The Distinction of Fiction, 
Proust’s Remembrance of Things Past possesses a “generic ambiguity” (58) 
that makes it difficult for readers to read it confidently either as a novel 
or as an autobiography. Though Cohn concludes that the work is a novel, 
she admits that a “genuinely fictional reading” of it is extremely difficult to 
achieve, both because “the sheer mass of essayistic, philosophical discourse 
in the Recherche discourages the mental construction of a narrator who is 
not identified with the author” and because “criteria of narrative content 
and narrative mode are too weak, as compared to contractual criteria, to 
enforce a bona fide fictional reading” (78). by referring to “Proust” rather 
than to “Proust’s narrator” or even to “marcel,” Caroline tacitly endorses 
an autobiographical reading of the text, and though she does not spec-
ify which passage from the work she has in mind, thematically there is a 
strong case made for this one on the “livre intérieur” from the final third:
as for the interior book of unknown symbols (symbols carved in relief 
they might have been, which my attention, as it explored my unconscious, 
groped for and stumbled against and followed the contours of, like a diver 
exploring the ocean bed), if i tried to read them no one could help me 
with any rules, for to read them was an act of creation in which no one 
can do our work for us or even collaborate with us. how many for this 
reason turn aside from writing! . . . but excuses have no place in art and 
intentions count for nothing: at every moment the artist has to listen to his 
instinct, and it is this that makes art the most real of all things, the most 
austere school of life, the true last judgment. This book, more laborious to 
decipher than any other, is also the only one which has been dictated to us 
by reality, the only one of which the “impression” has been printed in us 
by reality itself. . . . The book whose hieroglyphs are patterns not traced by 
us is the only book that really belongs to us. . . . What we have not had to 
decipher, to elucidate by our own efforts, what was clear before we looked 
at it, is not ours. . . . i had arrived then at the conclusion that in fashion-
ing a work of art we are by no means free, that we do not choose how we 
shall make it but that it pre-exists us and therefore we are obliged, since it 
is both necessary and hidden, to do what we should have to do if it were a 
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law of nature, that is to say to discover it. . . . in this conclusion i was con-
firmed by the thought of the falseness of so-called realist art, which would 
not be so untruthful if we had not in life acquired the habit of giving to 
what we feel a form of expression which differs so much from, and which 
we nevertheless after a little time take to be, reality itself. (iii 913–15)
 The simultaneous avowal and disavowal of conscious artistry in this 
passage, the claim that the “interior book,” the true book, is achieved only 
by pursuing one’s impressions as if to trace “a law of nature,” suggests 
Caroline’s own resolution of her predicament: she will become a novel-
ist herself, following not realistic conventions (significantly, she has been 
struggling with the chapter in Form in the Modern Novel on realism [59]), 
but by listening to “unconscious” suggestions and learning to distinguish 
what is true in them. The strongest implication is that while Caroline has 
not ceased to be a character in the work, she has also become its author. 
Though this suspicion is not confirmed by what Cohn calls “contractual 
criteria” (for instance, the narrator never uses the pronoun “i” in a way 
that would establish her co-identity with Caroline), laurence’s discovery 
of “an enormous sheaf” for Caroline’s novel in the final pages suggests its 
plausibility, as does his reaction to the notes: “you misrepresent all of us” 
(232).
 Spark does not, to be sure, identify Caroline with herself in the ambig-
uous way that Proust applies the name “marcel” to his narrator, but the 
biographical parallels between her and Caroline extend even to Caroline’s 
hearing voices. in January 1954, Spark began having hallucinations as she 
worked on a study of T. S. eliot: “[T]he letters of the words i was reading 
became confused. They formed anagrams and crosswords. . . . i thought at 
first that there was a code built into eliot’s work and tried to decipher it” 
(Curriculum 204). The hallucinations proved to be an effect of Spark’s taking 
Dexedrine as an appetite suppressant, and as she recovered from the drug’s 
effects, she resolved “to write a novel about my recent brief but extremely 
intense word-game experience” (Curriculum 205), though she recast the 
visual hallucinations as auditory. moreover, Spark responded to the discov-
ery of her hallucinations as Caroline does, coming to believe that despite 
their literal falsity, they provided valuable information about herself. as she 
put it in a letter of 26 march 1954 to Derek Stanford, “now i feel released 
from a very real bondage & can make use of the experience. The real deliv-
erance is the feeling that i can discover things about myself independent 
of the ‘code’—things that i didn’t intuitively find among the anagrams but 
which i hope will come to light in my mind & in fact have already done 
so” (qtd. in Stannard 157). here, too, the parallel with the Proust passage—
in which “no one could help” the writer “with any rules” because reading 
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“the interior book of unknown symbols” is an act of “creation” rather than 
“collaboration”—is suggestive.8
 i have dwelled on these parallels not to argue that The Comforters is 
merely a disguised autobiography but to suggest that in its reworking of 
obviously autobiographical material, it provides a revealing point of entry 
into Spark’s larger argument about the relations among religious belief, aes-
thetic pleasure, human freedom, and the moral ambiguity of authorship. 
laurence reflects that “[r]eligion had so changed Caroline,” for it made 
her insist that he would “have to be involved personally” to understand 
her, and the “know-all assumption of the words” had “infuriate[ed] him” 
(233). he does, it would seem, understand her desire to know the truth 
and to turn this knowledge into a form of control, for since his childhood, 
he has delighted in spying on people and reading their private letters (4), 
though when the shoe is on the other foot, he reacts with rage (78) before, 
apparently, resigning himself to being “the character called laurence man-
ders” (231). The implication seems to be that Caroline’s belief in Catholi-
cism affords her greater freedom to see the truth and to benefit from it—her 
“personal” involvement absolves her of the charge of merely playing God, 
for it ensures that she does have a genuine relationship with the truth, a 
relationship that confirms her vocation as a writer. as Spark put it in “my 
Conversion,” “nobody can deny i speak with my own voice as a writer 
now, whereas before my conversion i couldn’t do it because i was never 
sure what i was, the ideas teemed but i couldn’t sort them out, i was talk-
ing and writing with other people’s voices all the time” (26). Conversion, 
then, is a vehicle to personal and artistic freedom, but one needs to tread 
carefully, for there is inevitably a moral hazard in the writer’s trade—pre-
destining the fates of characters as if one were God. by staging a novel 
in which a Catholic convert character fights for her own freedom and 
becomes, as it were, her own author, Spark hints—but does not confirm—
that a properly religious but suitably intellectual faith alone enables such a 
liberation, especially if it not accompanied by illusions about its capacity to 
make human beings nicer.
III. Spark’s misfit: 
 The Girls of Slender Means
if The Comforters associates religious faith with pursuit of the truth, artistic 
ambition, and the extension of one’s freedom, The Girls of Slender Means, 
 8. it is, admittedly, tempting to read Spark’s experience as an illustration of harold 
bloom’s “anxiety of influence,” in which she fights off eliot, her overdetermined precursor, 
by creatively misreading what had been his secret, threatening code.
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her novel set in london during the final days of the Second World War, 
seems more analogous to O’Connor’s work, for it uses violence as an occa-
sion for grace and portrays genuine freedom as an elusive, improbable 
occurrence. The belated explosion of a bomb outside the may of Teck Club, 
a girls’ hostel, sets the building on fire. as the firemen attempt to rescue 
those trapped on the top floor, nicholas Farringdon, a feckless anarchist 
poet who has frequented the club because he has an idealized image of the 
girls who live there, witnesses two events in quick succession. First, his 
lover Selina manages to escape, but as she does so she steals another girl’s 
Schiaparelli dress that she had coveted. Secondly, Joanna, the daughter of 
an anglican curate known for her elocution and her devotion to unworldly 
romantic ideals, falls to her death as the building collapses. as a result of 
this shocking juxtaposition—the equivalent of The misfit’s encounter with 
the grandmother—nicholas converts to Catholicism, becomes a priest, and 
dies in haiti as a martyr.
 in addition to sharing this basic plot structure with O’Connor, Spark 
reveals herself to be even less committed to the individualized charac-
ter portrait than O’Connor. Despite the splendidly realized period ambi-
ence and sparkling dialogue of The Girls of Slender Means, Spark ruthlessly 
reduces her characters to types in ways that foreshadow the cipherlike 
human beings of Not to Disturb, yet simultaneously critiques prevailing 
stereotypes of the period for their sentimentality. at a moment when the 
“general axiom” is that “[a]ll the nice people in england were poor” (1), 
the poverty of the may of Teck girls should speak in their favor, but Spark 
deftly undercuts such a conclusion: “few people alive at the time were more 
delightful, more ingenious, more movingly lovely, and, as it might happen, 
more savage, than the girls of slender means” (4). The girls themselves are 
not unique in their corruption: as crowds assemble on vJ night to await the 
appearance of the royal family, nicholas witnesses a sailor stab a woman to 
death, undetected. When he cannot draw attention to the murder because 
of the thickness and preoccupation of the crowd, nicholas contents him-
self with shoving a forged letter in praise of his manuscript (intended to 
impress a publisher) down the sailor’s blouse, because “it was a gesture. 
That is the way things were at the time” (183). Collectively obsessed with 
“love and money” (27), individually the girls and their boyfriends are 
reduced to a few broad strokes and “gestures”: Joanna is idealistic and 
naïve, Selina stupid and “extremely slim” (36), Jane “fat but intellectually 
glamorous by virtue of the fact that she worked for a publisher” (33), and 
nicholas himself a familiar, pretentious type of artist. The repeated taglines 
and idées fixes that might seem to convey individuality in fact do just the 
opposite, so that the predictability of everyone forms a background against 
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which nicolas’s conversion, the genuinely free or genuinely providential 
act, registers more strongly.
 yet despite these similarities, Spark’s novel also provides revealing 
contrasts to O’Connor’s method. Whereas “a Good man is hard to Find” 
moves chronologically toward the encounter between the grandmother 
and The misfit, whose gravity it is impossible to doubt, Spark does not 
foreground the conversion when it occurs but treats it from the beginning 
of her novel as a fait accompli. The novel oscillates between the events of 
1945 and brief proleptic passages referring to an unspecified future date, 
and even in the first chapter presents nicholas’s conversion and martyr-
dom, well before introducing him as a character. later, the reader discov-
ers that it was indeed his observation of Selina’s theft that prompted the 
conversion, but this information is revealed offhandedly, long before the 
moment happens: “he had not yet slept on the roof with Selina on the hot 
summer nights . . . and he had not yet witnessed that action of savagery so 
extreme that it forced him involuntarily to make an entirely unaccustomed 
gesture, the signing of the cross upon himself” (73). interestingly, nicho-
las seems less certain than the narrator that this is the moment of conver-
sion, for, as the narrator reports, “later, reflecting on this lightning scene, 
he could not trust his memory as to whether he then involuntarily signed 
himself with the cross. it seemed to him, in recollection, that he did” (161). 
but to avoid any doubt that he considers his conversion provoked by Seli-
na’s action, whether he remembers crossing himself or not, the narrator 
reveals that he has left in the manuscript of The Sabbath Notebooks, his col-
lection of pensées, “a note that a vision of evil may be as effective to conver-
sion as a vision of good” (180).
 This departure from traditional chronology, which Spark has explained 
by saying, “i don’t think chronology is causality” (interview with Sara 
Frankel 451), in fact implies a more determinist vision of conversion than 
O’Connor’s. readers see the author’s design from the beginning, which 
time cannot alter, and so are partially inoculated against the shock of the 
event. moreover, they know nicholas’s thoughts about what he witnesses 
far more clearly than they know the grandmother’s—not only because the 
narrator reports them, but also because the fact that he is not simultane-
ously the victim and the beneficiary of violence allows him to explain his 
conversion and so to confirm its necessity. The image with which the novel 
concludes—one of the remaining may of Teck girls, “sturdy and bare-
legged on the dark grass, occupied with her hair” (183)—is remembered by 
nicholas years later in haiti, and what edgecombe calls this image’s “epi-
grammatic closure” (60) indeed provides a fitting illustration of Spark’s 
design.
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 how, then, should readers understand these differences between 
O’Con nor’s and Spark’s texts? it would seem that Spark, more than O’Con-
nor, has taken to heart Girard’s claim that if an author is free, her characters 
cannot be. because readers are never allowed to forget this lack of freedom 
in Spark’s novel, they must locate her appeal to the reader instead as an 
ironic, intellectual savoring of the pleasures of determinism. O’Connor, 
however, in striving to make readers forget her design, and placing at the 
heart of even a story so heavy with chronological necessity and foreshad-
owing a space into which any possibility at all might flow, proves both 
more faithful to Catholic teaching and, as her greater popularity among 
ordinary readers and critics alike suggests, more accessible.
 in subsequent novels, Spark would continue to explore the connections 
between artistic vision and the truths and benefits of religious faith. in gen-
eral, the more central Spark’s focus on a particular artist-figure, the greater 
his or her achievement and freedom. When she pursues a strategy of indi-
rection and interrupted chronology, as in The Girls of Slender Means, she 
entraps her characters in a predestined structure and invites audiences to 
admire the turning of her screws: nicholas’s authorship and conversion, for 
instance, may associate him with the apprehension of intellectual truth, but 
it does not confirm his autonomy, as his life ends in a martyrdom reported 
second-hand rather than witnessed, whose significance is lost even to 
those who repeat the word. When Spark employs a more straightforward 
chronology and more consistent focalization through a single character, 
as in The Abbess of Crewe and Loitering with Intent, her portrayals of artists 
become both more loving and more fabulous. at the same time, these char-
acters continue to reflect upon the problems of determinism, both in their 
own conception of themselves before God and in the way they use other 
people toward the achievement of their artistic goals. as Spark becomes 
more indulgent with her characters, her stance toward Catholic doctrine 
becomes more ambiguous, though references to it are never abandoned.
IV. totality, Freedom, and Personalism: 
 The Influence of newman
The opening sentence of Spark’s late novel Reality and Dreams gestures 
toward these problems, both theological and narrative: “he often won-
dered if we were all characters in one of God’s dreams” (7). by introduc-
ing the protagonist with a pronoun rather than a proper name, the novel 
implies the lack of individual agency associated with dreams. yet despite 
such feelings, Tom richards is not just a character in a novel (and so pre-
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sumed to have “depth” and autonomy until proven otherwise) but also, as 
a film director, a fellow artist. and in fact he displays his own artist-God 
complex nakedly, going to ridiculous lengths to control every aspect of his 
artistic production and dismissing others as “superfluous” (13). When the 
novel opens, he is in a drugged state of semiconsciousness, recovering in a 
hospital from a fall from a crane on the set of his current film, tentatively 
called The Hamburger Girl. reflecting later upon the moments before the 
fall, he thinks, “yes, i did feel like God up on that crane. it was wonderful 
to shout orders through the amplifier and like God watch the team down 
there group and re-group as bidden” (14). a reader of Flannery O’Connor 
might suspect that the fall functions as a deserved humiliation. When read-
ers learn that in his drugged state, he had entertained the thought of mur-
dering his wife, Claire, in order to inherit her fortune and to give it to the 
girl who inspired his film (a young woman glimpsed cooking hamburg-
ers at a campsite kiosk in France), the problem of confusing life and art is 
established clearly.
 at this point, one might refer this problem, as David lodge does, back 
to the specific content of Catholicism and its emphasis on freedom. even 
if Tom cannot demonstrate his “freedom” from the text in which he is 
inscribed, Catholic references in the novel might work toward an argument 
about extratextual human freedom. here, however, readers confront the 
apparent arbitrariness of such references. Complaining to one of his friends, 
ralph, that “[i]f auden was alive, he would have come to see me in his 
shabby clothes,” Tom continues to reminisce about writers he has known, 
turning the subject to Catholicism as he does so:
“if Graham Greene were alive he would have looked in to see me, perhaps 
not in hospital but certainly here at home. Sex was his main subject, when 
you met him at least to start with. he had a mix-up of women and felt 
guilty the whole time. Without girls i think he couldn’t have carried on. 
he needed it for his writing. Graham would have sent me a dozen bottles 
of rare wine or champagne. he would have come for an evening’s talk and 
drink if he had known i was stuck in this bedroom. he would talk about 
sex always as if it was the forbidden fruit of the tree of knowledge. Sex 
and desire and the hazards thereof, such as divorce and venereal disease. 
i tried to get him on to religion but he was chary of that subject, Cathol-
icism. he believed in it without swallowing everything, which is possi-
ble, and in fact more widely practised than one might think. in fact, he 
couldn’t not believe, in spite of himself.
  “So much for his beliefs, but in some ways he had a bureaucratic con-
ception of Catholic doctrine, but so do many Catholics including the pres-
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ent Pope [John Paul ii]. Greene never called me Tom, by the way. it was 
always ‘richards.’ but he called Claire ‘Claire’ of course. Which reminds 
me of allen Tate another Catholic who was keen on women. have you 
heard of Tate?”
  “no,” said ralph. “Unless you mean an american writer, i seem to 
remember. . . .”
  “you remember right. he was an american poet, critic, and anglo-
phile. he went to see Pius Xii in 1957. he told me how it went. allen said, 
‘your holiness, the english and american Catholic bishops are feeling 
uneasy about the index of Forbidden books. after the acts of censorship 
under totalitarianism the intelligent Catholic laity want more democratic 
freedom.’
  “‘ah yes,’ said Pius, ‘[Jacques] maritain was here last week with that 
problem. Greene came about it recently. how many children,—nephews, 
do you have?’
  “allen told him how many.
  “The Pope said, ‘here are four rosaries. The black ones are for boys, 
the white for girls.’ end of audience.”
  “Was that the Pope before this?”
  “no it was actually five Popes ago.” (45–47)
 This passage is funny, but establishing the target of the humor is sur-
prisingly difficult. Who or what is being mocked here—“cafeteria” Catho-
lics who profess to believe but are selective in their application of belief, 
such as Greene? (Certainly Greene and Tate were “keen on women.”) Writ-
ers who think that promiscuity is essential to their art or take sex too seri-
ously? a Church and Pope so cut off from the laity that the rote dispensing 
of rosaries passes for “dialogue”? Critics who invariably seek references 
to Catholicism in Spark’s work, and of whose theories she has become 
“chary”? The naïveté of Catholic intellectuals such as Tate, whose interest 
in “democratic freedom” pales in significance next to the truths and of the 
Church and who deserve to be brushed aside in this way? ecclesial corrup-
tion and infidelity to vows, perhaps hinted in the reference to “nephews”?9 
The ridiculousness of the now-abolished index—yet another focus for argu-
ments about the scope of freedom? The garrulity and peevishness of an old, 
ill, and nostalgic man? all of the above? and to what extent are readers to 
approve of Tom’s judgments about Catholic matters—for instance, that it is 
possible “to believe without swallowing everything,” or that John Paul ii’s 
conception of doctrine is “essentially bureaucratic”?
 9. The reference to nephews alludes to robert browning’s “The bishop Orders his 
Tomb at Saint Praxed’s Church,” in which the dying bishop addresses his illegitimate sons 
as “nephews.”
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 if readers refer, as they might in the case of O’Connor, to Spark’s com-
mentary on the people mentioned to help them answer these questions, the 
confusion only deepens. in this passage, Greene “couldn’t not believe, in 
spite of himself,” but in a 1987 interview Spark used this phrase to refer to 
herself—and, in the same passage, to distinguish her own kind of “Catho-
lic writing” from Greene’s: “Graham Greene is a different type of Catholic 
writer. . . . i have the impression that he’s always on the verge of disbe-
lief, and so he’s constantly faced with a conflict. i don’t have that conflict, 
because i can’t not believe: i couldn’t not believe” (interview with Sara Fran-
kel 446). are readers to conclude that Spark has changed her mind about 
Greene, or that Tom’s assessment of Greene’s belief is unreliable? On the 
other hand, the notion that Greene “believed in it without swallowing 
everything” sounds remarkably like Spark’s own position—her distaste 
for “popular Catholicism,” with its “terrible bleeding hearts, the saints, the 
Pope, priests,” her claim that she arrives at mass only “after the sermons, 
because the sermons are so bad i couldn’t possibly listen to them” (inter-
view with Sara Frankel 446)—and it even echoes the artist-figures from her 
fiction, such as Fleur, who resemble her. Of John Paul ii, Spark once wrote, 
“i wouldn’t take the Pope too seriously. he’s a Pole first, a pope second, 
and maybe a Christian third” (qtd. in neuhaus 74)—provoking hostility 
from at least one prominent Catholic intellectual.10 and what of maritain? 
When asked whether she accepted maritain’s claim that Catholics ought to 
be the best novelists, Spark once replied, “i think maritain was full of a bit 
of air, actually,” but did not clarify (interview with Sara Frankel 447). The 
specificity of the references leads in numerous directions, but any authority 
that might attach to them individually seems to disperse. Thus far, com-
plaints of the stylish triviality of it all seem justified.
 Perhaps, then, readers should conceive of Spark’s religious references in 
the broadest sense, so that mention of Greene or John Paul ii functions only 
as a nod to the totality of Catholic belief and practice, as understood by 
Spark and as revealed to readers through her account of her conversion—
the most concise description of which is found in Curriculum Vitae (1993), 
her autobiography:
in 1953 i was absorbed by the theological writings of John henry new-
man through whose influence i finally became a roman Catholic. i tried 
the Church of england first, as being more “natural” and near to home. 
but i felt uneasy. it was historically too new for me to take to. When i am 
 10. richard John neuhaus: “That’s just vulgar nasty, the kind of thing said by minor 
celebrities who get interviewed and feel the need to say something smart. . . . i cannot imag-
ine that three hundred years from now, or thirty years from now, anyone will wonder what 
muriel Spark might have said about anything” (74–75).
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asked about my conversion, why i became a Catholic, i can only say that 
the answer is both too easy and too difficult. The simple explanation is 
that i felt the roman Catholic faith corresponded to what i had always 
felt and known and believed; there was no blinding revelation in my case. 
The more difficult explanation would involve the step by step building up 
of a conviction; as newman himself pointed out, when asked about his 
conversion, it was not a thing one could propound “between the soup and 
the fish” at a dinner party. (202) 11
Though i do not doubt Spark’s sincerity here, her foregrounding of new-
man should also be seen as a part of her own appeal to an intellectual audi-
ence—a conversion under the sign of an undoubted philosophical giant, 
who tackles the question of Catholicism’s historical validity and philo-
sophical soundness, carries more weight than one provoked by (to use an 
example from O’Connor’s “revelation”) a vision in the sky.
 moreover, newman’s own account of belief provides a helpful frame 
around the problem of freedom and determinism in Spark’s work. When 
Spark declares that she became a Catholic because it was what she already 
believed, she does not of course mean that she had unknowingly affirmed 
the existence of purgatory, the immaculate Conception, or transubstantia-
tion. it does, however, suggest that she understands her conversion as an 
instance of what newman calls the “indefectibility of certitude” (Grammar 
167). For newman, certitude has “a definite and fixed place among our 
mental acts;—it follows upon examination and proof,” and it always has 
“reference to propositions, one by one” (Grammar 179, 184). Furthermore, 
once certitude has been achieved, it does not change. religious conver-
sions, however much they resemble changes in certitude, should be under-
stood as processes of development, in which a human being, tenaciously 
working through the logic and implications of a given certitude, arrives 
at a truer understanding of what it encompasses—as in his hypothetical 
example of three Protestants who change their religious convictions but not 
their certitudes.12 Throughout this process, what newman calls the “illative 
 11. in The Comforters, Caroline’s account of her conversion to Georgina hogg echoes 
newman’s account, though more haughtily. When asked “What made you a Catholic, then?” 
Caroline responds, “many reasons . . . which are not too easy to define: and so i prefer not 
to discuss them” (29).
 12. “Thus, of three Protestants, one becomes a Catholic, a second a Unitarian, and a third 
an unbeliever: how is this? The first becomes a Catholic, because he assented, as a Protes-
tant, to the doctrine of our lord’s divinity, with a real assent and a genuine conviction, and 
because this certitude, taking possession of his mind, led him on to welcome the Catholic 
doctrines of the real Presence and the Theotocos, till his Protestantism fell off from him, and 
he submitted himself to the Church. The second became a Unitarian, because, proceeding on 
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sense” operates, allowing readers to reason from partial evidence to gen-
eral conclusions that carry just as much authority as if they had syllogisti-
cally proven every intermediate step. The convert who, having assented to 
the authority of Catholicism because she has pursued the implications of 
her certitude, may not understand or even be aware of many of the spe-
cific doctrines that such a belief entails, but this does not matter: having 
proclaimed a belief in the “‘One holy and apostolic Church’ . . . an article, 
which, inclusive of her infallibility, all . . . can easily master and accept with 
a real and operative assent,” it follows that she can assent even to what she 
cannot understand, because she believes in the Church (Grammar 113).
 but the implications of newman’s philosophical theology extend even 
further, for his “illative sense” is irreducibly personal. She who acts in 
accord with it is on the one hand merely obeying the law of her nature, 
and there is simply no gainsaying its existence or reliability: “We are what 
we are, and we use, not trust our faculties. To debate about trusting in a 
case like this, is parallel to the confusion implied in wishing i had had a 
choice if i would be created or no, or speculating what i should be like, if 
i were born of other parents” (Grammar 47). yet there is a further criterion 
that confirms the certitudes of the illative sense: complexity. in an astonish-
ing passage, newman argues that the very complexity—even the apparent 
self-contradiction—of the Catholic Church proves its truth:
There is a religious communion claiming a divine commission, and hold-
ing all other bodies around it heretical or infidel; it is a well-organized, 
the principle that Scripture was the rule of faith and that a man’s private judgment was its 
rule of interpretation, and finding that the doctrine of the nicene and athanasian Creeds did 
not follow by logical necessity from the text of Scripture, he said to himself, ‘The word of God 
has been made of none [sic] effect by the traditions of men, and therefore nothing was left 
for him to profess what he considered primitive Christianity, and to become a humanitarian. 
The third gradually subsided into infidelity, because he started with the Protestant dogma, 
cherished in the depths of his nature, that a priesthood was a corruption of the simplicity 
of the Gospel. . . . then came the question, what after all was the use of teachers of religion? 
why should anyone stand between him and his maker? . . . [S]o he came to the conclusion 
that the true and only revelation of God to man is that which is written on the heart. This did 
for a time . . . [b]ut then it occurred to him that this moral law was there within the breast, 
whether there was a God or not, and that it was a roundabout way of enforcing that law, to 
say that it came from God, and simply unnecessary, considering it carried with it its own 
sacred and sovereign authority, as our feelings instinctively testified . . . so he dropped it, 
and became a purus, putus atheist.
  “now the world will say that in these three cases old certitudes were lost, and new 
were gained; but it is not so: each of the three men started with just one certitude, as he 
would have himself professed, had he examined himself narrowly; and he carried it out and 
carried it with him into a new system of belief. he was true to that one conviction from first 
to last [ . . . ] he has indeed made serious additions to his initial ruling principle, but he has 
lost no conviction of which he was originally possessed” (Grammar 186–87).
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well disciplined body; it is a sort of secret society, binding together its 
members by influences and by engagements which it is difficult for strang-
ers to ascertain. it is spread over the known world; it may be weak or 
insignificant locally, but it is strong on the whole from its continuity; it 
may be smaller than all other religious bodies together, but it is larger than 
each separately. it is a natural enemy to governments external to itself; it 
is intolerant and engrossing, and tends to a new modeling of society; it 
breaks laws, it divides families. it is a gross superstition: it is charged with 
the foulest crimes; it is despised by the intellect of the day; it is frightful to 
the imagination of many. and there is but one communion such.
 Place this description before Pliny or Julian; place it before Freder-
ick the Second or Guizot. “apparent dirae facies.” each knows at once, 
without asking a question, who is meant by it. One object, and only one, 
absorbs each item of the detail of the delineation. (Development 192–93)
 This complexity, moreover, is grasped as a totality, and it is only once 
this totality is imaginatively apprehended that any kind of “local” effort to 
distinguish between its true and false aspects can make sense at all. as Ste-
phen Prickett puts it,
For newman . . . the true analogy of the Church is not a grain of mus-
tard-seed, nor yet a vine, but a sentient human being—and preferably, 
indeed, one who had been educated at Oxford through the controversies 
of the 1820s and 1830s, and had held a fellowship at Oriel. . . . how are we, 
finally, to distinguish between the living body and the vain enchantments 
of simulacra? The true story and the false? beyond the application of rule-
of-thumb tests, the final answer appears to be by means of the imagina-
tion. This is the reason for the apparent circularity of the argument of the 
Essay. it is only after our imaginations have intuitively grasped the whole 
picture that such tests will serve to convince us. (175, 176)
it follows that the richer one’s imaginative capacity, the “truer” one’s per-
ceptions and beliefs should be, and that the index of their “truth” would 
be their complexity. and it is no great leap to conclude that the very dis-
tinction between reality and dream—the opposition that frames Spark’s 
novel—becomes meaningless viewed from the standpoint of this all- 
encompassing imaginative truth. Spark’s own frequently quoted statement, 
“i don’t claim that my novels are truth—i claim that they are fiction, out 
of which a kind of truth emerges” (qtd. in Kermode 30) takes on a greater 
resonance in light of newman’s framework. So does her insistence that 
“nobody can deny i speak with my own voice as a writer now, because 
before my conversion i was never sure what i was” (“my Conversion” 26).
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 although newman is not mentioned in Reality and Dreams, his account 
of the self offers a model for how Tom’s references to religion function in 
the text—as a display of imaginative, contradictory richness that mark him 
not just as a believer (and so in touch with the truth) but as the best kind 
of believer. Unlike the rote beliefs of those who have inherited their reli-
gion and feel little need to question it, Tom’s self-consciousness and even 
his playfulness about it imply, to invoke newman’s language, a certitude 
reflected both in the authority with which he dispenses religious judg-
ments and in his lack of seriousness about them. even when Tom wonders 
whether he is a character in one of God’s dreams, the narrator takes pains 
to emphasize the paradoxical reality of such an idea: “To an unbeliever 
this would have meant the casting of an insubstantiality within an already 
insubstantial context. Tom was a believer. he meant the very opposite. Our 
dreams, yes, are insubstantial; the dreams of God, no. They are real, fright-
eningly real. They bulge with flesh, they drip with blood. my own dreams, 
said Tom to himself, are shadows, my arguments—all shadows” (63–64). 
This reality, in turn, casts a different light on his artistic production, his own 
meager attempts to play God. as long as he recognizes the shadowy nature 
of his dreams, without confusing them with reality (he is appropriately 
horrified when he remembers after his operation his drug-induced plans 
to have Claire murdered, and contents himself with having an “element of 
this scenario” [20] in the film script), his artistry remains praiseworthy. if he 
occasionally requires correction—such as a fall from a crane—we are never-
theless not invited to exult in his humiliation or to experience pity and fear 
in identifying with him.
V. the nun and the Autobiographer: 
 Figures of the Artist in The Abbess of Crewe 
 and Loitering with Intent
The deftness of Spark’s achievement in creating Tom becomes more evi-
dent if we compare him to two of his forebears—alexandra, the abbess 
of Crewe, and Fleur Talbot, the aspiring novelist of Loitering with Intent—
whose very different personalities are combined and rendered more con-
vincing in Tom. Though The Abbess of Crewe is among Spark’s most spirited 
performances—taking inspiration from alexander Pope’s “The rape of the 
lock,” the Watergate break-in, and the often comical spectacle of factional-
ism in the Catholic Church after the Second vatican Council—alexandra 
herself is so grandiose as to be alternately lovable and creepy. Determined 
to remake the abbey in light of her megalomaniacal vision, alexandra 
manipulates the scandal that occurs when a nun’s thimble is stolen into a 
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drama that the engrosses the global media, all the while building a regime 
of surveillance—even the poplars of the nuns’ avenue are bugged—in 
her campaign against her rival, Sister Felicity. alexandra’s transforma-
tion of the abbey is intended to maximize good taste and to minimize 
vulgar piety. Detesting no less than Caroline rose the drabness of ordi-
nary Catholics, alexandra does not share her conviction that truth should 
trump style. not only does she respond to the chants of the liturgy of the 
hours not with prayer but with poetry by marvell and Keats; she reveals, 
in an address to the nuns, her aristocratic indifference to religious belief: 
“a lady may secretly believe in nothing; but a bourgeoise [sic] invariably 
proclaims her belief, and believes in the wrong things. . . . a lady is free; 
a bourgeoise is never free from the desire for freedom” (79, 80). even at 
the level of material comforts, these differences are enforced: alexandria 
and her henchmen enjoy pâté and white wine, while the despised ordinary 
nuns, ostensibly to mortify themselves, subsist on nettles and tinned cat 
food.
 much of the humor of The Abbess of Crewe derives from the way such 
pronouncements, impossible to take at face value, nevertheless provoke a 
kind of admiration in readers for their zany singularity and for the oblique 
light they shed on the context of the Catholic Church beyond the abbey 
walls. alexandra’s innovations, for instance, satisfy neither traditionalists 
nor progressives in the tumultuous post–vatican ii context. as she puts it,
“it is absurd in modern times that the nuns should have to get up twice 
in the middle of the night to sing the matins and the lauds. but modern 
times come into a historical context, and as far as i’m concerned history 
doesn’t work. here, in the abbey of Crewe, we have discarded history. We 
have entered the sphere, dear Sisters, of mythology. my nuns love it. Who 
doesn’t yearn to be part of a myth at whatever the price in comfort? The 
monastic system is in revolt throughout the rest of the world, thanks to 
historical development. here, within the ambience of mythology, we have 
consummate satisfaction, we have peace.” (20)
as edgecombe aptly notes, “it is almost impossible to disentangle the 
skeins of sympathy and mockery in the tone here” (97). One of the attrac-
tions of Christianity has always been its promulgation of a standard by 
which to judge the world. yet while the appeal to something that stands 
above the vagaries of “historical context” makes sense, the Christian narra-
tive must remain “historical” rather than merely “mythic” if it is to retain 
its integrity. even as she makes such astonishing claims, however, she 
proves shrewd enough to detect lapses in orthodoxy in other nuns. When 
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the globe-trotting Sister Gertrude, modeled on henry Kissinger, compro-
mises Catholic doctrine in her efforts to preach to a group of “witch doc-
tors” in the Congo, alexandra pours scorn on her synthesizing, relativizing 
approach: “Sister Gertrude, believe me, is a philosopher at heart. There is 
a touch of hegel, her compatriot, there” (20). in this way she manages to 
stand against both the historical relativism of post–vatican ii progressives 
and the “mythic” approach that would recommend results and “ambi-
ence” over dogma—a contradiction reconciled, if at all, only by the force 
of her singular charisma. Drawing from St. Paul and the heretical theology 
of Joachim of Fiore (with a possibly feminist twist) to justify her actions, 
alexandra soars into antinomian ether:13 “The ages of the Father and the 
Son are past. We have entered the age of the holy Ghost. The wind bloweth 
where it listeth and it listeth most certainly on the abbey of Crewe. i am a 
benedictine with the benedictines, a Jesuit with the Jesuits. i was elected 
abbess and i stay the abbess and i move as the Spirit moves me” (5).
 Spark plays out such appealing yet appalling zaniness as far as it can 
possibly go before yielding to verisimilitude. no abbess in the Catho-
lic Church would be permitted such blasphemous eccentricities, and at 
the end of the novel alexandra is en route to rome to answer the charges 
against her. echoing Shakespeare’s Tempest, the novel’s final paragraph 
hints at alexandra’s almost-certain fate while indulging in one final paean 
to her glory: “Our revels now are ended. be still, be watchful. She sails 
indeed on the fine day of her desire into waters exceptionally smooth, and 
stands on the upper deck, straight as a white ship’s funnel, marveling how 
the wide sea billows from shore to shore like that cornfield of sublim-
ity which never should be reaped nor was ever sown, orient and immor-
tal wheat” (116). John Updike’s judgment that “though the author cannot 
approve of the abbess alexandra, she does love her, love her as she hasn’t 
loved a character in a decade” (“Top-notch” 344) seems largely correct, 
and the proof is clinched when alexandra, quoting ezra Pound, declares 
her membership in Spark’s fraternity of artists and intellectuals: “For i am 
homesick after mine own kind / and ordinary people touch me not” (59).14 
alexandra surely exaggerates her artistic credentials to a degree that Spark 
herself, ever impressed by results instead of sentiments, would not—yet 
her fantasies are so beguiling that Spark is willing to give mostly free rein 
to them.
 13. Joachim of Fiore’s apocalyptic teaching of the “three ages” was condemned by the 
Church as heretical in 1263—a hint that Spark’s appeal to a more “intellectual” Catholicism 
that equates divine inspiration with aesthetic production might indeed flirt with heresy.
 14. For two frustrated attempts to account for the discrepancy that Updike notes between 
disapproval and love, see Whittaker (103) and edgecombe (93–110).
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 if alexandra impresses but in the end must be let go as too implau-
sible even for Spark, Fleur Talbot, the protagonist of Loitering with Intent, 
has more substance. like Caroline rose, Fleur is modeled largely on Spark 
herself as she scrounges to survive the british postwar world of austerity 
and seeks to make it as a writer “right in the middle of the twentieth cen-
tury” (197). like The Comforters, Loitering with Intent probes the relation-
ship between fiction and autobiography: Fleur looks back to the time when 
she worked temporarily as a secretary for a motley but undistinguished 
crew of minor aristocrats and snobs who called themselves the “autobio-
graphical association” and wished to write their life stories for the benefit 
of posterity. The stories are obviously not worth telling, and Fleur amuses 
herself by revising the narratives so as to make them more interesting. in 
the interval since then, Fleur has become a successful writer of novels, but 
Loitering with Intent purports to be autobiography: “[i]t strikes me how 
much easier it is with characters in a novel than in real life. in a novel the 
author invents characters and arranges them in convenient order. now 
that i come to write biographically i have to tell of whatever actually hap-
pened and whoever naturally turns up” (59). by playing with readers who 
know the book to be fiction (albeit of an admittedly autobiographical cast), 
Spark flaunts her facility with both genres, and Fleur herself offers a naked 
appeal to the vanity of the book’s readers: “i always hope the readers of my 
novels are of good quality. i wouldn’t like to think of anyone cheap reading 
my books” (216).
 Such self-conscious and skilled generic crossings are also commented 
upon in the text in ways that look to newman for inspiration and carry 
implications for the role of Catholic belief in the life of a writer. like Caro-
line rose, Fleur despises vulgar piety even as she believes in Catholic doc-
trines; but like the abbess of alexandria, she refuses to mortify herself in 
the service of such beliefs: “i too was a Catholic believer but not that sort, 
not that sort at all. and if it was true . . . that i was taking terrible risks 
with my immortal soul, i would have been incapable of caution on those 
grounds. i had an art to practise and a life to live, and faith abounding; and 
i simply didn’t have the time or the mentality for guilds and indulgences, 
fasts and feasts and observances. i’ve never held it right to create more dif-
ficulties in matters of religion than already exist” (128–29). a partial jus-
tification for such attitudes may be gleaned from Fleur’s admiration for 
two biographies that complement each other: newman’s Apologia pro Vita 
Sua and the Life of benvenuto Cellini. Cellini’s rollicking narrative hints 
at the full range of license permitted to the writer, while newman, accept-
ing complexity, particularity, and even apparent contradiction, neverthe-
less provides continuous grounding for this license in the securely personal 
relationship with God.
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 bryan Cheyette has argued that in Loitering with Intent, Spark retreats 
from her earlier admiration of newman. The key passage from the Apolo-
gia that Fleur cites deals with newman’s religious feelings as a boy, when 
he “mistrust[ed] . . . the reality of material phenomena” and “rest[ed] in the 
thought of two and two only supreme and luminously self-evident beings, 
myself and my Creator.” Struck by this passage after she has recommended 
the Apologia to a member of the autobiographical association, Fleur comes 
to perceive an “awful madness” (95) in this apparent solipsism, though 
her initial resentment springs from the fact that her interlocutor likes the 
passage despite the fact that she, unlike Fleur, has not spent three and a 
half years studying newman, “at the sacrifice of pleasures and happiness 
which would never come my way again” (95). Skipping over Fleur’s petu-
lance here, Cheyette comments: “While newman unites his youthful and 
matured selves through his ‘neurotic’ (Loitering 96) relationship with God, 
Cellini is ‘comically contradictory’ (Loitering 124), recognizing a range of 
possible selves. Fleur, in the end, rejects the ‘awful madness’ (Loitering 95) 
inherent in newman’s homogenizing narrative” (108). This is a distortion 
of newman’s account of the self, which is capacious enough (as i have 
already suggested) to embrace the “comically contradictory.” it is revealing 
that Cheyette’s own language trips him up, for he at once criticizes new-
man for “unit[ing] his youthful and matured selves” and lauds Spark for 
being “on the side of unification or desegregation” and seeing “a split self 
as untenable” (102). What’s the difference? moreover, he does not acknowl-
edge that Fleur, retreating almost at once from her own petulance, con-
cedes that her characterization of the Apologia as “a beautiful piece of poetic 
paranoia” is “over-simple, a distortion” (96). She then continues to refer to 
the text as “lovely” (195), and when she places a passage from it alongside 
Cellini’s Life at the end of the novel, “admiring both” (196), the two auto-
biographies are revealed not as opposed to each other but as complemen-
tary. The phrase “from there by the grace of God i go on my way rejoicing” 
(217), which ends the novel, gives Cellini the last word but does not thereby 
diminish her admiration for newman.
VI. Religion against moralism in 
 Reality and Dreams
although i judge Reality and Dreams as a novel to be inferior to Loitering 
with Intent, its portrait of Tom provides in some respects the most convinc-
ing portrait of Spark’s romance with “really intelligent people,” the artists 
with whom she identifies and whose beliefs she recommends to her read-
ers. lacking the abbess alexandria’s zaniness, Tom shares her conviction 
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of self-worth; possessing the shrewdness and common sense of Fleur Tal-
bot, Tom nonetheless shows that artists need not prove their credentials 
through poverty in postwar london. like his compatriots, Tom has an 
imaginative literary sensibility (as his friendships with great writers and 
his frequent musings on T. S. eliot’s “The love Song of J. alfred Prufock” 
indicate) and an exalted, even grandiose conception of his creativity. in a 
novel in which redundancy (in american parlance, being laid off) is a major 
motif—and in which Tom is himself briefly made “redundant” when his 
injuries prevent him from directing his own film—he has no sympathy for 
those in this predicament, maintaining that “nobody fires a man if he is 
exceptionally good, unless the whole outfit closes down” (21) and that art-
ists are by definition not redundant: “no work of art can be replaced. a 
work of art is like living people” (23).15 like them, he is a religious believer, 
but one who is unrepentant about his sins (above all, his frequent adul-
teries), and whose own theological pronouncements, however confidently 
delivered, are questionable—as when he tells Dave, his deeply religious 
taxi driver and confidant, “The bible doesn’t teach Christian beliefs. it only 
illustrates them. The bible came before Christianity by hundreds of years” 
(66).16
 The catalog of admirable traits continues: Tom accepts the intermin-
gling of spirit and matter in a way that might be called sacramental—as 
when he tells his masseur that the two are “[a]t least, interdependent” (55). 
he overcomes several obstacles to his work, including not just his injuries 
and a series of delays in filming, but also two attempts on his life. and as 
with the abbess and Fleur, there is virtually no hint that the narrator disap-
 15. in an interview with martin mcQuillan, Spark expanded on the theme of the redun-
dancy in the novel: “The issue is to have a whole new philosophy of life where usefulness 
is questioned. . . . a lot of people do without having the problem of whether they’re useful 
of not. if it’s an economic problem, it can be solved by society being arranged in such a way 
that there’s enough for everybody. What one does with one’s time is said to be important 
because of this puritanical thing about having to work to be useful” (223). here Spark associ-
ates work with Puritanism and utility in a way consistent with Tom’s remarks on redundancy. 
human beings are irreplaceable, but this is so because they are like works of art, not because 
they are useful. To have one’s uselessness confirmed by being laid off is, both Tom and Spark 
suggest, no reason for despair. Those who do despair become easy targets for manipulative, 
puritanical do-gooders—at which point any possibility of sympathy for them ceases.
 16. One obvious mark of Tom’s kinship with the abbess of Crewe is his repetition of her 
Joachite theology: “i want some sign of inspiration. Do you know what inspiration is? it is 
the descent of the holy Spirit. i was talking to a Cardinal the other day. he said there was a 
theory that the ages of the Father and the Son were over and we were approaching the age 
of the holy Spirit, or as we used to say, Ghost. The century is old, very old” (59). in both 
novels, however amusingly grandiose these pronouncements, there is little to suggest that 
they are intended ironically—that the abbess and Tom are not, in fact, “inspired” in a sense 
that conflates the theological with the aesthetic.
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proves of him. even when the narrator appears to introduce doubt about 
him—“[W]ho was to say that he was the just arbiter of other people’s char-
acter?”—she immediately qualifies it in ways that redound to his credit: 
“Simply because he was always ready to assume that part, and others only 
too ready to listen to him with dazzled conviction is not to say that Tom 
was always right (although generally there was something in what he said” 
(33). he is innately talented, aesthetically sensitive, and capable of weaving 
any complexity and uncertainty—even the limits on his own powers—into 
a satisfying whole. his preoccupation with J. alfred Prufrock may suggest, 
as anna Walczuk would have it, that he is “unable to find a definite ver-
bal formula for everything that bothers and fascinates him in life” (96), but 
although he acknowledges such hesitations (and even releases The Ham-
burger Girl under the title Unfinished Business), he nevertheless succeeds, as 
eliot does, in making such confusion into genuine art. he is, in short, just 
the kind of protagonist whom avowedly postmodern intellectuals, suspi-
cious of theological discourse but deeply invested in their own status as 
right-thinking and creative individuals, would admire.
 What makes his religious belief attractive to such an audience—as 
opposed to merely an eccentricity that can be taken or left—is not only the 
fun to be had with it but also its implicit opposition to moralism, embod-
ied in the novel by his daughter, marigold. Described early in the novel as 
(by Tom) an “unfrocked priest of a woman” (11) and later (by the narrator) 
as “worthy as any woman or man in the works of George eliot, unlovely, 
graceless” (34) and still later as “[h]ideous” and “[a]lways negative” (87), 
marigold functions throughout the novel as a malignant force, full of righ-
teous but—as the narrator continually insists—unjustified anger. When she 
complains to Claire that Tom is cheating on her, she is astonished when 
Claire declares that the subject “bores” her and that she has no intention 
of divorcing him (62). She also likes to make sarcastic remarks about Tom’s 
wealth, but the narrator immediately ironizes them: “you must not imagine 
marigold was particularly deprived” (12). When Tom and Claire wonder 
whether they are responsible for marigold’s negativity, the narrator reas-
sures us: “[T]hey were in no wise to blame. marigold was simply a natural 
disaster” (90). and again: “how had Tom managed to conceive her? and 
Claire, so emotionally creative?” (34). “in no way could she be explained” 
(87).
 as Tom reflects, what makes marigold particularly unpleasant is the 
fact that “[s]ooner or later . . . [she] had to make it out to be a moral ques-
tion” (54), irrespective of what “it” is. She describes moral deliberation as 
“see[ing] things sub specie aeternitatis” (making herself pedantic by adding, 
“Which means . . . ‘under the light of eternity’” [37]), and when Tom is not 
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actively appalled by her attitude, he finds it “too serious” (33). much of 
her moral energy is directed against what she regards as the evils of redun-
dancy, and she spends several memorable sequences pontificating not just 
against the cruelty of making people redundant, but also against luxury in 
general: “[n]obody should take on responsibilities which would demand 
more expenditure than would be gained from the dole and the income sup-
port schemes. . . . in other words, if all lived austerely, redundancy would 
bring no shock to the person or the family” (34). as Spark has suggested, 
marigold’s interest in redundancy is meant to be seen as unhealthy.17 even-
tually she disappears, leading Tom and Claire to worry that she might have 
been murdered, only to be discovered later disguised as a homeless man on 
a campsite in Gloucestershire, “living like this,” as she explains, “in order 
to experience at first hand what it’s like to be destitute. . . . Few realize 
what redundancy can lead to” (136). although Claire, after speaking with 
her, is convinced that “she means every word” (137), the novel also implies 
that she is equally driven by a desire to make Tom feel guilty and to manip-
ulate him—as when she briefly hides with a temporary and unnamed lover 
on the campsite in France that had inspired The Hamburger Girl, having had 
a (confirmed) hunch that Tom will search there for her (101). There is also 
the possibility—neither confirmed nor denied in the text—that while in 
hiding marigold has persuaded Kevin Woodstock, a redundant television 
director with whose wife Tom has been having an affair, to assassinate Tom 
(the bullet instead hits Dave, nearly killing him). at no point is there any 
indication that marigold shares her father’s religious beliefs, which sug-
gests that when religion disappears, an unattractive and even murderous 
moralism replaces it.
 marigold does, to be sure, display her own kind of creativity—passing 
as a homeless man, becoming a national figure, and writing Out of Work 
in a Camper, which becomes a bestseller. Tom, who initially finds her own 
attempt at filmmaking (on redundancy) laughable (“Tom and Claire hurled 
themselves about the sofa in their hilarity” [86]), later considers that her 
book gives her “a glamour which [he] could only admire” and concludes 
that she is “more ambitious” than he (141). even so, he finds ways to make 
use of marigold’s talents for his own purposes, casting her as a “hermaph-
roditic Celt of the years c. 436” who foresees the future in his next film, 
Watling Street (140). in doing so, he again suggests the priority of the aes-
 17. “That’s one of the things i wanted to bring out in the book, this frustration people 
have about redundancy. There’s this awful girl, marigold, a sort of social worker, working up 
this feeling at the same time” (“The Same” 223). Spark implies that frustration at redundancy 
is unwarranted, and that those who exploit such feelings—whether from a sincere desire to 
help or not—cause more harm than good.
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thetic over the moral, the imaginative over the factual, and angers her all 
over again: “it was often said privately that her disappearance had been 
a publicity stunt to work up interest in Watling Street. and when this was 
suggested publicly on a talk-show, she denied it vehemently. her experi-
ences were real sufferings, she explained” (141). “real” they may have 
been, but even her newly acquired celebrity cannot hide the aesthetic flaws 
of their presentation, as Claire eventually suggests upon learning of her 
plans for a second book on redundancy: “i hope she gets a better ghost-
writer this time” (147). her murderousness, doubtful earlier in the novel, 
is confirmed when she encourages Jeanne (the actress who plays the ham-
burger girl, and who has her own grievances against Tom) to tamper with 
his crane a second time.
 in the novel’s final chapter, Tom tells his crew, “What we are doing 
. . . is real and not real. We are living in a world where dreams are reality 
and reality is dreams. in our world everything starts from a dream” (157). 
Working, like Spark, on a fiction from which a kind of truth emerges, Tom’s 
aesthetic position has now earned a certain authority and can be seen, 
like newman’s, as a matter of imaginative, personal connection to truth. 
it almost seems a foregone conclusion that instead of killing Tom, Jeanne 
falls to her death from the crane, while marigold flees to the United States. 
Tom, shaken by his latest brush with death, ends the novel with Claire’s 
“strength and courage sustaining [him], here in the tract of no-man’s land 
between dreams and reality, reality and dreams” (160).
VII. the nature of Sparkian Irony
in recent years, it has become common to speak of Spark’s novels as post-
modern—no doubt because of their metafictive properties and their flout-
ing of conventional readerly pleasures. yet the most familiar definition of 
the postmodern—Jean-François lyotard’s “incredulity toward metanarra-
tives” (xxiv), which finds an even more extreme embodiment in richard 
rorty’s figure of the “liberal ironist” (Contingency xv)—does not convinc-
ingly apply to Spark, despite the attempts of some contemporary crit-
ics to invoke something like it in connection with her. bryan Cheyette, for 
instance, argues that Spark places “a sense of history, tradition, and the 
avant-garde next to an irreverent and whimsical sense of the absurdity 
of all human philosophies” (10), that her work amounts to a continuous 
demystification of anything that would propose itself as true or binding.
 i hope to have shown that for all the playfulness of Reality and Dreams, 
this novel does commit to certain nonnegotiable and binding values, explic-
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itly aesthetic and implicitly religious. What saves these values from for-
mula is not their nonnegotiability but their particular relation to irony, 
which has little in common with the thought of lyotard or rorty. Stephen 
Prickett observes that in such versions of postmodernism, “There is no hid-
den meaning to be implicitly drawn on, because there is . . . nothing to be 
hidden. There can be no implicit conflict between various versions of real-
ity; there can be no gap between what is asserted and what we all know to 
be true; all is surface, there is no depth” (204). For Prickett, rorty counts 
as a “fundamentalist” (204) precisely because he “knows,” in advance, that 
there can be no relationship whatsoever between language and whatever 
“bedrock reality” might exist outside of it (203). Such a position leaves 
nothing meaningful to be said and has no use for persuasion in good faith; 
it also misunderstands what literature is, because “a novel that is unre-
lated to any unrecognizable truth at all is boring, if not downright unread-
able” (205). a genuine ironist, by contrast, recognizes that the relationship 
between words and things “is neither constant, nor contingent, but essen-
tially unstable” (257). Spark suggests that perhaps only in God is a bridge 
between narrative and thing possible—as in Tom richards’s notion that 
God’s dreams bulge and bleed—but artists and religious converts construct 
their own imperfect bridges, “dreams” that nevertheless partake of (though 
never coinciding with) “reality.” There is an element of determinism in such 
a vision, for those gifted with artistic vision or religious faith are best suited 
to build these bridges. but within this determinist framework, such peo-
ple are also genuinely free—free from aesthetic or moralizing convention, 
and free to bring new and irreplaceable objects into the world that gesture 
toward truth. They also live comfortably with contradiction.
 For all the richness of Spark’s Catholic irony, there are two obvious 
risks that it runs. The first is that its appeal to an intellectual audience 
might descend into what booth calls “disguised expressions of snobbery 
which would never be tolerated if expressed openly in commentary” (391). 
The second is the distortion of Catholic doctrine in the service of such 
an appeal. if there is a hint of unseemly arrogance in Spark’s self-identi-
fication with “really intelligent people,” there is also the danger that con-
tradiction will become something not merely to be lived with but even 
celebrated. There is no necessary contradiction, for instance, between 
Tom’s sincere religious belief and his adulteries in Reality and Dreams—
but while he does not (as he says that Greene did) avow that many sex-
ual partners are essential for his work, he is forthright enough about the 
usual pattern of his affairs to suggest that he feels no guilt about them. To 
the extent that Spark’s work does suggest that Catholic morality may be 
neatly demarcated from Catholic belief and rendered optional—especially 
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among practicing artists—it does indeed distort Catholic doctrine and 
comes to resemble the “once saved, always saved” position of some Prot-
estant denominations. if the orthodox position that adultery is under all 
circumstances sinful remains discernible as the norm from which Spark’s 
vision departs—and in Reality and Dreams it is present in the figure of the 
“biblically religious married” taxi driver Dave, who enjoys Tom’s “religious 
reflections” and finds himself “in full sympathetic understanding” with 
him (64)—it is nevertheless presented as essentially boring. a cynical reader 
might conclude that it is better for Dave to take the bullet that is intended 
for Tom—had Dave been killed, it would be no great loss and he would 
have his reward, but had Tom been killed, there would have been no more 
of his films. This is indeed, as booth would fear, snobbery.
 The question of whether such a presentation would appeal to Spark’s 
intended audience, however, is a separate issue, and here her rhetorical 
skill seems certain and surprisingly timely. indeed, as contemporary intel-
lectuals have begun to observe that secularization may not be the irrevers-
ible and inevitable process that it once seemed, the pluralistic condition 
of postmodernity has become “a supreme opportunity” (milbank 1) for 
some to assert the Christian story anew, in all its radical claim to truth. 
by combining the aesthetic strategies of postmodernism with the recog-
nition that postmodern theories rooted in the centrality of language are 
increasingly untenable, Spark’s fiction speaks to—though does not neces-
sarily endorse—the arguments of recent thinkers as different as John mil-
bank, Geoffrey Galt harpham, and Peter augustine lawler.18 moreover, her 
finessing of the freedom/determinism binary appeals to thinkers who have 
seen subversion instead of blows for freedom as the surest way to engage 
with (and perhaps even to enjoy) one’s own embeddedness in a larger sys-
tem. Catholicism in Spark comes across not as a system of moral injunc-
tions but as an aesthetic of freedom, experienced as a complex personal 
discipline that colors all of life. if it also happens to be true, so much the 
better.
 all of which suggests both why Spark’s fiction is uniquely positioned 
to speak to current arguments about religion in the twenty-first century and 
why she lags behind O’Connor in popularity among critics and ordinary 
readers. O’Connor does not count as a “fundamentalist” in Prickett’s sense 
of the word, but her commitment to the existential urgency of whether to 
 18. i have in mind here milbank’s project of “radical orthodoxy,” lawler’s reinterpreta-
tion of postmodernism as a “return to realism,” and harpham’s argument that there is no 
such thing as “language alone”—that is, that theories purporting to treat of language in itself 
surreptitiously smuggle in all kinds of unacknowledged or unavowable assumptions, usually 
about the nature of human beings.
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believe, with its undoubted emotional punch, is simply more compelling 
even to most intellectual readers than Spark’s more complex treatment of 
belief. From an orthodox standpoint, O’Connor’s position is more solid—
not only because it distorts Christianity less but also because God is on the 
record as not being particularly fond of intellectuals. That Spark has iden-
tified with them, elected to appeal to them, and even fallen into what a 
strict accounting of Christian doctrine would acknowledge as theological 
error in this appeal only confirms the difficulty of her task. That she has 
undertaken it at all is admirable, for “really intelligent people” are people 
too. 
I. Barth, tocqueville, and emerson: 
 updike’s Appeals to the Self
in an unfavorable—and now legendary—review of Toward the End of Time 
(1997), David Foster Wallace refers to John Updike as one of the “Great 
male narcissists who’ve dominated postwar american fiction” (51). The 
label is apt, for many of the specific indictments that have been lodged 
against Updike in the course of his career—misogyny, satyriasis, quietism, 
racism, preciousness of style, distortion of Christian doctrine—converge 
upon the accusation of a pervasive narcissism. Whatever his ostensible 
subject, Updike’s constant focus is his ineffable self, embracing contradic-
tion and perpetually affirming, even in his weaknesses and anxieties, the 
wondrousness of his being. it may be a remarkable feat to win both the St. 
edmund Campion medal (awarded by the Catholic book Club to a “distin-
guished Christian person of letters”) and a “lifetime achievement award” 
for “bad Sex” in fiction—but somehow it seems less surprising in a man 
who titled his memoir Self-Consciousness and devoted far more space in it to 
his psoriasis than to his wives and children.1
 1. The phrase “distinguished Christian person of letters,” from the award description 
of the Campion medal, is quoted by Updike in the remarks he delivered upon receiving the 
medal the medal on 11 September 1997 (More Matter 850). Updike won the bad Sex in Fiction 
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 To call Updike’s fiction narcissistic is of course to criticize the author 
as well as the work, and indeed, to an unusual degree readers who dislike 
the work view the man as reprehensible. no doubt this has something to 
do with the fact that many of Updike’s fiercest critics have been feminists 
who have interpreted the slogan “the personal is the political” as license 
for ad hominem attacks. yet this cannot be a sufficient explanation, for in the 
case of many other twentieth-century male writers, “personal” attacks in 
the 1970s soon gave way to more sophisticated critiques that located sex-
ism less in the malice of the author than in all-encompassing structures of 
discourse or ideology—while critiques of Updike have frequently retained 
their personal character.2 Though i agree with feminist critics that Updike 
is as self-absorbed as his writing suggests, i do not agree with their impli-
cation that his work may therefore be dismissed as unconscious solipsism 
or gratuitous offense. (no merely solipsistic writer, after all, can sustain 
the interest—or even the opposition—that Updike has.) Wayne booth’s 
famous distinction between the implied and real author of a work of fic-
tion, intended to forestall unproductive debates about the sincerity of 
authors when readers judge their work, may or may not be tenable—rich-
ard Walsh, for instance, has mounted a vigorous critique of it—but whether 
readers regard the narrators of Updike’s novels as real or implied stand-
ins for the man (as i am usually comfortable doing) or not, they can cer-
tainly identify a deliberate rhetoric of narcissism as central to his work.3 
lifetime achievement award, a distinction conferred by the edinburgh-based Literary Re-
view, in 2008.
 2. Consider, for instance, mary Gordon’s judgment: “[Updike] has a real problem about 
women. he covers that up with a notion that he really does love women, but he doesn’t. . . . 
For him, women are really corrupt in the flesh. he’s a liar, stylistically and morally” (Con-
versations 66–67). Such a judgment seems on a continuum with the (admittedly anecdotal) 
judgments reported by David Foster Wallace as representative of “literary readers . . . under 
forty . . . a fair number [of whom] are female”: Updike is “[j]ust a penis with a thesaurus,” 
a “son of a bitch” who has never had “one unpublished thought,” who “[m]akes misogyny 
seem literary” (52).
 3. For Walsh, “fictions are narrated by their authors, or by their characters. . . .  extradi-
egetic heterodiegetic narrators (that is, “impersonal” and “authorial” narrators), who cannot 
be represented without thereby being rendered homodiegetic or intradiegetic, are in no way 
distinguishable from authors” (84). The “implied author” disappears entirely. What do we 
make of fictions by a writer such as Updike, whose characters, whether first-person narrators 
or not, are often versions of himself? i am not sure that “reliability” (or the lack thereof) is 
a sufficient criterion for distinguishing between Updike the author and one of his narrated 
characters, for many of the hallmarks of an “unreliable” narrator—such as inconsistency 
between thoughts and actions, or false consciousness—are revealed, once one has explored 
Updike’s fictional project more closely, not to indicate unreliability at all. Updike’s work, 
that is to say, is inconsistent in the same consistent ways. We may reject his premises or the 
judgments of his characters that they imply, but if my argument in this chapter is correct, 
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Updike’s protagonists present themselves or are limned by their narrators 
both as representative selves of their historical moment—an effect typi-
cally achieved through the proliferation of realistic detail about the world 
they inhabit—and as quasi-shamanistic illuminators who bestow mean-
ing on this world through their sustained attention to it. When they suc-
ceed in persuading readers of their sometimes outrageous claims, they do 
so because Updike has successfully exploited his readers’ own narcissism. 
This is so not only when the territory is sex—where the possibilities for 
solipsism are obvious—but also, more audaciously, when Updike presses 
the claims of his Protestant Christianity.
 For Updike, the necessity of Christianity is described in unabashedly 
narcissistic terms, as the means to thwart death, to go on “being a self for-
ever.” Updike has candidly identified himself as one “for whom nothing-
ness . . . is an insuperable problem, an outrageous cancellation rendering 
every other concern, from mismatching socks to nuclear holocaust, negligi-
ble” (Self-Consciousness 228). he also implies that the division of humanity 
into those who fear nothingness and those who regard it with indifference 
is a phenomenon that fully comes into its own in the twentieth century, 
when not only grave and high-minded victorian agnostics but also large 
numbers of professed Christians in the United States find belief difficult:
During [my] adolescence, i reluctantly perceived of the Christian religion 
i had been born into that almost no one believed it, believed it really—
not its ministers, nor its pillars like my father and his father before him. 
Though signs of belief (churches, public prayers, mottos on coins) existed 
everywhere, when you moved toward Christianity it disappeared, as fog 
solidly opaque in the distance thins to transparency when you walk into it. 
i decided i nevertheless would believe. i found a few authors, a very few—
Chesterton, eliot, Unamuno, Kierkegaard, Karl barth—who helped me 
believe. Under the shelter (like the wicker chairs on the side porch) that i 
improvised from their pages i have lived my life. (Self-Consciousness 230)
This confession emphasizes not only the fiercely willed quality of Updike’s 
belief, but also his sense that his predicament is historically representative. 
as an educated man of the twentieth century, unable to deny the strengths 
of a thoroughgoing materialism, he suggests that if Christian belief is sal-
vageable, it must be buttressed by arguments both suitably intellectual 
(hence his need for the imprimatur of celebrated theologians and writers) 
his authorial intentions, whether expressed through an extradiegetic heterodiegetic narrator 
or a character, are discernible.
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and deeply felt—arguments that seem absent from the daily life of exist-
ing congregations. yet what makes this desire for eternal life narcissistic is 
neither the desire itself nor the arguments that it marshals but the nature 
of the life imagined. as the reverend Tom marshfield puts it in A Month 
of Sundays (1975), humans possess “a craving not for transformation into a 
life beyond imagining but for our ordinary life, the mundane life we so drift-
ingly and numbly live, to go on forever and forever. The only Paradise we 
can imagine is this earth. The only life we desire is this one” (209). The cor-
ollary is announced by alfred Clayton in Memories of the Ford Administra-
tion (1992): “We want life eternally, or else its joys are hopelessly poisoned” 
(215). hence the continuity between the erotic and the religious in Updike’s 
work: sex, like Christian belief, is a fist shaken in the face of death, an inti-
mation of familiar corporeal splendors forever. What Freud calls primary 
narcissism—“the libidinal complement to the egoism of the instinct of self-
preservation” (546)—corresponds more closely to Updike’s sexual and 
religious yearnings alike than to the orthodox Christian hope for a transfig-
ured life in the presence of God.
 To be sure, Updike sometimes obscures the narcissism of his writing 
by casting it as testimony to the splendor of God’s creation, in a manner 
that occasionally recalls O’Connor’s notion of writing as sacramental: “The 
yearning for an afterlife is the opposite of selfish: it is love and praise for 
the world that we are privileged, in this complex interval of light, to wit-
ness and experience” (Self-Consciousness 217). Or, more explicitly:
imitation is praise. Description expresses love. i early arrived at these self-
justifying inklings. having accepted that old Shillington blessing, i have 
felt free to describe life as accurately as i could, with especial attention to 
human erosions and betrayals. What small faith i have has given me what 
artistic courage i have. my theory was that God already knows everything 
and cannot be shocked. and only truth is useful. Only truth can be built 
upon. From a higher, inhuman point of view, only truth, however harsh, 
is holy. (231)
yet such sentiments are accompanied by a note of deliberate self-justifica-
tion, a rhetorical ploy that admits to the compensatory nature of narcis-
sism. humans love the created world and yearn for an afterlife not because 
the world exists and is good but because they desire “an intended relation 
to the outer world,” a “coherent matrix [that] has been prepared for this 
precious self of ours” (218). even the truth-telling of writing is, in the end, 
about comfort: “The fabricated truth of poetry and fiction makes a shelter 
in which i feel safe, sheltered within interlaced plausibilities in the image of 
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a real world for which i am not to blame. Such writing is in essence pure” 
(231). The confession of self-love and the conviction of “purity” follow so 
swiftly upon the theological affirmation that they cannot but be read as an 
invitation to fellow narcissists, a wager that readers will recognize their 
own desires in the work and enjoy with Updike the fellowship of complic-
ity. like David, the protagonist of his early story “Pigeon Feathers,” Updike 
pays tribute to creation but does so because he believes that it confirms his 
own centrality: “[T]he God who had lavished such craft upon these worth-
less birds would not destroy his whole Creation by refusing to let David 
live forever” (150).
 Updike’s suturing of this narcissistic motive for Christian belief to a 
theology derived from Karl barth is one of the most intriguing aspects of 
his work, for it distinguishes him both from the other major Christian fic-
tion writers of the mid-twentieth century (most of whom were roman or 
anglo-Catholic) and from the half-secularized mainline american Protes-
tantism of the late twentieth century. a schematic account of Updike’s dif-
ferences from mainline Protestantism might read like this: barth, not Paul 
Tillich or John Shelby Spong; sola fide, not faith and works; a God tran-
scendent and absconditus, not immanent and accessible; traditional dogma, 
including the insistence that some will be damned, not trendy appeals to 
social justice and feel-good universalism. Updike’s sanctioning of unre-
strained erotic pursuit is, of course, inconsistent with traditional Christian 
morality—as John Gardner once sarcastically put it, “Christ has redeemed 
us in advance, so let’s fornicate” (98)—but it has its origins in luther’s 
injunction to “sin boldly” and in barth’s pugnacious claim that Satan’s 
appeal is “to genuine morality, to the freedom of a knowledge which dis-
tinguishes and an activity which elects” (qtd. in Wood, Redemption 46) 
instead of to a simple, abiding trust in God. Such a position rejects ethics 
as sinful presumption and calls into question Updike’s own assertion that 
his novels “are all meant to be moral debates with the reader,” in which 
“[t]he question is usually, ‘What is a good man? or ‘What is goodness?’” 
(“One big interview” 502).4 Only in Updike’s earliest work—and above all 
in The Poorhouse Fair (1959)—are there protagonists in whom ethical action 
and orthodox belief form a coherent whole, and it seems significant that 
 4. it is instructive to contrast Updike’s use of the word “good” here with his complaint 
elsewhere that muriel Spark’s novels “lacked a compelling portrait of the good, and that 
without that it was difficult to provide a convincing portrait of evil” (qtd. in Spark, interview 
with Sara Frankel, 452). Once, when once asked about this judgment, Spark retorted, with 
much justice, “Well i think it depends on what you mean by a portrait of the good. . . . i 
don’t know whether John Updike has given us a convincing portrait of the good, mind you; 
his characters are just in and out of bed all the time” (interview with Sara Frankel 452–53).
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the clearest of these exemplars, John hook, is modeled on Updike’s grand-
father, whose serene connection to a premodern ethos is assumed. For anx-
ious moderns such as Updike himself, it would seem, orthodoxy can be 
preserved only when ethics is renounced altogether, for ethics is by its very 
nature too worldly, too unconcerned with eternity—indeed, too feminine. it 
may be uncharitable to attribute the change in Updike’s attitude, as Fred-
erick Crews does, to “an overreaction to self-judgment on the single point 
of adultery” (173)—but it is true that the “charitable works and kindly feel-
ings” that barth denigrates as a retreat from true Christianity are indeed, 
in Updike’s fiction, “the values invariably associated with the deserted or 
soon-to-be-deserted wife” (173).
 The straight line between Updike’s version of Christianity and the 
importance of adultery and divorce to his work reveals that for all its debt 
to european theologians, Updike’s Christianity is also distinctly ameri-
can, for it conflates adherence to sola fide with an american ideal of inno-
cence, as mary Gordon, following leslie Fiedler, once shrewdly noted.5 
Updike retains the notion of sin, which in orthodox Christianity maims all 
human beings, as the chief source of evil and confusion in the world. yet in 
a development that that can be read either as a startling reversal of ortho-
dox Christianity or as its necessary evolution in a secularized world, Chris-
tian faith often appears not as the mark of God’s redemption from sin but 
as the expression of a primordial innocence, a matter of narcissistic being 
rather than doing, that is somehow retained in the face of evil. Unlike the 
heroes of the nineteenth-century novels that Fiedler examines, for instance, 
Updike’s run toward rather than away from sex, but the underlying fear 
remains: there is always, as ralph Wood observes, “the fearsome coin-
cidence and equation of opposites: sex equals life equals death” (Comedy 
189). That they pursue sex nevertheless and sing in praise of it suggests 
that adultery is in part a testing ground for innocence, that one confirms 
one’s innocence by plunging into carnality and emerging unscathed, ready, 
like rabbit angstrom, to run again. The materiality of sex, however enjoy-
able, becomes a focus of contempt—as rabbit puts it, “the mud of women, 
of making babies” (Rabbit is Rich 202)—but the essential and innocent self 
remains unengaged. indeed, the distaste with procreation that accompanies 
such an attitude helps to explain the increasingly outré depictions of car-
 5. “One of the things that i think is remarkable about the american idea of innocence is 
that it doesn’t seem connected to behavior. So that, in other words, you can behave badly, you 
can even kill and still be called an innocent. and that, to me, is extraordinarily peculiar. That 
is, i think, a tremendously Protestant notion of innocence, that goodness is something you’re 
born with and that you don’t lose by behaving un-innocently. and i think this is very, very 
different from a european tradition.” (Gordon, Conversations 75) because Updike embraces 
such innocence, he is, for Gordon, “a kind of professional boy” (66).
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nality in Updike’s work (in rabbit’s case, from fellatio to anal sex to sleep-
ing with his daughter-in-law—not, perhaps, comparable to the marquis de 
Sade, but certainly “transgressive” enough to earn notoriety). The power of 
reproduction, figured as belonging to women, becomes a trap for men to 
escape or triumph over—either by conceiving of nonprocreative sexuality 
as fecund nevertheless, or, in the most chilling instances, as something close 
to celebrating sterility for its own sake.6
 indeed, in his most unguarded moments, Updike’s reflections about 
innocence and death seem less an expression of Christianity than of a 
thinly disguised version of what harold bloom calls the Gnostic “ameri-
can religion,” delivered in an emersonian accent.7 The Calvinist mystery—
that God is the ultimate author of evil, but human beings are nevertheless 
responsible for it—becomes transmuted into a kind of radical innocence 
that would equate creation with the fall and yearn for whatever spark of 
uncreated divinity might still be imprisoned within matter. Consider, for 
instance, this autobiographical account of watching a rainstorm from the 
safety of his porch as a boy:
On our side porch, it was my humble job, when it rained, to turn the 
wicker furniture with its seats to the wall, and in these porous woven 
caves i would crouch, happy almost to tears, as the rain drummed on the 
porch rail and rattled the leaves of the grape arbor and touched my wicker 
shelter with a mist like the vain assault of an atomic army . . . [T]he expe-
riencer is motionless, holding his breath as it were, and the things experi-
enced are morally detached from him: there is nothing he can do, or ought 
to do, about the flow, the tumult. he is irresponsible, safe, and witnessing: 
the entire body, for those rapt moments, mimics the position of the essen-
tial self within its jungle of physiology and its moldering tangle of inheri-
tance and circumstance. early in his life the child i was sensed the guilt in 
 6. a few examples: The ludicrous poem “Fellatio” (1969) imagines that “each of these 
clean secretaries” “takes / a fountain into her mouth / and lets her insides, drenched into 
seed, / flower into landscapes” that include “small farms each / with a silver silo” (Midpoint 
73). in Rabbit Is Rich, rabbit angstrom describes anal sex with Thelma in this way: “The grip 
is tight at the base but beyond, where a cunt is all velvety suction and caress, there is no 
sensation: a void, a pure black box, a casket of perfect nothingness. he is in that void” (417). 
marshall boswell associates this passage with references to homosexual ministers in Updike’s 
work and argues that in both instances, we see the influence of barth’s notion of evil as “the 
power of the being which arises out of the weight of the divine ‘no’” (qtd. in boswell 165). 
That roger lambert cheerfully urges his niece verna to have an abortion in Roger’s Version, 
despite the fact that he is not the father of the child, may also be relevant here.
 7. For this reason, i find it ironic that bloom has consistently ranked Updike as a sec-
ond-rate writer, “a minor novelist with a major style” (7). For a good exposition of Updike’s 
emersonian strain in the Rabbit novels, see David Jarraway.
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things, inseparable from the pain, the competition: the sparrow dead on 
the lawn, the flies swatted on the porch, the impervious leer of the bully 
on the school playground. The burden of activity, of participation, must 
plainly be shouldered, and has its pleasures. but they are cruel pleasures. 
There was nothing cruel about crouching in a shelter and letting phe-
nomena slide by: it was ecstasy. The essential self is innocent, and when 
it tastes its own innocence knows that it lives forever. if we keep utterly 
still, we can suffer no wear and tear, and will never die. (Self-Consciousness 
34–35)
 This passage, an extraordinarily pure distillation of Updike’s rhetoric 
of narcissism, is surpassingly lovely but difficult to describe as Christian. 
its Cartesian implication that the “essential self” is imprisoned in a “jungle 
of physiology” works against a sacramental understanding of matter and 
tends toward heterodox interpretations of the incarnation, while the notion 
that this self is “innocent” as long as it does nothing contradicts the doc-
trine of original sin. We would die, of course, even if we could “keep utterly 
still,” but the Christianity that we believe will save us from eternal death 
does not, in Updike’s view, transfigure us in ways now unimaginable; it 
returns us to our individual childhood narcissisms, before we sensed “the 
guilt in things.” The narcissistic appeal is thus inseparable from a capac-
ity for american nostalgia, but the imagined lost golden age is usually, in 
Updike, the recent past, a time actually experienced by his characters and 
invested both with its glamour and with a wistful sense of failure by the 
very fact of their having lived through it.
 as a fictive strategy of persuasion, a rhetoric of narcissism is fraught 
with danger. Unlike more forthright appeals to elitism (whether aesthetic 
and intellectual or ethical and religious), which gesture toward objective 
standards against which a claim to elite status can be measured, narcissism 
offers no justification for itself and thus always risks the response, “Who 
the hell do you think you are?” yet in another sense, narcissistic appeals are 
more in keeping with the character of everyday life in secular, democratic 
societies, for in precisely this lack of justification they reflect what alexis de 
Tocqueville called the democratic “passion for equality” (226). noting that 
“[i]n democratic societies, each citizen is usually preoccupied with some-
thing quite insignificant: himself” (561), Tocqueville hypothesized that such 
preoccupation explains why an american who approaches poetry expects 
“some prodigious thing to behold” as “the price he demands to tear himself 
briefly away from the myriad small concerns that keep him busy and lend 
charm to his existence” (561). Tocqueville feared that such demands would 
produce a literature of the bizarre; he did not foresee that in the work of 
u p d I k E ’ S  R h E T O R I C  O F  C h R I S T I A n  A M E R I C A n  n A R C I S S I S M  •  93
Whitman and many of his successors, the tendency toward grandiosity 
would be applied to and conflated with the perceiving consciousness itself, 
with more felicitous, if uneven, results. he did, however, accurately per-
ceive that such a literature springs from conditions of broad equality and 
gives rise not only to vaunting feelings of independence but also to fanta-
sies of plenitude that mask or self-consciously transfigure the weakness of 
any given individual.
 The egalitarian impulse behind Updike’s rhetoric of narcissism helps 
to account, i believe, for the delight with which Updike adopts so-called 
politically incorrect positions—for it suggests that those who style them-
selves as progressives or leftists are similarly motivated and have no claim 
to a bogus ethical superiority. in Self-Consciousness, the Rabbit tetralogy, and 
the “Pennsylvania books” (such as The Centaur, Of the Farm, and the play 
Buchanan Dying), Updike identifies with the rural and small-town world 
of what has come to be called “red america” and suggests that his own 
life among readers of The New Yorker has been a deliciously ironic exile. 
Christopher lasch notes that many cosmopolitan americans imagine this 
territory to be “technologically backward, politically reactionary, repres-
sive in its sexual morality, middlebrow in its tastes, smug and complacent, 
dull and dowdy” (5–6), and both Updike and his characters have accepted 
many of these characterizations with a kind of whimsically defiant pride. 
(as D. Keith mano once jeered: “Pennsylvania, my God. Only a magnifi-
cent eccentric could run up debts to Pennsylvania” [75]). yet this egalitar-
ian narcissism applies no less to characters and narrators from Updike’s 
novels of suburban new england, such as Couples or Roger’s Version. nei-
ther the working-class- and petit bourgeois nationalism that led rabbit (and 
Updike) himself to support the vietnam War nor the cold self-indulgence of 
his affluent Tarboxers in Couples is subject to anything approaching a rig-
orous critique; both are equally the expression of narcissistic rather than 
elitist attitudes. if there is any justification for these attitudes, something 
that might allow readers to identify with and share them, it is to be found 
in the egalitarian, american milieu of the fiction itself, no matter where it 
is set—hence the affectionate profligacy of Updike’s descriptions, which 
strive in Whitmanian fashion for an observer who assimilates and redeems 
the observed.
 Christians and non-Christians alike have observed that one of the 
attractions of Christianity is its insistence that before God, human beings 
are, in Peter augustine lawler’s words, “unique, free, and infinitely valu-
able” (33), irrespective of their intelligence, moral standing (if anything, 
conspicuous sinners have a certain advantage), taste, or degree of wealth. 
The conviction of their own value that Updike’s protagonists generally 
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possess seems to be derived from both their Christianity and their ameri-
canness, which for some characters appear to be conflated. (in rabbit ang-
strom’s words, “america is beyond power, it acts as in a dream, as a face 
of God” [Rabbit Redux 47]). While Updike and his more cerebral narrators 
may have required the permission of barth or Tertullian to believe, he does 
not demand similar justification for rabbit, nor does he intend that his 
readers despise the “unexamined” quality of rabbit’s faith or his visceral 
love for the United States. Updike’s theology and patriotism are deeply 
personal: characters who quote barth or meditate upon James buchanan do 
so not out of a snobbish or sincere desire for intellectual rigor or amplitude, 
but simply because they are the kind of people who do this kind of thing. 
(indeed, their intellectualism is itself mediocre.) Other characters, equally 
narcissistic and mediocre, do their own kinds of things. most often, the 
stakes are weighted most heavily against those characters who reject not 
only the “infinite value” of Updike’s heroes but also their own—those char-
acters, that is, who refuse to wear their american innocence proudly, either 
because they are women or because their adherence to liberalism or secu-
lar humanism entails a critique of american innocence. To be american, or, 
more precisely, to be privileged observer and participant of the american 
scene, is to be already redeemed—all one has to do is acknowledge the fact.
 Paradoxically, Updike’s egalitarianism produces an ethos both affec-
tionate and misanthropic. On the one hand, everyone is eligible for the 
redemptive embrace of Updike’s american Christianity; on the other hand, 
no innocent american owes anything to anyone but God, and in this iso-
lation cruelty and solipsism spring eternal. Perhaps Updike’s greater pop-
ularity with educated general readers than with tenured critics springs 
in part from this egalitarianism, which makes intellectuals understand-
ably distrustful. On the other hand, if Updike succeeds in making Chris-
tian belief attractive, this may have something to do with the appealingly 
egalitarian, yet also complacent revelation that believers are not only just 
as susceptible to cruelty as anyone else, but also already forgiven for it and 
therefore (and here the claim becomes doctrinally problematic) immune to 
further charges of hypocrisy.
 in this chapter, i will consider Updike’s rhetoric of narcissism broadly 
over the course of his career, focusing primarily on his first novel, The 
Poorhouse Fair (1959), and his late historical novel, In the Beauty of the Lil-
ies (1996), though i will also touch briefly on a number of his other texts, 
including Couples (1968), Roger’s Version (1986), and Terrorist (2006). i do not 
develop an extended reading of the rabbit novels, partly out of a desire 
not to step onto well-trodden ground or to repeat critical commonplaces, 
but also out of a conviction that the two novels at the center of this chap-
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ter have not yet received the attention that they deserve. i argue that these 
two novels can be viewed as poles between which Updike’s rhetoric of nar-
cissism moves, and the premise common to both is the waning of historic 
Christianity in the United States—a problem that extends back at least as 
far as to what ann Douglas called “the feminization of american culture” 
in the early nineteenth century, but which is exacerbated by the remote-
ness of God in Updike’s barthean theology. in The Poorhouse Fair, Updike 
has not yet broken with the conviction that belief and right conduct should 
accompany each other, and in the novel’s central debate between a believer 
and an atheist, the believer compels not so much because of his argu-
ments—the atheist’s are in fact stronger—but because of his personal integ-
rity. The believer’s ringing defense of Christian belief and evident charity 
toward his opponent, moreover, reveal that at the beginning of his career, 
Updike was willing to take the claims of atheism seriously and to combat 
those claims in the culture at large, even if the overwhelming fear of death 
as a motive for belief is still present. In the Beauty of the Lilies, on the other 
hand, suggests that because Updike finds it hard to take disbelief seri-
ously—despite the fact that two of its protagonists are professed unbeliev-
ers—he also has difficulty portraying authentic belief convincingly. across 
the whole of his career, Updike retains the image of a God who has with-
drawn, but in his later work, his characters’ reasons to believe or not to 
believe become equally narcissistic yet also more marked with a persistent 
sense of personal failure. indeed, for all that Updike maintains his critique 
of liberal, feminized theology, his own protagonists increasingly seem too 
conscious of—indeed, too narcissistically delighted by—their own weak-
nesses to proffer a convincing alternative.
II. when the wood was green: 
 Fears of Religious and national decline in 
 The Poorhouse Fair
readers who come to The Poorhouse Fair after having read Updike’s more 
celebrated works are generally surprised: no sex, no thinly disguised 
ciphers for Updike himself, no extended discussions of Protestant theolo-
gians, no icy misanthropy lurking in the wings. yet it is not necessarily mis-
leading to call the novel, as George J. Searles has done, Updike’s “thesis 
statement” (231), for at its center is a defense of traditional Christian belief. 
This defense partakes of several rhetorical strategies, of which an actual 
positive argument for God’s existence (a fairly predictable argument from 
design) is the least prominent. more often, God is presented as the neces-
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sary precondition for love, patriotism, excellence, and—most uncharacter-
istically for Updike—goodness. at the same time, arguments against God, 
grounding themselves in a desire that the world should be other than it 
is, are revealed to spring from the same narcissistic impulses as belief in 
God, so that their ethical force is called into question. Published before 
“the sexual revolution” became a slogan, The Poorhouse Fair does not revel 
in the putative gap between ethics and Christian orthodoxy, as many of 
Updike’s later works do. yet it is continuous with them in its overt argu-
ment that religious faith and love of the sensuous particular are essential to 
the good life in general and to the continued existence of the United States 
in particular.
 at the center of the novel is the debate between John hook, a ninety-
four year-old former schoolteacher, and Conner, the administrator of the 
poorhouse where he lives, about the existence of God and the afterlife. 
Structurally, the debate recalls similar verbal tussles in O’Connor’s fiction—
between Sheppard and rufus Johnson in “The lame Shall enter First,” or 
between mason Tarwater and rayburn in The Violent Bear It Away—and like 
O’Connor’s characters, hook and Conner are types: the one deeply reli-
gious, gentle, and slightly ridiculous but lovable; the other tormented but 
passionate in his atheism and torn between a heartfelt desire to do good 
and an even more powerful desire to be admired for his goodness. yet 
despite Updike’s clear sympathies for hook’s side in the argument, there 
is an apparent effort to be fair to Conner, evident in the greater portion of 
the novel devoted to Conner’s thoughts and words, which are often sympa-
thetically presented, though never without the narrator’s irony.
 The debate between hook and Conner springs up when amy mortis, 
another resident of the poorhouse, speculates about what heaven must be 
like. Conner responds with a rapturous picture of the future:
“i see [heaven] placed on this earth. There will be no disease. There will 
be no oppression, political or economic, because the administration of 
power will be in the hands of those who have no hunger for power, but 
who are, rather, dedicated to the cause of all humanity. . . . no longer suf-
fering but beauty will be worshipped. art will mirror no longer struggle 
but fulfillment. each man will know himself—without delusions, without 
muddle, and within the limits of that self-knowledge will construct a sane 
and useful life. Work and love: parks: orchards. Understand me. The fac-
tors which for ages have warped the mind of man and stunted his body 
will be destroyed; man will grow like a tree in the open. There will be no 
waste. no pain and above all no waste. and this heaven will come to this 
earth, and come soon.”
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 mrs. mortis asked, “Soon enough for us?”
 “not you personally perhaps. but for your children, and your grand- 
children.”
 “but for us ourselves?”
 “no.” The word hung huge in the living room, the “o” a hole that let 
in the cold of the void.
 “Well, then,” mrs. mortis spryly said, “to hell with it.” (106–8)
in this first stage of the argument, before hook joins it, Conner’s vision 
is deflated by mrs. mortis’s final remark, and everyone listening laughs 
with her in agreement. mrs. mortis voices here the characteristic Updikean 
narcissism: what good is a heaven confined to this life, from which vast 
numbers will be excluded simply because they die before technology and 
proper education make it available? Only eternal life would allow Conner’s 
vision to be a true heaven, for only it would guarantee the infinite value of 
each human being, in his or her solitariness, without qualification. Conner 
appeals to an image of individual strength when he describes the future 
man as “like a tree in the open,” but his heaven is nonetheless communal, 
with “work,” “love,” and—implicitly but nonetheless inescapably—sacri-
fice (“above all no waste”) as essential to it. mrs. mortis’s response refuses 
sacrifice for the happiness of future generations and reaffirms her earlier 
resentment toward Conner when he suggested that she might like to move 
her table: “you expect us to give up the old ways, and make this place a 
little copy of the world outside, the way it’s going. i don’t say you don’t 
mean well, but it won’t do. We’re too old and too mean; we’re too tired. 
now if you say to me, you must move your belongings over beneath the 
tree, i’ll do it, because i have no delusions as to whose mercy we’re depen-
dent upon” (43). Conner is astonished by the “blunt injustice” (43) of her 
words. yet her selfishness binds her more closely to her fellow human 
beings, who laugh in identification with her, while Connor, feeling “the 
common exclusion from the run of human hearts that minutes before he 
had imagined as binding them” (108), is pained. The man who imagines 
future humanity in terms of communal work and belonging nevertheless 
perceives his own isolation from more fundamental forms of connection, 
such as the family. it is fitting that he hates beds—those most common foci 
of domestic and erotic relation—because they are “damp and possessive” 
(49).
 belittled by mrs. mortis, Conner continues the argument with hook. 
hook does not contradict mrs. mortis, but he turns the argument away 
from the desire for eternal life and toward the conviction that God exists 
and that faith in God requires right conduct. according to hook, punish-
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ment necessarily follows sin and is even transferred between generations: 
“and who is to say how the ailments of my childhood may have been 
the fruit of my father’s short-comings, or of his before him. . . . The book-
keeping is far more strict than even that of a boston banker. if the size of a 
mouth is passed down, why not the burden of wrongdoing?” (111). When 
Conner asks for evidence that God exists, hook turns to the argument from 
design, professing delight in creation and skepticism that something could 
be generated from nothing without God. Conner counters with the exis-
tence of pain, ugliness, and stupidity, contending that “if the universe was 
made, it was made by an idiot, and an idiot crueler than nero. . . . life is a 
maniac raving in a sealed room” (113, 114). The two sides of the argument 
are familiar enough, drawing opposed conclusions from the same points of 
reference, and they quickly end in an impasse. Conner speaks of the terrible 
immensity of the stars in the nothingness of space, while hook speaks of 
them as “points of light arranged at random, to give the night sky adorn-
ment” (114). in the end, Conner wins the argument on logic, shaking hook 
with his anecdote of a Peruvian indian who, upon being given electric 
shock, had a hallucination of Christ speaking. but hook wins rhetorically, 
charging Conner with a “bitterness” that “is the willful work of [his] own 
heart” (111) and concluding that “[t]here is no goodness, without belief. 
There is only busy-ness” (116). his perception that Conner is both bitter 
and full of busy-ness (the novel begins, in fact, with hook’s quite unneces-
sary marking of the chairs in the poorhouse with personalized nameplates 
for each resident—an action that provokes anger in most of the residents 
and that hook dismisses with the phrase “a child must tinker” [4])—does 
not, of course, prove the existence of God, but it does suggest that athe-
ism is more often the result of personal bitterness than of logical arguments 
pursued in good faith.
 Conner is wounded by hook’s accusations because he knows them to 
be true. For all that he desires to do good, he is even greedier for praise. 
Stirred by music, he indulges in fantasies that combine his desire to be wor-
shiped for his achievements with visions of corporeal beauty and sexual 
fulfillment:
in the language of melody speeches about man’s aspirations and eventual 
victory could be made that explicit language would embarrass. he could 
not hear a dozen chords without crystals building in his head, images: 
naked limbs, the exact curve of the great muscle of a male thigh, cities, 
colored spires soaring. man was good. There was a destination. health 
could be bought. . . . he envisioned grown men and women, lightly clad, 
playing, on the brilliant sand of a seashore, children’s games. a man threw 
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a golden ball, his tunic slowly swirling with the exertion; a girl caught 
it. . . . another man caught the girl by the waist. She had a wide belt. he 
had her above his head; she bent way back, her throat curved against 
the blue above the distant domes. The man was Conner. Then there was 
Conner again, at his desk, speaking to grateful delegates, calm, flexible, 
humorous; the listeners laughed, admiringly. Conner shunned admiration, 
and gained it doublefold; the world was under his wing. yet in visualizing 
this world which worshipped him, he returned to the triangles and rhom-
boids flashingly formed by the intersection of legs and torsos scissoring in 
sport, and the modulated angles of nude thoracic regions, brown breasts 
leaning one against another, among scarves of everlasting cloth, beneath 
the sun. (124–25)
again, Conner is made both sympathetic and ridiculous. his discomfort 
with language is of course disadvantageous for a character in a novel, for 
the music and mental imagery that move him must be rendered verbally—
and were he real, he would no doubt be embarrassed by Updike’s descrip-
tion of his fantasies. his delight in the human form of course makes him 
a kindred spirit of humanists who trace their intellectual heritage to the 
Greeks, while the playful eroticism of the scene might be seen as tribute to 
Updike’s praise of creation. yet there is a disturbing undercurrent as well. 
Conner responds less to the particularity of human flesh than to its abil-
ity to be redescribed as geometric figures, as “triangles and rhomboids,” 
so that his delight in it seems continuous with that of the cities with “col-
ored spires soaring.” The power to refigure human beings as manipulable 
shapes, in turn, is continuous with his own desire for power, both sexual 
and political, and with his conviction that intangible markers of well-being 
such as health may be purchased. Conner may dream of a world in which 
power is exercised by “those who have no hunger for it,” but his own hun-
ger for it raises the question of how one knows such a world could ever 
exist.
 indeed, Conner provides a textbook illustration of the tension inherent 
within many contemporary intellectuals’ embrace of Darwin. On the one 
hand, the process of evolution, guided as it is by natural selection, cannot 
possibly be teleological, and viewed objectively, existence cannot have any 
meaning beyond what is groundlessly attributed to it. On the other hand, 
Conner’s faith in an evolutionary telos—a thoroughly human world with-
out oppression, greed, or the desire for power—is clung to despite this lack 
of grounding, and in this sense his view is just dependent upon faith as 
hook’s. repeatedly Conner torments himself with the discrepancy between 
the glorious imagined future and the intolerableness of what is, and while 
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he is capable of flashes of searing humility when he realizes how imper-
fectly he lives his ideals, more often he is “appalled by the conservatism 
zoological charts portrayed” and indulges eugenicist thoughts about his 
subhuman enemies: “he could picture the woman who had sent him the 
letter, her active pink nose, her dim fearful eyes, her pointed fingers crab-
bedly scraping across the paper—a tree-shrew, a rat that clings to bark. 
When would they all die and let the human day dawn?” (78). Conner is 
in this sense faithful to the project that alain badiou identifies as the cru-
cial to the thought of the twentieth century, “the idea of changing man, of 
creating a new man . . . [which] always comes down to demanding that 
the old one be destroyed” (8). if the possibility of creating human beings 
who do not desire power is at all feasible, then much blood will have to be 
spilled. Under the cover of Darwinian science, dependent upon the vaga-
ries of genes and environments, Conner espouses a Promethean and even 
transhumanist liberation, looking forward to “the crystalline erections”—
a revealing double entendre that suggests a mineral rather than an animal 
sexuality—“that in his heart he felt certain would arise, once his old people 
were gone” (64).
 yet one of the more intriguing aspects of The Poorhouse Fair is that Con-
ner and hook are equally frustrated by the contemporary world because 
of its lack of opportunities for heroism, a lack associated with the ascen-
dancy of feminine values. readers may be appalled by intimations of 
bloodshed in Conner’s worldview, but hook too admires martial values, 
and even though he speaks of “a war we can wage without blood” (160), 
he also thinks of virtue—which he at one point defines as “obedience to 
the commands of God” (111)—as “[a]n austerity of the hunt, a manliness 
from which comes all life, so that it can be written that the woman takes 
her life from the man” (160). it follows that because such manly austerity 
is almost gone—hook opines oracularly that “[t]his last decade . . . has wit-
nessed the end of the world, if the people would but wake to it” (152)—the 
United States has become feminized and pathetic: “Women are the heroes 
of dead lands” (160). Conner’s preferred metaphors are vegetative rather 
than feminine, but his own sense of the contemporary scene is much the 
same: “he wanted things clean; the world needed renewal, and this was a 
time of history when there were no cleansing wars or no sweeping purges, 
when reform was slow, and decayed things were allowed to stand and 
rot themselves away” (64). it seems to him unaccountable that the heroic 
humanist forebears should have produced a modern world with “few 
opportunities for zeal anywhere” (64), and he “envie[s] the first rationalists 
their martyrdoms and the first reformers their dragons of reaction and self-
ishness” (65). he has little of the delight in creation that even O’Connor’s 
u p d I k E ’ S  R h E T O R I C  O F  C h R I S T I A n  A M E R I C A n  n A R C I S S I S M  •  101
rayber perceives, and when he finds himself “content to gaze at nothing, 
or what amounted to nothing,” he can think only that he has been “infected 
with the repose that was only suitable to inmates waiting out their days” 
(66). against the humanist vision of perfected humanity and the Chris-
tian eschatological hope looms the decadent present of political consensus 
(“[t]he opposition of republican and Democrat had been unreal since the 
republican administrations of a generation ago” [93]) that embraces instead 
“the tendency of the universe toward eventual homogeneity, each fleck of 
energy settled in seventy cubic miles of otherwise vacant space” (65) and 
crafts policies toward this end under the rubric of “Settling.”
 Updike has called The Poorhouse Fair “a deliberate anti-Nineteen Eighty-
Four,” explaining that his vision of the near future (the book is set in 1977) 
does not portray “the death of everything”—the most terrifying implica-
tion of Orwell’s vision—but rather a milder dystopia in which “it is oth-
ers that die, while an attenuated silly sort of life bubbles decadently on” 
(Foreword x). The poorhouse is relatively cut off from this “silly sort of 
life,” because both its elderly inhabitants, remembering an older world, 
and Conner, anticipating a brave new one, would prefer not to dwell on 
the realities outside—the decline of traditional values, the shoddiness of 
contemporary manufactured goods, the soulless “administrators [and] 
report-readers” who are Conner’s superiors (14). yet the poorhouse fair, at 
which the townspeople of andrews come to buy handicrafts made by the 
residents, is an intrusion of the outside, made more symbolically pointed 
when a delivery truck, driven by a sullen teenager, breaches the stone wall 
that surrounds the property. The final third of the novel, consisting largely 
of glimpses of random townsfolk at the fair, their thoughts, and their inter-
actions with the residents, has an elegiac tone, heightened by the narra-
tor’s intermittent declarations that americans have become a sad lot, aware 
of their own material and spiritual decline and quicker than ever to seek 
solace in nostalgia. Demand for the old people’s wares bespeaks “a keen 
subversive need, at least in the cities, for objects that showed the trace of 
a hand” (145). in the longest of these declarations, the narrator identifies 
boredom, prosperity, and meaninglessness as the causes of their “silly” life:
heart had gone out of these people; health was the principal thing about 
the faces of the americans that came crowding through the broken wall to 
the poorhouse fair. They were just people, members of the race of white 
animals that had cast its herds over the land of six continents. highly neu-
ral, brachycephalic, uniquely able to oppose their thumbs to the four other 
digits, they bred within elegant settlements, and both burned and interred 
their dead. history had passed on beyond them. They remembered its 
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moment and came to the fair to be freshened in the recollection of an older 
america, the america of Dan Patch and of Senator beveridge exhorting 
the anglo-Saxons to march across the Pacific and save the beautiful weak-
minded islands there, an america of stained-glass lampshades, hardshell 
evangelists, Flag Days, ice men, plug tobacco, China trade, oval windows 
marking on the exterior of the house a stair landing within, pungent nos-
trums for catarrhal complaints, opportunism, churchgoing, and well-
worded orations in the glare of a cemetery on summer days. . . . There 
was to be no war; we were to be allowed to decay of ourselves. and the 
population soared like diffident india’s, and the economy swelled, and 
iron became increasingly dilute, and houses more niggardly built, and 
everywhere was sufferance, good sense, wealth, irreligion, and peace. The 
nation became one of pleasure-seekers; the people continued to live as 
cells of a body do in the coffin, for the conception “america” had died in 
their skulls. (158–59)
The shift here toward a discourse of american exceptionalism and decline 
parallels Conner and hook’s longing for struggle, though with a complex 
irony that doubles back upon itself and appeals to readerly complicity. 
The narrator waxes ironic about the racialist overtones of (white) ameri-
can identity, its bygone belief in manifest Destiny, its susceptibility to crass 
commercial appeals (“nostrums for catarrhal complaints”), and even about 
the belief in human distinctiveness (“highly neural, brachycephalic”). 
yet this irony registers both an appropriate liberal discomfort with such 
notions and a conviction that they are nevertheless valuable (even, per-
haps, the quack medicines), that irony provides cold comfort when genu-
ine vitality is lost. moreover, the continued population growth (Updike did 
not foresee the drop in the birth rate in the United States after the postwar 
“baby boom”), traditionally associated with ethnic conquest, becomes itself 
an index of decline, associated not with american destiny but with Third 
World fatalism. (here, perhaps, is an early hint of Updike’s discomfort with 
procreation itself.)
 if the double irony of this passage seems unpalatable to many readers, it 
is because Updike has taken too much for granted an audience that believes 
in the fearful possibility of national decadence, an audience that might be 
persuaded that shared religious belief constitutes the best defense against 
it—in short, an audience shaped by the historically specific fears of the 
early Cold War, when the phrase “under God” entered the Pledge of alle-
giance and the struggle against Soviet Communism was widely perceived 
as a struggle against godlessness.8 Updike’s scriptural epigraph for the 
 8. although D. Quentin miller is correct to see expressions of Cold War anxiety in The 
Poorhouse Fair—references to atomic bombs, as well as Updike’s prediction that the Cold War 
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novel—“if they do this when the wood is green, what will happen when 
the wood is dry?” (luke 23:31)—evokes both what Updike would con-
sider the thinness of half-secularized mainline Protestantism and the com-
placency of newly prosperous postwar america, but for a contemporary 
audience accustomed to think of the Cold War largely in terms of oppres-
sion and what alan nadel calls “containment culture,” it may also appear 
shocking that anyone might consider a pre–women’s movement, pre–civil 
rights america a land of “green wood.”9 here the divide between nonaca-
demic and academic readers of Updike might loom especially large: for all 
the prominence of pop-cultural critiques of the 1950s, nostalgia for that era 
of putative american strength has not disappeared. From the standpoint of 
such nostalgia, Updike’s worry about the long-term viability of american 
strength might today appear prophetic.
 What finally distinguishes The Poorhouse Fair from Updike’s later work, 
however, is its hint that fears of national decline or of creeping meaning-
lessness must be combated not only with vaunting egoism and with obei-
sance before God but also with the moral actions that such an attitude 
demands. hook’s insistence that belief itself, though a necessary prerequi-
site for a worthwhile life, requires “obedience to the commands of God” 
(111) is a far cry from the tortured rationalizations for adultery that later 
Updike protagonists will offer up, all the while proclaiming their belief 
in the God who forbids it. indeed, despite the novel’s effort to present the 
debate between Conner and hook fairly, it is on the question of how their 
beliefs affect their actions that the tables finally swing against Conner. The 
key moment occurs when Conner, trying to organize the poorhouse men to 
help cart away the stones that have fallen when the wall was breached, sud-
would still be going strong, reveal as much—his emphasis on a paralyzing fear of nuclear 
apocalypse is misplaced. The more potent fear is not that the world will be destroyed—
“There was to be no war” (159), after all—but that life will become meaningless, that even 
the antagonism of the Cold War has been safely contained and rendered merely formal. here, 
Updike anticipates Walker Percy’s more sustained reflections on human beings’ attraction to 
apocalyptic thinking in a time of comfort and boredom.
 9. The Poorhouse Fair did not anticipate the women’s movement, but it did project the 
successful passage of civil rights laws: “Dark-skinned people dominated the arts and popular 
culture; intermarriage was fashionable, psychologists encouraged it; the color bar had quite 
melted in all states save virginia. The enforced reforms, so stirring to Conner’s youth, might 
never have occurred, to hear hook talk” (93). here Conner’s identification with the post–civil 
rights order serves to bring the movement itself into question. The coming of racial equality 
is linked with the disappearance of meaningful distinctions, so that intermarriage becomes 
both a fashion statement and a kind of therapy, while the older, more vital america is explic-
itly racialized as white (158). The only redeeming feature of Ted, the teenaged driver of the 
truck that breaks the wall, is his disdain for “all this latin stuff. every other movie star was a 
Cuban or mestizo or something, as if you had to be brown to look like anything. Some guys 
he knew wore ‘torero’ pigtails standing up from the back of their heads and sprayed their 
hair with perfumed shellac. Ted’d be damned if he’d do this. They could call him a Puritan 
all they wanted” (55).
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denly finds himself being stoned by some of the men who have resented his 
treatment of them. The assault is over quickly—a show of “disdain” (133) 
is enough for Conner to quell it—but it brings Conner closer to his desired 
martyrdom than anything else in the novel, and even hook, who did not 
take part in the stoning but witnessed it, “had the thought that here was 
something glorious. battles of old had swayed beneath such a canopy of 
missiles” (132). and indeed, Conner rises to the occasion magnanimously, 
continuing to gather the stones after the men disperse and telling his 
enraged friend buddy that he intends to “forgive them” (134).
 Conner’s caritas, however, is short-lived: he soon feels that “it was not 
quite enough, merely to forgive them” (135), and he confronts hook, whom 
he falsely believes to have been the instigator of the attack. hook, not 
understanding Conner’s suspicion, attributes the attack to boredom and 
idleness, which provokes an angry reply: “my patience is not limitless. any 
repetition of mass defiance, and there will be measures taken” (136). he 
then orders hook to stop smoking cigars, lest he endanger himself and the 
wooden buildings on the grounds, and permits buddy to wrench the cigar 
away and to stamp it into the ground. even the impulse to forgive cannot 
long triumph over petty vindictiveness, and Conner’s last appearance in 
the novel—in which he reads, for the tenth time, an angry anonymous let-
ter accusing him of not respecting the inmates’ rights—suggests that he will 
cling to his injuries petulantly.
 hook, on the other hand, receives the final word in the novel, and his 
actions convey a more genuine desire for reconciliation with Conner. he 
wakes in the middle of the night because
[h]is encounter with Conner had commenced to trouble him. The young 
man had been grievously stricken. The weakness on his face after his 
henchman had stolen the cigar was troubling to recall; an intimacy had 
been there hook must reward with help. a small word would perhaps set 
things right. as a teacher, hook’s flaw had been over-conscientiousness; 
there was nowhere he would not meddle. he stood motionless, half in 
moonlight, groping after the fitful shadow of the advice he must impart 
to Conner, as a bond between them and a testament to endure his dying in 
the world. What was it? (185)
even as the narrator hints at the futility of hook’s desire to give advice—
his schoolteacher’s “meddling” is, indeed, a humorous counterpart to 
Conner’s “busy-ness”—its poignancy is undeniable. The denotative ambi-
guity of the final sentence—is it the “testament” or hook himself that must 
“endure” (survive? tolerate?) his dying?—also suggests a sympathetic vul-
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nerability, a desire to put accounts in order before death and a fear that he 
might be unable to do so. Whether readers interpret this passage primar-
ily as the upsurge of a usually suppressed (and quintessentially Updikean) 
fear of nothingness or as a wholly selfless desire to comfort, what seems 
crucial here is its direction outward, toward relieving Conner’s anguish. 
even if i place the most narcissistic construction on hook’s motive here, 
i must acknowledge that it pushes him toward what is not merely the 
“right” thing to do but an act of gratuitous kindness. its placement at 
the end of the novel, after the less conclusive arguments about the exis-
tence of God and the more potentially unsavory arguments about national 
decline, suggests that Updike intends for this appeal to Christian caritas to 
be decisive. never again would Updike be so explicit in aligning belief in 
God with goodness. in the name of the new possibilities for self-affirma-
tion afforded by the sexual revolution, Updike would increasingly come 
to sunder Christian belief from ethical action. Continuing to reject ver-
sions of Christianity that minimize unfashionable dogma and emphasize 
good works and social justice, Updike would eventually come to suggest 
that even belief itself is a matter of indifference, given humans’ inability 
to approach God at all—that what truly matters is not being taken in by 
ethics.
III.  the Feminization of American Religion and the 
 Refusal of Argument: 
 Couples and Roger’s Version
One year before Updike published The Poorhouse Fair, the now mostly for-
gotten nebraskan novelist Wright morris brought out The Territory Ahead, a 
study of the persistence of nostalgia as a major theme in american fiction. 
For morris, one of the most revealing traits of american writers—exempli-
fied by Faulkner’s famously overblown praise of Thomas Wolfe—is their 
glorification of failure:
Failure, not achievement, is the hallmark of success. The romantic origins 
of this statement are less pertinent to this discussion than the prevailing 
tendency to find in such a statement a profound truth. The great writer 
must fail. in this way we shall know that he is great. in such a writer’s fail-
ure the public sees a moral victory: what does his failure prove but how 
sublime and grand the country is? This point of view has so much to rec-
ommend it that to call it into question smacks of un-americanism. it calls, 
that is, for a shrinking of the national consciousness. (xiv)
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according to this logic, all american writers will fall short of the sheer, 
raw sublimity of america itself, but in their ambition to do so, they return 
obsessively to the places and the moments when they first confronted 
this sublimity in all its transformative power. For earlier generations of 
writers, this meant, quite literally, taking to the woods and recording the 
immensity of the american landscape; in the twentieth century, now that 
the frontier is no more, the same move focuses on the epiphanies of child-
hood and youth, which are figured, in Wordsworthian fashion, as intima-
tions of privileged glory. There is, to be sure, a good deal of egoism in such 
strategies, and indeed, the effect among readers is frequently the reverse, 
so that Whitman or Thoreau, for instance, seems to invest the scenes he 
describes with meaning rather than being their passive recorder. yet in both 
cases, the writer’s greatness is achieved by his very woundedness, which 
he probes by returning to the scene of former glory and contrasting it with 
the present.
 Updike’s novels participate in this dynamic, though in a curiously 
attenuated fashion. Few of his protagonists can be called successful in any 
conventional sense; many are detached and lacking in worldly ambition, 
and their obsessive yet complacent attention to the world—what James 
Wood calls their “quality of fattened paganism” (227)—is matched by a 
querulous suspicion that things were once better still. rabbit angstrom 
may be prototypical in that he often looks back on the glory days of his 
youth (in the first paragraph of Rabbit, Run [1960], the note is already pres-
ent, as the twenty-six-year-old watches a group of youths playing bas-
ketball and thinks, “the kids keep coming, they keep crowding you up” 
[1]), but one of the most striking features of Updike’s work as a whole is 
its wistful dwelling on the recent past. The moment so prized shifts from 
novel to novel—typically, there is a gap of five to twenty years between 
the relatively disillusioned present of either the novel or the moment of the 
novel’s publication and the splendors of the past remembered or immedi-
ately depicted in the novel. This gap, moreover, persists whether the novel 
is narrated in the first or the third person. The Poorhouse Fair, set in 1977, 
looks back to the moment of the novel’s actual publication as a time when 
“the wood was green”; the notorious Couples shortens the interval to a mere 
five years, valorizing 1963 as the charmed moment after postwar prosperity 
and the sexual revolution had contrived to create an affluent sexual utopia, 
but before feminism and the antiwar movements had brought civil divi-
sion and rancor between the sexes. in Marry Me: A Romance (1976), the same 
early 1960s moment is the site of a narrative of adultery and remarriage 
whose cruelty is matched only by its lyricism. and in Memories of the Ford 
Administration, alfred Clayton, though he acknowledges them to have been 
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a time of “post-apocalyptic let-down, of terrifying permissiveness” (248), 
nonetheless delights in “those far-off Ford days [when] it was assumed 
that any man and woman alone in a room with a lock on the door were 
duty-bound to fuck” (16)—in contrast to the 1980s and 1990s, when aiDS 
and the recognition of sexual harassment as a crime have imbued relations 
between men and women with caution and bitterness.
 Such depictions of nostalgia are familiar enough when the focus of the 
nostalgia happens to be (as the previous examples have suggested) youth, 
sexual delight, or belief in american exceptionalism. The fact that all of 
these are entangled with Updike’s version of Christianity, however, com-
plicates matters, for it raises the question of just when the “fall” away from 
orthodox Christianity occurred and why. in Updike’s fictional world, this 
fall is rarely personal—which is to say that Updike’s protagonists seldom 
lose their faith, though they do often wonder why they continue to believe 
and even, like roger lambert, glory in the distance between themselves 
and God. Some are even inclined to consider their faith a moral weakness, 
an exaggerated respect for conventionality. Piet hanema, for instance, won-
ders in Couples “what barred him from the ranks of those many blessed 
who believed nothing. Courage, he supposed. his nerve had cracked when 
his parents died. To break with a faith requires a moment of courage, and 
courage is a kind of margin within us, and after his parents’ swift death 
Piet had no margin.” as an apparent afterthought, the narrator adds, “also, 
his european sense of order insisted that he place his children in Chris-
tendom” (20). Such passages, however, seem intended ironically: David 
lodge is much closer to the truth when he speaks of Updike’s attempt 
to depict Piet as “a kind of primitive, a rough diamond” (36) who might 
plunge just as readily into adultery as his fellow Tarboxers but who nev-
ertheless stands apart from them, lacking the secular alienation that makes 
their own attempts to “break back into” hedonism so unsatisfying for them 
(48). Piet’s faith remains secure, but it depends for its resonance on a sense 
that everyone else’s is irretrievably lost, and that believers and unbelievers 
languish—though with considerable compensations—“in one of those dark 
ages that visit mankind between millennia, between the death and rebirth 
of the gods, when there is nothing to steer by but sex and stoicism and the 
stars” (31). has so much changed in the four years between the publication 
of The Poorhouse Fair, when it is still possible to imagine that in 1977 a few 
elderly folk might still abide by Christian morality, and the events depicted 
in Couples?
 Updike’s work as a whole suggests that the collective american fall 
from Christian orthodoxy took place long ago, but that americans have 
only begun to perceive this fall and its effects in the recent past. it may 
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be, in fact, that his characters’ personal nostalgia for lost youth or amer-
ican self-confidence is misplaced, that it serves to conceal an authentic 
desire for God that can no longer declare itself without irony in a world 
of waning belief. Perhaps the clearest sign of this argument can be found 
in Updike’s sustained engagement with the work of nathaniel hawthorne, 
who even appears as a minor character in Memories of the Ford Administra-
tion.10 David lodge has argued that Couples is, in part, a rewriting of The 
Blithedale Romance (“Post-Pill” 33), and it has become common to speak of 
the later novels A Month of Sundays, Roger’s Version, and S. (1988) as a Scar-
let Letter Trilogy, whose three protagonists are modeled upon arthur Dim-
mesdale, roger Chillingworth, and hester Prynne. Updike’s own claim that 
“[a] very vivid ghost of Christianity stares out at us from [hawthorne’s] 
prose, alarming and odd in not being evenly dead, but alive in some limbs 
and amputate in others” (“hawthorne’s Creed” 76) seems, particularly 
in the novels written after Couples, to be a description of his own stance. 
moreover, both Updike and hawthorne associate their sense of the decline 
of american religious orthodoxy with the ascendancy of not only women 
in general but also with a cloying and sentimental ideology of feminin-
ity. hook’s claim in The Poorhouse Fair that “women are the heroes of dead 
lands” takes on additional resonance in light of this comparison and sug-
gests that Updike’s often-remarked antifeminism, though certainly no less 
narcissistic for being so, is not merely a matter of misogyny.
 in The Feminization of American Culture, ann Douglas famously argues 
that a sea change in american Protestantism took place between roughly 
1820 and 1875. The Calvinist orthodoxy of Presbyterian and Congrega-
tional denominations that had dominated the american colonies until 
soon after the revolutionary War was, after a protracted struggle, dises-
tablished in the states where it had been an official creed, and in the free 
marketplace of religion that ensued, it quickly lost ground to upstart 
denominations (baptists, methodists, and in new england, Unitarians) 
that competed for souls by stressing an emotional rather than an intellec-
tual relationship with God, holding out the possibility (if not always the 
likelihood) of universal salvation, and promoting a saccharine and overtly 
feminized cult of domestic and necrophilic piety. Douglas discerns in 
this development the beginnings of american mass culture and describes 
its ascendancy as a remarkably successful push for power on the part of 
 10. Perhaps it is more accurate to speak of Updike’s hawthorne as a character conceived 
by a character. alfred Clayton, the novel’s narrator, is writing a fictionalized biography of 
James buchanan, and hawthorne appears in this section of the novel as the focalizer of a 
scene in which he and buchanan converse, during the days of the Pierce administration, in 
liverpool, where hawthorne was serving as the american consul.
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two allied but culturally marginalized groups—american clergymen and 
white, middle-class women. Douglas’s account sheds considerable light on 
hawthorne’s ambivalent relation to the Calvinist culture that these women 
and nineteenth-century clergy routed. Wendy Piper notes that hawthorne 
“believed the Puritan doctrine of natural depravity, despite its severity, to 
be a more accurate understanding of human nature than that suggested 
by the optimism and ideals of the Transcendentalists” (40–41). accord-
ingly, he admired the Puritans’ unsentimental sounding of human deprav-
ity and rigorous habits of thought—both virtues traditionally coded as 
“masculine”—while deploring their scorn for fleshly life, including sexu-
ality, which bespeaks a false belief that spirit and matter are opposed to 
each other and leads to what aquinas called libido dominandi. The tension 
in such an attitude is evident in hawthorne’s depiction of hester: she is 
celebrated for her own emotional strength, resilience, maternal ardor, and 
sexual warmth—qualities that hawthorne attributes in lesser degree to her 
contemporaries, with “broad shoulders and well-developed busts, and . . . 
round and ruddy cheeks, that had ripened in . . . far-off [england], and 
had hardly yet grown paler or thinner in the atmosphere of new england” 
(161). yet she is also implicitly condemned for her own antinomianism, 
which is well-nigh Transcendentalist—when she tells Dimmesdale, “What 
we did has a consecration of its own!” (286), she replaces a Puritan convic-
tion of evil with an even less tenable sense of natural goodness. both she 
and the Puritans who condemn her, however, appear in a more favorable 
light than many of hawthorne’s contemporaries, who have abandoned 
both a rigorous, unsentimental religion and a robust emotional life for a 
cloying sentimentality.
 Updike’s own beliefs about the relationship between orthodox reli-
gion, femininity, and national decline follow hawthorne’s in broad out-
line, although where hawthorne suggested both irreconcilable difference 
and comfortable proximity—preventing hester from ever achieving a full 
reconciliation with her community yet maintaining her in a relationship 
with it nonetheless—Updike exaggerates the impossibility of reconcilia-
tion, even hinting that orthodox religion gives a more delectable savor to 
one’s adulteries than atheism, agnosticism, or Transcendentalism would. 
as many commentators have observed, when lightning destroys the Con-
gregationalist church at the end of Couples, this is presented not as God’s 
wrath against an epidemic of adultery, but rather as further evidence 
of God’s self-withdrawal, his taking leave of a house that has become an 
empty shell. being abandoned by God in this way might be painful, but it is 
nothing new—it is only to be expected from the Calvinist God who selects 
a few as his elect and predestines everyone else to eternal damnation. The 
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distance and otherness of God becomes, paradoxically enough, the surest 
license for one’s own narcissistic pleasures.
 Once one has gone so far, the distance between a Calvinist God who 
may be absconditus but remains no less real and the human God whose 
death is plangently announced by nietzsche becomes very small indeed, 
even if Updike cannot join nietzsche in his brand of tragic affirmation 
after such an announcement, tending instead toward what i called before 
an attenuated celebration of failure. Roger’s Version suggests how small the 
difference between these two conceptions might be by making its central 
religious debate occur not between an atheist and a believer but between 
two believers. The first, roger lambert, is a middle-aged professor of theol-
ogy and former minister, an avid barthean, misanthrope, and connoisseur 
of pornography; while the second, Dale Kohler, is a young “Jesus freak” 
and computer scientist who wishes to prove the existence of God mathe-
matically. Whereas in The Poorhouse Fair Updike attempted to present both 
sides of a debate on religion fairly, in Roger’s Version—as the novel’s very 
title suggests—roger’s victory is a foregone conclusion, and Dale’s even-
tual loss of faith is presented with malevolent glee. roger considers Dale’s 
desire to prove God’s existence “blasphemy” and “loath[es] the icy-eyed 
fervent way” Dale declares Christ to be his Savior (22); he even goes so far 
as to name the Devil “the absence of doubt . . . [that] pushes people into 
suicide bombing, into setting up extermination camps” (81), thus suggest-
ing that atheism may be preferable to much of what passes for Christianity. 
he also prefers to keep his own faith as secret as possible, hating the fact 
that his “hot barthian nugget insulated within layers of worldly cynicism 
and situation ethics” are “dragged toward the light by this boy’s earnest 
agony” (180). Dale, for his part, is genuinely needy in his own faith—
when he loses it, “he can’t sleep . . . because he always used to pray and 
that would put him to sleep” (315–16). While roger does believe Dale’s 
approach to be wrong and blasphemous, it is clear that he is repulsed even 
more by how obvious Dale’s neediness is: the pathos of Dale’s loss of faith 
only strengthens roger’s contempt for him.
 readers of Roger’s Version have judged roger and Dale in diametrically 
opposed ways, despite general agreement that the game is rigged against 
Dale. James Wood, for instance, maintains that “Dale is, throughout, a 
repulsive character; roger lambert, a genial, mild professor” (229), while 
Frank G. novak, Jr., making much of the parallel between lambert and 
hawthorne’s Chillingworth, considers roger a “satanic personality” who 
deceives many readers into believing that Updike endorses his barthean 
theology (3). Such divergent responses are themselves enabled by Updike’s 
severing of ethics and morality from Christian orthodox belief. it is tempt-
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ing to conclude that those who rate orthodoxy higher than morality, per-
ceiving them as separable, will prefer roger, while those who maintain that 
orthodoxy must be demonstrated by a moral life will prefer Dale. even this 
judgment, however, is too simple. viewed from the standpoint of ortho-
doxy, roger is correct that only revelation guarantees the truth of Christi-
anity, and any response to that revelation is always “subjective,” in that it 
engages us not merely intellectually, but (as the She’ma puts it, “with all 
your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your strength” [Deuteron-
omy 6:5]). yet it does not follow that reason is worthless and has no place in 
theological reflection. it is significant, moreover, that despite his professed 
allegiance to barth, roger is an academic specialist in Christian heresy and 
a former teacher of a course on blasphemy.11 in the central section of the 
novel, when he imagines (or, implausibly but not impossibly, has revealed 
to him in a vision) his wife’s possible adultery with Dale, his pornographic 
description of the scene is juxtaposed against passages from Tertullian, the 
orthodox champion who became a heretic (though roger proposes that the 
work from which he quotes is not heretical at all). indeed, roger accuses 
himself of heresy after his affair with his niece, verna—“that of committing 
deliberate abominations so as to widen and deepen the field in which God’s 
forgiveness can magnificently play” (289). On the other hand, although 
Dale professes belief in Jesus as his Savior, he admits that his efforts to 
prove God’s existence, if successful, will only prove deism: “we’re not try-
ing to prove anything about the incarnation, or the Trinity—a hindu could 
be just as happy with this news as a Christian” (25). in this way, for all 
 11. it is also, of course, possible to compare roger’s quotations from and commentar-
ies about the texts by barth and Tertullian in the novel, taking into account such factors as 
when these texts appeared in their author’s careers. Such an effort requires a familiarity with 
theology beyond what most educated general readers will possess. Frank G. novak, Jr., for 
instance, has argued that Updike sides decisively against roger in part because his favorite 
passages from barth come from earlier works whose ideas barth himself later corrected by 
placing less emphasis on the total otherness of God and more on the incarnation. although 
my own theological commitments lead me to agree with novak more than i disagree with 
him in my own judgment of roger as a character, his reading implies a degree of games-
manship in Updike’s novel that complicates the rhetorical situation that is my primary in-
terest here—the communication from an avowedly Christian author to a (probably) secular 
audience. Unlike Walker Percy, for instance, whose own engagements with philosophy and 
theology in his novels are presented accessibly and in a way that leads little doubt as to how 
the author intends for readers to interpret his work, Updike makes the relationship between 
these passages and his own purposes more obscure—even going so far as to leave several 
of the quoted passages from Tertullian untranslated into english. i am not sure that Updike 
intends for readers to come to particular conclusions about how roger’s use of barth and 
Tertullian reflects upon his theological or moral beliefs; rather, i take this use primarily in a 
broad, sociological sense: roger is the kind of man who reads theologians to justify his ac-
tions, and other men aren’t. even if he misreads them, the only readers who might be able 
to identify this misreading are those who are already interested in theology.
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the fervency of his belief, Dale’s actual project seems congruent with the 
long nineteenth-century effort to “rescue” Christianity with science, and in 
the process of doing so discarded much of its dogma as mere myth. at the 
same time, however, if roger’s allegiance to barth is more consistent with 
Updike’s own professions of faith, Dale’s terror of nonbeing suggests some-
thing of Updike’s own similarly professed fear.
 nor does judgment become clearer if one shifts its criteria from ortho-
doxy to morality. both roger and Dale are adulterers, and roger’s adultery 
is also incestuous. Though it is eventually confirmed that Dale did have an 
affair with a woman who could have been roger’s wife esther (318–19), 
it is not fully established that it was esther, or that roger’s pornographic 
visions were true, though there is some circumstantial evidence to sug-
gest as much. esther herself, however, is not very compelling as a hester 
Prynne: readers are led (though by roger) to believe that her affair with 
Dale is the result of suburban housewifely boredom and resentment against 
her husband’s relative freedom, and though roger’s callousness toward her 
is evident throughout the novel, it is balanced against her desire to remain 
with him because she enjoys “the solid and lively social matrix” that her 
position as his wife gives her (293). Dale’s own relative sexual inexperience 
and immense gratitude toward esther might make his participation in the 
adultery less culpable, but the novel prevents us from making an informed 
judgment on this point: readers are never shown how he reconciles the fact 
of the adultery with his professed Christianity. The novel ends with roger 
triumphant and Dale crushed, but with a wide variety of specific judg-
ments of both characters left open. indeed, the final sentences of the novel 
open yet a new possibility: esther, an avowed atheist throughout the book, 
decides one Sunday to attend church. if one takes her at her word when 
she tells roger that she does so to annoy him (329), one might be led to the 
conclusion that nothing has changed, that her attendance merely begins a 
new cycle of boredom, resentment, and possible adultery; if, however, one 
assumes that behind this stated motive there is a genuine interest and even 
an incipient faith that might have been stimulated by her interactions with 
Dale, one might reach an altogether different conclusion about the myster-
ies of divine grace.
 Ultimately, i would argue that Updike creates such ambiguous ending 
in order to suggest that none of these judgments, however one might per-
sonally resolve them, necessarily follow. The primary fact is that God, after 
having intervened through the incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection of 
Jesus, has withdrawn, and in the long interval until Jesus returns, there is 
no practical difference between believers and unbelievers. roger is closer to 
the atheist myron Kriegman (and indeed, to the atheist critic James Wood) 
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than to Dale precisely because he believes that God cannot be proven, and 
while he may derive a certain comfort from his faith, the nature of this 
comfort seems no different from Dale’s—it is, inevitably, a response to the 
fear of death. moreover, if belief or unbelief has no bearing on one’s moral 
life—so that Updike reflects what ralph Wood calls “an ethical quietism” 
(Comedy 190)—then why not indulge in all that the modern world has to 
offer? Wood is correct to note that “[u]nlike nietzsche, Updike does not 
envision humanity as the inventor of life’s meaning and value” and that 
he “is not finally a tragedian but an ironist” (204). a “tragic” view of the 
death of God, like nietzsche’s, offers something to reckon with. a merely 
ironic view might serve, as booth claims that irony inevitably does, to build 
a community—in this case, Updike implies, the entire human race, which 
needs God and yet cannot approach him. but this very need becomes a 
focus for complacency, both in those who acknowledge it (and in doing so, 
forgive themselves for almost anything) and in those who profess to have 
overcome it. God becomes an object among others that might help one get 
one through the night, chosen for reasons that are therapeutic at best and 
irreducibly selfish at worst. Those who choose objects other than God for 
this purpose have no reason to gloat, and if they fancy that they have freed 
themselves from the irrationality of “needing” God, they condemn them-
selves to false consciousness. Though Updike theoretically acknowledges 
the existence of people who do not share his terror of death and whose 
belief or unbelief might therefore be grounded on something else, the major 
work of his last two decades, In the Beauty of the Lilies, suggests that he finds 
it increasingly hard to credit such positions. roger may share Dale’s fear of 
death, but he takes a stubborn pride in not admitting as much. There is no 
such pride in the later novel—everyone needs God, and those who profess 
not to are whistling in the dark, proving themselves pathetic.
IV. the American Sadness: 
 In the Beauty of the Lilies
In the Beauty of the Lilies follows four generations of an american family 
from the period 1912 to 1990. The novel reaffirms Updike’s implicit claim 
that Christian belief has been waning for decades yet remains as neces-
sary as ever to the psychic health of americans. George Steiner’s judg-
ment that “[o]ne puts down this novel with the intimation that america is, 
very near its center, the saddest country on earth” (106), rings true, for here 
Updike suggests, more clearly than in any novel since The Poorhouse Fair, 
that without the conflation of american identity with doctrinally Protes-
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tant commitments and a capitalist work ethic, americans are condemned 
to a profound sense of emptiness. The novel begins with the loss of faith of 
Clarence Wilmot, a Presbyterian clergyman in Paterson, new Jersey, and 
ends when Clarence’s great-grandson Clark, having joined a religious cult 
that is almost too heavy-handedly called the “Temple of True and actual 
Faith” (360), loses his life in a conflagration modeled on the 1993 branch 
Davidian disaster in Waco, Texas. Paralleling the vicissitudes of the Wilmot 
family’s faith is a transformation in american life, in which traditional vir-
tues of industry and Protestant self-reliance (presented, as in The Poorhouse 
Fair, with an irony that doubles back upon itself in an effort to redeem its 
ethnocentrism) yield to the solipsistic pleasures of motion pictures and por-
nography and the hollowing out of american identity itself. Clarence loses 
“the last particles of his faith” (5) at the very moment that mary Pickford, 
who is being filmed by D. W. Griffith in Paterson, faints—as if to suggest 
that faith in God and faith in the illusions of film serve the same purpose 
and are similarly vulnerable.
 One significant historical context for the novel is provided by the indus-
trialization of Paterson and the waves of immigrants that it attracts. as 
Clarence adjusts to life without his faith, Paterson becomes the scene for 
a confrontation between the industrial Workers of the World (the “Wob-
blies”) and the owners of textile mills, between a largely Catholic and Jew-
ish population of workers and the “born Protestants” (26) who own the 
mills. Though the strike is broken, in the long run the immigrants win pre-
cisely by embracing a superficial americanness without also adhering to 
the religious (and capitalist) values that sustained such americanness in 
the past. “The climate of the times,” opines the narrator, only half ironically, 
“was against [Clarence]. The immigrant hordes had brought to america 
German radicalism and italian anarchism and Semitic materialism; this was 
no time for native-born Protestants to grow lax and abandon the sublime 
values and articles of faith that had induced God to shower down upon 
them the blessings due a chosen people” (89–90). it is fitting that when 
Clarence gives up his pastoral duties, he finds work selling The Popular 
Encyclopedia door to door—an inferior product whose chief appeals are that 
it “is edited entirely by americans, and is much superior on american sub-
jects” (91) and that its articles on religion are “uniformly respectful and stu-
diously neutral” enough for “[n]o child’s faith, of whatever denomination,” 
to be disturbed” (94). even more fittingly, in this capacity he is patronized 
by his former housekeeper, an irish immigrant now pregnant out of wed-
lock, who takes pity on him. The loss of national faith entails that “real” 
americans of Protestant background are becoming aliens in their own 
country. Seventy-six years later, Clarence’s son Teddy will write to his own 
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grandson about the eventual fate of Paterson: “Pretty near everybody is 
black. Those that aren’t are spic. market Street looked like something out 
of haiti, it felt to me like carnival time, all these boom boxes and the girls 
in bright rags and not much of them, the men standing around laughing as 
though every day was a legal holiday” (417–18). Though Teddy professes 
not to be “put off” by the scene and to prefer “people jigging down the 
middle of market Street than huddled in those slave shacks over on beaver 
road [as in Paterson’s industrial heyday]” (418), the irony is palpable.
 more significantly for Updike’s theological purposes, Clarence’s loss of 
faith conforms to Douglas’s account of the feminization of american cul-
ture and religion. as a Calvinist minister, Clarence must be committed both 
to the dogma of double predestination and to sola fide. yet even though 
he reads atheist writers such as robert ingersoll, herbert Spencer, and 
nietzsche and eventually comes to agree with them, the initial cause of his 
loss of faith is his reading in the higher Criticism: “They called themselves 
theologians, these Teutonic ravagers of the text that luther had unchained 
from the altar and translated out of latin, and accepted their bread from 
the devout sponsors of theological chairs, yet were the opposite of theo-
logians, as in the dank basement of Greek and aramaic researches they 
undermined Christianity’s ancient supporting walls and beams” (15). 
Clarence concludes: “For all its muscular missions to the heathen and fallen 
women and lost souls of city slums, the nineteenth century had been a long 
erosion, and the books of this century that a conscientious clergyman col-
lected . . . Clarence now saw as so much flotsam and rubble, perishing and 
adrift, pathetic testimony to belief’s flailing attempt not to drown” (16). The 
older, orthodox books of bunyan, Kempis, and Calvin, by contrast, were 
“ignorant but not pathetic” (16). because faith is a “force of will,” Clarence 
accuses himself of listening to the feminizing blandishments of liberalizing 
Christianity: “the failure was his own, an effeminate yielding where virile 
strength was required” (18).
 a turning point occurs when Clarence is called to comfort mr. Orr, a 
dying, elderly member of his congregation. much to his surprise, even 
though mr. Orr is concerned about his salvation, he chides his pastor for 
not emphasizing damnation enough in his sermons, for shrinking from 
what he perceives to be a logical consequence of Christian teaching: “Take 
away damnation, in my opinion, a man might as well be an atheist. a God 
that can’t damn a body to an eternal hell can’t lift a body up out of the 
grave either” (47). Just as the barthean roger lambert has more in common 
with his atheist colleagues than with Dale Kohler, Clarence Wilmot finds 
himself agreeing with his congregant despite his loss of faith, and when, 
the following Sunday, he preaches a sermon that culminates in the claim 
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that “election . . . is choice” (54), he loses his voice immediately afterward. 
as if to consummate the feminization of religion, his wife Stella finishes 
the service for him and continues to do so on future occasions, enjoying her 
new power immensely. The implication that it is better to be an atheist than 
to subscribe to such an effete version of Christianity, with its “sickly” talk 
of compassion (41), is unmistakable. even Stella’s faith, however, proves 
not to be solid: when Clarence finally confesses to her his loss of faith, she 
becomes angry, advises him to “stop this tedious mooning about faith” (65), 
and complains bitterly about the loss of income and social standing that 
will follow should he give up his position. indeed, after Clarence’s death, 
once the family has relocated to the small town of basingstoke, Delaware, 
she lies to her son Teddy about the end of her husband’s career as a minis-
ter: “he didn’t lose his faith, he lost his voice” (140). Teddy discerns in such 
lies further evidence that Christianity is false, and resolves to remain loyal 
to his father’s unbelief: “he used to wonder how the stories of Jesus’ mira-
cles and resurrection could have been spread across the world if they were 
not true, but his mother had showed him how” (140).
 yet though Stella is lying here, she may be speaking more truly than 
she knows. Clarence loses his faith, yet the passivity into which he sinks, 
which he at first attributes to relief at no longer having to maintain “an 
immense strain of justification” (7), becomes more serene even as his health 
and his family’s economic position deteriorate, as if he comes eventually 
to abandon himself to God’s mercy. The brief, despairing prayer that he 
speaks, “smiling at the futile sound of it,” in the immediate aftermath of 
his loss of faith—“have mercy” (24)—is repeated at the end of his chap-
ter by the omniscient narrator (108), hinting that it has become more genu-
ine. even Teddy comes to suspect as much: “looking back i wonder if Dad 
didn’t believe more than he knew, and that’s what made him so serene at 
the end” (417). because Teddy considers faith a security blanket, he does 
not begrudge other people’s faith and does not object when his grandson 
joins the cult. indeed, his own attitude is less active disbelief than anger 
at God: “[i]t seemed to me God could have given Dad a sign. To help him 
out. Just a little sign would have done it, and cost God nothing much. 
Damned if i’d go to church to sing his praises after that” (410). Teddy 
himself inherits much of his father’s passivity and spends years after his 
father’s disgrace “waiting for some second, even bigger blow to fall” (114), 
but ultimately his life is more successful than his extreme caution would 
suggest: he marries the woman he loves, lives into old age, and attributes 
his own serenity to the fact that he “never expected too much out of life” 
and thus escaped disappointment (418). his melancholy does not cross into 
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genuine despair, and he retains both a sense of basic decency and a genu-
ine curiosity about the world. Though i agree with ralph Wood’s judgment 
that the novel “tells us, with great power and poignancy, what is happen-
ing to us and why,” i do not share his sense that Teddy becomes “some-
thing of [Updike’s] self-portrait,” nor the implication that Teddy, because 
he does not blame others, fails to regard others as fully human (“Updike’s 
Sloth” 457). both Clarence and Teddy believe more than they know, if only 
because they know what they have lost. a truly committed atheist would 
neither pray even so vague a prayer as “have mercy” nor feel any anger 
toward God. Their very existence confirms Updike’s inability to believe, as 
it were, in disbelief—they belong to the ranks of those who claim to have 
overcome a need for belief yet merely channel their need into substitutes.
 Of the four Wilmot protagonists whom In the Beauty of the Lilies follows, 
it is Teddy’s daughter essie, eventually the movie star alma Demott, whose 
obsessions and self-image correspond most closely to those of Updike him-
self. Whether his decision to filter his own convictions so largely through 
a female character springs from an ironic response to hostile feminist crit-
ics, or an ironic rethinking of what the feminization of american culture 
might portend in the age of film, Updike chooses to combine his own rev-
erent yet contemptuous attitude toward sexuality in the person of alma, 
for whom sex is both bliss—“an entertaining smooth chute into the dark 
red bliss of things” (313), a phrase worthy of Piet hanema—and an unsen-
timental, devious livelihood: “sex was at the heart of show business, but 
was not worn, actually, on its sleeve” (305). She stands in contrast both to 
her father and grandfather, who for Updikean protagonists are mostly dif-
fident about sex and completely uninterested in adultery. alma’s breathtak-
ing narcissism, which her career permits her never to outgrow, also raises 
the question of whether feminine narcissism is qualitatively different—
and thus either more or less culpable—than the masculine narcissism that 
is Updike’s usual trademark. her girlish sense that God’s love “pressed 
down from heaven and fit her whole body like bathwater in the tub” (233) 
never leaves her: as a teenager, she reasons that “God understood” her 
sexual desires because “he made us, after all” (267), and even as an expe-
rienced, middle-aged star, she regards moments of unusually felicitous act-
ing as instances when “something from God would flow into her face from 
behind” (336). as a child, she associates her feelings with God with the sto-
ries she hears about her grandfather Clarence; when she is old enough to 
learn the particulars of his story, she pities him for having “fallen into a 
shining white hole of damnation forever” (334), but remains secure that her 
own faith will compensate for her own ethical failures—above all, her pro-
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miscuity and her benign neglect of her son Clark, who grows up appropri-
ately jaded.12
 What ostensibly distinguishes essie’s faith from that of Updike’s pre-
vious protagonists is her sense that God remains continually close to her. 
Unlike roger lambert, she does not envision God as remote, awful, and 
self-concealing—on the contrary, she marvels at one point at the fact that 
“God always answered [her] prayers” (277). This difference, however, may 
be less significant than it seems, for unlike Dale Kohler, essie does not 
ground her sense of God’s involvement in her life in scientific or philo-
sophical arguments; she simply takes it for granted and lives as she pleases. 
both she and the male protagonists struck by God’s absence invoke God 
in the course of licensing their pleasures. On the other hand, essie’s beliefs 
can be seen, perhaps, in Douglas’s terms as signs of the transformation of 
nineteenth-century post-Calvinist Protestantism into the twentieth-century 
mass culture of stardom. There may well be more gravity in choosing dam-
nation, as Clarence and Teddy do, than in nodding piously toward God 
while selling sexual fantasies—yet her character also raises the possibility 
that Updike himself may not be doing anything so different.
 Clark is the most elusive of the four Wilmots. he becomes acquainted 
with the Temple when he picks up a young woman, hannah, at a ski resort, 
who takes him back as a potential convert and sleeps with him. yet though 
he does so willingly enough, he has none of the single-minded focus on 
sexual desire that is typical in Updike, and the experience itself is anticli-
mactic—“sleepy and dutiful, a poke and a submission” (390). moreover, 
the events of his life before the Temple tend to confirm a sense that sex as 
he has learned about it, in the context of the impossibly beautiful people 
of hollywood and the falsity of film, is always distasteful: in one memo-
rable scene, he masturbates to a pornographic film, concludes immedi-
ately afterward that “people are disgusting,” and resolves “to get out of 
los angeles, out of reach of the fucking movies” (434). hannah’s offer of 
herself may have been a necessary lure, but what seems to confirm Clark 
in his decision is not the promise of sex, but the cult leader’s declaration 
that he is “the only person you will meet . . . who is not interested in your 
 12. interestingly, the consciousness of parental neglect appears to be the one thing that 
reliably makes Updike’s male protagonists feel pangs of remorse for their adulteries and de-
sertions of their spouses—the short story “Separating” and the novels Marry Me and Memories 
of the Ford Administration provide especially wrenching examples. essie, however, has no such 
regrets. When Clark asks her why she had (briefly) married his stepfather rex, she replies, 
“rex was all cock.” reasonably enough, Clark translates this response as “Get off my case, 
kid” (363, italics in text). indeed, she is relieved when Clark elects to join the Temple, seeing 
it as just the latest instance of how God continually provides for her: “Off her hands, and 
into God’s. So be it. Good riddance” (360).
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mother. i am interested in you” (383). Jessie is also uncannily correct when 
he opines, “your mother perhaps was jealous of her God and did not wish 
to share him with the world, even with her son” (383). Jessie’s is a Toc-
quevillian appeal to an ordinary young man in a democratic culture preoc-
cupied with the petty object of himself and whose frustrated egoism burns 
bright. it is also, as Peter augustine lawler has noted, the essential (albeit 
distorted) appeal of Christianity for many americans: God loves you too, 
even if you find that hard to believe, and no one has the right to keep you 
from him. in this, Clark is his mother’s son, though either he or the narrator 
(Updike’s use of free indirect discourse makes this distinction ambiguous at 
this point) seems more clear-eyed about the denial involved: “a company 
of believers is like a prisonful of criminals: their intimacy and solidarity are 
based on what about themselves they can least justify” (416)—in theologi-
cal terms, their fallenness and their need for God’s mercy, which they do 
not deserve.
 Though Clark is attracted to the Temple in part because it offers an 
escape from a world of meaningless sexualization, Jessie’s vision of the cor-
rupt american culture and of the impending apocalypse that he believes 
he will usher in is no less distorted in its understanding of sex. Officially 
suggesting that women and men in the Temple can sleep freely with each 
other, in practice Jessie tries to keeps the women for himself, believing that 
it is his duty to father as many children as possible. his condemnation of 
the “whoremongering” outside the Temple is directed less against the sin 
of fornication than against the separation of sexual intercourse from procre-
ation. From the point of view of orthodox Christianity, his preaching on the 
subject is a mixture of the true and the false:
“Scientific studies show, brother, that alcohol and tobacco impair sexual 
potency, and this impairs a man’s bounden duty to disseminate his seed, 
as enjoined in Genesis, leviticus, and the Song of Songs. in the Song of 
Solomon, six eight, we read, ‘There are threescore queens, and fourscore 
concubines, and virgins without number’ . . . Keep that temple pure,” 
Jesse told him, “and it will function.” (382)
accordingly, Jessie hates contraception, and one of the few ways in which 
Clark proves unfaithful to his teaching is by using condoms on the rare 
occasions when hannah sleeps with him. as i have suggested above, pro-
creation is a vexing subject in Updike’s fiction: men tend to associate it with 
female wiles, for children, once they are brought into the world, bind men 
to their wives, and the genuine love that men feel for their children makes 
this fetter all the more painful. Updike’s preoccupation with nonprocre-
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ative sex seems in part a defiant effort to bypass this hazard of lovemak-
ing, and Jessie’s desire to bring as many children as possible into the world 
would probably be anomalous enough, even without his bizarre religious 
framework, to mark him as suspect in Updike’s world. When the Temple’s 
compound is eventually attacked by law enforcement and Jessie begins to 
kill the women and children in the belief that he is sending them to heaven, 
the implication seems to be that his desire to procreate and his murderous-
ness are complementary: he who makes life has the right to destroy it as 
well. as insane as Jessie’s position is, it sheds additional light on the usual 
distaste of Updike’s heroes for procreation: to bear and raise children is to 
be responsible for them unto death, and this is a responsibility not gladly 
embraced, except, it seems, by madmen.
 Clark is given the name “esau” in the Temple, though he is also called 
“Slick” in mocking tribute to his wealthy and socially adept background, 
and his sense of having found a home is tempered by a nagging sense of 
hostility toward him. his mixed motivations ensure that judging him for 
his violent role in Jessie’s endgame will be difficult. as policemen begin to 
descend on the Temple, Clark kills one—in part, it seems, to overcome “his 
unease, his virginity in regard to guns” (399) and to gain respect from the 
hardier men in the compound. Still later, as he finds himself in the same 
room with a group of women and children and anticipating that he and 
everyone else will be in heaven shortly, he asks with exasperation, “how 
had he acquired this clattering scorpion’s tail of women and children?” 
(481). yet when he is ordered by Jessie to kill hannah, the woman who 
brought him to the Temple, and her two children, the narrator abruptly 
speaks of Clark’s “non-coöperative streak,” repeating a phrase that had ear-
lier been associated with essie’s judgment of her son (484, 360), and imme-
diately afterward, Clark kills Jessie and another of his henchmen before he 
is himself shot. his motivations are unclear: is it because he pities hannah 
and her children, or because Jessie calls him “Slick” at this crucial moment? 
moreover, how does he evaluate his own action in the moments before his 
death? in this crucial paragraph, Updike’s use of free indirect discourse 
becomes maddeningly ambiguous:
There was nothing for him on the outside now, just hassle, and embarrass-
ment for mother. Whoremongers, sorcerers, the whole pack of supercil-
ious shits. he wasn’t worried; the living God had laid hold of him, the 
present-tense God beyond betting on. . . . even through the chemical filter, 
the smoke was palpable, like a fine rich coke being stuffed very fast up 
his nostrils, down his throat, into his eyes. his head was losing its abil-
ity to make pictures. The second death, when had the first been? The Lamb 
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shall overcome, how could a lamb overcome, by letting its throat be slit? 
That vast indignant beast with seven heads was whuffing and beating on 
the panelled white door as if entitled to admission. esau was a cunning 
hunter. he had a twin, somewhere in the smoke. he heard a noise, soft 
but pointed, over where the cups and plates used to be: a cup settling on 
a saucer or a twig snapping in the fire or the bolt of a rifle being stealthily 
slipped back. Go ahead and shoot. You’ll be doing me a favor. (486)
 is this heroism, stoic resignation before death, panic, or despair? The 
characterization of the outside world as “whoremongers, sorcerers, and 
supercilious shits” connotes both theological condemnation and the pain 
of social rejection. The death-bringing smoke may be a harbinger of his 
salvation, or a perverse thrill like the rush of cocaine. The distinction 
between the “living God”—into whose hands it is a fearful thing to fall—
and the God on whose existence people merely place bets suggests a sud-
den fullness of faith (hence the accompanying lack of worry), but Clark’s 
subsequent remembrance of biblical references bespeak incredulity and 
irony—doubt at the efficacy of Christ’s sacrifice, confusion about whether 
hell (“the second death”) awaits him, whether the seven-headed beast of 
revelation is “entitled” to him. There is also, in the reference to esau’s twin 
Jacob, a question as to whether he sees his role to destroy not just the false 
prophet but the true patriarch who will become israel as well. is it there-
fore just that the imagined Jacob destroys him? That Updike attributes his 
confusion to the loss of his ability to “make pictures” is characteristic, for 
it resonates with Updike’s continual gesture of simply pointing to the vis-
ible world and celebrating it in all its detail. Perhaps the suggestion is that 
someone who is no longer able to see properly is beyond any intimation of 
salvation, and that Clark’s apparent welcoming of death should be attrib-
uted to despair at losing his vision.13
 although the question of Clark’s motivation and ultimate salvation 
is unclear, as news of what happened at the Temple reaches the outside 
world, he is acclaimed as a hero who has saved the lives of women and 
children. essie, in fact, thanks God for letting him achieve this heroism, 
 13. in The Humiliation of the Word, the French theologian Jacques ellul mounts a sustained 
critique of vision as that which deceives by falsely establishing human perceptions at the 
center, so to speak, of the universe. Writing itself is problematic insofar as one reads instead 
of hears it, for faith comes by hearing. What Clark sees in these final moments is fragmentary 
and ambiguous; what he hears is the harbinger of his death. To the extent that Updike’s fic-
tional project privileges sight over sound and associates nonbeing with the absence of visual 
sensation, it is possible to locate his theological problems precisely in this lack of concern 
with what one hears—a call not only to believe the Gospel but also to transform one’s life in 
accord with that belief.
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once more reinforcing her own egoistic conception of her relationship with 
God (488). The proverbial last word in the novel is given to Teddy, who, 
watching the news reports and reflecting on how much more depraved the 
world has become since his childhood, watches women from the Temple 
emerging “as if just waking up, carrying or holding on to the hands of their 
children, too many to count. The children” (491). ralph Wood calls this 
final sentence “a blank cry for pity,” and though he is correct, such pity is 
uncharacteristic for Updike, who rarely shows such concern for the welfare 
of children (“Updike’s Sloth” 455). i would argue that this pity is directed 
less at the children than at the United States, for whose future the children 
serve as a familiar metaphor. These children have, after all, survived the 
carnage along with their mothers; if they are to be pitied for what they have 
lost, the implication is that they may have been better off in the Temple. 
leaving it, they enter a world that has its own “whoremongers and sorcer-
ers,” but which, lacking the drama of apocalypse, might prove more emo-
tionally barren. Jessie’s faith may have been neither “true” nor “actual,” 
but clearly his power drew upon hungers for genuine religious conviction. 
The novel’s title, which quotes the line “in the beauty of the lilies Christ 
was born across the sea” in Julia Ward howe’s “battle hymn of the repub-
lic,” seems relevant here. in ralph Wood’s words, “american exceptional-
ism does not mean, for Updike, that this nation is God’s ‘last, best hope 
of earth,’ as lincoln declared. it means that our Union is uniquely blessed 
and cursed by God’s absence. . . . The Christ of Updike’s fiction strikes me 
as stratospherically remote, dwelling in the distant loveliness of lilies that 
fester far more than they transfigure” (“Updike’s Sloth” 455–56). Updike 
is unable to take disbelief seriously, but he is also unable to take belief in 
Christ’s presence seriously—his attempt to do so in this novel, through 
the character of essie, is sincere, but it appears as yet another version of 
the feminization of religion that he decries. The children are bereft—not, 
strictly speaking, by their loss of faith, but by their inevitable going out into 
a disenchanted world, where even Updike’s egoistic and cheap version of 
sacramentalism cannot long prevail.
V. Coda: 
 Christianity versus Islam in Terrorist
Updike’s rhetoric of narcissism, as a strategy intended to make Christian 
belief credible and compelling, is a calculated and audacious risk. The 
degree to which Updike connects both narcissism and Christian belief to 
a discourse of american exceptionalism bespeaks a certain shrewdness, 
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for in contemporary democratic culture, egoism is simultaneously reviled 
(since radical equality regards airs of superiority as intolerable) and cele-
brated (since equality guarantees the supreme worth of each individual). 
readers who are unsympathetic to Updike’s Christian project are quite able 
to see in it nothing but a terrified flailing against death, an interpretation 
that Updike anticipates and even, at times, appears to endorse: “Of my own 
case, looked at coldly, it might be said that, having been given a Protestant, 
lutheran, rather antinomian Christianity as part of my sociological make-
up, i was too timid to discard it. my era was too ideologically feeble to 
wrest it from me, and Christianity gave me something to write about, and 
a semblance of a backbone, and a place to go on Sunday mornings, when 
the post offices were closed” (Self-Consciousness 234). Some might add: and 
it also gave you a point from which you could contemptuously disregard 
all the accusations of sexism, racism, and sheer personal arrogance that you 
deserve.
 yet if this were the whole story, Updike would simply not have the fol-
lowing that he has attracted. What might be most compelling in his reli-
gious vision, finally, is the way he simultaneously presents Christianity as 
embattled—a “ghost” in american life since the nineteenth century, despite 
many americans’ belated realization of this fact—and yet as so necessary 
that alternatives to it are almost unthinkable. acknowledging the theoreti-
cal possibility of people for whom nonbeing holds no terrors, Updike finds 
their actual existence incredible, and the effects of this disbelief become 
more pronounced as his career progresses. The respect accorded both to 
believers and unbelievers in The Poorhouse Fair dissolves into an indifferent 
embrace, as both come to be seen as advancing their own narcissistic dra-
mas, their own secret forms of belief—dramas that the reader is cordially 
invited to identify with his or her own. atheists and lukewarm believers 
are, in the end, the same, whether they admit it or not—so why not, Updike 
implies, go all out and wager on eternal life?
 and yet, even with his increasing equivocation between belief and 
unbelief, Updike insists that if one sides with belief, it must be Christianity, 
and not any other religious alternative—both for the historical reason that 
the United States was founded and sustained by Christians and for the self-
serving reason that no possible competitor affords the same degree of nar-
cissistic delight. This, i would argue, is the main interest of Terrorist (2006), 
Updike’s penultimate novel, which was widely criticized for its implausible 
portrayal of ahmad ashmawy, a high school student in north new Jersey 
who comes to espouse islam and becomes involved in a plot to blow up the 
lincoln Tunnel. ahmad resembles Clark Wilmot in his disgust for the lax 
religiosity and triumphant license of contemporary american society—yet, 
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in characteristic Updike fashion, he does not let this disgust prevent him 
from accepting a sexual favor from a fellow student. The degree to which 
ahmad resembles many previous Updike forebears is indeed implausible, 
as is the epiphany he experiences at the last moment that compels him not 
to trigger the explosion: “[God] does not want us to desecrate his creation 
by willing death. he wills life” (306). The novel’s final paragraph, how-
ever, suggests that ahmad recoils immediately from his epiphany once he 
emerges from the tunnel into manhattan:
all around them, up eighth avenue to broadway, the great city crawls 
with people, some smartly dressed, many of them shabby, a few beauti-
ful but most not, all reduced by the towering structures around them to 
the size of insects, but scuttling, hurrying, intent in the milky morning sun 
upon some plan or scheme or hope they are hugging to themselves, their 
reason for living another day, each one of them impaled upon the pin of 
consciousness, fixed upon self-advancement and self-preservation. That, 
and only that. These devils, ahmad thinks, have taken away my God. (310)
 ahmad may voice something of Updike’s praise of creation and refrain 
from murder, but he does not accept what appears in Updike’s work as its 
necessary corollary—the love of self as the perceiving consciousness that 
confirms creation’s value. it would seem that for Updike, islam is not a 
viable alternative to Christianity precisely because it lacks such a concep-
tion of the centrality of the self: ahmad perceives his Updikean epiphany 
as a fall into the kind of self-consciousness that disgusts him, a desire for 
self-preservation that he rationalized into a belief that he was doing God’s 
will in not causing the explosion. ahmad has, it would seem, lost his faith 
precisely because he has discovered his capacity for narcissism even in the 
midst of what would seem an act of total submission to God. yet he does 
not embrace this capacity, and the chilling quality of the final sentence sug-
gests that for Updike, not to do so compromises one’s humanity. Whether 
ahmad presents a convincing portrayal of muslim belief in america in the 
early twenty-first century or not, Updike wagers that readers will recoil 
not from his sense of shame but from his refusal to celebrate himself, his 
dogged insistence that if one believes, one ought to live as if one does. For 
all of Updike’s professions of orthodoxy, in this respect, at least, he drearily 
conforms to amy hungerford’s thesis of postmodern belief: orthodoxy is a 
private matter, and one must accept the trivialization of public and commu-
nal life that accompanies such a stance.
I. narrative in the diagnosis and treatment 
 of Boredom
among avowedly Christian writers of merit in the late twentieth century, 
Walker Percy is distinguished not only by his novelistic achievement but 
also by the range and sophistication of his intellectual interests. valued by 
some readers primarily as a novelist and by others as a philosopher or even 
a guru, Percy has engaged in his fiction and essays with French existen-
tialism, the civil rights movement in the South, the mid-twentieth-century 
revival of scholasticism, the theories and fortunes of psychoanalysis, the 
historical burdens of being a white southern male, the relationship between 
anthropology and the philosophy of language, the sexual revolution, the 
critique of scientism and technological hubris, the fascination of apocalyp-
tic fantasy, the possibility that a distinctly southern culture and literature is 
dying, and the cultural and religious consequences of the Second vatican 
Council.1 There is no doubt, however, that Percy subordinated all of these 
 1. Kieran Quinlan rightly notes that “Walker Percy is one of the few contemporary 
novelists who has made a difference in the lives of many of his readers” (13). James atlas 
confirmed this statement when he interviewed Percy in 1980: “Percy has acquired a devoted, 
even fanatical following that responds to his work in a very personal way; readers are forever 
writing and calling him up to discuss their problems” (186).
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engagements to his Catholic faith, or that his most devoted admirers turn 
toward this faith as the key that unlocks all the nuances of his thought. like 
muriel Spark, Percy was a convert who seems to have regarded his conver-
sion as the precondition for his achieving an original writing voice. but he 
was far more forthright than Spark about his proselytizing impulses and 
his Catholic critique of culture, once describing his modus operandi in fiction 
as “ass-kicking for Jesus’ sake.”2 yet Percy has also provoked more perplex-
ity and more wide-ranging assessments than this straightforward commit-
ment to “ass-kicking” would suggest—both among secular readers who 
admire his work and among Catholics who find the positive commitments 
of his faith blunted by the ironies and even the sheer range of his writing. 
if Percy’s emphasis on evangelization resembles Flannery O’Connor’s, how 
is it that he has largely avoided the polarizing response that surrounds 
O’Connor’s work—so that few readers would either make a case for Percy’s 
sainthood or simply revile him as a benighted reactionary?
 The answer to this question, i believe, lies above all in the differ-
ent stances that Percy and O’Connor take toward their audiences. like 
O’Connor, Percy writes for an audience who believes that God is dead—
but unlike O’Connor, he neither assumes the hostility of this audience nor 
believes that shock and violence are the most effective rhetorical strategies 
to appeal to it. even when his characters’ “moments of grace” are accompa-
nied by literal or metaphorical violence, the shock is muffled by the sheer 
geniality of Percy’s prose and its insistent posture that characters are real 
people to whom real things happen, not grotesques confronting divine vio-
lence. While O’Connor’s works do seem, in some readers, to sharpen the 
pleasures of self-righteousness, Percy’s suggest that his readers share the 
same essential “predicament” (to use one of his favorite words) as his char-
acters—and indeed, as himself—and in doing so projects a reassuring sense 
of equality. moreover, unlike Updike’s appeal to an american narcissism, 
which presupposes a theoretical human equality but frequently entails an 
icy misanthropy in practice, Percy’s evocation of a common predicament 
works, ironically, to strip his characters of their privileges, to render them 
everymen despite their marked departures from a generic, late twentieth-
century american norm. all of Percy’s protagonists, like Percy himself, are 
white, upper-class males conscious of their familial legacies and increas-
ingly unsure of how they should behave in a South that is losing its faith in 
blood and breeding, ideologies of white supremacy, and traditional codes 
of honor. Their efforts to read correctly the markers that determine other 
 2. From a letter of 6 april 1962 to his mentor, Caroline Gordon, quoted in Jay Tolson’s 
biography, Pilgrim in the Ruins: A Life of Walker Percy (301).
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characters’ places in the social hierarchy probably strike contemporary 
readers as rarefied, comic, or sinister, but above all as anachronistic. yet 
one of Percy’s most remarkable achievements is to make such characters 
sympathetic, so that readers discern in their befuddlement not an unpleas-
ant mixture of elitism and self-pity but rather finely observed variations on 
the Percyan predicament—the mutually reinforcing problems of boredom 
and sinfulness, as well their somatic expression, clinical depression. indeed, 
as befits a physician-turned-Christian writer, Percy conceives of conver-
sion not only as a matter of salvation but also, secondarily, as a therapeutic 
breakthrough.
 it is difficult to overstate the centrality of boredom—often described 
as a living death—to Percy’s work. “For some time now the impression 
has been growing upon me that everyone is dead” (99), says binx bolling 
in The Moviegoer (1961), and the theme continues through Father Smith’s 
conviction in The Thanatos Syndrome (1987) that only dying people tell the 
truth, even though “everyone else is dying too and spending their entire 
lives dying to themselves” (244). as Percy put it in “Questions They never 
asked me” (1977), a “self-interview”: “[O]rdinary life in an ordinary place 
on an ordinary day in the modern world is a dreary business. i mean dreary. 
People will do anything to escape this dreariness: booze up, hit the road, 
gaze at fatal car wrecks, shoot up heroin, spend money on gurus, watch 
pornographic movies, kill themselves, even watch Tv” (407). boredom may 
lie at the intersection of “ordinary life” and “the modern world,” but Per-
cy’s diagnostic emphasizes the second of these two terms. in Lost in the 
Cosmos: The Last Self-Help Book (1983), Percy maintains that the word “bore-
dom” did not enter the english language until the eighteenth century, and, 
asking why this should be the case, proposes as one possibility the fact that 
“for the past two or three hundred years the self has perceived itself as a 
leftover which cannot be accounted for by its own objective view of the 
world” (70). according to this account, the “modern world” fully emerged 
in the eighteenth century, as enlightenment and historical consciousness 
drove out myth and religion, forcing ethics to become secularized and the 
self to lose its formerly privileged yet also dependent position as a fallen 
creature of God. What began as the promise of liberation—that one can use 
one’s reason, know oneself, and transform the world—soon turned destruc-
tive: “if one had to set a date of the beginning of the end of the modern 
world, 1914 would be as good as any, because it was then that Western 
man, the beneficiary of precisely this scientific revolution and Christian 
ethic, began with great skill and energy to destroy himself” (Signposts 208).
 in Percy’s view, enlightenment promises of liberation cannot succeed, 
because consciousness and language, the very things that most distin-
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guish human beings as a species, remain inexplicable if viewed through 
the frames of positivist science and utilitarian philosophy. Consciousness 
and facility with linguistic signs are the only things that allow humans 
to place themselves in the world, yet their very existence is absurd, an 
unaccountable “leftover.”3 Scientists can explain distant phenomena in the 
universe more fully than they can explain the most mundane daily experi-
ences (Lost 1), and their failure to legitimate experience as such leads both 
to a preoccupation with the self and to an impoverishment of daily life. 
Paraphrasing Kierkegaard, Percy critiques hegel as the great exemplar of 
such an attitude: “hegel knew everything and said everything, except what 
it was to be born and to live and to die” (Conversations 109). in the wake 
of hegel and all his successors who claim to have either transcended or 
explained away mere experience, boredom flourishes. it is simultaneously 
a heightened self-consciousness, “the self being stuffed with itself,” and a 
“loss of sovereignty in which the self yields up plenary claims to every sec-
tor of the world to the respective experts and claimants of those sectors” 
(Lost 71). Percy’s first rhetorical principle, then, is to assume that his readers 
will find their own experiences “certified” in such a description, no mat-
ter who or where in modernity they may be.4 it is as if all of his works ask 
readers the questions that, he maintains, would be the most appropriate 
questions to ask of extraterrestrial intelligences, should any ever turn up on 
earth—“Did it also happen to you? Do you have a self? if so, how do you 
handle it? Did you suffer a catastrophe?” (109). Clearly, Percy expects most 
readers to nod in recognition.
 if such recognition is the necessary precondition for taking Percy’s 
efforts to persuade seriously, then much of his work appears a repetitive 
examination of different strategies to escape from boredom, to “redeem 
the time.” The most obvious of these seek to abolish consciousness of time, 
either by grasping a scheme of meaning that transcends time (such as sci-
 3. Geoffrey Galt harpham has argued that inquiry into “language alone” has been the 
dominant intellectual project of the twentieth century precisely because the term “stands as 
a luminous and highly concentrated token of the multiple mysteries of human life” (236). 
Percy anticipates this claim when he maintains, “What is involved in a theory of language is 
a theory of man” (“Questions” 420).
 4. “Certification” is defined by binx bolling in this way: “nowadays when a person 
lives somewhere, in a neighborhood, the place is not certified for him. more than likely he 
will live there sadly and the emptiness which is inside him will expand until it evacuates 
the entire neighborhood. but if he sees a movie which shows his very neighborhood, it be-
comes possible for him to live, for a time at least, as a person who is Somewhere and not 
anywhere” (Moviegoer 63). Though binx refers here to the medium of film and to place in a 
strictly geographical sense, i believe that the same logic describes Percy’s choice of fiction as 
a medium and his notion that selves must “place” themselves temporally as well as spatially.
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entific laws and mathematics, or a totalizing philosophy such as hegel’s) or 
by plunging as often as possible into pure immanent sensation (drugs, alco-
hol, promiscuity, or mindless consumption). Scientists and artists, accord-
ing to Percy, can achieve a kind of temporary transcendence through their 
discoveries and creations, which seem to affirm some kind of truth beyond 
the flux of temporality, and though scientists suffer less from the inevitably 
transient nature of this exaltation than artists, this is a difference in degree, 
not in kind.5 Those who are neither artists nor scientists either suffer in 
silence or, embracing the palliatives of a consumer society, live in bad faith.
 yet though Percy focuses on the particular afflictions of modernity, he 
also holds that all was not well with the self in the serenely religious ages 
that preceded the enlightenment. even before there was what Weber calls 
“the disenchantment of the world,” there was original sin—that primor-
dial rupture between human beings and God that forced humans into time 
(and death), predisposing them to selfishness and to the boredom and vio-
lence that are its inevitable consequences. This “disaster,” in which human 
consciousness “falls into the pit of itself” (Lost 212), loomed less large in 
premodern times not because human beings were qualitatively better (they 
weren’t), but because, at least in the Christian world, the knowledge that 
Jesus Christ had died to redeem all those who believe in him sufficed to 
make life meaningful and endurable, even in the midst of boredom. The 
incarnation, in which God situates himself in human time and subjects him-
self to death, provides reassurance that even God has experienced some-
thing of the human predicament and loves us enough to deliver us from 
it. The waning of Christian faith, then, leaves humankind more vulnerable 
than ever. Condemned to be neither angels nor beasts, but “wayfarers” (a 
term Percy borrows from Gabriel marcel), only the conviction of ultimate 
redemption can deliver humankind from the torments of boredom or from 
the unprecedented violence (for Percy, the two world wars of the twentieth 
 5. For Percy, the scientist suffers less because “[he] is the prince and sovereign of the 
age. his transcendence of the world is genuine. That is to say, he stands in a posture of ob-
jectivity over against the world, a world which he sees as a series of specimens or exemplars, 
and interactions, energy exchanges, secondary causes” (Lost 115). The artist, lacking both a 
comparable esteem from society at large and the posture of objectivity that scientists enjoy, is 
often incapacitated by everyday dreariness: “it is one thing to write The Sound and the Fury, 
to achieve the artistic transcendence of discerning meaning in the madness of the twentieth 
century, then to finish it, then to find oneself at reed’s drugstore the next morning. a ma-
jor problem of reentry, not solved but anaesthetized by alcohol” (123). Only in a few, rare 
instances—Percy mentions Simone Weil, martin buber, and Dietrich bonhoeffer—do writers 
manage both to “become themselves transparently before God” and “to live intact through 
difficult lives” (157), and it seems significant that these exceptions are not writers of fiction. 
For an extended account of how Percy’s conception of transcendence and immanence informs 
his theories of fiction and of life, see especially Farrell O’Gorman (135–36, 141–49).
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century and the threat of nuclear holocaust) toward which they tend in a 
technological age.
 if Percy is largely successful in persuading readers that they share a 
general predicament of boredom and meaninglessness in the twentieth cen-
tury (and this particular claim has been seconded by many non-Christian 
writers), he is, perhaps, less successful in persuading readers that conver-
sion is the only effective remedy. in this Percy seems like a twentieth-cen-
tury successor to Pascal, whose reflections on the misery and greatness of 
human beings continue to prove more resonant to more people than does 
his wager that hope for happiness must lie in faith. Pascal was, to be sure, 
aware of the gap between convincing people that faith might be reason-
able and leading them to believe in its truth, and Percy confronts the same 
gap in his writings. his preferred strategy in negotiating it is indirection. 
because the experience of boredom is inextricable from the experience of a 
time that cannot be redeemed, Percy guides the reader toward his Christian 
doctrines not by beginning with calls to repent and believe—indeed, the 
characters in his fiction who do so, such as Father Smith in Love in the Ruins 
and The Thanatos Syndrome, are often presented with a certain destabilizing 
irony—but by suggesting that one’s first step should be to reconcile oneself 
to time.
 edward J. Dupuy, one of Percy’s best critics, has suggested that this step 
is also the fundamental project of autobiography, and in this sense, Percy’s 
novels and essays can be considered as reflections on the autobiographi-
cal dimension of all narrative. Drawing upon the work of James Olney, 
Georges Gusdorf, and Janet varner Gunn, Dupuy holds that “[t]he auto-
biographer redeems his time through the interplay of past and present, 
which takes place in memory” (22), setting into motion a self-conscious rep-
etition of events that reveals their significance. For both Percy and Dupuy, 
this redemption must involve an acceptance of temporality and one’s 
enmeshment in it, so that the self’s here and now becomes not just a limit-
ing condition, but also a source of possibility. Such a project contrasts with 
certain prominent features of modernism—the spatializing of narrative 
form and the preoccupation with recurring, mythic structures that always 
already account for everything. For this reason, argues Dupuy, Percy’s 
work can be considered postmodern in some respects:
autobiography and Percy as autobiographer . . . seem postmodern because 
they are not primarily concerned with the past but with the now. The auto-
biographer retrieves the past, and is thus preoccupied with it, but always 
from the perspective of the present. Percy’s characters, for their part, want 
nothing to do with the great southern archetypes of dignity and honor and 
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duty. instead, they come to a realization of the possibility of acting now. 
allie says in The Second Coming: “What was my (your, our) discovery? That 
i could act. i was free to act. . . . how does one ever make the discovery that 
one can actually be free to act for oneself? i don’t know. i don’t know how 
many people, if any, do it” (40). For both Percy and autobiography the past 
serves primarily as a repository of foreclosed potentialities. The possibility 
for action in time depends on these potentialities becoming actual. (20–21)
here Dupuy’s argument aligns with Peter augustine lawler’s judgment 
that postmodernism should be seen as “human reflection on the failure of 
the modern project to eradicate human mystery and to bring history to an 
end” (1), and with lawler’s assessment that Percy’s work exemplifies such 
reflection, because it affirms that “[h]uman beings have religious longings 
that cannot be satisfied by social or political reform” (109). The possibility 
for free action that Percy illuminates has little to do with politics, let alone 
with mastery of the world, but rather with the sudden discovery that one is 
free to love and be loved, wherever and whenever one finds oneself.
 if Percy’s project is seen as postmodern in this way, one of the features 
of his writing that has exasperated many readers—his characteristic lack 
of novelistic closure—becomes more explicable.6 With the exception of The 
Second Coming (1980), Percy’s novels tend to end with their plots resolved 
but with their characters left nonetheless in a state of ambiguity—in some 
cases, possibly having converted or on the cusp of a conversion to Chris-
tianity (as in The Moviegoer and Lancelot), but without decisive clues that 
would confirm such a judgment, and with an overarching sense of irony 
that even had such an event taken place, life goes on. it is understandable 
that such ambiguity would frustrate both Christian readers who want a 
clearer affirmation of Christian dogmas and all ordinary readers who seek 
the pleasures of closure. yet Percy’s endings in fact represent both the pre-
dicament that he diagnoses and the necessity of accepting temporal change. 
The only genuine closure in human life is death, and novels traditionally 
impart their sense of the meaning of a human life through their selection of 
an end that retrospectively determines this meaning—either death or some-
thing that functions as its structural equivalent, such as marriage. Peter 
brooks’s insight that “plot is the internal logic of the discourse of mortal-
ity” (22), derived from his reading of Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 
states the problem well: readers who demand closure from Percy’s novels, 
seeking to read backward from their ends a definitive meaning (and thus 
 6. i have criticized Percy on these grounds myself, but that was in another country. See 
my Fears and Fascinations: Representing Catholicism in the American South (154–55, 166–68).
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to redeem the time of reading), are also seeking the “death” of the narra-
tive and enacting through their demand for it the belief that only death 
can confer meaning on life.7 yet the corollary of such a view is that death 
(as well as the end of a narrative) is desired—the desire of narrative is not 
to elude its end but to arrive at it in its own individual fashion. redemp-
tion thus becomes identical with individualized, meaningful death. On the 
other hand, in Christianity the world is already redeemed by Jesus’ sacrifice 
(even as human beings still live after the event), and Christians’ greatest 
difficulty consists of keeping faith with that redemption, perceiving its ulti-
mate closure and promise of more abundant life not only in the hereafter 
but also in the very flux of banal dailiness. Until the moment of death, the 
story remains open: even those who have become Christian may fall away, 
and even the most confirmed atheist may come to believe. The greatest 
difficulty for Percy’s wayfarers is not merely to accept Christianity—or at 
least the necessity of something like it, since Percy is more explicit about 
this in some novels than in others—but to continue to live in the ordinary, 
dreary world after having arrived at this knowledge.
 Percy’s novels suggest two broad strategies for characters who arrive 
at this point. although rhetorically they are opposed to each other, they are 
shown to be complementary in practice, so that over the course of a novel, 
the same protagonist often oscillates between the two. The first involves 
embracing a sacramental understanding of the world, in which what had 
seemed irredeemably dreary appears in its true light as a splendid, gratu-
itous gift, charged, in hopkinsesque fashion, with the glory of God. (here, 
Percy follows the example of his mentor, Caroline Gordon, who explic-
itly conceived of fiction as a sacramental undertaking and declared, “i am 
 7. although Percy was critical of Freud (in “Questions They never asked me,” for 
instance, he expresses exasperation at Freud’s “rather stupid hydraulic model of art as the 
sublimation of libidinal energies” [405]), both he and his characters—above all, Dr. Thomas 
more—respect Freud’s preference for the long, hard work of analysis. more seems to be 
speaking for Percy when he says in The Thanatos Syndrome (whose very title expresses its debt 
to Beyond the Pleasure Principle), “Though i admired and respected Dr. Freud more than Dr. 
Jung, i thought Dr. Jung was right in encouraging his patients to believe that their anxiety 
and depression might be trying to tell them something of value. They are not just symptoms. 
it helps enormously when a patient can make friends with her terror, plumb the depths of 
her depression. . . . True, in the end Dr. Jung turned out to be something of a nut, the source 
of all manner of occult nonsense. Dr. Freud was not. he was a scientist, wrong at times, but 
a scientist nonetheless” (67). Part of more’s professional difficulties spring from the fact that 
“[o]ld-fashioned shrinks are out of style and generally out of work,” having been “mostly 
superseded by brain engineers, neuropharmacologists, chemists of the synapses” who reject 
“such a quixotic quest as pursuing the secret of one’s very self” (13). more’s most authentic 
mentor is identified in this novel as harry Stack Sullivan, for his view that “[p]eople can get 
better, can come to themselves, without chemicals and with a little help from you” (17).
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a Catholic, i suspect, because i was first a fiction writer.”8) Percy’s Ches-
tertonian claim that “The only cure for depression is suicide” (Lost 75) is 
informed by the possibility of such sudden illuminations—only the “ex-
suicide,” who knows that his depression is justified by the real conditions 
of the world and has seriously entertained the possibility of nonbeing, can 
also know that “he has nothing to lose by being alive. it is good to be alive” 
(Lost 79). more fortunate still are those characters in Percy who already pos-
sess such an attitude. Some are committed but unselfconscious Catholics 
(often lax in practice) who take life easily, enjoy ordinary domestic plea-
sures, and do not concern themselves much with what binx bolling calls 
“the old longings” (Moviegoer 9). binx’s Uncle Jules, for instance, is “the 
only man i know whose victory in the world is total and unqualified.” he 
is “an exemplary Catholic, but it is hard to know why he takes the trouble. 
For the world he lives in, the City of man, is so pleasant that the City of 
God must hold little in store for him” (Moviegoer 31). binx’s mother also 
falls into this category: her Catholic faith appears to her son as “a bargain 
struck at the very beginning in which she settled for a general belittle-
ment of everything, the good and the bad” (Moviegoer 142)—but a bargain 
that has worked well for her. Such minor characters do present a poten-
tial problem that is related to the novels’ lack of closure: if Percy’s recom-
mended alternative, Catholicism, is not explicitly shown carrying the day 
against both modern anomie and rival belief systems—for instance, the 
cheerful evangelical Christianity in the background of The Second Com-
ing and The Thanatos Syndrome—then the indirection that Percy employs 
can lead all too plausibly to conclusions that he would not have endorsed, 
that turning to Catholicism is merely a matter of therapeutic and aesthetic 
self-fashioning.
 however, such portraits of Catholics ensconced in serene domesticity 
and aware, whether they verbalize it or not, of the sacramental in daily life, 
are juxtaposed in Percy’s fiction with a preoccupation with apocalypse. The 
modern world may be coming to an end, but for many of Percy’s charac-
ters, who believe that meaning can be recovered only in the aftermath of 
a general destruction, this end cannot arrive soon enough. Percy seems to 
give a qualified endorsement to his characters’ desires by selecting a pas-
sage from romano Guardini’s The End of the Modern World as the epigraph 
to The Last Gentleman: “The world to come will be filled with animosity 
and danger, but it will be a world open and clean” (105). yet it is important 
not to overstate the violence implied by Percy’s apocalpytic intimations, or 
 8. letter to brainard Cheney, quoted in ann Waldron, Close Connections: Caroline Gordon 
and the Southern Renaissance (259).
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to equate it simply with the annihilation of humanity. as Gary m. Ciuba 
puts it, “Composed of all the unquestioned assumptions about reality, the 
world is the accustomed manner of looking or, for the unseeing seers at the 
beginning of Percy’s novels, the way of not looking. The end of the world 
is really the end of a worldview” (5). The expiring worldview is that of 
secular modernity, and Guardini suggests that as it goes, “the unbeliever 
will emerge from the fogs of secularism. he will cease to reap benefit from 
the values and forces developed by the very revelation he denies” (124). 
meanwhile, Christianity will not itself become new—that is, it will not 
respond to contemporary exigencies by replacing its scandalous dogmas 
with something more appealing—but it will stand out more sharply against 
a non-Christian, secular world. The “animosity and danger” that Guardini 
forecasts are a consequence of this contrast, but so is the possibility for a 
more undiluted witness to the truth—and perhaps also a greater opportu-
nity for unbelievers to be persuaded of it.
 although Percy’s protagonists yearn for the possibility of “seeing” in a 
new way, and thus are accurately described as “apocalyptists” in Ciuba’s 
sense of the word (5), their quests for a redeemed world—what binx simply 
calls “the idea of the search” (Moviegoer 13)—are marred by confusion and 
even, on occasion, bloodlust. actual moments of transfiguration, in which 
the sacramental erupts into consciousness, are often literally as well as met-
aphorically violent—such as when binx counts among his “best times” (10) 
the moments after being shot in the shoulder during the Korean war and 
being injured in a car accident; or when Will barrett, in The Last Gentleman, 
recovers his sexual desire (and saves a child to boot) in the middle of a hur-
ricane (23–24), or discovers a velázquez painting “glowing like a jewel” 
(27) only after a skylight in the modern museum of art collapses, injur-
ing a worker. These merely personal instances of the therapeutic effects of 
violence become more generalized in Percy’s later works: a character such 
as lancelot lamar looks forward to what he calls “the Third revolution,” 
and Percy himself, clearly influenced by Walter m. miller Jr.’s novel A Can-
ticle for Leibowitz, imagines as a thought experiment in Lost in the Cosmos the 
possible lives of survivors of a nuclear war in the deserts of Utah.
 The complementarity of these two strategies for overcoming boredom—
celebrating the sacramental nature of creation and looking forward to 
apocalypse—is to be found, as i have suggested, in the fact that the salva-
tion of the world is both an accomplished fact ever since Christ’s resurrec-
tion, immediately accessible to all who believe in it, and something whose 
consummation is yet to come. Dupuy’s reflections on the autobiographi-
cal nature of narrative again seem relevant here—the organizing faculty 
of memory, which imposes meaning on the past in a way that illuminates 
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the present, is analogous to the understanding of the Christian revela-
tion implied here, and one way to grasp this might be to refer to augus-
tine’s meditations on time and the redemptive nature of both its passing 
and its perception as a continuous, threefold present in the Confessions.9 
The committed Christian, in Percy’s view, can “repeat” his experiences in 
such a way that their wonder and newness remain ever present to him; his 
being-in-the-world provides a certain inoculation against the despairs of 
boredom, even though he remains subject, until his own death, to possible 
fluctuations in his faith, and even though the very nature of the process 
opens a gap between the narrating and the narrated self that his language 
both testifies to and struggles to close. The unbeliever or lukewarm 
believer, on the other hand, might require violence, just as O’Con nor pre-
dicted—but even these violences will be familiar to us, not necessarily fatal 
or humiliating, and presented in a spirit of fellow suffering, rather than in 
the garish, otherworldly light that characterizes O’Connor’s violence. Per-
cy’s own freely acknowledged reworking of his own experiences in fiction, 
as well as biographical evidence of his own fluctuations in faith, demon-
strates that he does not exempt himself from the struggles of his characters.
 if, then, readers find themselves identifying the predicaments of Percy’s 
characters with their own, it would seem that there are two characteristic 
ways in which Percy’s strategies might misfire. First, readers might reduce 
the sacramental in Percy to the aesthetic, so that its efficacy becomes pri-
marily a function of their form instead of their content. Sacramental intima-
tions could then appear as examples of hungerford’s “postmodern belief.” 
Conversely, readers might take the intimations of apocalyptic violence too 
literally, concluding that one need not just endure the “end of the modern 
world” but work to bring it about. Though Percy clearly attempts to bal-
ance the two impulses against each other and to forestall the effects that 
either one might bring about if left unchallenged, in his later work there is a 
definite shift in emphasis away from the sacramental pleasures of dailiness 
and toward the urgencies of apocalyptic violence embraced selfishly—as 
Ciuba puts it, toward the danger that characters will not read their lives in 
 9. book 11 of the Confessions explains the threefold present by noting that whether one 
reflects on the past, the present, or the future, one does so only in the present: “[W]hatever 
they [future and past things] are, and wherever there, they must be there in the present” 
(270). Paul ricoeur’s masterly commentary on book 11 in Time and Narrative, volume 1, sug-
gests what is at stake for theories of autobiography more generally: “augustine’s inestimable 
discovery is, by reducing the extension of time to the distention of the soul, to have tied this 
distention to the slippage that never ceases to find its way into the heart of the threefold 
present—between the present of the future, the present of the past, and the present of the 
present. in this way he sees discordance emerge again and again out of the very concordance 
of the intentions of expectation, attention, and memory” (21).
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light of the book of revelation, but rather that they will rewrite “revelation 
so that it becomes the way the world looks after all but the ego has disap-
peared” (171).
 in an earlier book, Fears and Fascinations: Representing Catholicism in the 
American South, i argued that in The Moviegoer, The Last Gentleman, and to 
a certain degree Love in the Ruins, Percy’s portraits of domesticity prove 
so attractive that some readers (and, indeed, some writers who followed 
Percy) might be tempted to reduce Catholicism to a lyotardian micronar-
rative, a set of strategies for living pleasantly in a world perceived to be 
evacuated of metanarrative gravity (147–68). beginning with Love in the 
Ruins, however, Percy’s work begins perceptibly to shift toward an empha-
sis on the apocalyptic, rendered in increasingly violent terms. Whereas 
binx bolling and Will barrett were focused primarily on their own personal 
struggles with despair, Dr. Thomas more, though struggling with alcohol-
ism himself, is concerned primarily with the civil strife that has engulfed 
the United States, and though he believes (wrongly, as it turns out) that his 
therapeutic invention, the lapsometer, has the potential to “save” america, 
he also simultaneously fears and hopes that the events its distribution has 
set in motion will create a literal explosion—“the end of the world” (3). in 
this chapter i will argue that particularly in Lancelot, The Second Coming, the 
“Space Odyssey” section of Lost in the Cosmos, and The Thanatos Syndrome, 
Percy runs the risk not of making Catholicism seem too cozy and domestic, 
but rather either of celebrating violence or of making readers turn away in 
the belief that his work celebrates violence.
II. Yearning for the end in Lancelot
The new departure in Percy’s work marked by Lancelot (1977) can be seen 
in the way its protagonist describes his project: “a quest for evil” (138). 
Whereas Percy’s earlier protagonists, either drifting aimlessly in their “sick-
ness unto death” or, like Dr. more, consumed with visions of total transfor-
mation, still hope that redemption will be on the side of the good, lancelot 
andrewes lamar, whose own despair has been interrupted by the acciden-
tal discovery of his wife’s infidelity, is galvanized into his mock-arthurian 
quest because he wonders whether the recovery of evil must precede the 
recovery of God. in the long monologue that he narrates to his old friend 
Percival from the “Center for aberrant behavior” (3), lance locates the ori-
gins of his quest in his intimation that his wife’s infidelity is uniquely intol-
erable: “is the sexual offense a special category and therefore unlike other 
offenses, theft, assault, even murder?” (15). he seems, in fact, surprised by 
the vehemence of his response to the discovery:
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but let me ask you seriously: Why is it such an unspeakable thing for one 
creature to obtrude a small portion of its body into the body of another 
creature? is it not in fact a trivial matter when one puts it that way? i don’t 
think women attach too much importance to it.
 but suppose i put it another way. isn’t it unspeakable to me to imagine 
margot lying under another man, her head turning to and fro in a way i 
knew only too well, her lips stretched, a little mew-cry escaping her lips? 
isn’t that unspeakable? yes. but why? When i imagined other things hap-
pening to margot, even the worst things, they were painful but not intol-
erable: margot seriously ill, margot hurt in an accident, margot stealing 
money, even margot dead, murdered. The thought of margot dead was 
painful but not intolerable. but margot under another man. . . . (16)
 lance contrasts his own violent response, rooted in his conviction of sex 
as a supreme good, with the casual ubiquity and consequent devaluing of 
sex that he sees in the contemporary world. While he had enjoyed “dirty 
books” and frequented whores as a young student, it was still possible 
for him to view these experiences as portentous revelations: “Sometimes i 
think we were the victims of a gigantic hoax by our elders, that there was 
an elaborate conspiracy to conceal from us the one simple fact that the only 
important, certainly the best thing in life, is ordinary sexual love” (12). yet 
the younger generation, coming of age in a time of triumphant license, 
seems to have demystified sex entirely. even from the window of his cell, 
lance can see that “the old majestic Theater” has become “adult Cinema 
16” and is showing a film called “The 69ers” (22)—a publicly advertised 
consumer diversion, different in kind from the private discoveries of erotic 
literature. and lance’s son, “who got enough of women before he was 
twenty” and now “appears to be a mild homosexual,” is representative of 
his generation, for whom “[s]ex doesn’t even seem to rate among the Top 
Ten experiences” (17).
 lance’s attitude here reflects Percy’s belief that sexual activity remains 
for many a vehicle for escaping temporal consciousness in a world of “left-
over selves.” yet even it is endangered by a mindset that makes it not a 
sacramental experience, but merely the instrumental act of a mind achiev-
ing its own mastery and satisfaction through its own and others’ bodies. 
lance’s intimation that sexual transcendence can be recovered only by 
associating it with sin harks back to binx’s reflections on his own unsatis-
factory fornication with Kate: “Christians talk about the horror of sin, but 
they have overlooked something . . . [T]he truth is that nowadays one is 
hardly up to it. There is very little sin in the depths of the malaise. The 
highest moment of a malaisian’s life can be that moment when he manages 
to sin like a proper human” (Moviegoer 200). The distance between 1961 and 
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1977 can be measured by the fact that binx’s sense of fornication as “sin” 
still has some cultural resonance, as his genial narration presupposes, while 
lance’s yearning for sin has become all but incomprehensible in a time 
when “courses in how to fuck for schoolchildren” (220) have reduced the 
act to a matter of mental hygiene.
 Once lance associates sexuality with a lost sense of sin, he generalizes 
this loss to his entire historical moment:
but suppose you could show me one “sin,” one pure act of malevo-
lence . . . but we have plenty of evil around you say. What about hitler, the 
gas ovens and so forth? What about them? as everyone knows and says, 
hitler was a madman. and it seems nobody was responsible. everyone 
was following orders. it is even possible that there was no such order, that 
it was all a bureaucratic mistake.
 Show me a single “sin.”
 One hundred and twenty thousand dead at hiroshima? Where was 
the evil of that? Was harry Truman evil? as for the pilot and bombardier, 
they were by all accounts wonderful fellows, good fathers and family men.
 “evil” is surely the clue to this age, the only quest appropriate to the 
age. For everything and everyone’s either wonderful or sick and nothing is 
evil. (138)
lance’s very presence in the Center for aberrant behavior seems to con-
firm his view, for having premeditatedly murdered margot’s lover and 
blown up belle reve, his plantation home—certainly sinful actions accord-
ing to any standard—his efforts to retrieve the murder weapon are inter-
preted as evidence of mental illness. he is not even “sick,” a condition still 
redolent of irreducibly human and animal consciousness, but “aberrant,” 
a mechanism with a surely explicable and correctable glitch. moreover, 
lance regards his quest as a failure. The very act of cutting Jacoby’s throat 
results not in a consciousness of evil but rather of a fascinated, amoral 
materialism that echoes his earlier description of sexual intercourse: “steel 
molecules entering skin molecules, artery molecules, blood cells” (254). For 
all the vehemence of his ranting and the optimism that it falsely suggests, 
lance’s depression has returned, and his emotional range has become still 
more restricted: “i feel so cold, Percival” (253).
 it is to lance’s credit that even having achieved a kind of revelation of 
nothingness rather than of sin, he continues to declare both the depraved 
world around him and the nothingness that might protect one against it 
intolerable: “if God does not exist, then it will be i not God who will not 
tolerate [the world as it is]” (255). an essentially pagan stoicism, obvi-
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ously indebted to Percy’s Uncle Will and given specificity by the south-
ern ideology of honor and chivalry, becomes lance’s own desired code 
after the apocalypse that he has experienced.10 in the Wilderness of vir-
ginia, the deserted place where robert e. lee “lost,” lance proposes to 
begin again with like-minded people, to promulgate “a tight-lipped cour-
tesy between men. and chivalry toward women” (158). Such a social order 
will be founded upon a conscious rejection of truth, for rather than admit-
ting the “truth” of nothingness, it will violently enforce codes of belief and 
conduct in a manner that suggests fascism.11 here, too, lance’s obsession 
with sexuality as the index of human meaning recurs, even though he no 
longer claims to endow it with transcendence. if “love,” for example, is 
nothing more than a euphemism for unredeemed carnality, which in turn 
is nothing more than a collision of molecules, then chivalry and romantic 
love must be enforced to deny this “truth,” which lance calls “The GreaT 
SeCreT OF liFe”: “[m]an’s happiness lies for men in men practicing vio-
lence upon women and . . . woman’s happiness lies in submitting to it. The 
secret of life is violence and rape, and its gospel is pornography” (224). as 
lance explains it elsewhere in the text, “[w]omen must be saved from the 
whoredom they’ve chosen” (158), but the very word “chosen” reveals an 
ambiguity: if this “whoredom” is only the natural pursuit of women’s hap-
piness, then the code that opposes it must constitute a fierce revolt against 
matter itself. yet lance also hopes that women, perceiving this truth, will 
join him in rejecting it: “Someday women will admit the truth, will refuse 
to accept it, and then they will be my best recruits” (252).
 is such a vision merely insane? Ciuba argues that lancelot’s’s “merci-
less cult of good form lacks the splendor of apocalyptic renewal. its martial 
values are paltry, middling, even minimal” (185) when compared with the 
new heavens and new earth described in the book of revelation. yet while 
a confirmed Christian would assent to Ciuba’s judgment, Percy’s rhetori-
cal gamble in Lancelot probably succeeds only if readers are initially will-
ing to consider the possibility that for all its violence and possible insanity, 
 10. Percy’s extended engagement with William alexander Percy’s code of southern 
stoicism begins with his first important essay, “Stoicism in the South” (1958), and extends 
through several novels in which particular characters serve as surrogates for Uncle Will or 
voice his beliefs—most obviously in the case of binx’s aunt emily. O’Gorman is correct to 
note that “[i]n a very real sense, Walker spent the rest of his life reacting to Uncle Will” (35). 
On the parallels between the elder Percy and aunt emily, see Tolson (277, 287).
 11. Percy confirms such hints in an interview with elzbieta Olesky: “So, his solution 
for his alienation is a kind of fascism, or nazism [sic]. in a way, he admires the nazi ; only 
he says: ‘The nazis were stupid’” (qtd. in Olesky 79). (The exact quotation from Lancelot is 
“Don’t confuse it with the nazis. They were stupid. if in fact there was a need to clean up 
the Weimar republic and if in fact they did that in part, they screwed everything up by get-
ting off on the Jews. What stupidity! The Jews were not to blame” [156]).
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lance’s vision stands as a compelling alternative to the disenchanted 
United States of the late 1970s, in which lance appears merely “aberrant,” 
since a genuinely transcendent alternative is not perceived to be widely 
available. Jerome C. Christensen describes such readers’ dilemma well:
i can, if i choose . . . reasonably explain away lancelot’s rant by psycho-
analyzing him, reducing his unsettling vision of america, of man and 
woman, to the wholly understandable consequence of childhood trauma. 
From that perspective all that stuff about the end of the world is merely 
more of the same. repetition is the limit of action and knowledge. but the 
monstrous excellence of this book is that though Percy generously sup-
plies the material and tools for such a reduction, he cannily prohibits any 
comfort in its execution. if i, rationalist, substitute a bright, tidy psycho-
analytic explanation for lancelot’s eccentric narrative, i merely repeat his 
obsessive quest for the determinate and thereby commit myself to a mono-
logue mad like his but chilling and sterile. every man has a ma, but only 
lancelot tells his disturbing story.
 repetition is the possibility of action and knowledge. That possibility 
is realized in the book through the development of the figure who listens 
to lancelot’s story. (117)
 The distinction between repetition as “limit of action and knowledge” 
and repetition as “possibility of action and knowledge” that Christensen 
identifies here is key. To read the lance’s monologue as the unfruitful rep-
etition of his murderous rage, and his planned “Third revolution” as a 
repetition of violent reactionaries from the Ku Klux Klan to the nazis, is 
also to commit oneself to unfruitful repetition: everything can be reduced 
to the eternal Oedipal triangle, and one can become less “sick” by becom-
ing conscious of it, but there will be no breakthrough, no repetition with a 
difference that will lead to free action. The ultimate horizon, just as brooks 
suggests, is death, but the knowledge said to come with the consumma-
tion of death can have nothing in it of love, nothing of the reciprocity and 
commitment that would render sexuality anything more than a struggle 
to use the other for pleasure, or contemporary life more than a series of 
diversions to keep despair at bay. lance’s characterization of the “whore-
dom” of women may indeed be antifeminist, but one wonders uncomfort-
ably whether an alternative description of promiscuity, in which men and 
women freely choose their sexual objects and exert control over their own 
sexual desires, escapes an instrumentalist and dehumanizing conception of 
sexuality any more successfully.
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 Unsurprisingly, Percy’s preferred alternative both to 1970s america and 
to lance’s stoicism-cum-fascism is Catholicism, the “action and knowledge” 
of which are only intimated by lance’s interlocutor, Percival, also known 
as Father John. listening to lance’s narrative, Percival rarely speaks, and 
when he does, the words are either repeated or paraphrased by lance, so 
that until the final pages of the novel, Percival lacks a voice. moreover, 
lance infers from Percival’s “phony casuals” (instead of “priest clothes”) 
(5) and refusal to say a prayer for the dead that a woman requests from him 
on all Souls’ Day (11) that his friend is suffering a crisis of faith. lance con-
cludes—and “manage[s] to surprise” Percival by saying so—that Percival 
is “a screwed-up priest or a half-assed physician. Or both” (10). Percival, 
then, is no less a victim of the contemporary malaise than lance, though 
his malaise partakes more of depression than murderous rage. evidently 
intending both to minister to lance and to oppose his arguments, Percival 
can do so for much of the novel only by repeating the word “love,” a pos-
sibility that lance refuses to entertain: “That sort of love is impossible now 
if it ever was. The only way it will ever be possible again is if the world 
should end” (56). For lance, Percival joins the ridiculous nuns “in J.C. Pen-
ney pantsuits” (5) as representatives of a post–vatican ii Church that has 
been infested by “the same fleas as the dogs [it has] lain down with” (157). 
even so, lance opines, Catholicism remains the only other option think-
able: “i could live your way if it were true” (155). at the end of the novel, 
lance states, “There is no other way than yours or mine, true?” and Per-
cival responds with a simple “Yes” (257).
 Given the disadvantages under which Percival labors, any reading of 
the novel that discovers in it a clear affirmation of Christian belief must 
place enormous weight on the final exchange: lancelot asks, “is there any-
thing you wish to tell me before i leave?” and Percival answers, “Yes” (257). 
The implication is that now Percival will do the talking, lance will listen, 
and the fullness of Catholic faith—which lance has already recognized as 
the only worthy alternative—will be affirmed in an unwritten sequel. This 
is, perhaps, Percy’s boldest rhetorical gamble yet, for as reynolds Price 
asks, “[h]ow many contemporary readers of fiction are equipped or even 
prone to provide a sufficient counter statement?” (qtd. in Tolson 412). in 
order for the strategy to work, readers must come to identify not only with 
lance but also—and in the end, even more—with Percival, who finally 
recovers his faith, appears before lance in priestly garb, and announces 
that he is off to take charge of a suburban parish in alabama. if Percy’s per-
suasion depends in part on convincing readers that lance’s Third revolu-
tion is indeed preferable to the social decay and anomie that hold sway, the 
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final step consists of making Percival’s Catholic alternative—dismissed by 
lance as “more of the same” because it consists of “forgiv[ing] the sins of 
buick dealers [and] administer[ing] communion to suburban housewives” 
(257, 256)—more attractive still.
 Percy prepares the way for this possibility in part by exploiting the 
difference between what James Phelan calls in Living to Tell About It, his 
close study of character narration, “narrator functions” and “disclosure 
functions” (12). according to Phelan, narrator functions comprise the 
straightforward telling of material from a narrator to a narratee; disclo-
sure functions, by contrast, are signaled by the redundant telling of mate-
rial that the narratee already knows but the authorial audience does not. 
because Percival is a childhood friend whom lance addresses as “you” 
throughout the novel, Percy must construct a plausible rationale for lance’s 
own redundant telling of material that Percival knows—for instance, that 
lance and Percival were classmates at Tulane, or that Percival was a sol-
itary, skinny drinker who converted to Catholicism before becoming a 
priest. Percy initially suggests a plausible rationale by having lance plead 
amnesia, a condition not surprising in an inmate in a psychiatric hospi-
tal: “Don’t i know you? . . . i’ve been feeling rather depressed and i don’t 
remember things well” (3). Since the pronoun you implicitly places both 
Percival and the reader in the same position, the awkwardness of having 
lance narrate information that Percival knows, readers are led to believe, 
will be mitigated. interestingly enough, however, lance quickly confesses 
this to have been a ruse before the disclosure function begins: “i was not 
quite honest yesterday when i pretended not to know you. i knew you per-
fectly well . . . [i]t’s just that it was quite a shock seeing you after all these 
years. no; not even that is true. i noticed you in the cemetery the day before 
yesterday. Still i hardly knew what to say to you. What do you say to some-
one after twenty years when you have already said everything?” (9). if the 
initial explanation of amnesia provided a reason why lance would have 
to reconstruct so much of the past not to a therapist but to an old friend, 
lance’s changed rationale actually builds upon the former one to establish 
a greater sense of intimacy. not only does lance now convince Percival that 
he is now telling the truth (that is, he does remember him), he also suggests 
that the very intimacy of their friendship can serve as a pretext for going 
over mutually known events. “everything” may have been said, but for 
precisely that reason, a certain repetition is necessary to discover whatever 
insights might be new and valuable. The disclosure functions which then 
follow not only contribute necessary information to the reader’s interpreta-
tion of lance and Percival; they also pave the way for the narrator function 
that predominates afterward, in which the particulars of lance’s story are 
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new both to Percival and to the reader. ironically, an initial lie framed by 
the context of mental illness helps to cement a more secure trust, to suggest 
that whatever lance’s problems may be, insanity, properly speaking, is not 
one of them. To hold that he belongs in the Center for aberrant behavior, 
instead of in prison, is the real lie.
 yet for all the care with which Percy develops such narrative strategies, 
readers must still draw their own conclusions at the end—will they con-
cur with Percival’s repeated “yeses,” acknowledging his truer, more viable 
Christian alternative to lance’s violent stoicism? readers might detect an 
echo of molly bloom’s “yes yes yes yes yes” in Percival’s words and per-
ceive through the allusion Percy’s affirmative intent, though the fact that 
these words are interspersed with lance’s own jaded dialogue limits the 
likelihood of such an identification. as i argued above, the novel’s lack of 
definite closure here does affirm both lance’s freedom and the fact that 
until his own death, all he can do is remain faithful to his choice, whatever 
it may be. The same is true for readers of the novel. Ultimately, Percy makes 
a wager similar to O’Connor’s in “a Good man is hard to Find.” O’Connor 
opined, “i prefer to think that, however unlikely this may seem, the old 
lady’s gesture, like the mustard-seed, will grow to be a great crow-filled 
tree in the [sic] misfit’s heart, and will be enough of a pain to him there 
to turn him into the prophet he was meant to become. but that’s another 
story” (“On her Own Work” 112–13). The very implausibility of such 
a choice, the very fact that it is not determined by what has come before, 
might serve to show that it is the freest choice of all. if lance, no matter 
how his life with anna in the Shenandoah valley may unfold, will have 
been affected enough by Percival’s proclamation of love to live henceforth 
as a believer, then perhaps this is his truest achievement. but that, too, is 
another story, and by no means a certain one.
III. Believing the Apostle: 
 The Second Coming
biographical evidence suggests that at least some of the uncharacteristic 
ferocity of Lancelot can be attributed to a crisis of faith that Percy experi-
enced during the novel’s composition. That this crisis was resolved success-
fully seems to be confirmed by The Second Coming, the most overtly didactic 
of all of Percy’s novels and the one that departs the most from his usual 
practices of indirection and suspended closure.12 Picking up the story of 
 12. On this crisis of faith, see Tolson (380–82, 387–88). On its recovery, see especially 
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Will barrett many years after the events described in The Last Gentleman, 
The Second Coming reveals that he has married a yankee episcopalian 
woman, grown middle-aged and affluent, and survived his wife’s death. 
he finds himself once again experiencing fugues, intense memories of 
his father, bemusement at the craziness of the contemporary South, and 
what his psychiatrist calls “wahnsinnige Sehnsucht,” or inappropriate long-
ing (303). alternatives familiar from Percy’s previous novels are predict-
ably presented to him: the stoic code of honor that secretly loves death 
and moves through an inexorable logic to suicide; the transient pleasures 
of sensory delight; and the inadequacy of most of what passes for reli-
gious belief in 1980, whether the vague episcopalianism the novel satirizes, 
the practice of astrology or pantheism (lumped together under the rubric 
“Californian”), or the aggressively cheerful (and powerful) fundamentalist 
Christianity that flourishes in the South. Desiring apocalypse on his own 
terms, Will tries to escape his predicament by concealing himself in a cave 
until God either declares his existence or refuses to appear. (The gesture 
repeats lance’s resolution in Lancelot—instead of implementing his “Third 
revolution” at once, he declares, “i’ll wait and give your God time” [256]). 
Such bravado, however, fails: driven by toothache and malnutrition out of 
the cave, he falls into the arms of allie, the daughter of his old girlfriend 
Kitty, who has escaped from a psychiatric hospital and is hiding out in the 
greenhouse she owns. The two fall in love, resolve to marry, and presum-
ably live happily ever after.
 Still more happily, Will ends the novel on the brink of a definite conver-
sion experience—the book’s most significant departure from The Last Gen-
tleman, and indeed from all of Percy’s previous novels. Tolson’s appraisal of 
the novel as a “philosophical fairy tale” in which Percy could indulge his 
impossible desire for perfection (432) is convincing: the resolution of the 
contradictions that had plagued Will in the earlier novel is so sudden and 
unexpected as to suggest an O’Connoresque descent of grace. at one point 
in the novel, Will begins a long litany that begins “here are the names of 
death, which shall not prevail over me because i know the names” (272), 
then enumerates these “names” over the space of two and a half pages, 
whooping with joy throughout. his final words in the novel, as he ponders 
the prospect of married life, are “am i crazy to want both, her and him? 
no, not want, must have. and will have” (360). These moments flaunt their 
narrative implausibility, but—as is not the case in O’Connor’s work or in 
Lancelot—there is no mystery as to how readers should interpret their effect 
Quinlan (162), who speculates that Karol Wojytla’s accession to the papacy in 1978 may have 
particularly cheered Percy.
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on the character, no implicit invitation to make a similar leap. This is the 
kind of closure that comes only with death, and if readers, like Will, “pre-
vail” over “the names of death,” they do so simply by finishing the book.
 Two features of the novel, however, pull against this overwhelming 
sense of closure. The first is that Will converts not to Catholicism but to 
episcopalianism. even in 1980, the anglican Church was hardly known for 
its doctrinal uniformity, and in subsequent decades, disputes between tra-
ditionalists and progressives have grown bitterer—a situation hardly cal-
culated to win Percy’s approval. in Percy’s other novels, episcopalianism 
figures largely as the preferred religion of backward-looking, stoic southern 
gentlefolk precisely because of its rich aesthetic tradition, doctrinal fuzzi-
ness, and snobbery—Tom more’s wife, ellen, for instance, has become in 
The Thanatos Syndrome “one of those Southern anglicans who dislike Catho-
lics—romans, she calls them—and love all things english” (46). For men, 
episcopalianism is also bound up with romantic, martial fantasies. lance 
lamar, for instance, is nominally episcopalian and named for the angli-
can divine lancelot andrewes (who would have a considerable influence 
on T. S. eliot), but he explains that “the andrewes was tacked on by him 
to give it episcopal sanction”—his father really cared more for “roman-
tic english poetry, Southern history, robert e. lee biographies” and other 
books in which one “could detect no common denominator except a taste 
for the extraordinary and marvelous, the sentimental, the extraordinary 
experience . . . the extraordinary glory of a lost cause which becomes more 
extraordinary as it recedes in time and in fact robert e. lee and the army 
of northern virginia had long since become for him as legendary and 
mythical as King arthur and the round Table. Do you think i was named 
lancelot for nothing?” (116). Such an attitude stands in contrast to the sac-
ramental embrace of the mundane here and now that Percy celebrates.
 yet there are two episcopal characters in the novel who complicate 
this picture. The first, Jack Curl, is an anglican priest who pursues Will 
throughout the novel for donations to a planned retirement community. he 
is made “uneasy” by talk about religion (138) and can speak of it only if 
he casts himself as a manual laborer, a “sweaty episcopal handyman” and 
“godly greasy super” (125) who wears hideous jumpsuits. in one sense, his 
approach seems no different from that of such Catholic characters as binx’s 
mother and Uncle Jules; his is a pragmatic, world-invested Christianity. 
Unlike these characters, however, Jack Curl is tainted by his blatant pur-
suit of Will’s money and fondness for soothing the troubles of the rich and 
powerful. For these reasons, as much as for the priest’s lack of earnestness 
about God, Will dismisses him: “Seldom can an episcopalian (or an angli-
can) be taken for a Christian” (189). yet Will also retains enough respect for 
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Curl’s office to ask himself, when he hears that Curl has been picked to lead 
an ecumenical meeting, “Could Jack Curl reunite Christendom? . . . Why 
not? isn’t it just the sort of damn fool thing God might favor?” (309).
 The elderly episcopal priest to whom Will addresses himself at the end, 
Father Weatherbee, is more admirable. Demanding that Father Weather bee 
marry him and allie despite the fact that neither is yet a Christian believer, 
Will states, in an interestingly hedged declaration, that he and allie are 
“willing to take instructions, as long as you recognize that i cannot and 
will not accept all of your dogmas. Unless of course you have the author-
ity to tell me something i don’t know. Do you?” (358). Will’s words here 
hark back to the 1975 essay “The message in the bottle,” in which Percy 
develops Kierkegaard’s distinction between a “genius” and an “apostle” 
and offers these criteria for determining whether an apostle’s authority is 
genuine:
Faith comes from God, but it also comes by hearing. it is a piece of news 
and there is a newsbearer. but why should we believe the newsbearer, the 
apostle? must the apostle first prove his case to the scientist in the seminar 
room? no, because this would mean that God and the apostle must wait in 
the porter’s lodge while the learned upstairs settle the matter. . . .
 how then may we recognize the divine authority of the apostle? 
What, in other words, are the credentials of the newsbearer? The credential 
of the apostle is simply the gravity of his message: “i am called by God; 
do with me what you will, scourge me, persecute me, but my last words 
are first; i am called by God and i make you eternally responsible for what 
you do against me.” . . . [W]hat if a man receives the commission to bring 
news across the seas to the castaway and does so in perfect sobriety and 
with good faith and perseverance to the point of martyrdom? and what 
if the news the newsbearer bears is the very news the castaway has been 
waiting for, news of where he came from and who he is and what he must 
do, and what if the newsbearer brought with him the means by which the 
castaway may do what he must do? Well then, the castaway will, by the 
grace of God, believe him. (146, 147, 149)
Percy makes the intended parallel between this passage and his preferred 
episcopal priest Father Weatherbee all too clear, for not only does Father 
Weatherbee have a professed interest in the apostolic Succession—a doc-
trine which aligns him with the anglo-Catholic wing of anglicanism (and 
which Curl rejects as something that “sounds more like the ancestor wor-
ship of his mindanao tribesmen” [311])—but he also has spent fifty years as 
a missionary in the Philippines, where he found a happy simplicity of faith 
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among his congregation that americans lack: “They believed the Gospel 
whole and entire, and the teachings of the church. They said that if i told 
them, then it must be true or i would not have gone to so much trouble” 
(359). These words confirm what Will had already suspected, that Father 
Weatherbee “seem[s] to know something—and that by the same token Jack 
Curl does not” (358). Father Weatherbee’s apostolic authority is genuine, 
and, it would seem, sufficient to convert Will, despite Father Weatherbee’s 
own bewilderment and his belief that Will is a “madman” (357). Clearly 
Jack Curl’s ambition of “reuniting Christendom,” however worthy a goal, 
takes a back seat to the more fundamental effort of bringing the good news 
to people, one by one.
 The question remains: even granting the very Catholic kind of angli-
canism that Father Weatherbee professes, why anglicanism at all? Kieran 
Quinlan, professing uncertainty here, suggests several possibilities: per-
haps “it was just too cumbersome for Percy to have Will jump through 
all the hoops in one novel”; perhaps “Percy deemed that the most theo-
logically obtuse of all his protagonists was unworthy to become a member 
of the church of the great St. Thomas aquinas”; or perhaps in the novel, 
as in Lancelot, “the Catholic faith is most present by its relative absence: 
the radical inadequacies of all alternatives reinforce its supreme neces-
sity” (173). i am inclined to agree most with the third possibility, not only 
because such a stance is consistent with Percy’s statements elsewhere but 
also because it provides an obstacle to complete closure in the novel.13 Will 
may be about to convert, but he will not have arrived at what Percy per-
ceives of as the fullness of Christian truth, which can be found only in the 
Catholic Church. moreover, readers unaware of Percy’s Catholicism may 
well perceive a different message altogether—as did richard Gilman, who, 
reviewing the novel in the New Republic, identified its “religious sense” 
but considered it to be “without creed or dogma” (31). indeed, as Quin-
lan observes, The Second Coming “seems to have had an especial appeal for 
those sympathetic with a new age style of Christian gnosticism [sic], an 
outcome that hardly would have pleased its by now ultraorthodox author” 
(172). The Second Coming may well be Percy’s most orthodox novel, if its 
sense of urgency and its presentation of a genuine conversion are the mea-
sures of orthodoxy, and i share the sense of many readers that it is also 
 13. in Lost in the Cosmos, Percy asserts that “Catholic Christianity” is the “most pre-
posterous” religion in the triad of Judaism, Protestantism, and Catholicism because of the 
counterintuitive nature of its claims, but he also holds that “in the end it is precisely this 
preposterous remedy, it and no other, which is specified by the preposterous predicament of 
the human self as its sole remedy” (253, 254). as preposterous as Will’s conversion is, it may 
not be preposterous enough.
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his most tendentious. even here, however, there is just enough of a gap to 
make its intended good news genuinely contestable, to emphasize the gen-
uine freedom of its readers and the genuine leap that belief requires.
IV. Living after the end: 
 “A Space Odyssey”
With Lost in the Cosmos—a parody of the self-help book genre, an intro-
duction to semiotic theory, and a compendium of “thought experiments,” 
several of which are recycled from his previous works, Percy provides the 
most concise and in many respects most entertaining summation of his 
thought. From the standpoint of an inquiry into the use of narrative as 
rhetoric, its most interesting feature is “a Space Odyssey,” two variations 
on a short fictional narrative that play out the logic of apocalypse that char-
acterized earlier works by Percy to its limit. Whereas Percy’s protagonists 
often longed for an apocalypse that either did not come or arrived with 
a whimper, here the theoretician proposes the real thing—a nuclear holo-
caust that leaves only a few survivors and their descendants on the earth—
as a test of whether Percy’s theories of the self, language, and redemption 
would still operate in the most extreme conditions imaginable. Predictably, 
the theories are verified—not even a literal end of the world, as opposed to 
a metaphorical one, can transfigure recalcitrant human nature.
 in the first part of “a Space Odyssey,” a group of astronauts on a mis-
sion to discover intelligent extraterrestrial life in the universe mysteriously 
loses contact with earth and begins to fear that a nuclear war has destroyed 
human civilization. Discovering evidence of extraterrestrial intelligence on 
a planet orbiting Proxima Centauri, the astronauts attempt to land but are 
prohibited from doing so, because the planet’s inhabitants determine, after 
a lengthy conversation with the astronauts’ captain, that human beings are 
afflicted with self-consciousness and will probably bring nothing but vio-
lence and sexual disorder to their planet.
 in the second variation on the narrative—which borrows its setting, 
premises, and even the name of its central character from Walter J. miller, 
Jr.’s science fiction novel A Canticle for Leibowitz—a similar group of astro-
nauts who lose contact with earth return to discover that nuclear holocaust 
has occurred in their absence. landing in the desert of Utah, they discover 
an unlikely group of survivors: abbot liebowitz [sic], a brooklyn Jew who 
has converted to Catholicism, presides over a benedictine abbey, and sus-
pects himself, in the absence of contradictory evidence, to be the Pope; the 
two african american monks who with him comprise the abbey; a young 
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Californian astronomer named aristarchus Jones who wears special cloth-
ing to protect him from ultraviolet light; and a group of children suffering 
from deformities and disabilities as the result of radiation.
 Percy’s habitual presentation of privileged southern males who can 
skillfully read the social distinctions implied by clothing and mannerisms 
becomes amusingly obsolete in this narrative, for race, disability, Juda-
ism, and southernness have ceased to mean much at all: a Jew might be the 
Pope, and the resemblance of Jones’s protective garb to the robe of a Ku 
Klux Klansman (243) reveals not the persistence of racism but the fact that 
even the most entrenched images associated with racism now signify dif-
ferently. The only stereotype that seems to survive concerns the extraordi-
nary intelligence of Jews: abbot liebowitz hopes to “revive the University 
of notre Dame around a nucleus of Jewish scientists whom [he] shall lure 
from israel” (249). indeed, the disappearance of all other social distinc-
tions seems dependent upon the survival of Jews and Catholics, the par-
ticular people called by God and the universal church that descends from 
them. as liebowitz puts is, “the two, Jew and Catholic, are inextricably 
attached to each other like Siamese twins at the umbilicus, whether they 
like it or not, and they both detest it, until the end of earth time” (249). in 
the irradiated deserts of the West, what matters is that the apostolic succes-
sion goes on, that the Church keeps its promise to endure, while the fact 
that a Jew leads it also points to God’s continued covenant with his chosen 
people.
 Percy offers two “options” for readers to choose regarding the future 
of this fledgling society. The first option, proposed by the astronomer, 
involves the survivors removing to the Jovian satellite europa, breaking 
completely with the past, and initiating a kind of behaviorist utopia to be 
named new ionia and grounded in a combination of Skinner-style con-
ditioning and Jungian theory. he invites the monks, though he also envi-
sions “a sexually free and peace-loving society where the sciences and arts 
can flourish freed from the superstitions and repressions of religion” (246), 
and he refuses to invite the malformed children, because “[i]t would make 
no sense to perpetuate genetic defects” (247). Such a plan is not so differ-
ent from the arrangements that prevailed among the astronauts on their 
spaceship, in which an equal number of men and women were enjoined 
to practice free love and bear children outside the context of a nuclear 
family. The first variation on “a Space Odyssey,” however, suggests that 
such an arrangement cannot last: three of the original men were killed in 
“quarrels over the women” (214), and one of the women, though she was 
deemed “culturally liberated” by “the screening procedure,” now wants 
to revert “to the old monogamy” and marry (216). Clearly, the implica-
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tion is that marriage is preferable to sexual anarchy—and, as if realizing 
that in its absence other measures must be taken to prevent such disorder, 
aristar chus resolves to codify his teachings in a “little Green book” and 
to demand group exercises of “self-criticism and honest appraisal of oth-
ers. . . . no more lies, no more self-deception, no more secrecy, no more 
guilt, no more shame” (257). needless to say, such a regime must prescribe 
“punishment, even exile, for aggressive, jealous, hostile, solitary, mystical, 
or other antisocial behavior” (256)—with the result that those who are dis-
satisfied learn to keep their unhappiness to themselves.
 in the second “option,” the survivors eventually move to lost Cove, 
Tennessee, begin to multiply and to attract immigrants, and soon reestab-
lish some markers of southern identity. Denominational divisions reappear 
among the Christian members of the group, as do racism, anti-Semitism, 
anti-Catholicism, agrarian ideals, and homemade whiskey. The five Jews in 
the colony—“one orthodox, one reformed, one conservative, one human-
ist, and one yemenite israeli” (259)—are too fractious to establish a tem-
ple. even one of the two african american monks has “discovered his roots 
in nearby alabama, resigned his priesthood, and joined the Shiloh baptist 
Church” (259). When contact is made with a “Celtic enclave across the old 
Carolina line, a growing community with a reputation for violence and 
snake-handling” (260), the old, long-suppressed social hostilities erupt into 
plain view, as the Celts propose an alliance of white americans and Chris-
tians against the african americans, Catholics, and Jews. in the words of 
the marcus aurelius Schuyler, captain of the spaceship and Percy’s inevi-
table spokesperson for old-fashioned southern stoicism, “Jesus Christ, here 
we go again” (261).
 The juxtaposition of these two options reprises the alternative that 
Percy presents at the end of Lancelot: only Catholicism and some form of 
fascism (an unusually “light” version in this case, with its emphasis on 
behaviorism and self-interrogation) are viable solutions to the predicament 
of the self in modernity, and of the two, only Catholicism has the benefit 
of being true as well as more tolerant—a colony that was created under 
Catholic auspices welcomes Jews and unbelievers, and exiles nobody. 
neither option, however, obviates the need for the self to go on living, to 
confront everyday problems even as it embraces everyday grace. human 
beings may be already redeemed, but not even a nuclear holocaust can 
obliterate their tendency toward sin and disorder. even committed Cath-
olics, such as Percy’s african american monk, sometimes fall away; even 
committed agnostics might, even if they do not come to accept Christian 
belief itself, might come to admit how necessary it is. Percy’s choice of mar-
cus Schuyler—a man “like a Christian who had lost his faith in everything 
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but the Fall of man” (229)—as his central focalizer both in the new ionian 
and the Tennessean options, in fact, suggests that an unbeliever might be 
more cognizant of the radical nature of Christian teaching than many pro-
fessed Christians.
 marcus’s habitual boredom in new ionia, where nothing except sex, 
Shakespeare’s Henry IV plays, and mozart’s string quartets move him, is 
contrasted with his genial, if no less ironic, disposition in lost Cove. as 
Peter augustine lawler puts it, “he knows why he has affection for the 
priests and their Church. he knows, as he did not before, the limits of his 
independence. his freedom depends on the cave; his skepticism depends 
upon belief, and his pleasurable experiences of the goodness of life depend 
upon his love for others. he knows he is more alike than different from 
other human beings. he lives well with all sorts of misbegotten selves, 
because he knows that he himself is far from free from trouble or disorder” 
(103–4). in this conviction of the basic shared experience of flawed human 
beings, there is even a basis for democracy, in contrast to the false egalitari-
anism that fascism violently creates—and a basis for love and desire, which 
in turn nourish science and art. in new ionia, there is nothing to strive for 
and nothing to love. in lost Cove, love exists—and one must accept the 
existence of hatred, too, as its corollary—“Wherever there is love of par-
ticular troubled selves for others, there is hatred too”—but this makes for 
a view of the human condition as “more comic and genuinely mysterious” 
(103), not for despair. Percy’s two post-apocalyptic visions of the future 
in Lost in the Cosmos manage to escape, more clearly the texts that precede 
them, the temptations of losing the self in violence and building a new, but 
inhuman and loveless, order.
V. Fascinations with a Culture of death: 
 The Thanatos Syndrome
after the unprecedented novelistic closure of The Second Coming and the 
attempt to follow apocalyptic thinking to its limit in “a Space Odyssey,” 
Percy’s final novel, The Thanatos Syndrome, has struck some readers as a 
belaboring of material that Percy had brought to more successful fruition 
elsewhere. Kieran Quinlan, for instance, calls it “repetitious of his earlier 
themes” and full of “careless errors,” and speculates that “as he moved 
toward the conclusion of his life, Percy might have wanted simply to rein-
force his ideas without worrying too much about ‘art’”—he had, in fact, 
praised A Canticle for Leibowitz “for precisely this achievement” (198). a 
reader familiar with Percy will certainly find little in the novel that sur-
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prises, but what is new about The Thanatos Syndrome is not its ideas but its 
form: unlike the earlier novels, it is a concerted attempt at genre fiction, 
with the rapid, suspenseful plotting that characterizes thrillers. if Quinlan 
is correct that Percy attempted a more lowbrow style out of a sense that 
“literary” fiction may have become an obstacle to his theological argu-
ments, then perhaps his repetition is deliberate as well—an effort, so to 
speak, to get new readers up to speed while relying on the plot to maintain 
their interest.
 This plot concerns a secret experiment in social engineering performed 
by bob Comeaux and John van Dorn. Drawing on the work of Dr. Tom 
more, Percy’s protagonist from Love in the Ruins, the two men have released 
heavy sodium into the water supply of the region of Feliciana, louisiana 
and the city of baton rouge. People who consume the water experience 
“an average twenty percent increase in i.Q.—plus an almost total memory 
recall” (192), as well as the disappearance of anger and anxiety. There are 
also profound changes in sexual behavior and its consequences. because 
women now experience estrus instead of a menstrual cycle, unintended 
pregnancy disappears. homosexuality also disappears—the Gay and les-
bian Club at louisiana State University, for instance, voluntarily disbands. 
On the other hand, people feel less sexually inhibited, and their character-
istic sexual overtures resemble those of chimpanzees—“presenting rear-
ward” (20) instead of facing each other. Facility with language, that distinct 
attribute of human beings, also deteriorates, so that people communicate in 
factual, “two-word sentences,” which Comeaux, speaking for an unimagi-
native scientism, touts as “a lot more accurate than once upon a time there 
lived a wicked queen” (197).
 This is a familiar scenario, whose literary ancestors include aldous 
huxley’s Brave New World and whose philosophical touchstones include 
such thinkers as alexandre Kojève, richard rorty, and Francis Fukuyama.14 
human self-consciousness, described by Comeaux as “not only an aberra-
tion of evolution but . . . also the scourge and curse of life on this earth, 
the source of wars, insanities, perversions” (195), is eradicated, leaving rela-
tively happy, extremely intelligent animals able to live productive lives and 
to lose themselves in sexual happiness. van Dorn, believing sexual energy 
to be the source of human beings’ greatest accomplishments, wishes to 
“combine the high sexuality of [Don Giovanni] and einstein without the 
frivolity of the Don or the repressed Jewish sexuality of einstein” (220), and 
though he considers the heavy sodium to be a crude means to this end, he 
is willing to experiment with it until a more total sexual liberation can be 
 14. On the continuity between these philosophers’ views, see especially lawler (15–76).
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achieved, because he believes, like lance lamar, that the social decay of 
the late twentieth century is intolerable. Comeaux, committed to respect-
ing “the rights of the unwanted child not to have to suffer a life of suffer-
ing and abuse, the right of the unwanted aged to a life with dignity and a 
death with dignity,” is an advocate of euthanasia, responsible for disposing 
of “neonates” and “euthanates” at facilities called “Qualitarian Centers” 
(199), and his enthusiasm for heavy sodium springs from the same desire to 
maximize a so-called “quality of life,” even at the price of killing or render-
ing subhuman those who cannot attain it. indeed, Percy has described the 
“only message” of The Thanatos Syndrome as the claim that it is “[b]etter to 
be a dislocated human than a happy chimp” (More Conversations 202).
 as could have been predicted, the secret of such a vision of perfected 
humanity is that is based upon domination. neither Comeaux nor van 
horn undergoes the experiment, understandably preferring not to be 
guinea pigs and to be able to control their subjects. moreover, it is clear 
that both enjoy dominating people in other ways: Comeaux entertains the 
fantasy that the experiment will “restore the best of the Southern Way of 
life” (197), complete with “darkies singing” (331) as they work happily in 
the fields; while van horn is a predator who molests children at his “tradi-
tional Southern academy founded on Greek ideals of virtue and to avoid 
the integration of the public schools” (214). The euthanasia that Comeaux 
advocates is merely the logical consequence of such an attitude: human 
beings must conform to the pattern established by the experts who know 
best, or they prove themselves unworthy of life. helpless infants and suf-
fering elderly people may be unable (and sometimes unwilling) to resist 
their extermination, but the heavy sodium experiment, performed with-
out the consent of its subjects, precludes resistance altogether. lawler has 
cannily connected the heavy sodium experiment in The Thanatos Syndrome 
to some of the more chilling implications of richard rorty’s pragmatism. 
if, as rorty maintains, one should cease to concern oneself with death, 
because “[f]ear is of something concrete, and so one cannot fear nothing 
or one’s obliteration” (lawler 43), then not only is there no reason not to 
practice euthanasia in certain circumstances, there is also every reason to 
stigmatize dissenters who ground their arguments in a metaphysics of the 
human as dangerous: “We should say we have no transcendent or transhis-
torical truth . . . That way, anyone who has such metaphysical or theologi-
cal opinions about the truth can be excluded from discussion in a liberal 
democracy. They can rightly be labeled mad” (lawler 63). in The Thana-
tos Syndrome, the character of Father rinaldo Smith, who has sequestered 
himself atop a firetower (in imitation of St. Simeon Stylites) and refuses 
to speak to most people because he is disgusted by the fact that his hos-
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pice is being shut down in order to build a Qualitarian Center, is in danger 
of institutionalization. Tom more, who knows Father Smith, sympathizes 
with his anti-euthanasia stance, and suffers from guilt for having indirectly 
enabled the heavy sodium experiment through his own scientific research, 
is the novel’s narrator and hero: he must race to stop the experiment, save 
Father Smith and his hospice, and, after he learns of his crimes, bring van 
Dorn to justice.
 although these tasks are accomplished, in its lack of theological and 
even moral closure, The Thanatos Syndrome resembles Percy’s earlier nov-
els more than The Second Coming. a certain comic ambiguity, for instance, 
undercuts the novel’s outrage against sexual predation, suggesting either 
that even the most heinous of crimes can be forgiven, or that a nation so 
addled as to look to Phil Donahue for moral guidance has no right to con-
demn van Dorn.15 more significantly, Dr. more, who has lost his faith before 
the novel begins, shows no sign of regaining it. he assists Father Smith at 
a mass when called upon on the spur of the moment, but emphasizes that 
he will not do so again, because “since i no longer was sure what i believe, 
didn’t think much about religion, participation in mass would seem to be 
deceitful” (363). Such an ending is consistent with Percy’s familiar strate-
gies of indirection and his conviction that even for those who, unlike more, 
have made the leap of faith, life’s intractable problems do not disappear; 
they are merely rendered comic and bearable. yet if more resembles a typi-
cal Percy protagonist in this respect, it is striking that Father Smith, whose 
convictions are demonstrably Percy’s own for long stretches, is made such 
an unappealing figure. like lance lamar, he can be read as simply mad, 
and even Dr. more, his ally and friend, never denies this possibility. more-
over, though his position as a believing priest would render him lance’s 
opponent if the two were to engage in debate, the terms of the debate seem 
much the same as the agreement that lance and Percival reach at the end 
of Lancelot: there is Catholic Christianity as a solution to the problems of 
modernity, and there is fascism, but nothing else.
 15. in Lost in the Cosmos, Percy had mocked primatologists who, denying the uniqueness 
of human language, were devoting considerable effort to teaching chimpanzees and gorillas 
sign language. in The Thanatos Syndrome, van Dorn regresses to a prelinguistic consciousness 
after being forced to take his heavy sodium overdose as a punishment for his crimes, and as a 
result, is unable to stand trial. more eventually suggests that eve, a gorilla who knows some 
sign language, teach van Dorn. he moves in with her under the watch of a primatologist 
and soon fully recovers, though only after he has established a sexual relationship with her. 
Once he is able to stand trial, he is convicted—but because he writes a popular book called 
My Life with Eve, he is eventually pardoned and makes frequent appearances “on the Donahue 
show, often with Dr. ruth” (344). neither his imprisonment nor his unwilling participation in 
an experiment seems to faze him—what seems to be poetic justice at first loses its irony and 
suggests that even the crime of sexual abuse can be erased through shrewd self-marketing.
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 indeed, Father Smith is far more explicit than lance in identifying fas-
cism as the unwittingly chosen remedy of a secular world to modern ano-
mie. having spent some time visiting family in Germany in the 1930s, 
Father Smith was impressed enough by his cousin helmut, a member 
of the SS—“i had never met anyone ready to die for a belief” (247)—to 
have been willing to join him, had he remained in Germany. The parallel 
between the culture of the nazis and the traditional southern love of mili-
tary glory is clear enough: both are rooted in a sentimental (and, in Percy’s 
view, therefore cruel) romanticism, which stoically prefers noble death to 
muddled life. Father Smith goes on to argue, however, that the true impli-
cations of such a worldview are to be found in the nazis’ programs of 
abortion, eugenic euthanasia, and eventually, the attempt to exterminate 
the Jews. helmut’s father, a doctor who was contemptuous of hitler, nev-
ertheless became the murderer of children in hitler’s eugenics program, 
and fled at the end of the war, apparently to Paraguay. Father Smith’s 
point is that noble love of country and the humanitarian zeal to end suf-
fering, both forms of sentimentality, lead to atrocities. as he puts it in a cer-
emony to celebrate the reopening of his hospice, “more people have been 
killed in this century by tenderhearted souls than by cruel barbarians in all 
other centuries put together” (361). he paraphrases Flannery O’Connor’s 
words—“Tenderness leads to the gas chamber” (360)—and builds up to the 
following peroration:16
“listen to me, dear physicians, dear brothers, dear Qualitarians, abor-
tionists, euthanasists! Do you know why you are going to listen to me? 
because every last one of you is a better man than i and you know it! and 
yet you like me. every last one of you knows me and what i am, a failed 
priest, and old drunk, who is only fit to do one thing and to tell you one 
thing. you are good, kind, hardworking doctors, but you like me neverthe-
less and i know that you will allow me to tell you one thing . . . no, beg one 
thing of you. Please do this one favor for me, dear doctors. if you have a 
patient, young or old, suffering, dying, afflicted, useless, born or unborn, 
 16. O’Connor’s well-known reflections on this theme are from her introduction to A 
Memoir of Mary Ann: “One of the tendencies of our age is to use the suffering of children to 
discredit the goodness of God, and once you have discredited his goodness, you are done 
with him. . . . in this popular pity, we mark our gain in sensibility and our loss in vision. if 
other ages felt less, they saw more, even though they saw with the blind, prophetical, un-
sentimental eye of acceptance, which is to say, of faith. in the absence of this faith now, we 
govern by tenderness. it is a tenderness which, long since cut off from the person of Christ, 
is wrapped in theory. When tenderness is detached from the source of tenderness, its logical 
outcome is terror. it ends in forced labor camps and in the fumes of the gas chamber” (Mys-
tery 226–27).
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whom you for the best of reasons wish to put out of his misery—i beg 
only one thing of you, dear doctors! Please send him to us. Don’t kill them! 
We’ll take them—all of them! Please send them to us! i swear to you you 
won’t be sorry. We will all be happy about it! i promise you, and i know 
that you believe me, that we will take care of him, her—we will even call 
on you to help us take care of them!—and you will not have to make such 
a decision. God will bless you for it and you will offend no one except the 
Great Prince Satan, who rules the world. That is all.” (361)
Father Smith’s conviction that the doctors “like him” and will permit him 
to speak a necessary truth echoes the claim in The Second Coming that the 
apostles and their designated successors have the authority to proclaim the 
truth, that all one needs to do is listen. moreover, he suggests that one’s 
motivations do not necessarily matter—he will care for the sick and the 
unwanted, not out of love for them or even love for God, as a truly saintly 
Christian would, but simply because, as he tells Tom earlier, “dying peo-
ple were the only people i could stand . . . Dying people, suffering people, 
don’t lie. They tell the truth . . . everyone else lies” (244). The truly kind-
hearted are the ones most likely to usher in what Pope John Paul ii called 
a “culture of death,” and the political progressives who endorse abortion 
and euthanasia are already fascists in practice, though they would deny the 
claim vociferously, and though their historical moment resembles the Wei-
mar republic more than hitler’s reich.17
 because Father Smith emphasizes right conduct itself over the authen-
ticity of the motives behind it, his stance does locate itself at some distance 
 17. Percy would amplify his argument about the links between humanitarian sentiment 
and Weimar-era euthanasia in “an Unpublished letter to the Times,” written on 22 January 
1988 and later published in Signposts in a Strange Land. in this letter, Percy cites the influential 
book Die Freigabe der Vernichtung lebensunwerten Lebens [The Justification of the Destruction of 
Life Devoid of Value], published in 1920 by Karl binding, a jurist, and alfred hoche, a professor 
of medicine and medical ethics and points out that the nazi genocide took emerged from a 
democratic and humanitarian climate, that the justification for hitler’s eugenics program did 
not originate with the nazis themselves. Though Percy professes not to imply that “The New 
York Times, the United States Supreme Court, the american Civil liberties Union, the national 
Organization for Women, and suchlike” are “similar to corresponding pre-nazi institutions,” 
he maintains that “once the line is crossed, once the principle gains acceptance—juridically, 
medically, socially—innocent human life can be destroyed for whatever reason, for the most 
admirable socioeconomic, medical, or social reasons—then it does not take a prophet to 
predict what will happen next, or if not next, then sooner or later” (350–51). Quinlan sug-
gests that the editors of the Times might have found Percy’s view “rather oddball” (206), but 
it is interesting that many of the same questions Percy raises here reappear—albeit with a 
different emphasis—in Giorgio agamben’s Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, which 
includes an extended discussion of how binding and hoche’s book provided considerable 
justification for “the integration of medicine and politics, which is one of the essential char-
acteristics of modern biopolitics” (143).
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from the emphasis in much of Percy’s earlier work. Percy’s preoccupa-
tion with the particularity of the self, the uniqueness of its predicament, 
and the existential search for authentic being that consciousness of such a 
predicament provokes becomes less important than the demand that the 
self should do what is right. To be sure, in preaching against abortion and 
euthanasia, Father Smith is repeating the teaching of the Catholic Church, 
and in this sense one can also say that orthodoxy and right conduct are 
shown to go together, even in the absence of authentic motive. Such a move 
is implicitly Pascalian—even those who do the right thing for the wrong 
reason, such as Tom, who does not believe but agrees with Father Smith on 
abortion and euthanasia, might come to believe if they practice the actions 
of belief long enough. yet it also suggests a sense of exhaustion and a belief 
in the futility of argument that is surprising to see in a novelist so theologi-
cally committed.
 Percy prepares the way for this devaluation of argument with Tom 
more’s admission that unlike Comeaux, he doesn’t like to argue (34). 
Comeaux, who knows of Tom’s opposition to euthanasia, tries to engage 
him in argument but is repeatedly frustrated by Tom’s refusal to do so, 
which usually takes the form of agreeing with particular statements that 
Comeaux makes without accepting the conclusions that Comeaux draws 
from them. Comeaux reminds more of his fellow white-collar prisoners 
at Fort Pelham, alabama (more has spent two years in prison for deal-
ing drugs to truckers), “ideologues . . . [who] could argue plausibly for 
and against religion, God, israel, blacks, affirmative action, nicaragua” 
(34). more found the arguments themselves “boring,” because they never 
changed anyone’s mind, but he was nonetheless “interested in the rage”: 
“[W]hat is it the passionate arguer is afraid of[?] is he afraid that he might 
be wrong? that he might be right? is he afraid that if one does not argue 
there is nothing left? an abyss opens” (34, 35). later, Father Smith suggests 
that argument cannot convince because in these dark times, words no lon-
ger signify: “it is not a question of belief or unbelief. even if such things 
were all proved, if the existence of God, heaven, hell, sin were all proved 
as certainly as the distance to the sun is proved, it would make no differ-
ence . . . because the words have been deprived of their meaning” (118). 
more concludes from Father Smith’s words that the man “has gone batty” 
(120), but the priest’s claims are already implicit in more’s earlier specula-
tion that argument serves to conceal an abyss. They also explain why he 
is so nonchalant about more’s continued refusal to profess belief: “you 
have been deprived of the faith. all of us have. it is part of the times. . . . So 
don’t worry about it. . . . Do what you are doing. you are on the right track” 
(364, 366). it is perhaps this apparent indifference toward the question of 
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belief that leads ralph Wood to ask whether Smith and more “are drawn 
to Christianity mainly as a transcendent means for making their own cul-
tural critique,” which, in his judgment, renders the novel “disappointingly 
abstract” (“Thanatos” 858).
 if Father Smith’s argument about the priority of right action over belief 
clashes with Updike’s proclamation of the very opposite, his suggestion 
that in the late twentieth century there may be little to distinguish believers 
from unbelievers (though much to distinguish moral from immoral action) 
is very Updikean. indeed, it may be tempting to read into his remarks a 
falling away from Percy’s orthodoxy. That this would be a misreading, 
however, is confirmed by Father Smith’s conviction that only one word 
has maintained its proper signification: Jews. Jews are “unsubsumable” 
(352) under any other signifier, precisely because they are “the actual peo-
ple originally chosen by God” (124). Whether they continue to believe in 
God does not matter: God may have withdrawn, but Jews still exist and 
through their particularity testify to the truth. This unsubsumability is a 
scandal to all those who would erect their own universal orders to chal-
lenge God, and this, Father Smith argues, is the original reason both for 
anti-Semitism generally and for the nazi attempt to exterminate the Jews 
in particular: “an anti-Semite who despises Jews actually believes them 
deep down—that’s why he hates them!” (125). The implication seems to 
be that anyone who can recover the Word and its glad tidings must do so 
through the portal of the word “Jews”—as Father Smith maintains, quoting 
Jesus, “Salvation comes from the Jews” (124; John 4:22).18
 how is one to evaluate Percy’s heterogenous rhetorical maneuvers in 
The Thanatos Syndrome? apocalyptic motifs, perhaps cheapened but also 
made more accessible to a wider audience by being packaged in a thriller, 
are combined with a declaration of the futility of argument on the one hand 
(with the corresponding suggestion that what one does is more important 
than what one believes) and a strident fidelity to orthodoxy nonetheless, 
starting with its beginnings in God’s original revelation to and choosing 
 18. here, Percy is in considerable agreement with Philip rieff. rieff sees what he calls 
“remission” as central to the maintenance of culture, but credible only when it claims a divine 
mandate. he attributes the Shoah to the destruction of belief in such a mandate: “revela-
tion . . . refers to the unalterable directive word of God. . . . Displacing and humiliating the 
absolute word and its open tradition of meanings, there has happened in history an abso-
lutely human and faithless series of events commonly and mistakenly called ‘the holocaust.’” 
in these acts, as in the crucifixion, the carrier elites of world-immanent ‘values’ have affirmed 
themselves and so reduced the theological differences between the Jewish and Christian 
motifs of commanding transcendent truths to tired old theological quibbles between retreat-
ing and dwindling carrier elites of the second culture, still blind to that freedom of decision 
exploited and perverted by swarming new elites going about their business of creative de-
struction” (My Life 57).
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of the Jewish people. The critique of technology as a means to dominate 
despite its promise of liberation has a long history, but Percy’s working of 
new variations on it seems fresh, especially in light of the way such atti-
tudes both spring from and reinforce a dominant therapeutic ethos in the 
culture of the contemporary West. On the other hand, by insisting on the 
absolute particularity of the Jews and their narrative, Percy risks—and even 
admits, through more’s incredulity—the danger that such a position will 
seem monomaniacal. as in Lancelot, Percy’s fundamental wager is to be 
prepared to listen to what the purportedly mad have to say, for it just might 
be the truth.
 The unacceptability of that option to many readers is reflected in Kieran 
Quinlan’s rather gleeful prediction that Percy might come to be seen, at 
least “among some of his less discriminating readers,” as “appealing in 
the way that the new age religions he has so forcefully dismissed do: for 
their ‘mythical liveliness.’ Thus would this champion of roman Catholic 
orthodoxy join that ‘amorphous group ranging from California loonies like 
Shirley maclaine to the classier Joseph Campbell’” (227; internal quotation 
is from Percy’s Signposts, 308). and indeed, the ambiguity that attends the 
commitments of Percy’s protagonists—reflecting a comfy, domesticated 
belief in some instances and in visions of egoistic apocalypse in others—
can easily be misread. People seeking God must, of course, begin where 
they find themselves, but Percy leaves considerable room for his readers to 
conclude that such a belief, confessed in fullness and in truth, is less impor-
tant than the therapeutic practices that it legitimates. readers might agree 
with Percy’s diagnosis, yet conclude that Catholic Christianity can be only 
a palliative, not a cure—since even Percy admits it will not yield continu-
ous bliss.
 Quinlan’s judgment reflects, to be sure, his own conviction that Percy’s 
arguments are simply unconvincing, that he is “the last Catholic novelist” 
(218) because the historical moment that shaped his conversion is no more, 
and because “[a] resigned skepticism about ultimate questions rather than 
a dogmatic denial characterizes the present intellectual community. but 
in so far as this is the case, such positive assertions as the Catholic church 
makes seem at best of dubious validity” (225). The appeal to the authority 
of “the present intellectual community” is an appeal to a historicist mode of 
apprehending truth, and i have argued elsewhere about the limits of histor-
icism.19 The “present intellectual community” is not exactly the same now 
as it was in 1996 (even if there is much continuity), and to make its convic-
 19. See allen Dunn and Thomas F. haddox, “The enigma of Critical Distance; or, Why 
historicists need Convictions,” in The Limits of Literary Historicism.
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tions the basis for what one ought to profess—in this instance, “a resigned 
skepticism”—is to acknowledge that one might believe something com-
pletely different hundreds of years from now, without necessarily having 
better or worse reasons for doing so. Quinlan slides between maintaining 
that the rhetorical strategies of argument may be more or less persuasive 
at different historical moments and suggesting that differences in persua-
siveness amount to differences in truth. The fact that belief in Christianity 
has waxed and waned over the last two millennia (and it is by no means 
certain that secularization is the irreversible process it once seemed) obvi-
ously proves that some people have found it more or less persuasive at dif-
ferent times; the question of its truth is separate and primary. Percy affirms 
its truth, even when he is well aware that doing so makes him (and his 
surrogate, Father Smith) look ridiculous. if he persuades, it is likely to be 
because some readers will find its very defiance of conventional intellec-
tual attitudes bracing, its leap out of the prison of historicism compelling. 
if he fails to do so, it may well be because of the all-too-plausible misread-
ings that Quinlan identifies and Wood fears—that either therapeutic play 
or cultural critique take precedence over the truth.
I. triumph, then Collapse:
 Vatican II and American Mainline protestantism
nearly fifty years after its commencement, few topics continue to gener-
ate as much debate within roman Catholicism as “the spirit of vatican 
ii.” Should the pastoral council of the 1960s be understood as continuous 
with earlier magisterial teachings or as a dramatic departure from them 
that redefines what it means to be Catholic? numerous observers have 
offered conflicting interpretations of the council and of its effects in the 
lives of Catholics.1 most agree, however, that whether the changes should 
be applauded or deplored, vatican ii coincides with the collapse of a dis-
tinctly Catholic subculture in the United States—one founded largely by 
immigrants; one considered dogmatic, pious, and self-consciously insular; 
and one long regarded with suspicion by mainstream america. ironically, 
this collapse followed swiftly upon what many american Catholics per-
ceived to be their moment of cultural arrival. in the period following the 
Second World War, the celebrity of Catholic television personalities such as 
 1. representative examples include Jacques maritain’s The Peasant of the Garonne: An 
Old Layman Questions Himself about the Present Time (1968); Garry Wills’s Bare Ruined Choirs: 
Doubt, Prophecy, and Radical Religion (1972); and the second half of Charles r. morris’s Ameri-
can Catholic: The Saints and Sinners Who Built America’s Most Powerful Church (1997).
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Fulton Sheen, the idealized portrayals of priests and nuns in hollywood 
films, the association of Catholic politicians such as Joseph mcCarthy with 
an adamant anticommunism, and above all the election of John F. Kennedy 
as president contributed to a short-lived sense of american Catholic trium-
phalism. its sudden disappearance provoked consternation among many 
mainline Protestants as well as Catholics. as Garry Wills put it, “Catholics 
were the last believers; dubiety among them is an omen. . . . if this thing 
falls, then what can hope to stand?” (4).
 Wills’s tongue-in-cheek description of Catholics as “the last believers” 
was published in 1972, at a time when the postconciliar tumult was per-
haps obscuring a comparable shift in american Protestantism—the rapid 
decline of mainline Protestantism and the corresponding growth of Prot-
estant churches that, for all their differences (expressed under such labels 
as “fundamentalist,” “evangelical,” “charismatic,” and “emergent”) empha-
size a relative indifference to extrascriptural traditions, liturgies, and eccle-
siology. The denominations that constitute the mainline have long histories 
that extend back into the colonial era, rich theological traditions, and a his-
tory of frequent dispute with each other that did not preclude broad agree-
ment on morals and manners—indeed, arguably, enough of a consensus 
to determine the distinct character of american society. as Joseph bottum 
puts it, “Perhaps precisely because they were aimed inward, the Protes-
tant churches were able to radiate outward, giving a characteristic shape to 
the nation: the centrality of families, the pattern of marriages and funerals, 
the vague but widespread patriotism, the strong localism, and the ongoing 
sense of some providential purpose at work in the existence of the United 
States” (24). For bottum, the decline of mainline Protestantism and its cul-
tural effects are unprecedented:
The death of the mainline is the central historical fact of our time: the 
event that distinguishes the past several decades from every other period 
in american history. almost every one of our current political and cul-
tural oddities, our contradictions and obscurities, derives from this fact: 
The mainline used [sic] has lost the capacity to set, or even significantly 
influence, the national vocabulary or the national self-understanding. . . . 
[S]ince the 1970s, we have faced a unique kind of political dilemma, in 
which no agreement can be reached even on the terms by which we will 
disagree with one another. (24, 25)
bottum’s thesis about the political implications of the decline may be over-
stated, but the decline in numbers is indisputable, as is the bitterness of 
struggles within the denominations since the 1970s—struggles typically 
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described, like comparable clashes in Catholicism, as disputes between 
“traditionalists” and “progressives.”
 To date, vatican ii has generated more interest among fiction writers 
and literary critics than the decline of mainline Protestantism, though this 
interest has taken largely predictable forms. Catholic writers who depict 
the effects of the council do tend to portray a general sense of triumph 
followed by collapse, as well as little consensus about what either the tri-
umph or the collapse portends. in Testing the Faith: The New Catholic Fiction 
in America, anita J. Gandolfo, borrowing Thomas Kuhn’s notion of “para-
digm shifts,” argues that while the preconciliar church “reflected the classi-
cal paradigm of a fixed and static reality . . . the rest of Western civilization 
responded to a more modern paradigm informed by the renaissance, the 
enlightenment, and the age of romanticism” (5). Though Gandolfo’s 
opposition between “classical” and “modern” paradigms is crude and 
overdrawn, it cannot simply be dismissed, for it does reflect something 
of the self-understanding of american Catholics and non-Catholics alike, 
who have tended to view vatican ii as one aspect of the broader rubric “the 
Sixties.” Gandolfo is faithful to this general understanding, which implies 
belief in a progressive concept of history and conceals unacknowledged 
affinities to hegel behind its more up-to-date Kuhnian vocabulary. because 
history is progressive, its movements are authoritative and irreversible—
so that when the conditions for a “paradigm shift” are present, the old 
paradigm necessarily crumbles, no matter how strenuously its partisans 
might protest. For Gandolfo, the predicament of the postconciliar church 
is that while the old paradigm has been discredited, a new one has not yet 
been identified to take its place. Catholic fictions reveal this confusion, yet 
because they deploy “the imagination as a source of knowledge about real-
ity,” one might, through a synthesis of such texts, be able to pursue “the 
present task of Catholicism”—namely, “to discover the new paradigm” (21, 
22). The very use of the word “discover” here suggests the systemic, imper-
sonal nature of the shift—it has already happened, and one can understand 
its nature only after the fact. One cannot consciously forge it, in the sense of 
arguing on its behalf and hoping that one’s efforts will succeed—or, more 
precisely, one can, but it will not avail unless one’s position happens to con-
form to the historical avant garde. and this one can know only by study-
ing and plotting the course of history, whose path is the primary means 
through which God (or Geist) reveals himself.
 There is a forced quality in Gandolfo’s argument, as in most attempts 
to discern the teleology of contemporary events. if the old paradigm has 
been shattered, and evidence of the new can be gleaned from current fic-
tion, why the persistence of “conservative” Catholic novelists, or the emer-
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gence of newer novelists such as andrew Greeley, whose work, though 
undeniably popular, does not correspond to Gandolfo’s sense of what the 
new paradigm ought to contain?2 indeed, how does the synthesizing work 
proceed—how does one recognize the insignia of the new? That differing, 
incompatible opinions about Catholic teaching and life exist is undeni-
able, and at times Gandolfo offers little more than a survey of them. yet in 
implying that this confusion has a foreseeable end—that beneath it, a new 
and better paradigm already exists—she obscures her own argumentative 
commitments about this emerging paradigm’s content. at the very least, it 
is clear that Gandolfo is committed to an unspecified new paradigm and 
considers challenges to the old to be prima facie evidence of the shift under-
way.3 in the larger debate as to whether vatican ii signifies continuity or 
rupture within Catholicism, she stands on the side of rupture, rejecting 
 2. Greeley’s work, indeed, provides the biggest problem for Gandolfo’s argument, for 
popularity would intuitively seem a marker of fidelity to the Zeitgeist. if one can only “dis-
cover” a new paradigm, then Greeley’s combination of success and novelty ought to reveal 
something about what the new paradigm actually is, unless one wishes to deny that his work 
is “Catholic” in any meaningful sense at all. Gandolfo elides this problem. She views Greeley 
both as reactionary in his hostility to theological liberalism (a stance associated with the “old 
paradigm”) and as not genuinely Catholic in any sense because of his unacknowledged debts 
to what leslie Fiedler called the “Sentimental love religion” and which Gandolfo calls the 
“Sentimental love ethic” (Gandolfo 49–50). These are defensible propositions, but precisely 
because her argument is premised upon the necessity of the paradigm shift underway, she 
must explain why so popular a novelist (who is also a Catholic priest) has nothing to teach 
about the new paradigm, why his work can only be a projection of his own obsessions or a 
relic of an irrelevant past. Gandolfo’s answer is that Greeley’s readers are stupid: “Unfortu-
nately, the more passive readers to whom these slick narratives appeal are internalizing not 
only Greeley’s unvarnished hostile opinions of the Catholic hierarchy, liberation theologians, 
nuns, feminists, academic administrators, and other assorted victims of the Greeley mythic 
system, but they are also absorbing his theology of sex, a view Greeley propagates with the 
same glibness that characterizes his self-defense” (59–60). even if this is true, it remains to 
be shown why stupidity, bad sexual theology, and Sentimental love religion cannot pos-
sibly be elements of the new paradigm. To do so, however, would be to make Gandolfo’s 
own commitments more explicit, instead of letting them surreptitiously float under the pas-
sivity of “paradigms.” richard rorty, who radicalizes Kuhn’s notion of the paradigm shift, 
is more forthright about the sleight-of-hand involved here: the existence of paradigm shifts 
suggests that change of some kind will probably happen, but since i cannot honestly regard 
any change as an inevitable change for the better (that would be buying into the metaphys-
ics of an inevitable historical progress), i am better off appealing to the impersonality and 
inevitability of changes that i desire instead of arguing about their merits. my rhetorical ef-
forts work thus work to convey that resistance is futile, even though i know there is nothing 
inevitable about the program i espouse.
 3. This is not to say that the content of Gandolfo’s desires for a new paradigm are alto-
gether concealed—only that it must be inferred from her positive references to thinkers such 
as James Fowler, Carol Gilligan, mary Daly, and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. The resulting 
picture is impressionistic but discernible as what i described in the introduction as a “spiri-
tuality.”
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the possibility that recent developments might be either historical dead-
ends or recuperable, given enough hindsight, within the framework of the 
older paradigm. Surely a more prudent investigation would find the jury 
to be still out on this question, and a more confident advocate of the new 
would not shrink from arguing boldly on its behalf, instead of gesturing 
toward its inevitability or reacting irritably to those more skeptical of its 
superiority.
 in Postmodern Belief, amy hungerford proposes an interpretation 
of the fate of “belief” in american literature after about 1960 that paral-
lels Gandolfo’s account of the “new Catholic novel” but seems especially 
suggestive (and far more subtle) when applied to mainline Protestantism. 
beginning during the eisenhower administration—and coinciding with the 
rise of new Criticism, which hungerford reads as the latest stage in the 
effort to make literature fulfill the function or religion—the notion of “faith 
in faith . . . a version of religious thinking that minimizes the specificity 
of religious doctrine in service to usually nationalistic goals of civil con-
nection” comes to stand “in contrast to the version of religion that stresses 
doctrinal content, a kind that in 1950s america most prominently includes 
the multiple version of Christianity, from committed mainline Protestant-
ism and Catholicism to the more evangelical strains” (3). a harbinger of 
this development in american political life can be found in a widely quoted 
speech by eisenhower: “[O]ur form of government makes no sense unless 
it is founded in a deeply felt religious faith, and i don’t care what it is. With 
us of course it is the Judeo-Christian concept but it must be a religion that 
all men are created equal” (qtd. in hungerford 2).
 as hungerford notes, the notion of the “Judeo-Christian tradition,” 
developed by “the star theologians of the day, including Paul Tillich and 
reinhold niebuhr,” is “itself a notion that mediates between pluralism and 
doctrinal specificity” (3), making up in civic idealism for what it lacks in 
robust particularity. as i have suggested in chapter 3, the career of Updike 
can be viewed in part as a reaction against this emerging conception of 
american religion, which looks to the reformed tradition and especially to 
Karl barth in its rejection of Tillich and his half-secularized Protestantism. 
Updike is, undoubtedly, the most prominent doctrinally Protestant ameri-
can novelist since the 1960s, and his example might suggest that something 
as bland as the “Judeo-Christian tradition” proves thin gruel for Christian 
novelists, for whom the rendition of the particular remains a key criterion 
of aesthetic success. Despite the narcissism that i have identified as the cen-
tral preoccupation of his work—and even despite the emersonian commit-
ments that he evinces in his most autobiographical writing—i maintain that 
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in resisting this “faith in faith,” Updike proves not only a better Christian 
but also a more aesthetically satisfying writer than many of those whom 
hungerford considers exemplary.
 in this chapter i turn to the work of mary Gordon, a Catholic, and mari-
lynne robinson, a Congregationalist—two writers who, unlike Updike, 
appropriate Christian orthodoxy in the period after 1960 rather than 
arguing straightforwardly on its behalf. For Gordon, the turmoil that fol-
lowed vatican ii provides both opportunities and losses for the Catholic 
who wishes to identify with the Church’s aesthetic heritage yet withholds 
assent from much in Catholic moral teaching. robinson, writing in the 
first decade of the twenty-first century, looks back to the mainline Protes-
tantism of the 1950s, at exactly the moment when large sections of it were 
beginning to espouse something like hungerford’s “postmodern belief,” in 
order to highlight what she perceives as a suppressed link between politi-
cal liberalism and Christian faith. The fictive commitments of both writers, 
i argue, are primarily political and aesthetic rather than religious, for both 
ultimately affirm tolerance and spirituality more than the content of ortho-
dox Christian doctrine and practice. Gordon’s project of affirming aesthetic 
value and sexual freedom—two values mediated by the concept of “the 
body” that are not endorsed by Christian orthodoxy in the terms that she 
prefers—is an intelligent effort that nevertheless proves, in the end, even 
more narcissistic than Updike’s work. robinson, a greater novelist than 
Gordon, has nevertheless been misread by many of her recent critics, who 
do not perceive that the doctrinal content that she so lovingly examines in 
her novels and essays is not the main point but rather a means to her own 
political and aesthetic ends. 
II. the Church and the Body: 
 The Aesthetic of Mary gordon
Gandolfo’s half-acknowledged desires for a particular kind of new Catho-
lic paradigm find stronger advocacy in the work of Gordon, who is prob-
ably the most prominent postconciliar Catholic fiction writer in the United 
States to enjoy both mass appeal (her first two novels, Final Payments [1978] 
and The Company of Women [1980], were bestsellers) and widespread critical 
acclaim. like Gandolfo, Gordon regards vatican ii as an event that divides 
american Catholic experience into a “before” and an “after.” “before” was 
as much a place as a time, the milieu of Gordon’s own childhood—work-
ing-class irish communities in and near northeastern cities, with their tradi-
tional religious piety and gender roles, right-wing politics, and suspicion of 
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the larger world. “after” is the world wrought by the 1960s and their after-
math, characterized by sexual and economic freedom for women on the 
one hand and the rush of american Catholics into the cultural mainstream 
on the other. if the trajectory of Gordon’s own life as recounted in her 
memoirs and imaginatively transformed in her fiction resembles an immi-
grant success story—perhaps a kind of Catholic feminist counterpart to 
norman Podhoretz’s Making It—it never turns its back on the world of her 
childhood, seeking, in a manner that Gandolfo would probably approve, 
a just yet deeply personal measure of what has been gained and lost since 
vatican ii.
 Gordon portrays sexuality, politics, and aesthetics as the primary 
lenses through which to scrutinize these gains and losses, and her general 
assessment is that changes in Catholicism have been good for the first two 
(indeed, Gordon’s central political commitments, being feminist, turn pri-
marily on sexual matters) but bad for the third. although she dissents from 
magisterial teaching on a range of matters related to sexuality and gender—
the permissibility of pre- and extramarital sex, divorce, birth control, abor-
tion, the ordination of women—Gordon also continues to identify herself as 
a Catholic. rhetorically, such a stance both exaggerates and minimizes the 
status of sex. in a 1986 interview with lynn neary, Gordon explained her 
position:
i refuse to lose the richness and truth of the Catholic Church for issues 
which do not make up the whole of a religious life. . . . What in fact the 
Church hierarchy does is, by placing so much emphasis on a very narrow 
interpretation of sexuality, they cut many people off from a religious life, 
because most people who are in the modern world and live as moderns 
cannot go along with the Church’s position on sexuality. Therefore, what 
the Church does is say: if you don’t agree with us on this one small issue, 
you must leave. most people do. it seems to me that both the Church and 
those people lose a lot. i’m not going to let them do that to me. (Conversa-
tions 40–41)
The church’s teachings on sexuality are “one small issue,” nothing close to 
“the whole of a religious life,” but they are also, for “most people who are 
in the modern world,” impossible to affirm. it follows that remaining Cath-
olic even when one identifies as “modern” in this way requires a redefini-
tion of Catholic identity, a distinction between the “institutional church” 
and the church proper that, Gordon suggests, is thinkable only after vatican 
ii. in a 1987 interview, she clarifies: “i come in and go out of the institu-
tional church as i have more or less patience for it. . . . it’s not a great cost 
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to me to be in or out of the church” (Conversations 42). Secure in her knowl-
edge of the “richness and truth” of Catholicism—a formulation that sug-
gests the priority of the aesthetic over the ontological—the “institution’s” 
teachings become greater or lesser inconveniences, not provocations that 
one must address.
 On the other hand, if vatican ii has made such flexibility conceivable, it 
has also trashed the aesthetic heritage of the Catholic Church—what Gor-
don calls, in the same interview, “a kind of solemnity in the sense of for-
mal beauty—the beauty of the prayers, the beauty of the music.” Current 
Catholic ritual, she maintains, is, “at best . . . nondescript. Sometimes it’s 
actively ugly. . . . it’s really a grief to hear ugly music, to be in ugly build-
ings, to hear ugly or stupid or hackneyed language. it hurts me.” Unfor-
tunately, however, Gordon finds many Catholics who appreciate and wish 
to revive the older rituals to be “politically abhorrent” (Conversations 43), 
and this mismatch among politics, sexuality, and aesthetics was evident to 
her even as a college student, as she recounts in her memoir Seeing Through 
Places:
The archdiocese was presided over by Cardinal Spellman, a great sup-
porter of vietnam. if i went into a church, everyone would know i was 
having sex, and would order me to stop, and i knew i wouldn’t because 
i liked it too much. i understood that there were priests who opposed 
the war, but they were saying folk masses, and i couldn’t stand singing 
about transubstantiation to the tune of Peter, Paul and mary songs, and i 
suspected they loved themselves too much for consecrating whole wheat 
bread instead of hosts, and that, despite the antiwar protest and the whole 
wheat bread, they would still be telling me to stop having sex. i needed 
formality, but formality was in the hands of men who were shouting about 
communism and free love, just as the country was in the hands of men 
who were lying about burning the flesh of children. (244–45)
Gordon’s desire not just for purely subjective aesthetic delights but for “for-
mality” suggests that despite the influence of second-wave feminism on 
her politics, she does not subscribe to either of the aesthetic stances most 
often associated with this feminism—the wholesale debunking of the aes-
thetic as a patriarchal ideology on the one hand or the embrace of a fluid 
and avowedly “feminine” aesthetic on the other.4 her tastes are traditional, 
 4. There is, of course, an enormous range of feminist criticism, but the two poles i 
identify here are clear enough and have the benefit of having been espoused by certain enor-
mously influential texts from the 1970s—texts roughly contemporary with the beginning of 
Gordon’s career. The debunking of the aesthetic is best represented by Judith Fetterley’s The 
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even in the visual arts, where her admiration for painters such as Pierre 
bonnard complicates any attempt to align her with feminist critiques of the 
male gaze.5 yet her delight in a formal aesthetic is not presented merely as 
preference—for Gordon it is objectively better, as measured by competent 
authorities (which is to say, artists themselves) who know whereof they 
speak. Gordon proposes, in short, the sovereignty of art within its own 
realm and denies its necessary connection to ethical, religious, or polit-
ical stances of any kind.6 The implication is that while feminism may be 
essential to Gordon’s own art, it would be inappropriate to use feminist (or 
indeed, any other ethically charged) criteria to critique non- or antifeminist 
art qua art. Gordon’s own artist-protagonists, such as monica Szabo from 
Spending, are consistent in separating aesthetic judgments from politics in 
this way.
 in Cathedrals of Bone: The Role of the Body in Contemporary Catholic Lit-
erature, John Waldmeir has argued that for a number of post–vatican ii 
Catholic writers, including Gordon, “the body in all its physical specific-
ity—desire and pain, aroma and sweat—becomes . . . a source for mediat-
ing God’s presence to the world [and] takes shape as a sacramental reality” 
(7). Such an approach has the merit of proposing a mediating term—“the 
body”—at the juncture of Gordon’s primary interests: religion, aesthetics, 
and sex. aesthetics, as Terry eagleton notes, “is born as a discourse of the 
body” (Ideology 13), and the sensory nature of artistic production and per-
ception is irreducibly corporeal. liturgy, too, is bodily in nature: the con-
gregating of worshippers at mass; the physical movements of standing, 
kneeling, sitting, and approaching the altar; and, above all, the eucharist, 
in which bread and wine become the body and blood of Christ and are con-
sumed by faithful who themselves constitute the body of Christ. vatican 
ii, Waldmeir suggests, placed a corrective emphasis on the reality of the 
body as a vehicle for sacramental grace, in contradistinction to an earlier 
Resisting Reader, while the turn toward a “feminine aesthetic” finds its strongest example in 
the theoretical writings of hélène Cixous.
 5. On Gordon’s admiration for bonnard and his famous portraits of bathing women, 
see Circling My Mother (3–16).
 6. To characterize Gordon’s position as affirming the sovereignty of art in its own realm 
is not, necessarily, to make of the aesthetic a religion. as she puts it in “Getting here from 
There”: “Well, how did i get from there to here? an easy answer would be that i substituted 
art for faith, so that i found my new priesthood. That would be an easy answer, but it’s not 
true. i don’t believe in the religion of art, although i do believe in the vocation of the artist—
altogether a more slogging enterprise. i don’t believe that the aesthetic and the religious are 
one. . . . Great art need have nothing in it of the ethical, although the greatness of some great 
literature is enhanced by ethical components. but some is not” (173). as i hope to show, the 
aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious may not be “one,” but Gordon’s work reveals them 
to be far more mutually implicated than this summary definition would suggest.
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“anthropology that privileges the cognitive domain of human experience, 
specifically, human rationality” (12).
 What is the significance of this emphasis on the body for Gordon’s 
work? One can agree with Waldmeir that human life, art, and religion, are 
necessarily embodied, and yet not be convinced that constant, loving atten-
tion to this fact is any more successful at resolving the problem of mind-
body dualism, or any less selective in its investments, than an approach 
that overinvests in the cognitive.7 Waldmeir’s readings of texts draw atten-
tion to moments when bodies are foregrounded, as if the very act of dwell-
ing upon the corporeal were a priori an outpouring of grace, irrespective of 
what the body in question does or thinks. his method has affinities with 
bakhtin’s celebration of the grotesque, in that human equality is affirmed 
in bodily lowliness. moreover, it resonates with Gordon’s own preoccupa-
tion with bodies—her narrators frequently scrutinize bodies, in an effort 
to grasp not just their aesthetic features but also their phenomenology and 
agency. yet what rings false in Waldmeir’s frame when applied to Gordon 
is its blanket dismissal of hierarchy and its concomitant urging not just to 
accept human limitation and failure, but to celebrate it—two impulses that i 
identify in Gordon’s nonfiction but not in her fiction. as a committed lib-
eral, Gordon is programmatically hostile to hierarchy in political terms, yet 
sexually and aesthetically, she affirms it: some bodies, some works of art, 
and some liturgical practices are more beautiful than others, and to say oth-
erwise is to lie. insofar as “the body”—itself an abstraction from the multi-
tude of actually existing human bodies—lives and acts in the political, the 
sexual, and the aesthetic realms, it is no less entangled with hierarchy and 
with the necessity of hierarchical judgments than “the mind.” (indeed, it 
may be that it is impossible to escape the problem of dualism, that the over-
emphasis on one of these terms leads inevitably to an overemphasis on the 
other, and that one still, perhaps as a result of one’s fallenness, lack a vocab-
ulary for speaking of the whole human person in a coherent and meaning-
ful way.)8
 7. much of Waldmeir’s argument is rhetorically deployed against the notion of hierar-
chy wherever it rears its head, but his own preferences reinscribe hierarchies of their own: 
the Church Fathers and renaissance humanism, not the wasteland between the Council of 
Trent and vatican ii; in the new Testament, the letters to the romans and Corinthians but 
not those to the ephesians and Colossians; the John Paul ii who wrote Fides et Ratio, not the 
one who wrote Theology of the Body (5, 11–13). The problem is not that Waldmeir cannot make 
his argument—of course he can—but that he writes as if making this argument precludes 
hierarchical judgments or remains faithful to the totality of Christian thinking any more than 
do the arguments of those whom he opposes.
 8. This is why, for instance, Gordon is only half correct when she defines abstraction 
as “the error that results from refusing to admit that one has a body and is an inhabitant 
of the physical world,” and “[d]ualism, its first cousin” as that which “admits that there is 
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 beginning with the fact of such entanglement and with her own com-
mitments to a particular sexual politics on the one hand and to a formalist 
aesthetic on the other, Gordon’s novels ask the questions that such diver-
gent commitments compel: how does one recognize the legitimacy and 
interaction of different kinds of moral, religious, and aesthetic authority? 
how does one weigh their various claims against each other? Of what does 
readers’ authority consist, and what justification beyond desire does it 
require, if any? Why is hierarchy essential to aesthetic judgments but inad-
missible in matters of politics or sex? Catholicism cuts across all of these 
questions in unpredictable ways. The church claims for itself binding and 
ultimately infallible authority in the realm of faith and morality, so Gor-
don’s dissent from its teachings becomes rhetorically figured as a blow for 
freedom.9 (hence her assertion that as a student she would not stop hav-
ing sex because she “liked it too much”—no argument, she implies, could 
or should hold sway against her own desires here, even if there might be 
reasonable points to make about the advantages of sexual abstinence.) yet 
when one turns to strictly aesthetic matters, the church professes no com-
petence to judge, and there is no necessary relationship between the moral 
and theological claims that the church propounds and the media through 
which artists might engage them—certainly no single approved style or set 
a physical world but calls it evil and commands that it be shunned” (“Getting There” 160). 
The mainstream of Catholic theology rejects dualism, as, for instance, it is understood in 
the work of Descartes or in the Jansenist heresy. Gordon’s claim that she “was born into 
a church shaped and ruled by celibate males who had a history of hatred and fear of the 
body” (“Getting There” 161) is an overstatement, though one cannot deny the existence of 
particular priests and even theologians whose own examples do reflect such an attitude. 
here Gordon’s affiliation with irish Catholicism may have much to do with her perspective, 
for Jansenism had a much stronger (and longer-lasting) influence in ireland than in much of 
Catholic europe. if Gordon sees herself as correcting a particular distortion in thinking about 
the embodied nature of human beings, i would argue that a more urgent distortion today 
consists of precisely the abstraction involved when one refers to “the body.”
 9. “infallible” here does not refer solely to statements of the Pope spoken ex cathedra, 
which carry the explicit mark of infallibility. according to the Catechism of the Catholic Church, 
“Christ endowed the Church’s shepherds with the charism of infallibility in matters of faith 
and morals. . . . The infallibility promised to the Church is also present in the body of bishops 
when, together with Peter’s successor, they exercise the supreme magisterium, above all in an 
ecumenical Council” (256). but even teachings not expressly marked as “infallible” are nev-
ertheless binding: “Divine assistance is also given to the successors of the apostles, teaching 
in communion with the successor of Peter, and, in a particular way, to the bishop of rome, 
pastor of the whole Church, when, without arriving at an infallible definition and without 
pronouncing in a ‘definitive manner,’ they propose in the exercise of the ordinary magiste-
rium a teaching that leads to a better understanding of revelation in matters of faith and 
morals. To this ordinary teaching the faithful ‘are to adhere to it [sic] with religious assent’” 
(256–57). The consistent teachings of the Church on sexuality, whether stated in a “definitive 
manner” or not, fall under this “ordinary magisterium,” so that challenging them is an act 
of dissent.
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of techniques. Catholicism has inspired great art and kitsch, and if today 
the kitsch predominates, this may be because modern artists find intoler-
able the subordination of their egos to the service of God that earlier reli-
gious artists freely acknowledged—which, arguably, leaves a freer field for 
the always numerous purveyors of kitsch (“Getting here” 172). Gordon 
often seems to endorse milan Kundera’s famous claim that “[t]he brother-
hood of man on earth will be possible only on a base of kitsch” (251)—and 
if so, she wants no part of it.
 in practice, it is not so easy to distinguish aesthetic from ethical val-
ues, and Gordon is honest enough to grant that the poor and the afflicted 
are frequently ugly, spiteful, unintelligent, and distinctly unlovable. Such 
admissions, however, pose a problem for avowed leftists, and especially 
for those influenced by the Christian injunctions to love the poor and to 
care for the needy, whether this love is appreciated or not. like muriel 
Spark, Gordon gestures toward the superior aesthetic pleasures of Catholi-
cism while casting a jaundiced eye upon the mass of Catholics oblivious to 
them. yet there is little of Spark’s cold whimsicality or assured snobbery in 
Gordon’s fictive world: aesthetic pleasures are always more sensual than 
intellectual, and there is a note of defiant indulgence in their depiction, as if 
Gordon’s characters assert that they deserve such pleasure, as if their supe-
rior taste ensures greater freedom from conventional moralism. it is dif-
ficult not to conclude that the aesthetic is Gordon’s supreme value, despite 
her disavowal of the “religion of art,” and that political and religious judg-
ments are, ultimately, aesthetic as well: Catholicism thus deserves credit for 
enabling Chartres Cathedral or the music of Palestrina but blame for pre-
venting people from pursuing sexual delights outside of a fairly restricted 
context. it deserves credit for making notions of human equality an ideal 
toward which to strive but blame for trying to realize these ideals primar-
ily through charity—which necessitates contact with the unappealing, and 
which can be redeemed only if it takes on an aesthetic of self-renunciation 
that few can make work convincingly. as isabel moore puts it in Final Pay-
ments, “Charity is tedious, and sacrifice is not, as Christ deceived us into 
thinking, anything so dramatic as a crucifixion. most of the time it is pro-
foundly boring” (46).
 indeed, despite Gordon’s hostility toward Updike and often her shrewd 
observations about his unacknowledged assumptions, the narcissism of her 
characters often resembles the pervading attitude of his work: her protago-
nists, no less than Updike’s, resonate with Tocqueville’s observation that 
democratic people are preoccupied with themselves and bestow value on 
objects only insofar as the objects flatter their self-images or prove forceful 
enough to tear people away from themselves. broadly speaking, aesthetic 
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commitment and sensitivity serve the same role as Christian orthodoxy 
in much of Updike’s work—they make up for a multitude of sins, includ-
ing selfishness, contempt toward the dull and unsexy, and the tendency to 
instrumentalize human relationships. moreover, if Updike associates ortho-
doxy with good fortune and primordial innocence of being an american, 
Gordon associates her own aesthetics with the good fortune of being a 
Catholic woman privileged enough to live after feminism and vatican ii.
 in a harsh critique of Gordon’s early work, Carol iannone argues that 
her novels “are about the monumental self-centeredness released by the 
collapse of orthodoxy, the agitated emptiness that finds an expression in 
movements like feminism.” They resemble “those books and articles on 
‘having it all’ that are written for women, with their advice on cramming 
in as much as possible, keeping track of one’s needs, making sure they’re 
satisfied, the whole informed by a lurking fear that nothing will really suf-
fice” (66). Such an account is probably overstated, and ross labrie is no 
doubt correct that more nuanced judgments of Gordon’s work will come 
in the future, after its “artistic merits . . . become separated from her role 
as a feminist ideologue” (265). yet the linking of Gordon’s novels to a pos-
ture of self-centeredness is appropriate, even if the connections between 
this self-centeredness and feminism are contingent rather than necessary. 
if Updike’s work suggests that a commitment to Christian orthodoxy, 
however strained, may in practice coexist alongside a monstrous selfish-
ness, Gordon’s suggests that orthodoxy’s value lies precisely in its aesthetic 
potential, which can also facilitate selfishness. both writers’ work, accord-
ingly, is problematic yet also revealing of the dilemmas that even appeals to 
or uses of orthodoxy must confront in the contemporary world. 
III. the daughter, the Father, the Body: 
 Final Payments
Gordon’s first novel, Final Payments, derives much of its power from the 
way its working-class american Catholic world is at once familiar and 
unbelievably distant—a place of constriction and horror from which one 
escapes, but which, one must admit, continues to mark one’s life, in many 
ways for the better. isabel moore, the protagonist, introduces herself in this 
way:
i gave up my life for [my father]; only if you understand my father will 
you understand that i make that statement not with self-pity but with 
extreme pride. he had a stroke when i was nineteen; i nursed him until 
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he died eleven years later. This strikes everyone in our decade as unusual, 
barbarous, cruel. To me, it was not only inevitable but natural. The Church 
exists and has endured for this, not only to preserve itself but to keep cer-
tain scenes intact: my father and me living by ourselves in a one-family 
house in Queens. my decision at nineteen to care for my father in his ill-
ness. We were rare in our situation but not unique. it could happen again. 
(4)
if “keep[ing] certain scenes intact,” rather than saving souls, is the raison 
d’être of the Church, then the Church must be judged on the desirability 
of these scenes. are they in fact merely “barbarous” and “cruel”? isabel’s 
insistence that she feels pride rather than self-pity for her actions suggests 
that choosing a figurative martyrdom provides aesthetic bliss and confirms 
one’s superiority. The equivocal claim that “it could happen again,” no 
doubt shocking to those who, like isabel’s future lover hugh Slade, con-
sider her background “as strange . . . as if [she’d] been brought up in the 
Fiji islands” (160), emphasizes that such situations do not persist unless 
people derive some benefit from them, and such conditions could conceiv-
ably return. in this way Gordon proves less susceptible to the teleologi-
cal grandiosity of a critic such as Gandolfo—she does not believe progress 
to be irreversible, nor does she see the past merely as something to be 
overcome.
 even though isabel calls her case “rare but not unique,” she locates its 
rarity less in the actual care for her father than in the extraordinary nature 
of her relationship with him. a devout Catholic intellectual who “loved the 
sense of his own orthodoxy, of holding out for the purest and the finest and 
the most refined sense of truth against the slick hucksters who promised 
happiness on earth and the supremacy of human reason” (4), David moore 
rejects the enlightenment and all its works, but he nourishes his daughter’s 
aesthetic sense and encourages her intellectual aspirations: “he always 
said he was raising a Theresa of avila, not a Thérèse of lisieux: someone 
who would found orders and insult recalcitrant bishops, not someone 
who would submit to having dirty water thrown on her by her sisters in 
Christ and die a perfect death at twenty-four” (28). above all, however, he 
expresses his love for her with shocking, even blasphemous, honesty: “my 
father looked had once looked at me and said, ‘i love you more than i love 
God. i love you more than God loves you’” (251).
 at the heart of isabel’s relationship with her father, then, is the associa-
tion of Catholic orthodoxy with beauty and intellectual accomplishment—
an association unusual in the working-class, largely irish american world 
that she inhabits—and a tendency to measure the genuineness of love by 
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one’s capacity for its betrayal. David’s love for his daughter is proven pre-
cisely because it endangers his soul. The six-year old isabel who hears his 
declaration knows the statement to be sinful on its face, because the claim 
that his love exceeds God’s cannot be true—yet isabel suggests that this 
sin in no way calls into question his love for God. it seems retrospectively 
fitting that isabel elects to care for her father only after she has betrayed 
him, by sleeping with his favorite student and, she believes, thereby caus-
ing the stroke that incapacitates him: her betrayal proves the occasion for 
demonstrating the depth of her own love. in this relationship, then, Gor-
don manages to compress many of her characteristic preoccupations—the 
capacity of Catholicism to nourish beauty and (within limits) independence 
of thought, the privileged status of sexual desire, and the attractions and 
possible dangers of martyrdom. if isabel remains proud of what she has 
done, even after she has changed radically, she does so not out of any com-
mitment to the Church or to its way of life, but because her father, bestow-
ing such astonishing love on her, deserves comparable love in return, the 
exercise of which allows even greater opportunities for self-satisfaction.
 Gordon has acknowledged that isabel’s father is largely modeled upon 
her own, David israel Gordon: a convert from Judaism, a self-taught Cath-
olic intellectual and polemicist, an admirer of both Franco and Joseph 
mcCarthy, and, the evidence of his published texts suggests, an anti-Sem-
ite.10 Suggesting in her memoir The Shadow Man (1996) that she never pre-
sented him outright as a fictional character because “the details of his life, 
presented as fiction, would be too bizarre to be believed” (xiv), Gordon 
presents him as a tissue of contradictions: a brilliant and sincerely religious 
man who was also a fraud (“[h]is ‘work’ was a series of schemes to bankroll 
him and his magazines” [xv]), a convinced antifeminist who nonetheless 
envisioned his daughter as a great intellectual, an insecure man whose own 
writing was hopelessly marred by name-dropping, a liar who concealed 
from his family the real place of his birth (lithuania, not Ohio) and the fact 
that before his conversion he had edited a “girlie” magazine called Hot Dog. 
The Shadow Man is, simultaneously, an indictment of her father and a desire 
to understand him and in doing so, perhaps, to exculpate him. hence its 
peculiar tone, which veers sharply from self-aggrandizing righteousness to 
an almost abject sense that her beloved has been taken from her. at one 
point she sententiously declares, “[m]y silence about his part in the evil [of 
 10. here is the real-life counterpart of David moore’s declaration of love to his daughter, 
as Gordon reports it in The Shadow Man: “‘i love you more than God,’ he once told me. This 
was serious; he was a religious man. i didn’t know, and still don’t, if he meant he loved me 
more than he loved God or more than God loved me. it almost doesn’t matter. it was a seri-
ous thing to say and it scared me. Whichever he meant, he was right” (xviii).
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the holocaust] would be a sin. against the commandment ‘Thou shalt not 
bear false witness’” (94); at another point, she lines up photographs of ber-
nard berenson, h. l. mencken, ezra Pound, and henry roth, “looking for 
the face that stalked my father” (182), and accuses them of “murder[ing] 
the father i could have loved without stain” (185).
 The intense particularity of this love, threatened by the “stain” of his 
political convictions, becomes, in Final Payments, the background against 
which isabel’s confused negotiation of the post–vatican ii world must be 
evaluated. isabel insists both on the philosophical rightness of her devotion 
to her father—the day on which she learns of his stroke is the day “[she] 
felt most purely alive,” because “[c]ertainty was mine, and purity; i was 
encased in meaning like crystal” (6)—and on justifying this rightness in 
terms of bodily connection: “[W]e were connected by the flesh, so if any-
one should minister to the decay of my father’s, it should be i” (7). Wald-
meir argues that the novel’s central thematic concern is the home, the place 
where one lives and where one’s body has its appropriate work, and that 
isabel’s loss of her father is simultaneously a loss of home and a loss of 
identity for her body. accordingly, this “sense of homelessness leads isa-
bel to treat her own body as though it were an object, something wander-
ing and foreign to the rest of her” (50). isabel is free now, as she was not 
when she cared for her father, to equip herself with an iUD and to pur-
sue affairs with two married men, but it is true that in all of these cases, 
the text emphasizes her detachment from her body. The first affair, with 
the husband of a high-school friend, is unsatisfying because it is based 
only on lust (and because he will not leave her alone after she loses inter-
est in him). The second affair with hugh Slade, however, is described as 
falling in love, and the language isabel uses recalls her relationship with 
her father: “i was saying over and over, ‘i am the beloved; the beloved is 
mine.’ and i thought of the depths of selfishness in those words” (162). 
even when she exposes her breasts as a kindness to the elderly mr. Spenser 
(one of her cases in her new job as a social worker), because he has not had 
sexual intercourse in eight years, she distances herself from the act: “i had 
given him what he wanted and neither of us had suffered loss. . . . i had not 
believed it possible: giving and getting, as if no one had to suffer, as if it 
were possible not to feel cheated in the act of giving” (200). even if no one 
has been “cheated,” the language of economic exchange here testifies to the 
use of the body, and hence to one’s alienation from it.
 but if isabel suffers alienation both from home and body in the wake 
of her father’s death, she also expresses unalloyed revulsion against the 
body (and person) of margaret Casey, the woman who had worked as her 
father’s housekeeper and who had loved him:
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you can imagine how unbearable the brown patches on her skin—they 
were not moles but large, irregular in shape, like the beginning of a can-
cer—were to a child, or even worse, to an adolescent. i wondered how she 
managed to keep the house so tidy and yet look so inevitably germ-rid-
den herself. all her clothes seemed damp, as if her body were giving off a 
tropical discharge. i believed it to be contagious, although i could neither 
isolate nor identify it. her feet were flat as fish, except where the bunions 
developed like small crops of winter onions. The sound of her slopping 
around the house in her slippers is the sound of my nightmares. (28)
margaret has always distrusted isabel, regarding her as a spoiled child 
and taking every opportunity to chide her for her sinfulness and ingrati-
tude. isabel remains proud of the fact that at thirteen, she managed to drive 
margaret away by provoking her into declaring her love for her father—
whereupon he fled in disgust. Since then, margaret has lived in poverty, 
working in a box factory in a small town in upstate new york. When isabel 
is confronted by hugh’s wife, she feels such an extremity of guilt that she 
elects to go live with margaret, explaining to hugh, “if we can love the 
people we think are most unlovable, if we can get out of this ring of acci-
dent, of attraction, then it’s a pure act, love; then we mean something, we 
stand for something” (243). here isabel wishes to surpass the martyrdom 
of caring for her father, doing so without the self-interest of personal love 
or the unshakable responsibility implied by bodily connection. as she lives 
with margaret, her detachment from her body becomes contempt toward 
it: not only does she renounce sex, she also allows herself to become over-
weight, subjects herself to anachronistic hairstyling à la annette Funicello, 
and cultivates self-disgust as a mortification that would further validate 
her disinterested charity. indeed, Gordon emphasizes the penitential nature 
of isabel’s stay with margaret by making it coincide with lent. her actual 
“final payment” to margaret—a check for twenty thousand dollars—is 
delivered on Good Friday, and immediately afterward, isabel is spirited 
away by her closest friends.
 The turning point of the novel occurs when isabel shouts “The poor you 
have always with you” in response to margaret’s repeated proclamation of 
her poverty:
it is one of the marvels of a Catholic education that the impulse of a few 
words can bring whole narratives to light with an immediacy and a clar-
ity that are utterly absorbing. “The poor you have always with you.” i knew 
where Christ had said that: at the house of martha and mary. mary had 
opened a jar of ointment over Christ’s feet. . . . Judas had rebuked her; he 
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had said that the ointment ought to be sold for the poor. but, St. John had 
noted, Judas had said that only because he kept the purse and the thief. 
and Christ had said to Judas, mary at his feet, her hair spread out around 
him, “The poor you have always with you: but me you have not always.”
 and until that moment . . . it was a passage i had not under-
stood. . . . What Christ was saying, what he meant, was that the plea-
sures of that hair, that ointment, must be taken. because the accidents of 
death would deprive us soon enough. We must not deprive ourselves, our 
loved ones, of the luxury of our extravagant affections. We must not try to 
second-guess death by refusing to love the ones we loved in favor of the 
anonymous poor. (288–89)
because isabel cannot love margaret for who she is, the best that she can do 
is to provide for her, just as governments, motivated not by charity but by 
an impersonal mandate, distribute money: “Governments gave money and 
did not ask for love. money was beautiful; if you could give money and 
did not want love in return, you could change lives without giving up your 
life” (295).
 how are readers to understand this ending? having “given up her life” 
for margaret, isabel wants it back, but because she wants to resume the 
relationship with hugh, she must also make herself beautiful again, and 
doing so involves a further objectification of her body: “The body changed, 
went on changing, and could be changed. What i had done to myself was 
not final. it would take time, but i believed, with the unlikely faith of an 
early Christian, that i could make things happen to my body that would 
allow [hugh] to love it again” (291). For Waldmeir, isabel’s relationship 
with hugh is problematic not because it is adulterous but because “isa-
bel’s persistent sense of self-detachment contrasts so sharply with hugh’s 
confidence” (51). isabel is wounded, for instance, when hugh confronts 
isabel with a moldy coffee mug in her apartment and asks, “how could 
i even contemplate living with someone who could live in such filth?” 
(203). Waldmeir implies that the relationship might have a future if isabel 
could learn to inhabit her body and home—moldy mugs and all—without 
being so easily reduced to shame. yet because Waldmeir follows Gandolfo 
in regarding novelistic closure as a “vestige of the preconciliar paradigm” 
(Gandolfo 207), he also rejects the possibility that isabel might find love 
with hugh on programmatic grounds. indeed, he states simply that “their 
relationship fails” (51), ignoring hugh’s desire to get isabel back and her 
own desire to change for him—and criticizes Gordon for providing “the 
illusion of closure” (55) in isabel’s escape from margaret.
 if Waldmeir’s rejection of closure resembles Walker Percy’s own pref-
erence for open-ended endings and conviction that even conversion does 
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not eliminate the messiness of life, he is nonetheless vague about what is 
at stake in this rejection. how does closure, for instance, denigrate “the 
body”? isabel does continue to think of her body instrumentally, but she 
also acknowledges that it changes and might change again; she also states 
that the only real closure is death, the “accident” that would deprive one of 
one’s extravagant pleasures and commitments. She also affirms the particu-
larity of her body’s desires—not the impersonal charity extended to mar-
garet, but the irreplaceable bonds between her and her father, between her 
and hugh. i suspect that Waldmeir finds the end unsatisfying less because 
of its closure and more because it continues to affirm hierarchy, even—per-
haps especially—where bodies are concerned. isabel and hugh’s bodies as 
bodies, instead of as metaphors deployed against the habit of abstraction, 
simply matter more than margaret’s, and nothing can change this. in Final 
Payments, an ugly body reliably mirrors a petty, self-righteous, and grasp-
ing mind; a beautiful body, whether it embraces its loves or shrinks from its 
antipathies, can do no wrong.
 One must acknowledge Gordon’s admirable honesty in Final Payments. 
margaret is credible as a character, and her presence effectively demon-
strates that if one chooses to love selflessly, one must not expect to be loved 
in return, just as Christ’s sacrifice was rewarded not just with his resurrec-
tion, but also, as isabel points out, with “[y]ears of atrocities, monstrous 
ingratitude: who could make up to God for the stupidity, the selfishness of 
his people?” (293). isabel’s relationship with hugh is credible precisely to 
the extent that it celebrates the egoism of the lovers and argues that such 
egoism transcends merely moral concerns. Gordon’s error, from a Christian 
standpoint, is that God’s love for his people is never a matter of mere cal-
culation, an attempt to secure martyrdom on behalf of “anonymous poor.” 
nor is love for God properly understood as something equally anonymous 
and bloodless. Though it can be misdirected and tainted with selfishness, 
human desire points toward love of God, and God’s love is an individual 
love, demonstrated not by a painless act of divine will but through the 
incarnation and death of Jesus. Peter augustine lawler is closer to the 
truth when he writes (apropos of alexandre Kojève and Francis Fuku-
yama) that Christians “believe in the empirically unverifiable existence of a 
God who sees clearly into men’s hearts and judges them according to their 
intentions. each Christian believes that he or she is recognized by God as 
unique, free, and infinitely valuable” (33).11 a father’s love for his daughter 
should intimate God’s love, but by its very nature, it cannot transcend it. 
isabel is correct to perceive in a love that claims to transcend it “depths of 
 11. incidentally, marilynne robinson’s John ames, the narrator of Gilead, makes a similar 
point, invoking augustine’s authority for the claim: “[T]he lord loves each of us as an only 
child, and that has to be true” (245–46).
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selfishness” (162). She is a human being of her time, and of ours. her repre-
sentative status is most clearly signaled by her willingness, in a time when 
spirituality rather than outright atheism is a dominant ethos, to appropriate 
the Christian gospel for selfish purposes instead of arguing directly against 
it.
IV. nuancing narcissism: 
 The Company of Women, Spending, Pearl, and “The deacon”
Final Payments is the keynote of Gordon’s career. her subsequent novels 
complicate and deepen its commitments to the aesthetic and to the primacy 
of the self, registering occasional doubts about these commitments but 
not departing significantly from them. The Company of Women, Gordon’s 
best novel, surrounds its protagonist, Felicitas Taylor, with an ensemble 
cast that consists of Felicitas’s mother Charlotte; her circle of friends, all 
of whom she met while attending religious retreats for working women; 
Father Cyprian, a “conservative” and contentious priest, usually at odds 
with his superiors, who led these retreats; and robert Cavendish, Felici-
tas’s professor at barnard College, who seduces her and gets her pregnant. 
as in Final Payments, much of the novel’s skill comes from the rendering 
of a detailed world that has, after vatican ii, suddenly vanished. Felicitas 
herself shares much in common with isabel moore: a beloved, intellectu-
ally gifted child who is held up by Father Cyprian as “our only hope” (7) 
in degraded modernity, she has an even keener conviction than isabel of 
her self-worth: “‘Domine, non sum dignus.’ She said the prayer but did not 
mean it. She believed she was worthy. her soul she saw as glass filled with 
sky or water, as beautiful, as light, as silvery and as important” (6). Though 
she suffers from the doubts and confusions of adolescence, she never aban-
dons this posture of certainty—loathing herself when she falls short of 
her ideals, professing that “she wouldn’t lie to make people happy” (72), 
and acknowledging only as an adult that the main reason she wants to 
marry her (intellectually inferior) lover leo is that she “want[s] to be more 
human” (260).
 The superiority of The Company of Women lies in its wider canvas, its 
revelation that all of its characters have crosses to bear and struggle against 
their private narcissisms. by following two sections set in 1963 and 1969–70 
and narrated in third person with a section set in 1977 in which the major 
characters narrate in first person, Gordon suggests that however much 
readers may need to understand the historical moment of the novel and 
see its characters as shaped by larger social forces, their responses to events 
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and the retrospective significance that they attribute to them are always 
irreducibly personal. Waldmeir’s claim that the novel’s “‘open-ended’ nar-
rative structure” (56) marks an advance over Final Payments also seems 
justified: the last word is given to Felicitas’s daughter, linda, and its sim-
ple affirmation—“We are not dying” (291)—reminds the reader that, until 
death, anything remains possible. Father Cyprian and the circle of women 
have tried to be faithful Catholics, and their struggles against a variety of 
mundane but very real trials—the insane husband who has been committed 
but whose insanity does not render his marriage invalid (33), the younger 
generation of priests who dress inappropriately and “let souls under [their] 
care risk eternal damnation to swim with methodists, eat hot dogs with 
baptists” (51), even the fact that Shakespeare and Jane austen can be more 
enthralling than Dante despite their purported lack of “a deeply spiritual 
vision” (74)—are genuinely moving, even when Gordon’s narrator makes 
her own ironic stance toward the commitments that fuel these struggles 
clear.
 Ultimately, however, Felicitas remains the moral ideal of the novel, and, 
like isabel moore, her superiority is indicated both by her willingness to 
draw upon the best of the Catholicism that she has grown up with and her 
determination to reject it when it inconveniences her or offends against her 
reason. as a girl, she idolized Father Cyprian; as an adult, she continues 
to “revere him for his labor, for his passionate, excluding love, for the dig-
nity of his priestly calling . . . the habit of his grand, impossible life” (264). 
She even values the fact that he “trained me too well, trained me against 
the sentimental, the susceptibility of the heart,” despite its consequences: 
“i will not accept the blandishments of religious life; i will not look to God 
for comfort, or for succor, or for sweetness. God will have to meet me on 
the high ground of reason, and there he’s a poor contender” (264). yet she 
perceives Father Cyprian to be intellectually deficient: “he has three ideas: 
the authority of the Church, the corruption induced by Original Sin and 
the wickedness of large-scale government. all the rest is instinct and effu-
sion” (264). it is arguable, however, that both Felicitas and Father Cyprian 
have been wrong here. Cyprian’s claim that “reason is a whore . . . [who] 
goes with anyone” (40) echoes martin luther rather than Thomas aquinas 
and overlooks the real possibility that the modern world may have too little 
reason in it, not too much. Conversely, Felicitas’s belief that there can be 
nothing reasonable in one’s religious life, that it is primarily a matter of 
“instinct and effusion,” partakes of an admirable zeal against sentimental-
ity and kitsch but also defines itself too narrowly, holding that the face of 
God would be worth something only if it could be perceived, as Kant might 
put it, “free from all necessity” (265). even as she affirms Felicitas’s stance 
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more reliably than the positions of her other characters, Gordon honestly 
expresses doubt about whether her vision will prevail by turning at the 
end toward linda, the representative of the future. linda is an appealing 
blend of the old and the new: on the one hand, she knows, unlike her class-
mates, “four Greek words, ten latin words, the names of angels” (290); on 
the other, she persuades Cyprian to pray for the ordination of women (288). 
it is tempting, if one subscribes to a teleology of succeeding paradigms, to 
see in this blending a synthesis that will reveal the new paradigm. but the 
novel’s last words suggest otherwise: as long as linda isn’t “dying,” she 
can come to any possible relation with God and with the Church. nothing 
is inevitable.
 indeed, as vatican ii has receded in time, Gordon’s novels have 
acknowledged—albeit with varying degrees of equanimity—that younger 
Catholics may feel little need to define themselves in relation to the Coun-
cil, and even that there may be something inaccurate about the sense of 
world-historical rupture that Catholics of Gordon’s generation perceived in 
it. Spending: A Utopian Divertimento (1996) has relatively little to say about 
Catholicism, and its primary concern—the trials, opportunities, and signif-
icance of the woman artist—more explicitly subordinates religion to aes-
thetics than Gordon’s early work does. at one point, monica Szabo, the 
painter who narrates the novel, remembers the devotional self-forgetfulness 
of Sister imelda, a nun who taught her in the first grade, and emphasizes 
both the differences and the similarities between her vocation and Sister 
imelda’s: “The object of my attention isn’t what Sister imelda’s was. i tried 
to make it, for a while, the same as hers: God. it didn’t work. The object of 
my attention is the visible world. Whenever i feel i’m working the right 
way, i know it has something to do with that self-forgetfulness and atten-
tion i saw when i looked at Sister imelda in the beam of blue light.” her 
own series of paintings, depictions of the Deposition of Christ meant to 
suggest postcoital exhaustion, is described as “[t]he coming together of art 
and faith in the hands of a woman—me—whose life was no longer shaped 
by belief. The light presence, not oppressive, of a former impression, some-
thing traced, but lightly, barely visible” (132). What religion and art have 
in common is an aesthetic experience of self-forgetfulness, not content or 
doctrine, and the experience itself is what matters most. moreover, art-
ists themselves, not spectators, are the only ones who can properly judge 
the experience and the work that it produces. as monica puts it, “i really 
envy brain surgeons. People aren’t always coming up to them . . . and say-
ing, ‘you know i do a little brain surgery myself. maybe you could come 
over . . . and look at a brain i just operated on’” (14).
 it follows that whatever restricts this experience or calls into question 
the authority of artists is to be deplored—financial constraints, prohibitions 
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against certain subject matters, received ideas about the gender of artists. 
Spending is “utopian” because it asks what it might be like for a woman 
painter in the late twentieth century to enjoy the same advantages as the 
greatest painters of the past. Unlike feminist critics who would reject their 
art as tainted by sexism, monica declares her admiration for their work: 
“There was nothing i was making fun of, no fault, either in execution or in 
interpretation, i was trying to show up. There was only the one thing that, 
as a woman artist, i was occasionally stunned to remember: for most of his-
tory, no woman was allowed to do what they did” (88). monica gets the 
opportunity to “do what they did” when b., an immensely wealthy futures 
trader, stands up at a talk that monica gives in Provincetown and declares 
his willingness to be her muse. he provides her with money for a new 
apartment, trips to italy, luxurious meals, and lots of sex; he even agrees 
to serve as a nude model for her work. monica embraces the arrangement 
despite periodic doubts about its implications, and the novel is indeed 
thought-provoking about the relationship between money and art and its 
ethical consequences.
 monica’s greatest enemy, however, is a former schoolmate, alice marie 
Cusalito, the representative of “the Catholic Defense league” (186), who 
leads a protest against the exhibition of monica’s paintings of Jesus, argu-
ing that they are blasphemous and offensive. monica argues in response 
that people like alice are stupid, for they disregard “the history of art and 
the history of thought,” “reinforcing [the world’s] prejudices that Catholics 
are a bunch of ill-educated, bigoted yahoos.” They believe that “[t]he truth 
is simple,” whereas “[w]hat i believe in won’t fit into a sound bite” (203). 
alice herself is, predictably, ugly, with a “puddingy face” and “bad hair” 
(181)—indeed, when the Catholic Defense league’s efforts lead to a debate 
on the Charlie rose show, alice is replaced by “one of those exceptionally 
well-groomed right-wingers” (196)—and her deepest motive is probably a 
long-nursed desire for revenge: “[S]he didn’t even get nominated for senior 
class president at St. augusta’s high School and i won the election” (194). 
When monica tries to come to “a calm understanding of what they were 
doing,” she imagines that “what was driving [them] crazy was that i was 
taking images that they thought of as theirs and using them in a way that 
they didn’t like”—a formulation that concedes, at least provisionally, some 
validity to the criticism of spectators. even so, “i didn’t want to come to 
a calm understanding of what they were doing. i wanted to pound their 
heads on the pavement” (188). The only way, monica tells Theresa, to com-
bat them in the public sphere is “to get across” that “they’re against fuck-
ing” (199). The autonomy of the artist, it would seem, is also the autonomy 
of the man or woman pursuing sexual satisfaction, and no one, least of all 
the Church, has the right to infringe upon it.
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 What is most interesting about Spending, however, is the novel’s reluc-
tant suggestion that this argument about art and blasphemy, though it 
might (in Charlie rose’s words) make for “good television” (204), is essen-
tially a battle within Gordon’s generation, able to be plausibly recast as 
a high-school feud. monica’s daughter rachel, indeed, seems not only 
unconcerned with the debate but disapproving of her mother’s arrange-
ments with b.—she goes so far as to suggest that her mother is lying to 
herself, that the arrangement amounts to prostitution, even if the money 
involved is ostensibly taken for “painting” rather than “fucking” (83). 
When her other daughter, Sara, decides to marry despite not being preg-
nant and to “live in the country and teach music to preschool children” 
while her husband “direct[s] a nature study center in montana,” monica is 
appalled because “[i]t’s so unadventurous” (261). While neither daughter 
speaks about Christianity—and while Sara even reassures her mother, “it’s 
not that i’m not a feminist” (264)—the implication is that a whole array of 
matters related to art, religion, and the politics of gender may no longer 
carry the heavy symbolic baggage that Gordon has perceived in it.
 in Pearl (2005), Gordon takes the theme of daughters unwilling to fight 
their mother’s battles even further. maria meyers, a feisty, middle-aged 
woman of devout Catholic background who broke with her father and 
joined the political underground in the 1960s, has always been vaguely 
disappointed by her daughter, Pearl, who knows “that some things were 
hopeless,” that “some things no one could do anything about” (82). When 
Pearl, studying the irish language in Dublin, becomes emotionally involved 
with partisans of the irish republican army, she decides to starve herself 
to death because she believes that she has been responsible for a death and 
because she believes that her death will bear witness to the rightness of 
the Good Friday peace agreement of 1998. as in Final Payments, belief in 
one’s own responsibility for a loved one’s catastrophe leads to an embrace 
of martyrdom, which is simultaneously self-destructive and full of unsus-
pected potential for narcissism. maria, having passed beyond the belief in 
martyrdom and the ideal of purity that it reflects, was perhaps “too hope-
ful about the ability of the human species to absorb quick change” (128), 
finds Pearl’s actions incomprehensible; Pearl, in turn, was once “obsessed 
with hatred for her mother’s body,” in part because she discovered and 
read her mother’s “adultery diary” (129). The anonymous narrator tac-
itly grants that there may be nothing unique about the changes that maria 
lived through: “i am not a good enough historian to say whether or not 
there were other periods in history like those ten years, eleven maybe, 1962 
to 1973 . . . years in which so easily, so quickly, you became a person you 
would not have recognized” (53). if such admissions gesture toward the 
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possibility of repeating struggles that were once thought to be finished, of 
daughters who seem to their mothers like throwbacks to an earlier era, then 
they also emphasize the lack of finality in any statement made about vati-
can ii, its legacy, and indeed, about the telos of the contemporary world.
 if, despite these admissions, Gordon’s later novels still constitute a con-
tinuation and a nuancing of narcissism rather than a departure from it, it 
is because they do not finally question the subordination of orthodoxy to 
the aesthetic in any meaningful sense. monica can accept Sara’s marriage 
if it can be reframed as a question of Sara’s own satisfaction rather than as 
a rebellion against monica’s values; maria and Pearl can exchange mutual 
forgiveness, and maria can forgive her father, but the question of an ulti-
mate value that transcends the self must remain in abeyance. When Pearl, 
having been saved from starvation, asks her mother, “Why is it that it’s life 
we want?” (339), maria thinks, “it is a ridiculous thing to say, life is worth 
living because of ice cream and your dog. but it seems preferable to saying, 
life is worth living because you must live for me” (340). her response to 
Pearl, “it seems we’re meant to” (341), is, as she realizes, inadequate.
 From the perspective of orthodox Christian doctrine and practice, Gor-
don’s most successful work might be “The Deacon” (1999), a short story 
which, like Final Payments, associates Jesus’ words “The poor you always have 
with you” with an epiphany. Sister Joan Fitzgerald, a shrewd and competent 
nun, is made to accompany Gerard, an inept and unlovable (though not, 
like margaret, hateful) deacon, to a celebratory meal on the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of his ordination. Though Gerard inspires in her nothing “but 
a wish to flee from [his] presence” (82), she discovers that Gerard believes 
her to have cared about him, merely because she relieved him of his teach-
ing duties at the parish school and installed him instead in the computer 
lab, where his incompetence would do less damage. in fact it had been 
the parish priest, Steve, who “had prevented her from throwing him out 
on the street” (82). like isabel moore, Joan longs for—and interprets Jesus 
as enjoining—“an active love that fills the soul and lightens it, that draws 
people to each other with the warmth of the spirit, that makes them able to 
be with each other as a brother is with a sister or a mother with her child” 
(82). because she cannot feel such a love for Gerard, she is initially horrified 
to discover that Gerard believes that she has loved him. yet the recollec-
tion of Jesus’ words eventually reconciles her to her role and clarifies the 
more difficult nature of Christian love: “[S]he knew that she would always 
have Gerard. he was poorer than estrelita Dominguez, thirteen years old 
and three months pregnant, or laTrobe Sandford, who might be in jail this 
time next year” (82). yet while isabel believes that she can fulfill her duty to 
the comparably poor margaret with money instead of love, Joan acknowl-
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edges the need to go on doing what she can for Gerard, despite her feel-
ings. When the waiter appears at the end of the story to offer her a drink, 
she orders only water because he “was an irishman; he’d be scandalized 
by a nun’s ordering Scotch. She didn’t want to disappoint him” (83). it is 
clear that Joan appreciates the gustatory pleasures that Scotch represents; 
she apparently realizes that true charity involves not just doing good for 
others but refusing to let self-serving professions of honesty create scandal. 
This is a far cry from maria’s claim at the end of Pearl that one should live 
because one is meant to. Perhaps maria represents the best that a particular 
kind of contemporary consciousness—lacking any cultural consensus about 
what constitutes virtue—can muster when it is forced to look beyond itself. 
Joan’s example in “The Deacon,” however, provides grounds for hope that 
something much better remains available. 
V. the Liberal Calvinism of marilynne Robinson
When marilynne robinson’s Housekeeping was published in 1980, it was 
praised as an extremely impressive debut, yet for nearly two decades after-
ward, critics of the novel betrayed little suspicion that Christianity might be 
relevant to its interpretation. and with good reason: not only does House-
keeping lack an overtly Christian thematics, its spare but luminous prose, 
its suspension of traditional closure (its narrator becomes a drifter), and its 
meditations on desire, dailiness, transience, and the physical world seem 
to align it with one of the major critical trends of its historical moment: a 
discourse of second-wave feminist spirituality and poetics that includes 
writers as different as hélène Cixous, mary Daly, and adrienne rich. The 
keywords that regularly appear in published criticism of Housekeeping are 
characteristic: domesticity, feminine subjectivity, spirit, ecocriticism, wom-
en’s writing, pre-oedipal desire. in the terms that i invoked in the introduc-
tion of this book, many of the novel’s readers have regarded Housekeeping 
as “spiritual” but certainly not as “religious.”
 after eighteen years of such a critical response, The Death of Adam 
(1998), a collection of essays, came as a surprise. “i miss civilization, and i 
want it back,” she declared in the opening pages (introduction 4). Getting 
it back requires attending to the works of the past “in their own terms” 
(introduction 3), rather than cynically assuming their lack of relevance 
except as a record of oppressions now overcome, ideologies now demysti-
fied. it might even require the resuscitation of John Calvin’s reputation. as 
if such statements were not difficult enough to reconcile with prevailing 
readings of Housekeeping, her essay “The Tyranny of Petty Coercion” (2004) 
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forthrightly announced, “i will make a shocking statement: i am a Chris-
tian” (16). The publication of Gilead (2004) seemed to confirm as much: its 
narrator, John ames, is an aging Congregationalist minister in the town of 
Gilead, iowa in the year 1956. he is, moreover, a good man and a reliable 
narrator, sincerely occupied with matters of religious faith and with self-
criticism. in short, ames is so square that lee Siegel could write that Gilead 
“almost makes you—it’s embarrassing to admit this—want to start being 
ironic and urbane again” (83).
 how does one reconcile such apparent traditionalism with the puta-
tively feminist achievement of Housekeeping? readers who prefer not to do 
so, it would seem, also prefer the earlier novel and are distinctly uncom-
fortable with the thought that it might be tainted by Christian concerns. 
Stefan mattessich, for instance, acknowledges that robinson’s Christianity 
complicates readings of Housekeeping, but rather than inquiring into how 
Christian doctrine might inform the novel, he assimilates it to metaphysi-
cal thought more generally, arguing that the novel “thinks the metaphys-
ics that persist in every denial of metaphysics” (61)—a thesis, derived from 
Derrida and Jean-luc nancy, that violates robinson’s own desire to take 
writing on its own terms.12 On the other hand, readers who laud Gilead 
and its sequel, Home (2008) (which presents the same story told in Gilead 
from another perspective) seem to value (sometimes with pleasant surprise, 
sometimes with unpleasantly self-righteous vindication) its demonstration 
that unfashionably Christian doctrines and virtues can remain, even after 
so much secular tub-thumping, the raw materials of great art.
 in what follows, i will argue that The Death of Adam, Gilead, and Home 
reveal robinson’s use of Protestant Christianity to be more slippery—
though not necessarily ineffective as a rhetorical tool—than both groups 
of readers allow. On the one hand, in declaring allegiance not just to main-
line Protestantism but to the thought and legacy of John Calvin (whom she 
prefers to call Jean Cauvin, so as to minimize the prejudices that have accu-
mulated around his more familiar name), robinson does indeed challenge 
a pervasive contemporary cynicism, which she defines as “nothing more 
than an understanding of how arbitrary morality is, how unpredictable 
and unenforceable, how insecurely grounded in self-interest” (“Puritans” 
 12. mattessich, to be sure, is quite honest about doing so: “it may be that Housekeeping, 
refractory to the secular presuppositions that critical culture brings to bear on it, rejoins her 
readers’ interest in agency only by driving its stakes more willingly than we might like into 
the ground of a metaphysical tradition of thought about subjectivity” (61). The implication 
seems to be that “we,” the practitioners of “critical culture,” might not find what “we might 
like” in such an overtly Christian writer, though we might be generous enough to admit that 
we, too, might be haunted by metaphysics even in our denial.
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170). Second-hand judgments of Calvin, deriving from the work of Weber 
or from blinkered understandings of what the term “Puritan” connotes, 
have reduced Calvin’s career to the doctrine of double predestination and 
the death of michael Servetus, his legacy to the triumph of unrestrained, 
exploitative capitalism. robinson is correct that such judgments are not 
just distortions but obstacles to americans who seek ways to implement 
a more humane future that are nevertheless rooted in the national past. 
merely by presenting the goodness that a Calvinist worldview has nour-
ished, whether in Jonathan edwards’s condemnation of his new england 
congregation’s neglect of the hungry (“Puritans” 151) or in the fictional 
John ames’s capacity for self-scrutiny, moral action, and joy in creation, 
robinson powerfully testifies to the benefits of Christian orthodoxy.
 On the other hand, i maintain that this presentation remains, in robin-
son’s work, a use of orthodoxy more than a commitment to it. This is not 
to doubt robinson’s explicit statements of Christian belief, but rather to 
suggest that in her work, the starting points for a consideration of Chris-
tianity are always the primacy of religious experience and the benefits—
including civil order and prosperity—that Christian belief can afford. 
in some respects she resembles Percy, whose foregrounding of the mod-
ern predicament is, nearly always, the place from which his protagonists 
struggle toward Christian belief. yet while Percy used a similar rhetorical 
strategy both in his fiction and his essays, robinson uses the two genres 
for different purposes. in The Death of Adam, she emphasizes the deficien-
cies of contemporary life that might be remedied if Christianity were taken 
more seriously; in Gilead and Home, she creates a fictional world in which 
Christianity is the norm, a quietly sustaining reality against which the cen-
tral unbelieving character, Jack boughton, appears to be less an existential 
hero (as some readers might initially suspect) than one who torments him-
self needlessly—even, perhaps, one predestined to perdition. her strategy 
has been so successful that Siegel has gone so far as to declare (wrongly, i 
believe) that one “cannot truly understand” Gilead unless one is “a believ-
ing Christian with strong fundamentalist leanings” (82). if i describe her 
rhetoric, then, as a “use” of orthodoxy, it is because ultimately she does not 
press the claims of whether the Calvinist Christianity that she advocates is 
true—only that it is more humane, and less obviously false, than the the-
ories promulgated by the central theorists of modernity. i identify robin-
son’s primary value as equality and hold that according to her novels, the 
value of Calvinism lies primarily in the degree to which it validates it. here 
she departs from Percy, for whom the truth of Catholicism was precisely 
what guaranteed its efficacy against the modern malaise.
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 robinson is, to be sure, aware of her somewhat unorthodox relation-
ship to Christianity, and in the autobiographical essay “Psalm eight,” she 
accounts for it as the continued unfolding of the mystic intimations that she 
enjoyed as a young girl:
all the old writers on the subject remark that in every age and nation peo-
ple have had the idea of a god of some sort. So my archaic self might have 
been nothing other than a latter-day pagan whose intimations were not 
altogether at odds with, as it happened, Presbyterianism, and so were sim-
ply polished to that shape. Or it might have been that i was a mystic by 
vocation and, despite Presbyterianism, suffered atrophy of my gift in a life 
where i found little use for it. For all i know i am a mystic now, and sim-
ply too close to the phenomenon to have a clear view of it. in any case i 
began as a pagan and have ended as one, though only in the sense that i 
have never felt secure in the possession of the ideas and loyalties that are 
dearest to me. i am a Saxon in a basilica, refusing to admire so that anyone 
can see me, thrown back on impassivity as my only notion of decorum. i 
am surely wrong if i blame history for this sense i have of tenuous claim, 
wrong to invoke the notion of blame at all. interloper thought i may be, i 
enjoy the thief’s privilege of pleasure in the simple preciousness of things 
that are not my own. i enjoy it far too much to attempt to regularize my 
situation. in my childhood, when the presence of God seemed everywhere 
and i seemed to myself a mote of exception, improbable as a flaw in the 
sun, the very sweetness of the experience lay in that stinging thought—not 
me, not like me, not mine. (229–30)
robinson’s rhetorically subtle self-characterization begins with an appeal 
to the universality of religious experience (“the idea of a god of some sort”) 
rather than to the doctrines of Christianity. her own experiences might then 
be conceivably filed under one of William James’s “varieties,” so that her 
religious belief could be assimilated to her psychology. yet robinson imme-
diately complicates such a notion by aligning primordial religious con-
sciousness with the word “pagan,” applying the term to herself, and then 
amplifying this term with the word “interloper.” To profess Christian belief 
while using such labels is to suggest that one’s claims upon Christian faith, 
tradition, and forms of life are “tenuous.” This is, in one sense, a confession 
of epistemic humility—an engaging admission that whatever she might 
say about God or faith will be inadequate to the reality of religious expe-
rience, combined with the presumption that others, for whatever reason 
more secure in their connection to these things, may be more knowledge-
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able or more devout than she, though not (an interesting exception) more 
“historically” entitled to their security. a “pagan” sensibility, then, grasps 
the divinity that imbues creation—what could be characterized as a sense 
of the sacramental, but which here tends more toward panentheism—but 
professes not to deserve its relation to this divinity. (in this sense, the term 
is perhaps analogous to “Gentile,” as it is used in Christian discourse to 
refer to those who lack God’s original commitment to the Jews but who 
have nevertheless been “adopted” by him after Jesus’ sacrifice.)
 The expression of humility, however, almost at once slides into an 
expression of privilege, even the defiant privilege of a “thief,” who will 
affirm what she finds experientially valuable in Christianity while reserv-
ing the right to judge its people and practices from this very position of the 
“outsider.” robinson does not so much reject Calvinist doctrinal commit-
ments as hold them at arm’s length, always evaluating them on the basis of 
whether they affirm or occlude this mystical consciousness. Theology must 
be judged in this light, and can be found lacking precisely to the degree 
that it can be intellectually understood. The bible itself, robinson main-
tains, is never lacking, because the sheer luminousness of its language can-
not be mastered by the human intellect. She especially prizes “the devout 
old custom . . . of merely repeating verses, one or another luminous frag-
ment, a hymn before and a hymn afterward. by grace of my abiding igno-
rance, it is always new to me. i am never not instructed” (“Psalm” 230–31). 
again, robinson deploys the double move of humble receptivity and 
judgment predicated on exclusion: she is instructed only by virtue of her 
“abiding ignorance,” and thus implies that others, less ignorant, are to that 
degree incapable of “instruction.” So far, robinson seems to position her-
self in relation to the many people who, in contemporary Western societ-
ies, might identify themselves as “spiritual but not religious,” but she also 
seems to suggest that to be spiritual within a religious tradition (an “inter-
loper”) might be best of all, for religion is at bottom (as she explains else-
where) a “framing mechanism,” a “language of orientation that presents 
itself as a series of questions” (interview). Such a position need not reject 
other traditions within Christianity, although the differences between the 
traditions in such a view become differences in experience and in aesthet-
ics: “[W]ould we be richer for the loss of Catholicism? Would we be richer 
for the loss of the Quakers? isn’t it true that every one of these traditions 
expresses Christianity in a way that the other traditions could not? it’s pris-
matic” (interview).
 robinson affirms her own doctrinal identity in this way: “i have shifted 
allegiances the doctrinal and demographic inch that separates Presbyteri-
ans from Congregationalists, but for all purposes i am where i ought to be, 
T h E  u S E S  O F  O RT h O d O x y  •  191
as sociologists calculate, and i should feel right at home. i will concede only 
that the sensation of exclusion is more poignant to me in these precincts 
than in others, being after all these years so very familiar” (“Psalm” 231). 
a reader of Updike confronted with this passage will be reminded of the 
difference presented in Couples between Piet hanema’s childhood faith and 
the religion of those Tarboxers who still go to church: “Piet had been raised 
in a sterner church, the Dutch reformed, amid varnished oak and dour 
stained glass where shepherds were paralyzed in webs of lead. he had 
joined this sister church [Congregationalist], a milder daughter of Calvin, 
as a compromise with [his wife] angela, who believed nothing” (20). From 
Updike’s standpoint, the Congregational church in Tarbox is insufficiently 
orthodox, and its destruction by lightning at the end of the novel confirms, 
as it were, God’s displeasure with it. robinson, again, cannily positions 
herself both within and yet outside of an orthodox tradition: she is “socio-
logically” where she belongs, given (one presumes) her ancestry, politics, 
and aesthetic allegiances, yet the content of her belief is only imperfectly 
contained within Congregationalism, and she enjoys the piquancy of being 
not “at home” despite her long years of membership. She marvels on the 
occasions in church when “the minister will conclude something brave 
and absolute,” because she is “so far unregenerate that they never cease 
to impress [her] deeply” (“Psalm” 231). Once again, the implication is that 
those who take such statements as a matter of course are not “unregener-
ate” enough—too comfortable in their habitual piety to let the force of 
the words change them. at the same time, the doctrinal latitude of Con-
gregationalism imbues such statements with a certain irony: how often, 
indeed, robinson implies, does one hear something “brave and absolute” 
preached within such a venue? Only “[f]rom time to time, on the strength 
of the text” (“Psalm” 231).13
 here the question of how robinson wishes readers to take the doctrines 
most associated with Calvin becomes relevant, for in the popular concep-
tion, few ideas are more “brave and absolute” than double predestination. 
in the two-part (and misleadingly titled) essay “marguerite de navarre,” 
robinson affirms that for Calvin, the doctrine is a necessary consequence 
of his belief in the absolute freedom, power, and knowledge of God, and 
that Calvin’s opponents, such as ignatius of loyola, also affirmed predes-
tination, though with greater caution and with a degree of “nuance” that 
one should understand as a rhetorical appeal to a very different audience: 
“ignatius was writing for an elite of highly committed men; Calvin, for 
 13. appropriately enough, the narrator of Gilead, John ames, is a Congregationalist min-
ister; his best friend, robert boughton, is a Presbyterian minister. both are good men, but, as 
Home confirms, ames is the better of the two.
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anyone who could read him” (187). in the work of both men, “[t]he logical 
difficulties of their positions matter only if the question is understood in 
terms both explicitly reject” (188). This is, of course, true, and robinson’s 
insistence on understanding Calvin in his own terms is admirable. She 
does not, however, explain whether she holds this doctrine to be true or 
merely worthy of intellectual respect.14 nor does it explain whether what 
contemporary people might find valuable in Calvin is the doctrine itself 
or certain implications which, derivable from it, are nevertheless also to 
be found elsewhere. The doctrine of double predestination can indeed be, 
and historically has been, associated with the belief and practice of human 
equality, for human beings are all equally depraved, and the one distinc-
tion with real significance—whether one belongs to the elect or not—has to 
do with God’s efforts, not ours. but it does not follow that those who affirm 
the political or moral value of equality must ground their arguments on 
its behalf in Calvin’s work, even if it can be historically demonstrated that 
in the United States, Calvinism contributed much to creating a climate in 
which such values could thrive. indeed, robinson’s account of Calvinism 
becomes suspiciously selective: everything that tends to affirm the liberal 
humanism that robinson herself espouses is underscored, while everything 
that offends contemporary sensibilities must be explained away. Thus, Cal-
vin’s “extreme disparagements of the physical body” must be read not lit-
erally but as rhetoric “in the service of an extraordinarily exalted vision of 
the human soul” (“marguerite” 182). Todd Shy’s judgment that robinson 
is in fact closer to montaigne and erasmus than to Calvin, to renaissance 
humanism than to reformed faith, seems borne out here (257–58).
 14. robinson’s most explicit statement on the matter frankly indicates the difficulty: “i 
have never heard of even one persuasive case made for the compatibility of eternal damna-
tion with the justice and mercy of God. but there it is, a conspicuous presence in Scripture 
and in tradition, and Calvin could hardly be expected to set it aside.” here, she speaks not 
of double predestination per se, but of the existence and eternity of hell—a Christian doctrine 
much more widely accepted than double predestination. She then goes on to argue, correctly, 
that predestination itself is not a doctrine first invented by Calvin, and that a consequence of 
the doctrine is “to make the categories ‘redeemed’ and ‘unredeemed’ profoundly mysterious 
to mortal eyes, to remove every basis for our making any such radical judgments about our 
fellows” (“Calvinism” 183). in short, instead of answering the question “is double predes-
tination true?” robinson responds with something like “Consider instead its implications 
for human equality.” On whether double predestination is Calvin’s opinion (which again 
leaves robinson’s own view of its possible truth unstated), robinson astonishingly declares, 
“Whether predestination is ‘double’ or ‘single’ is a quibble with which Calvin was too honest 
to have patience” (“Polemic” 97). i would compare robinson here with newman, who simi-
larly acknowledged that many Christian beliefs are also “beset with intellectual difficulties; 
and it is simple fact, that, for myself, i cannot answer these difficulties,” but whose position 
on the consequences of this fact is far more straightforward: “[t]en thousand difficulties do 
not make one doubt, as i understand the subject; difficulty and doubt are incommensurate” 
(Apologia 155).
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 Perhaps another way to approach this problem would be to investigate 
how robinson understands what newman called “development of doc-
trine.” To what extent do the doctrines of the reformed faith prove capable 
of change, even change understood—to return to the terms that i invoked 
with respect to vatican ii—as continuity or deepening rather than as rup-
ture? robinson’s humanism is, of course, about the possibility of human 
improvement: she is friendly, or wishes to be friendly, toward science and 
art, and she wants to regard the habitus of democratic culture as it devel-
oped in the United States as an ideal environment for its flourishing. She 
must therefore account for the fact that much in contemporary american 
culture appalls her, and she discerns the cause in large part in a deliberate 
decision to reject the Calvinist heritage, to misread it as illiberal and repres-
sive. much of the blame she lays at the feet of Weber, whose famous argu-
ment that Calvinism helped create “the spirit of capitalism” she detests:
by comparison with lutherans, Calvinists lack gemütlichkeit—they are 
not good fellows. Weber says you can see this in their faces. This is the 
new historical method. This is how spirit becomes a term suitable for use 
in economic analysis. i suppose i am unfair in saying that for Weber a 
prejudice is a proof. he offers none of the usual criticisms of capitalism 
itself—that it is exploitive, that it is crisis prone, that it creates extremes 
of wealth and poverty. his criticism is that, in its “modern” form, those 
who prosper from it do not enjoy their prosperity. he knows and says 
that Calvin did not encourage the accumulation of wealth, and that he 
insisted the “church”—in this sense, the elect—do not prosper in this 
world. . . . [Weber argues] that a social group defined by [him] as the 
people who adhere to or have been acculturated by a particular theol-
ogy are, with generalizable and world-historical consistency, peculiarly 
inclined to behave in ways precisely contrary to the teaching of that the-
ology. . . . Surely it is fair to wonder if any of this amounts to more than 
personal animus—which was the preferred historical method of much of 
the Western world at the beginning of this bitter century. . . . in fairness to 
Weber, he considered his conclusions in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism to be merely tentative, likely to be superseded when “compara-
tive racial neurology and psychology shall have progressed beyond their 
present and in many ways very promising beginnings.” (“introduction” 
23–24)
even if everything that robinson argues here is correct, it does not neces-
sarily invalidate Weber’s thesis, and it raises the question of what alterna-
tive explanations for the evolution of capitalism might be more convincing. 
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if the hypercapitalist, morally priggish yet licentious, and aesthetically 
desensitized specter of contemporary american life is a dramatic depar-
ture from the nation’s originally Calvinist ethos, rather than an unintended 
but retrospectively traceable consequence of this ethos, what enabled such 
dramatic changes? it is conceivable that it is precisely the democratic 
emphasis of Calvinist belief and practice that has facilitated the growth of 
capitalism and the lowering of aesthetic standards that robinson deplores, 
contrary to her expectation that democracy should inculcate a high-minded 
humanism—some of Tocqueville’s observations of nineteenth-century 
america and concerns about the nation’s future, for instance, might be 
enlisted in support of such a claim.
 even if such an interpretation is not fully convincing, alternative 
accounts—ann Douglas’s thesis, for instance—might not necessarily be 
more congenial to robinson. What if the pursuit of equality leads not to 
human flourishing but to a degraded mass culture, and what if Calvinism 
delayed the emergence of such a mass culture precisely to the extent that 
it impeded political equality (even as it undeniably affirmed the equality 
of human souls in relation to each other)?15 in any event, the fact that capi-
talism has historically expanded the most rapidly and produced its most 
effective theorists in societies with long traditions of Calvinist belief and 
democratic polity (the United States, Scotland, the netherlands) needs to 
be accounted for. moreover, robinson’s attempt to discredit Weber by link-
ing him to eugenics not only violates her own injunction to read thinkers 
in terms of their own historical moment rather than to apply contemporary 
standards to them but also seems continuous with her own hostility toward 
Darwinism, which might just as conceivably be described as a “prejudice” 
based on the fact that for strict Darwinists, talk of the human soul and even 
the mind is inadmissible. Surely a thinker whose own religious thinking is 
grounded in the primacy of certain individual experiences should be more 
careful about castigating the “individual” perceptions of others, even if 
these concern the presence or lack of Gemütlichkeit in certain faces.
 15. Douglas shares robinson’s loathing for mass culture and her admiration for Cal-
vinism, but not her sense that Calvinism and humanism are compatible: “Calvinism was 
a great faith, with great limitations: it was repressive, authoritarian, dogmatic, patriarchal 
to an extreme. its demise was inevitable, and in some real sense, welcome. yet it deserved, 
and elsewhere and at other times found, great opponents. One could argue that the logical 
antagonist of Calvinism was a fully humanistic, historically minded romanticism. exponents 
of such romanticism appeared in mid-nineteenth-century america—one thinks particularly 
of margaret Fuller and herman melville—but they were rare” (12–13). One might quarrel 
with the particulars of Douglas’s description here—robinson, i feel certain, would bristle at 
the characterization of Calvinism as “patriarchal to an extreme” (see “marguerite” 184–87, 
in which robinson defends Calvin against the charge of misogyny)—but her affirmation of 
a “fully humanistic, historically minded romanticism” sounds exactly like robinson’s own 
larger project.
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 in the most comprehensive situating of robinson’s fiction within the 
tradition of american Puritan writing thus far, Christopher leise argues 
that robinson “is consciously reading the Puritan tradition against itself,” 
an approach that “looks at religion not as a stable entity at all but one that 
is fluid and—quite the opposite—actively destabilizing” (350). This over-
states the case considerably. leise’s argument is grounded not on the par-
ticulars of robinson’s stated beliefs but rather on the theses of Derridean 
deconstruction as they are applied to religion via the work of mark C. Tay-
lor. leise reduces the upshot of his argument to “[r]eligions are dynamic, 
not static” (351), but this, surely, is a fact and a platitude: one can endorse 
such a statement without writing off in principle, as leise appears to do, 
the vexing questions of how one should understand which developments in 
a religious tradition are proper to it and which genuine departures. robin-
son would, i am certain, describe her project as a faithful return to tradition 
rather than an ironic destabilization of it; she would also not be friendly to 
the implication that disagreements in how one understands a given tradi-
tion should simply be attributed to the inevitable self-undermining of any 
systems. moreover, when she departs from the polemical strategy of her 
essays to the presentation of Calvinist Christianity in her two recent novels, 
robinson is refreshingly free of the global irony that Taylor discovers in the 
phenomenon of religion—so free, in fact, that a common complaint from 
readers of Gilead it is that so good and sincere a man as John ames is sim-
ply not credible.16 This lack of global irony makes the novels, as instances 
of rhetoric, unusually effective: to those put off by the pugnacity and the 
thorny doctrinal questions associated with Calvinism, robinson offers the 
serenity of a Calvinist milieu that is simply assumed. That she must set her 
novels in 1956 to make such a milieu convincing, however, suggests her 
readers of the novel may have to struggle with—or be open to—an implicit 
nostalgia in the two novels, a desire (rather like Updike’s in The Poorhouse 
Fair) to return to a stronger, less riven america.
VI. the Primacy of Religious experience in 
 Gilead and Home
Gilead takes the form of a letter written by reverend John ames, the 
seventy-six-year-old Congregationalist minister of Gilead, iowa, to his 
seven-year-old son, the child of a second marriage entered into after a long 
widowerhood. Diagnosed with heart trouble and not expected to live long, 
 16. again, Siegel makes this argument in the strongest possible terms: “[T]hese people 
finally seem sprung from some moral vanity, some secret disdain for their flesh-and-blood 
particularity” (83).
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ames expects that as a grown man, his son will read the letter and learn 
“things i believe it becomes me as a father to teach you” (133–34). Through-
out the novel, three lessons recur obsessively: the beauty of the world, 
charged as it is with the glory and love of God; the opacity of human 
beings, even when they have known and loved each other their entire 
lives; and, consequently, the dangers of moral judgment. These lessons 
are consistent with ames’s Jamesian conviction that “it is religious expe-
rience above all that authenticates religion, for the purposes of the indi-
vidual believer” (145), and that it is therefore “presumptuous to judge the 
authenticity of anyone’s religion, except one’s own. and that is also pre-
sumptuous” (173). many of the novel’s loveliest passages, indeed, are affir-
mations of dailiness that authenticate ames’s own religious sense: a game 
of blowing bubbles with the pet cat, with its “effulgence of bubbles rising, 
and so much laughter” (9); a memory from childhood of a group of women 
singing in the rain and eating “the bread of affliction” (102) because their 
church has burned; the coming of dawn over the prairie (246). Knowing 
one’s own luminous self-awareness, the novel implies, one has no right 
to deny others their own.17 To think otherwise, ames holds, would entail 
that “people are disabled from trusting their thoughts, their expressions of 
belief, and their understanding” (146).
 in the course of writing his letter, ames finds that these beliefs are 
tested when Jack boughton, the son of John’s best friend, returns to Gil-
ead. as a child, Jack was constantly into “mischief only bordering on harm, 
generally speaking” (182); when he was older, he renounced his family’s 
Christian faith. he is a frequent liar, as he admits, and he struggles with 
alcoholism. most spectacularly of all, as a young man he got a very poor 
young woman pregnant and abandoned her, never publicly acknowledging 
the child, who died at the age of three of an infected cut. Jack, now forty-
three, wishes to confide in ames, but ames is nervous: although he “see[s] 
the error of assuming a person is not speaking with you in good faith,” he 
admits that “it is hard for me to see good faith in John ames boughton, 
and that is a terrible problem” (154). indeed, one might suspect that the 
consistency of Jack’s reprehensible behavior is intended to give credence 
to the Calvinist dogma of double predestination—for, as ames also avows, 
“[g]enerally, a person’s behavior is consistent with his nature” (151).
 both Gilead and Home reflect the degree to which robinson regards total 
depravity—the doctrine that provides the precondition for predestination—
 17. robinson’s notion of “self-awareness,” as she describes it in Absence of Mind, is pos-
sibly relevant here: “i do not mean merely consciousness of one’s identity, or of the complex 
flow of thought, perception, memory, and desire, important as these are. i mean primarily 
the self that stands apart from itself, that questions, reconsiders, appraises” (118).
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as essentially democratic in its implications. yet robinson is aware that 
belief in it can also make for complacency, a certain impatience with dis-
tinctions that may nevertheless be meaningful, as Jack’s sister Glory reflects 
in Home:
maybe she had never before known anyone who felt, or admitted he felt, 
that the state of his soul was in question. Whatever might transpire in her 
father’s study, there had been only calm and confidence among his flock, 
to all appearances. Granting the many perils of spiritual complacency, and 
her father did grant them as often as Pharisees figured in the text, com-
placency was consistent with the customs and manners of Presbyterian 
Gilead and was therefore assumed to be justified in every case. Christian 
charity demanded no less, after all. among the denominations of Gilead, 
charity on this point was not granted by all and to all in principle, but 
in practice good manners were usually adhered to, and in general the 
right to complacency was conceded on every side. even her father’s ser-
mons treated salvation as a thing for which they could be grateful as a 
body, as if, for their purposes at least, that problem had been sorted out 
between the Druids and the centurions at about the time of hadrian. he 
did mention sin, but it was rarefied in his understanding of it, a matter of 
acts and omissions so commonplace that no one could be wholly innocent 
of them or especially alarmed by them, either—the uncharitable thought, 
the neglected courtesy. While on the one hand this excused him from the 
mention of those aspects of life that seemed remotest from Sabbath and 
sunlight, on the other hand it made the point that the very nicest among 
them, even the most virtuous, were in no position to pass judgment on 
anyone else. . . . The doctrine of total depravity had served him well. Who, 
after all, could cast that first stone? he could not, he least of all. but it was 
hard to get a clear view of something so pervasive as to be total, especially 
if, as her father insisted, it was epitomized in his own estimable person. 
(111–12)
This description of the Protestant denominations of Gilead, divided theo-
logically yet united in good manners, echoes bottum’s description of the 
days when mainline Protestantism set the tone for american life, creating 
a genuine sense of civic community even as it encouraged a possibly too 
complacent belief in american exceptionalism. all well and good, Glory 
seems to imply—such a regime indeed makes Gilead a fine place to live, at 
least for white americans—but what about those whose sins place them so 
far beyond the pale that they may be incapable of repentance? Why empha-
size only the salvation and not also the damnation that belief in predestina-
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tion entails? Glory herself has been guilty of fornication with a man whom 
she intended to marry but who concealed his marriage from her, and she 
has never informed her family of the truth—they continue to believe that 
her marriage failed. Perhaps this experience makes her more skeptical of 
her father’s complacency—and yet even she remains a believer who prays 
on her knees and reads her bible every day. how to account for someone 
like Jack without seeing at least the likelihood of double predestination? 
rowan Williams’s claim that in Jack, “we see something absolutely vital 
to human integrity, the knowledge that i do not coincide with myself, that 
who and what i am is significantly out of my control,” resonates with such 
a question and implies that Jack might find the doctrine of predestination 
“liberating” could come to accept it, because it declares that “our future is 
radically unknowable to us” (“native Speakers”).
 indeed, when Jack first approaches ames, he wishes to discuss the 
claim that “some people are intentionally and irretrievably consigned to 
perdition” (Gilead 150). The subject, which ames has discussed with many 
troubled souls, exasperates him, in part because “[n]ine-tenths of the time 
when some smart aleck starts in on theological questions he’s only trying to 
put me in a false position” (152). more fundamentally, however, he is impa-
tient with argument because of its inadequacy to match the reality of reli-
gious experience: “[m]y advice is this—don’t look for proofs. Don’t bother 
with them at all. They are never sufficient to the question, and they’re 
always a little impertinent, i think, because they claim for God a place 
within our conceptual grasp” (179). honest doubts, which come from one’s 
own experience and observation, can be respected, as ames shows through 
his appreciation for ludwig Feuerbach, who recognizes “the joyful aspects 
of religion” and “loves the world” (24).18 more often, though, doubts about 
religion are not really one’s own but rather “the mustache and walking 
stick that happen to be the fashion of any particular moment” (179).
 ames’s reflections here resonate with an entire tradition that holds 
Christianity to be not merely a set of beliefs, but a whole way of life, 
which cannot be “questioned” in the same way that one might question 
the logic of an argument. as hungerford points out, ames “does not say 
that arguments [against belief] are wrong, or mistaken, but that they do not 
participate in the religious practice of making experience open upon mean-
 18. indeed, in Absence of Mind, robinson writes: “if i were not myself a religious person, 
but wished to make an account of religion, i believe i would tend toward the Feuerbachian 
view that religion is a projection of humanity’s conceptions of beauty, goodness, power, and 
other valued things, a humanizing of experience by understanding it as structured around 
and mirroring back these values. Then it would resemble art, with which it is strongly as-
sociated” (127).
T h E  u S E S  O F  O RT h O d O x y  •  199
ing. . . . belief here is imagined as a religiously understood reality that is 
simply other to arguments against it” (116). For ames, this is so true that he 
even speaks of “[t]he oddness of the phrase ‘believe in God’” (143)—pre-
sumably, because to use the word “belief” as a potential wedge between 
the reality of God and an individual experience of him (after all, a belief 
can be true or false) is already to falsify, or at least to cheapen, the experi-
ence. Jack suggests that the same imperviousness to argument is true of 
his own unbelief: “i don’t even believe God doesn’t exist, if you see what i 
mean” (220). hungerford is to this extent justified in reading Gilead, despite 
its preoccupation with the content of Calvinist doctrine, as another illus-
tration of the “postmodern belief” that she sees as central to american lit-
erature after 1960. The emphasis here, hungerford proposes, is on belief as 
experience, as what Wittgenstein might call a “form of life,” not on belief as 
meaning: “While scholars of lived religion have sidelined belief as a way 
of understanding religion, robinson insists that belief is in fact something 
one experiences, just as thought is something that one experiences, and 
that the content of belief includes claims about the dignity of persons just 
as surely as it contains claims about God and God’s relation to humanity” 
(116).
 but what about the possibility of sincere inquiry about belief, coming 
from genuinely troubled, even desperate people who do not intend to be 
(even if in effect they often are) “smart alecks”? in Home, Jack’s motive for 
the discussion is suggested when he tells Glory that of all the Christian doc-
trines, “perdition is the one thing that always made sense to me. i mean, 
it has always seemed plausible. On the basis of my experience” (119)—a 
statement that might call into question Williams’s suggestion that belief in 
predestination is necessarily “liberating.” ames, to be sure, cannot discern 
Jack’s motives in asking about predestination, and in the absence of further 
information—and in light of Jack’s history—his suspicion that Jack is sim-
ply baiting him seems a plausible guess. but this does not relieve ames of 
the responsibility of answering, and Jack’s appeal to his personal experi-
ence here resonates with robinson’s own affirmation of the experiential—
perhaps double predestination is precisely the means through which Jack 
might come to believe, if not necessarily (if readers take him at his word 
when he characterizes his own unbelief) to be persuaded of Christianity’s 
truth. intellectually, the upshot of ames’s response is that predestination 
is a great mystery, and that it is presumptuous to judge the authenticity of 
anyone’s religion. both statements may be true, but rhetorically, they have 
the effect of irritably brushing away the question—which is, as Jack him-
self points out, not “a mere word, a mere abstraction” (Gilead 150). as a 
minister’s son, Jack is familiar with the theology that ames professes; the 
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pain of his apostasy is also the pain of discord within the family, and hun-
gerford is quite right to see that the “force of longing in Gilead is for Jack’s 
return to the boughton family, his reconciliation with those people, and that 
place, that formed his coherent moral context” (171). but how is such rec-
onciliation to be achieved, if acquaintance with theology and the example 
of his own family—Jack does not seem particularly ironic when he declares 
to ames, “We all love you, you know . . . you’re all saints” (242)—have 
not sufficed? Jack’s revelations about himself do serve to chasten ames 
for his lapses in charity. however, they do not, it would seem, make any 
room for the efficacy of actual discourse that inquires into the truth of pre-
destination—or, indeed, of any religious matters. if readers take robinson 
and ames at their word when they emphasize the irrefragability of reli-
gious experience, then this would include non-Christian religious experi-
ence as well and thereby frame her entire project within the discourse of the 
“spiritual.”
 a sort of reconciliation between ames and Jack—though not between 
Jack and his father—is achieved in Gilead when Jack reveals that he has, in 
his long absence from home, married Della, an african american woman 
from memphis, and become a father, despite fierce opposition from Della’s 
family. in Home, Glory meets Della and her son when she comes searching 
for Jack, who has recently left, perhaps never to see his father and sister 
again, and the revelation of Jack’s family and of their love for him moves 
Glory to an apparent conviction that Jack has found his redemption: the 
novel’s final sentence is “The lord is wonderful” (325). it is, perhaps, fitting 
that robinson might choose interracial love and marriage as the index of 
whatever goodness Jack might possess, for in both novels, racial justice for 
african americans is presented as the moral necessity that even the most 
upright of white americans often fail to see. in Gilead, ames reflects on his 
grandfather, an associate of John brown, who was militantly against slavery 
and who thought his own son’s pacifism to be a moral failing; this familial 
history is juxtaposed against a fire that destroys the only african american 
church in the town and the eventual departure of african americans from 
Gilead—all despite iowa’s reputation as “the shining star of radicalism” 
(176). in Home, Jack makes his sympathy toward the civil rights protests 
in montgomery clear, even though his father considers them provocations 
to violence (204); and when he tells his father that “colored people” in St. 
louis have been “kind” to him, his father reminds him that “people judge 
you by your associations” and that he “could help [him]self by finding a 
better class of friends” (156, 157). While it would be inaccurate to state that 
Jack marries Della because he believes in racial justice, the marriage is sym-
bolically appropriate because it suggests how far he is willing to offend 
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conventional ideas in pursuit of a moral ideal. (indeed, Della’s family is, if 
anything, more opposed to the marriage than Jack’s—not only because of 
the racial difference but also because Della’s father believes that “all white 
men are atheists, the only difference is that some of them are aware of it” 
[Gilead 220]).
 Jack’s attitude toward race goes a long way to redeem him in the eyes 
of a twenty-first century audience, but it is noteworthy that the degree of 
risk he undergoes in marrying Della is, like the portrayal of ames and Gil-
ead itself, rendered credible primarily through the mere fact of its being 
set in 1956. hungerford has suggested that “the work of both novels is to 
translate racial reconciliation into another mode of familial reconciliation” 
(119), so that “home” comes to serve as a metaphor for the nation’s racial 
history. yet this sense of the necessity for racial reconciliation seems diffi-
cult to reconcile with the atmosphere of nostalgia for home that permeates 
the two novels, with their almost defiant celebration of the provincial and 
their conviction that even so obscure a place as Gilead has, as ames says, 
been the scene of unsung “heroes . . . saints and martyrs” (173). The year 
1956 marks, on the one hand, a significant moment in a progressive his-
torical narrative, when the evil of institutional racism is challenged and its 
end now glimpsed as a real possibility. On the other hand, it also marks the 
impending collapse of the world that has sustained such men as ames—
the world shaped by american mainline Protestantism, in which cultural 
homogeneity and shared values have produced much good, despite their 
tendency to produce complacency as well. in the essay “Puritans and 
Prigs,” robinson states that Puritanism “appears to me to have died early 
in this [that is, the twentieth] century” (150), and that she shares a “gen-
eral sense that we are suffering a radical moral decline which is destroy-
ing the fabric of society, seriously threatening our sense of safety as well as 
of mutual respect and shared interest” (157). like the Updike of The Poor-
house Fair, robinson entertains the possibility that an older, more homoge-
nous america may have been preferable to the contemporary United States, 
despite its evident failures. affirming powerfully Calvin’s call “to embrace 
the whole human race without exception in a single feeling of love” (qtd. in 
“Puritans” 172), and translating this call into the political commitments of 
liberalism, robinson nonetheless fails to give a convincing answer to just 
how it is that a period that has seen the decisive triumph of many liberal 
ideals has also been a period of moral decline and social fragmentation. 
as a result, she runs the risk that some readers will discern in Gilead and 
Home little more than nostalgia, while others will view her religious com-
mitments as subordinate to their usefulness in promoting equality—and to 
this extent, optional, private, and largely therapeutic in nature.
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 in Absence of Mind, robinson mounts a powerful argument against 
Freud’s conviction that “the mind is not to be trusted” (105) in terms that 
echo ames’s defense of the authenticity of religious experience in Gilead. 
She attributes Freud’s errors to an understandable desire to reject not only 
the anti-Semitism that Jews suffered in early twentieth-century vienna but 
all theories of civilization and culture that focused on racial and ethnic dif-
ference: “rereading Freud, i have come to the conclusion that . . . very cen-
tral features of his thought, most notably the murder of the primal father 
with all its consequences, were meant to confute theories of race and nation 
that were becoming increasingly predominant as he wrote. This is not to 
say that he was not persuaded of their truth, only that his deep concern that 
they be maintained as a bulwark against ‘black mud,’ that they should have 
seemed to Jung to have had something like a religious significance for him, 
is entirely understandable” (84). if my argument about robinson is correct, 
then her own relationship to orthodox Christian doctrine and practice has 
a similar character. i do not doubt that robinson is persuaded of the truth 
of Christian doctrine. i do, however, hold that the use she makes of this 
orthodoxy—the affirmation of human equality, of the power and reality 
of the human mind, and of the irreducibly individual nature of authentic 
religious experience—is far more important in her essays and her fiction 
than the question of whether Christian orthodoxy is true. For this reason, 
i see an essential continuity between Housekeeping and her overtly Chris-
tian novels—all are concerned with the authenticity of religious experi-
ence, whether that experience can be described as “Christian” or not. i also 
believe that this helps to account for her dismissive attitude toward Flan-
nery O’Connor, whose orthodoxy is more evident than robinson’s but who 
shares little of robinson’s political liberalism.19
 19. in “a World of beautiful Souls,” an interview with the reformed journal Perspectives, 
robinson casts doubt on whether O’Connor is a Christian writer in any meaningful sense: 
“For some reason it is not conventional for serious fiction to treat religious thought respect-
fully—the influence of Flannery O’Connor has been particularly destructive, i think, though 
she is considered a religious writer and she considered herself one.” robinson is not arguing 
here that people have misread O’Connor, seeing religious mockery where none is evident; 
she is instead insinuating that it is all too likely that O’Connor, whatever her intentions may 
have been, did not in fact treat religious thought with respect. i see in this statement evidence 
that robinson is more complacent than O’Connor about religious matters, and that “respect-
ful treatment” of religion for her means an unwillingness to call into question any religious 
experience by asking whether it is true. because robinson sees as her primary antagonist 
the thought that descends from Darwin, marx, nietzsche, and Freud, all of whom call the 
existence of the human mind into question, i am sympathetic to her position—but i do not 
believe that “experience” is the primary criterion of religious truth, and i believe that holding 
this belief leads robinson into the error of disregarding a writer such as O’Connor, who is 
very much concerned with truth but just as opposed as robinson to this kind of positivism.
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 in their respective uses of Christian orthodoxy, both Gordon and rob-
inson are characteristic novelists of their time. Shaped by religious cultures 
that from the current historical moment seem uniform and dogmatic—the 
pre–vatican ii, working-class milieu of american Catholicism and the civic-
minded and small-town world of mainline american Protestantism—Gor-
don and robinson seek to find ways to valorize what they consider to be 
the best of these cultures, whether aesthetic, ethical, or political, while hold-
ing at arm’s length (or, in Gordon’s case, actually dissenting from) many of 
the specific dogmas that these religious cultures affirm. both seem haunted 
by the consciousness that the world has not turned out as they would have 
liked: as Gordon’s feminist conception of sexual liberation and robinson’s 
deep commitment to political (and especially racial) equality recede as mat-
ters of felt historical conflict, the possibility that certain of their commit-
ments, cut loose from a commitment to the primacy of Christian truth, may 
have actually led to social decline seems to be only grudgingly considered. 
yet their work is valuable precisely because it attests to the deep attractions 
of Christian orthodoxy, its staying power even in a world uncomfortable 
with the proclamation of truth. it may be that until more people are willing 
to embrace truth as truth, the work of such writers will be useful as a rhe-
torical model akin to what Pascal described long ago—to make people see 
that Christianity is desirable, good, and not contrary to reason before they 
can come to be persuaded of its truth.
in 2005, Stanley Fish predicted that religion “would succeed high theory 
and the triumvirate of race, gender, and class as the center of intellectual 
energy in the academy” (“One University”). eight years later, i can tenta-
tively conclude that Fish was on to something. religion has certainly not 
replaced these earlier foci, and its increased presence in the academy has not 
always entailed respect—certainly those who despise it, such as the new 
atheists, have made the bigger splash in the mass media. yet while a grow-
ing number of scholars, including hungerford and John mcClure, have 
focused welcome and generally respectful attention on the connections 
between literature and religion in the post–World War ii period, it is still 
fairly rare for scholars to identify themselves as Christians—and even rarer 
for them to affirm Christian orthodoxy. The default assumption that intel-
lectuals necessarily profess secular commitments has not been noticeably 
shaken.
 Despite all the work that has been done on theories of secularization, 
i am not convinced that it is necessarily harder to believe today than it 
might have been in ages past, even if it is undeniable that political, social, 
and educational structures once did much more to promulgate and even 
to “enforce” Christian belief in the West than they do today. (indeed, i am 
Kierkegaardian enough to suspect that Christian belief is healthier when it 
exists in tension with worldly powers than when it is cosseted and coopted 
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by them.) Updike’s Clarence Wilmot is probably close to the truth when he 
reflects, “Christ risen was no more easily embraced by Paul and his listen-
ers than by modern skeptics. The stumbling blocks have never dissolved. 
The scandal has never lessened” (Beauty 18). While there is a long philo-
sophical tradition that affirms the compatibility of a generalized theism 
with reason—acknowledged today both by the Catechism of the Catholic 
Church and by the formerly atheist but non-Christian philosopher anthony 
Flew—the truly implausible claims of the Christian narrative (above all, 
Jesus’ divinity and salvific death and resurrection) are apprehensible only 
through revelation. One accepts the testimony of the tradition that has 
handed news of these events down and believes in it, or one does not. Or—
what seems to be the most common option today—one cobbles together a 
belief structure and lifestyle from what one likes in the tradition and rejects 
the rest.
 i have focused on the post–World War ii period not just because it 
remains, in many important senses, the time in which we live, but also 
because of its particular rhetorical challenges. Facing a dominant narrative 
of secularization that would claim that the “hard sayings” of Christianity 
are particularly incredible to modern (and postmodern) people, Christian 
writers concerned with orthodoxy have responded to this historical fram-
ing with varied strategies intended to lessen this sense of radical incompat-
ibility with the consensus of human knowledge, to show that belief is and 
always remains possible. There is no denying, however, that such strategies 
can only go so far—especially if i am correct that the difficulty of accepting 
Christianity has less to do with empirical questions (considerable though 
these may be) than with its challenge to self-esteem. as ralph Wood puts it:
[We] must confront the hard truth that the Story here retold is not obvi-
ous but scandalous. it is not the story that we would tell ourselves. Such 
a story would make excuses for our massive crimes and tiny misdemean-
ors. it would justify our many misdeeds, both great and small. it would 
exonerate us from all final blame. it would offer solutions, whether simple 
or complex, that we could ourselves accomplish. above all, it would not 
offend by telling us that we are unable to save ourselves. The Christian 
Story refuses to pursue all of these easier paths. it is indeed an offensive 
and scandalous Story. it does not report what we want to hear, but some-
thing far better—what we ought to hear and thus, at the deepest level, 
what we truly long to learn. (viii)
Such obstacles, i would argue, formidable enough for human beings to 
overcome at any time, are particularly so for most inhabitants of the acad-
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emy today—often, precisely the people who have the greatest belief in the 
value of their own intelligence and the greatest resentment against a larger 
society that refuses to confirm their worth through appropriate remunera-
tion or status.
 There is a considerable irony in the fact that in the last few decades, 
scholars of literature, in part as a reaction to the prestige of the sciences in 
the contemporary university, have frequently professed a version of epis-
temic humility. influenced by the endless deferral of meaning that Jacques 
Derrida took as his keynote, or by the absolute responsibility toward the 
Other that emmanuel levinas enjoined, much recent thought has suggested 
that the pursuit of knowledge often amounts to a morally dubious attempt 
to master others, and that the desire for certainty is totalitarian. Such think-
ing continually emphasizes how little it knows, rarely asserts a proposition 
without profuse reminders of its provisional nature, and adeptly casts a 
disapproving eye at those who have the temerity to assert their claims as 
truth. Though the contradictory nature of such discourse has been exposed 
time and time again—dare one claim that it is “true” that “truth” is so 
harmful?—it has lost none of its appeal.
 Writers with orthodox Christian concerns confront this climate, for a 
narrative that claims to be the truth necessarily offends such a position. 
Perhaps the apparent contrast between O’Connor and robinson is most 
instructive here: O’Connor, who assumes the hostility of her audience 
and assaults her readers with the shocking implications of the Chris-
tian narrative, assumes that her audience will be no less convinced of its 
own “truth” (whether it grounds this truth in science or in uncertainty) 
and will require humiliation, while robinson, professing Christian belief, 
emphasizes the exalted conception of human nature that it affirms (“mar-
guerite” 183–84) against what she sees as a general belittlement of human 
capacities caused by a materialist worldview and abetted by capitalism. 
O’Connor, it might be said, doesn’t think much of human beings’ claims 
for themselves; robinson wishes that human beings would engage in “the 
rigorous imagination of a higher self” (“marguerite”183) and thus confirm 
her own high estimation of them.
 i would attempt to resolve this contrast by arguing not for epistemic 
humility but for Christian humility. i see little evidence that “epistemic 
humility” even exists—one believes what one believes, no matter how 
much one attempts to hold these beliefs at a distance, and the fact that one 
can imagine believing otherwise (the condition that defines Charles Tay-
lor’s “secular age”) in no way implies that one believes less firmly. new-
man’s work on assent and certainty corresponds to the structure of human 
belief as one encounters it; it confirms that all people are believers, if not 
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in Christianity, then in some set of ultimate principles, however much 
they may disavow such belief. Genuine humility has nothing to do with 
a reluctance to profess one’s belief; it has instead to do with how one con-
ducts oneself in the practice of this belief and with whether one admits 
one’s unworthiness. The ironic community that booth envisages, created 
through an invitation for human beings to leave their former selves behind 
is, i would like to believe, sustained through its gratitude for gifts unde-
served and incomparable. in evelyn Waugh’s historical novel Helena (1950), 
St. helena expresses such a sense of gratitude in a prayer to the three magi 
who brought gifts to the Christ child: “you are my especial patrons . . . and 
patrons of all late-comers, of all who have a tedious journey to make to 
the truth, of all who are confused with knowledge and speculation, of all 
who through politeness make themselves partners in guilt, of all who stand 
in danger by reason of their talents” (224). The writers i have discussed in 
this book understand the attractions of such a Christian community, and 
as writers of literary fiction, they write to an audience composed largely 
of just the sort of people with whom helena identifies herself. Though 
O’Connor, Spark, Updike, Percy, Gordon, and robinson differ in the rhe-
torical efficacy of their arguments and in the degree to which they represent 
Christian belief faithfully, their efforts have much to teach about the rhet-
oric of fiction, the use of narrative as argument on behalf of Christianity. 
i venture no prediction as to whether the academy will, as Fish suggests, 
become friendlier toward such efforts—though i hope, ardently, that it will 
prove up to the challenge.
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